SPOUSES AMADEO CUAÑO AND AURORA Y. CUAÑO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, RAMON AREOLA, PEDRO DIONI­CIO, TERESA ERILLA, LUCIA CUDIA, LUCILA …

Amadeo and Aurora Cuaño (“Cuaño spouses”) ask us to reverse a
decision of the Court of Appeals which, affirming the judgment of the trial
court, held that private respondents were tenants of the late Andres Cruz and
accordingly eligible to exercise a right of redemption in respect of the land
they were working on which was sold to petitioner Cuaño spouses.

In 1956, Andres Cruz acquired a parcel of land situated in
Sapang, Jaen, Nueva Ecija with an area of 205,691 square meters, which was then
planted to some 100 mango trees.

In 1958, Andres Cruz took in private respondents to work on his
land. They were assigned specific areas
to work on and cultivate. They planted
more mango trees and cared for them, cultivating the fruit-bearing trees,
fertilizing, smudging and spraying them with insecticides and flower-inducing
chemicals. After deducting twenty-five percent
(25%) of the gross proceeds as reimbursement to Andres Cruz who purchased the
fertilizers, insecticides and chemicals used in the operations of the farm, the
balance of the proceeds of each portion or area of the farm was shared equally
between the private respondents assigned to such area and Andres Cruz.

Andres Cruz died in 1976 and the ownership of the land passed on
to his two (2) daughters, Cecilia Cruz-Mendiola and Carmen Cruz-Dolor. Private respondents, however, continued to
work on the land and the net proceeds of the farm operations continued to be
divided between Andres Cruz’s daughters and private respondents.

On 8 November 1980, the two (2) daughters, without previous
notification to private respondents, executed a contract to sell the land to
the Cuaño spouses, petitioners herein.

Sometime in December 1980, one Major Romy Cruz, apparently a
military officer and with the help of some military personnel, ousted private
respondents from the land. The farm was
fenced in and private respondents were prevented from entering upon and working
on the land. As a result, private
respondents filed a complaint against Major Cruz before the Court of Agrarian
Relations. So far as the record shows,
private respondents were not then yet aware of the contract to sell the
property to the Cuaño spouses; in any case, only the two (2) daughters of
Andres Cruz were impleaded with Major Cruz in that suit.

On 19 June 1981, Cecilia and Carmen, the two (2) daughters of
Andres Cruz, consummated the sale of the land to the Cuaño spouses for a total
stated consideration of P787,500.00, again without the knowledge of private
respondents.

Four (4) days later, on 23 June 1981, the Cuaño spouses obtained
a loan of P1,500,000.00 and, to secure that loan, constituted a mortgage on the
land in favor of the lender, First Summa Savings and Mortgage Bank, now known
as PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank (“PAIC”).

The next day, on 24 June 1981, the deed of sale in favor of the
Cuaño spouses, was registered. On that
same day, Transfer Certificates of Title covering the five (5) lots into which
the original 20.5691 hectares had been divided, were issued in the name of
petitioner Cuaño spouses.

On 6 November 1981, private respondents commenced suit against
the Cuaño spouses claiming that, as tenants or agricultural lessees, they were
entitled to redeem the land pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844 (known as
The Agricultural Land Reform Code) as amended by R.A. No. 6389, which reads as
follows:

“Sec. 12. Lessee’s Right
of Redemption. In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided, That
where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to
said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by
him. The right of redemption under this
section may be exercised within one hundred and eighty days from notice in
writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the
Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have
priority over any other right of redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the
time of the sale.

Upon the filing of the corresponding petition or request with the
department or corresponding case in court by the agricultural lessee or
lessees, the said period of one hundred and eighty days shall cease to run.

Any petition or request for redemption shall be resolved within
sixty days from the filing thereof; otherwise, the said period shall start to
run again.

The Department of Agrarian Reform shall initiate, while the Land
Bank shall finance said redemption as in the case of pre-emption.”

The Land Bank of the Philippines (“Land Bank”) was impleaded as a
party-defendant in order to require it to finance the redemption demanded by
private respondents. PAIC, as mortgagee
of the landholding under litigation, intervened in the suit and participated in
the trial thereof.

