🎧 Case Brief Lecture

HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED BY PURITA OLIVER AND PEDRO REMOQUILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE SERADILLA, AND NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESP…

G.R. No. 107069. July 21, 1994 July 21, 1994

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Heirs of Leandro Oliver versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Heirs of Leandro Oliver, represented by Purita Oliver and Pedro Remoquillo, against the Court of Appeals, Jose Seradilla, and the National Housing Authority. The petitioners sought to annul two administrative patents, and the transfer certificates of title issued on the strength of them, covering Lots 26 and 30 of the Tunasan Homesite in San Pedro, Laguna, which the National Housing Authority had sold to Jose Seradilla. The case matters because it fixes the consequences of a partition agreement executed inside the five-year restriction against transfer of public land, and because it reminds the reviewee that questions of fact are not the business of a petition for review on certiorari.

Procedural History

On the fourth of June 1982, the petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of title with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch Twenty-Five. They asserted preferential rights over the lots as heirs and as vendees of Leandro Oliver. On the sixteenth of February 1990, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the complaint, upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Jose Seradilla, and directing the plaintiffs or their assigns to vacate and surrender possession of the lots. The trial court dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, and so they came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

In August 1939, the Republic of the Philippines acquired the whole of the Tunasan Homesite from Colegio de San Jose. In that same year, a resurvey was conducted, and the vacant lot adjoining the Landayan Creek was designated as Lot 24. On the twenty-first of July 1955, the government, through the Director of Lands, executed an Agreement to Sell with Patricia Seradilla, covering several parcels, among them Lots 22, 23, 25 and 26 of Block 87. During these times, Leandro Oliver, brother of Patricia Seradilla and uncle of Jose Seradilla, was said to have been occupying Lot 24. Patricia Seradilla died on the fifteenth of September 1955.

On the sixth of November 1959, the heirs of Patricia Seradilla, namely Soledad, Paz, Esperanza and Pilar, all surnamed Seradilla, but without the participation of Jose Seradilla, entered into an agreement with their uncle Leandro Oliver, consolidating his Lot 24 with the lots left by the decedent and dividing the same equally among them. A sketch representing the agreed partition was signed on the ninth of July 1961 by all the heirs, including Jose Seradilla and Leandro Oliver. Pursuant to that agreement, Leandro Oliver vacated Lot 24 and occupied a portion of Lot 22, which was later designated as new Lot 26 and subdivided into Lots 26 and 30. On the nineteenth of September 1961, Leandro Oliver sold one-half portion of Lot 26 to Pedro Remoquillo for 500 pesos.

On the thirtieth of June 1963, Jose Seradilla urged his co-heirs to execute a new sketch excluding Leandro Oliver from the partition, and on the fifth of July 1963 the heirs executed an Agreement of Partition revoking the 1959 agreement. On the sixteenth of January 1980, on the basis of Jose Seradilla's representation that Lots 26 and 30 were included in the partition, the National Housing Authority sold those lots to him, and transfer certificates of title were issued in his name on the twenty-fifth of January 1980.

Issues

  • Whether or not a bilateral contract is void from the beginning merely because only four of the five heirs participated in it, representing their side.
  • Whether or not a bilateral contract may be superseded by a subsequent unilateral agreement executed by all five heirs but without the participation of the other party.
  • Whether or not the five-year restriction against transfer in an administrative patent was counted correctly, and what its effect is on the 1959 agreement.
  • Whether or not the personal disqualification of Jose Seradilla as patentee, and the alleged lack of basis for the grant of the patent, invalidate the titles.

Applicable Provisions

Section 118 of Commonwealth Act Number 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act Number 496, provides the five-year prohibition against transfer, and it is the provision the Court uses to strike down the 1959 agreement:

The Applicant shall not sell, assign, encumber, mortgage, transfer, or in any other manner affect his rights under this contract or in the property subject hereof without first obtaining the written consent of the Administration and this condition shall subsist until the lapse of five (5) years from the date of the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor and shall be annotated as an encumbrance on the certificate of title of the property that may be issued in his favor.

Paragraph 7 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code supplies the consequence of the violation:

Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

That paragraph makes the prohibited contract inexistent and void from the beginning, and therefore incapable of ratification.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition can succeed only by a showing that the Consolidation and Partition Agreement of the sixth of November 1959 is valid, and it upheld the Court of Appeals in ruling that the agreement is void because it was made within the five-year period prohibiting the sale, assignment, encumbrance, mortgage, or transfer of land acquired under free patent or homestead. The prohibition is expressly recited in the Agreement to Sell of the twenty-first of July 1955, and the agreement is binding upon the heirs of the parties. Because the agreement contravened the statutory prohibition, it is null and void under paragraph 7 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

On the second issue, the Court held that the reliance of the petitioners on the sketch of the ninth of July 1961, allegedly confirming the void agreement, is hardly of any moment, because void contracts cannot be ratified. It followed that the Agreement of Partition of the fifth of July 1963, revoking the void agreement, cannot be faulted.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the claim that Lots 26 and 30 were not among the properties left by the decedent, adopting the observation of the Court of Appeals that the omission to mention them specifically is more apparent than real, since they were the subdivided lots of new Lot 26, which was formerly Lot 22, and Lot 22 was among the lots awarded to Patricia Seradilla under the Contract to Sell of 1955.

On the fourth issue, the Court rejected the claim of disqualification. The trial court found that Leandro Oliver failed to file the requisite application over either lot; that the lots were awarded to Patricia Seradilla under the Agreement to Sell with its restrictive conditions; and that Leandro Oliver died on the twenty-third of December 1976, thirteen years after he had learned of the revocation of the original agreement, yet chose to remain silent, so that he must suffer the ultimate effects of laches. The Court added that the petitioners were grasping at questions of