In due time, the trial court rendered a judgment, dated 5 July
1989, in favor of private respondents. The dispositive portion of this judgment reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1.  Declaring that plaintiffs are entitled to
redeem, and ordering Defendants spouses Amado Cuaño and Aurora Cuaño to allow
plaintiffs to redeem the landholding in question within 180 days from finality
of this decision at the price of P787,500 free from the mortgage in favor of defendant
PAIC Savings Bank, plus interest thereon at the legal rate counted from the
time all the plaintiffs shall have been fully reinstated and/or restored to the
possession of the respective areas assigned to them by the late Andres Cruz,
until said price shall have been fully paid.

2.  Ordering defendants spouses Cuaño and all
persons claiming under them to vacate the landholding in question and to
surrender the same to the plaintiffs as their share tenants;

3.  Declaring that defendant PAIC Savings and Mortgage
Bank has preferential right as against defendants Cuaño Spouses in and to the
proceeds of the redemption of the landholding to the extent of the latter’s
mortgage obligation to it, and authorizing defendant PAIC Savings and Mortgage
Bank to collect said proceeds and apply the same against said mortgage
obligation;

4.  Ordering defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines to finance the redemption by the plaintiffs of the landholding in
question in accordance with paragraph 1, above, subject to the provisions of
R.A. 3844, as amended, and compliance with all legal requirements;

5.  Ordering defendants Cuaño Spouses to execute a
Financing Agreement for Agrarian Redemption by way of conveyance of the
landholding in question and to deliver to defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines the duly approved subdivision/segregation survey plan of the
landholding, when required by the latter;

6.  Ordering plaintiffs to execute an undertaking
to amortize to defendant Land Bank of the Philippines the total amount the latter
shall have paid to defendants Amadeo Cuaño and Aurora Cuaño under the terms and
conditions of defendant Land Bank of
the Philippines, when required by the latter;

7.  If, for any reason, the redemption is not, or
cannot be, effected, ordering defendants Amadeo Cuaño and Aurora Cuaño to
deliver to plaintiffs their respective shares in the harvests for three years,
computed on the basis of their last liquidation for one year;

8.  Ordering
Defendants, except Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

On appeal by the Cuaño spouses, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court in its entirety.^[2]

In the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, the
principal contentions of the Cuaño spouses are the following:

Firstly, the original landowner, Andres Cruz, never gave his
consent to the tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship, since the
alleged tenants or lessees had been hired merely as paid laborers by an
overseer of the landowner; secondly, the element of personal cultivation by the
tenants or agricultural lessees was absent, considering that the alleged
tenants or agricultural lessees had availed themselves of the services of paid
laborers to carry out some farm operations; thirdly, the annotation in the Transfer
Certificates of Title issued in the name of petitioner spouses that the land
was not tenanted, was conclusive proof that no tenancy or agricultural
leasehold relationship existed in respect of such land.

PAIC too came to us on its own Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106618). PAIC’s Petition was dismissed by the Court
on 23 September 1992 for failure to comply with the requirements of applicable
court circulars. Thereafter, PAIC filed
an Omnibus Motion^[3]
in the present Petition (G.R. No. 107159) praying that it be allowed to
intervene in these proceedings. In this
Omnibus Motion, PAIC reiterated the argument it had made before the Court of
Appeals that the right of redemption of tenants or agricultural lessees under
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, cannot be held to invalidate the rights of a
mortgagee provided for in the Civil Code.

The above issues, including that proffered by PAIC, are addressed
below.

As a preliminary point, we note that the landholding in dispute
is a mango plantation. We consider that
— and there appears no dispute on this point — this plantation is covered by
the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Section 166 (1) of which defines
agricultural land as

“land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle lands, and
abandoned lands as defined in pars. 18 and 19 of this section, respectively.”
(Emphasis supplied)

It is worth noting also that R.A. No.
1199, the earlier statute known as “The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines,” effective 30 August 1954, although it did not expressly define
agricultural land; did not limit its scope to rice land; to the
contrary, Chapter III, Section 41 of the statute, among other provisions, expressly
recognized share tenancy in respect of crops other than rice.^[4]

At the time the relationship between Andres Cruz and private
respondents began in 1958, the applicable statute, R.A. No. 1199, defined
“share tenancy” and “tenant” in the following terms:

“Section 4. Systems of
Agricultural Tenancy; Their Definitions. — Agricultural tenancy is classified into leasehold tenancy and share
tenancy.

Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land
and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions.

Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate
farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land
susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household belonging to or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 2263, approved
June 19, 1959.)

Section 5. Definition of
Terms. — As used in this Act:

(a)  A tenant shall mean a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates
the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

x x x                                                              x x x                                                                 x
x x.”

During the lifetime of Andres Cruz, R.A. No. 3844 (approved on 8
August 1963) went into effect. Section
166 of R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389 (approved on 10 September
1971) defined “agricultural lessee” in the following manner:

“Sec. 166. Definition of
Terms. — x x x

(2) ‘Agricultural
lessee’ means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within
his immediate farm household, cultivates, the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, for a price
certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

x x x                                                              x x x                                                                 x
x x”

It is apparent from the foregoing that a “share tenant” and an
“agricultural lessee” are defined in very similar terms and that a share
tenancy and an agricultural lease relationship have the following common
requisite elements:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship
is agricultural land;

(3) There is consent between the parties
to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.^[5]

In respect of the element of consent, petitioner Cuaño spouses
contend that that element was absent in the case at bar because private
respondents, alleged tenants or agricultural lessees, had merely been hired by
an overseer, one Evaristo Erilla, without the authority of Andres Cruz or his
successors-in-interest, his two (2) daughters Carmen and Cecilia.

It appears from the record that Evaristo Erilla had acted as
overseer of the land and the farm operations therein, both during the lifetime
of Andres Cruz and after his death when his two (2) daughters succeeded to the
ownership of the land.^[6]
Considering that private respondents had worked on the land since 1958, we find
it very difficult to suppose that the original landowner Andres Cruz had been
unaware all along of the presence and the activities, or of the status, of
private respondents in his mango plantation. From 1958 up to the time of his death in 1976, Andres Cruz had been
receiving his annual share in the harvest or the net proceeds of the harvest
from his mango plantation. Similarly,
from 1976 up to 1981, during the time that Carmen and Cecilia were owners of
the land, they received their respective shares of the net proceeds of the farm
operations. Moreover, considering the
size of the landholding, 20.5691 hectares, both Andres Cruz and his two (2) daughters
must have known that the overseer Evaristo Erilla could not have cultivated and
cared for the mango plantation and produced the net harvest therefrom personally
and single-handedly. By 1980,
there were at least 600 mango trees in the plantation.^[7]
It is thus clear to the Court that the landowners cannot reasonably claim
ignorance about the presence of private respondents in the mango
plantation. For more than twenty (20)
years, Andres Cruz and later his two (2) daughters had not objected to the presence
and the agricultural role or activities of private respondents in respect of
the mango plantation. Consent to that
relationship with private respondents must be imputed to Andres Cruz and his
two (2) daughters.

It was, of course, incumbent upon petitioner spouses to prove
their defense that the overseer had acted without the knowledge and authority
of Andres Cruz, and later of his two (2) daughters, with proof more substantial
than the bare allegations of petitioner spouses. No such proof was adduced by them.

We must, therefore, conclude at this point that the overseer
Evaristo Erilla had hired or retained private respondents as tenants and later
as agricultural lessees with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
landholder(s). We consider that this
knowledge and acquiescence on the part of the landholders validated the
relationship created (hypothetically) by the overseer and private
respondents. For this reason, Evaristo
Erilla is properly considered as an agent of the landowner(s) who acted
as such with at least implied or apparent authority and whose principal(s) were
accordingly bound to private respondents.

In other words, Erilla as an agent of the landowner(s) was
not an independent personality who could provide insulation for the
landowners from their legal obligations to private respondents as tenants or
agricultural lessees. To hold that the
landowner(s) did not give their consent because private respondents had been
hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the landowner(s) with
too easy an escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple
expedient of hiring an employee or overseer to stand between the landowner(s)
and the tenants or agricultural lessees. To sustain this particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the
force and effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, well-nigh to the vanishing
point.

Petitioners also contend that the element of “personal
cultivation” on the part of private respondents was absent. It is asserted that private respondents did
not “cultivate” the portions of the landholding which had been assigned to
them, that private respondents had been hired simply to carry out particular
jobs such as the “smudging” or “smoking” of the mango trees. The Court of Appeals, however, found that private
respondents had carried out all phases of farm operations leading to the
production of mangoes, from the first stage of clearing the land and there
planting the mango seedlings and then tending the trees, weeding and watering
them, fertilizing the ground, etc., until they bore fruit, including other
tasks essential to induce the trees to bring forth more bountiful harvest such
as smudging or smoking the trees and applying fertilizers and chemical
flower-inducers.^[8]
It is useful to note in this connection that the concept of “cultivation” is
not limited to the plowing or harrowing of the soil as in rice and corn
fields. Cultivation includes all
activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and
husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more
products or fruits. Such is the gist of
our case law in respect of coconut plantations,^[9]
case law that we consider equally applicable to mango plantations.

Petitioner spouses also aver that such cultivation as was done by
private respondent tenants or lessees was not “personal” in character,
considering that private respondents had availed themselves of the services of
farm laborers hired by the overseer. Under the statutory definition of an agricultural lessee quoted earlier,
an agricultural lessee is a person “who by himself, or with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household” cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by another.^[10]
The fact, however, that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may have been
assisted by farm laborers, on an occasional or temporary basis, hired by the
landowners, does not preclude the element of “personal cultivation” essential
in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. In De Guzman v. Santos,^[11]
the mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work himself but
temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the services of others to assist
him, was not taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement
imposed by the statute. We do not consider
that the statute prohibits the tenant or agricultural lessee who generally
works the land himself or with the aid of members of his immediate
household, from availing occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in
specific jobs.^[12]

We agree, therefore, with the Court of Appeals that all the
above-noted elements of a share tenancy and an agricultural lease relationship
existed between the landowner(s) and private respondents and that accordingly,
private respondents were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of Andres
Cruz, and later of his two (2) daughters and ultimately of petitioners Cuaño
spouses.

Petitioner Cuaño spouses also contend that the annotation in the
Transfer Certificates of Title standing in their names and covering the totality
of the land originally owned by Andres Cruz that said land is not tenanted, is
conclusive as to the absence of a tenancy (or of an agricultural leasehold)
relationship between the landowner(s) and private respondents. There are five (5) Transfer Certificates of
Title standing in the name of the Cuaño spouses and each Certificate of Title
contains the following annotation:

“Entry No. 3274-NT-170808:

Certification: Eugenio B. Bernardo, MAR OIC

Certifies that the property described in this Title is not tenanted.

Date of Instr.: June 8, 1981.

Date of Inscript.: June 24, 1981 at 1:15 p.m.”^[13]

The issue thus posed is whether or not
such annotation was conclusive upon the trial court, the Court of Appeals and
this Court, insofar as the characterization of the relationship between the
registered owners of the land and private respondents is concerned.

We believe and so hold that such annotation cannot be regarded as
conclusive upon the courts of justice as to the legal nature and incidents of
the relationship between the landowner(s) in this case and private
respondents. Firstly, the annotation
serves basically as notice to all persons of the existence of the
Certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo, but neither adds to the
validity or correctness of that certification nor converts a defective and
invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties.^[14]
Secondly, the certification issued by Mr. Eugenio Bernardo of the MAR (Ministry
of Agrarian Reform) is very much like the certifications issued by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform and other officials of the Ministry and later the Department
of Agrarian Reform concerning the existence of tenancy relationships in respect
of agricultural lands from which persons, who claim to be tenants, are sought
to be ejected.^[15]
It is well-settled that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given
locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties is merely preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon
the courts. Thus, in Puertollano, et
al. v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,^[16]
this Court held that:

“From the foregoing provisions of the law [Section 2 P.D. No. 316
and Section 2 of P.D. No. 1038], it is clear that the trial court cannot take
cognizance of any ‘ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or
remove a tenant in an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn’
without first referring the same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his
authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of
the relationship between the contending parties. If said officer finds that the case is proper for determination
by the court it shall so certify and thence said court may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute or controversy. Such
preliminary determination of the relationship however, is not binding upon the
court. Said court may after due hearing
confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and
substantial merit of the case may warrant.”^[17]
(Emphases supplied)

Thirdly, a certificate of title is, in
general, conclusive evidence only of the ownership of the land described
therein and as to the matters which were actually contested and determined, or
could have litigated and decided, in the land registration proceeding.^[18]
A land registration court cannot adjudicate the existence or non-existence of a
tenancy relationship since exclusive jurisdiction over such relationship was
vested in the Court of Agrarian Relations^[19]
and later in the Regional Trial Court.^[20]

We turn, finally, to the right to redeem the land here
involved. In view of our conclusion
that private respondents were share tenants and later agricultural lessees of
the owner(s) of that land, it follows that private respondents were entitled to
redeem the land upon the alienation thereof by the two (2) daughters of Andres
Cruz in favor of petitioner Cuaño spouses. This right of redemption is statutory in character, that is to say, it
is created by and rests upon the provisions of a particular law. It attaches to a particular landholding by
operation of law. In Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo,^[21]
the Court stressed that:

“x x x [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law,
between the landowner and the farmer- be a leasehold tenant or temporarily a
share tenant- a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such
as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant’s right to continue in
possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the
sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the
farmer’s pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under section 11
of the Code, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third
person without his knowledge, under section 12 of this Code.”^[22]
(Emphases supplied)

While conceding that the law grants priority to the tenant’s
right of redemption, PAIC contends vigorously that this priority extends only
in respect of other rights of redemption and not in respect of specific lien of
a voluntary mortgage. The claim of PAIC
is that its mortgage lien subsists and attaches to the tenanted land even after
it has been redeemed by the tenants and that, consequently, PAIC would then
still be entitled to foreclose its mortgage lien over the property here
involved.

PAIC’s argument does not persuade.

As discussed earlier, the land was, in the hands of the two (2)
daughters of Andres Cruz and of petitioner Cuaño spouses, already subject to
the right of redemption vested in private respondents. It follows that when the Cuaño spouses
mortgaged that same land to secure a loan obtained from PAIC, PAIC’s right as
mortgagee was subject to, and junior to, the prior right of private respondents
to redeem the said property. Put a
little differently, what the Cuaño spouses mortgaged to PAIC was not absolute
or unqualified dominium plenum over the land, but rather a right of
ownership qualified by and subject to the right of redemption of private
respondents. PAIC, of course, could not
have acquired rights superior to those of its mortgagors.

PAIC asserts that it became mortgagee of the land in good faith,
that it had relied on the annotation in the Transfer Certificates of Title of
the Cuaño spouses referring to the certification of Mr. Eugenio Bernardo that
the property was not tenanted. We
consider that a mortgagee is not entitled to place absolute reliance upon Mr.
Bernardo’s certification which, as already noted, cannot prevent a court from
reaching a different conclusion. The
record indicates, in this connection, that the Cuaño spouses obtained their
loan from PAIC one day before the Certificates of Title were issued in the name
of Cuaño spouses.^[23]
As pointed out earlier, litigation had by then broken out between private
respondents and the two (2) daughters of Andres Cruz together with Major
Cruz. PAIC has not demonstrated that,
with even a modest degree of diligence on its part as a prospective mortgagee,
it could not have acquired actual notice of such litigation.

It is especially noteworthy that although the Cuaño spouses
purchased from Cecilia and Carmen, the two (2) daughters of Andres Cruz, the
land in question for the price of P787,500.00, four (4) days later, the Cuaño
spouses mortgaged the same piece of land to secure a loan of P1.5 Million from
PAIC Bank.^[24]
Since the stated purchase price of P787,500.00 paid by the Cuaño spouses to
their vendors may be assumed to be the true and complete consideration for the
land, it is difficult to understand how PAIC could, four (4) days later,
conformably with good banking practice, have ascribed to the same land the
loanable value of P1.5 Million. It is
also difficult to assume that the fair and reasonable value of the land would
have doubled within a four (4) day period; the record offers no explanation for
such an extraordinary leap in value.

We consider that, at all events, PAIC’s right of recourse,
insofar as its mortgage loan is concerned, is not against the land itself nor
against private respondents, but rather against its mortgagors, the petitioner
Cuaño spouses.

Finally, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 12 of
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, which specifies that the “redemption price” shall be
the “reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale,” we agree that the
valuation placed by the Cuaño spouses themselves when they paid P787,500.00 for
the land, must be taken to be the reasonable price of the land purchased by
them.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari, and the Omnibus Motion filed by PAIC in this case, are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, and Vitug,
JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., on leave.

^[1]
Trial Court Decision, pp. 9-10; Records, pp. 411-412.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 24-42.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 69.

^[4]
See, e.g., Section 5 (c), R.A. No. 1199, as amended, where reference is made to
“coconut, citrus, coffee, ramie and other crops”; and Section 5 (i), id.–,
where “harvesting” is defined to mean “the gathering of the fruits or the
produce of a crop other than rice.” See also Mendoza vs. Manguiat,
96 Phil 309 (1954); De los Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574 (1969);
Tongson vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 426 (1992).

^[5]
Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 529 (1992); Prudential Bank vs.
Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159 (1990); Zamoras vs. Su, 184 SCRA 248 (1990);
Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 383 (1989).

^[6]
Trial Court Decision, p. 3; Records, p. 405.

^[7]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 83.

^[8]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 90.

^[9]
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136 (1986); Coconut Cooperative
Marketing Association (COCOMA) vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 568
(1988); Hernandez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 758 (1990).

^[10]
Section 166 (2), R.A. No. 3844, as amended.

^[11]
6 SCRA 795 (1962).

^[12]
Carag vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 44 [1987].

^[13]
Records, pp. 123, 125, 127, 129 and 131.

^[14]
Section 51 of Act No. 496 provides:

“Sec. 51. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land which
would under existing laws, if recorded, filed, or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates shall, if
registered, filed, or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds in
the province or city where the real estate to which such instruments relates, be
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or
entering.” (Underscoring supplied)

Section 51 above is substantially
reproduced in Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529, “The Property Registration Decree”
effective 11 June 1978. See also Seton v.
Rodriguez, 110 Phil. 548 (1960); and Gurbax Singh Pabla and Co. v.
Reyes, 92 Phil. 177 (1952).

^[15]
See e.g., Section 2, P.D. No. 316, effective 22 October 1973; Section 12, P.D.
No. 946, effective 17 June 1976.

^[16]
156 SCRA 188 (1987).

^[17]
156 SCRA at 193. The above ruling was
reiterated in Graza, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 163
SCRA 39 (1988); Dela Cruz v. Bautista, 186 SCRA 517 (1990); and Qua
v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 236 (1991). It may also be noted that Section 106 of P.D. No. 1529 requires
only an affidavit of the vendor or executor of “private agricultural
land principally devoted to rice or corn” stating “that the land involved is
not tenanted, or if tenanted, the same is not primarily devoted to production
of rice and/or corn.” Such affidavit can scarcely be considered as
birding upon the courts in any subsequent litigation involving the juridical
nature of the relationship between the landowner and persons claiming to be
tenants of the land.

^[18]
Dizon v. Banues, 104 Phil. 407 (1958); Lapore v. Pascual, 107
Phil. 695 (1960).

^[19]
Sec. 154, R.A. No. 3844, as amended; Sec. 12, P.D. No. 946; Ferrer vs.
Villamor, 60 SCRA 106 (1974).

^[20]
Section 19(7) in relation to Section 44, B.P. Blg. 129.

^[21]
33 SCRA 105, [1970].

^[22]
Id., pp. 112-113.

^[23]
Trial Court Decision, p. 7; Records, p. 409.

^[24]
Id., p. 3; Records, p. 405.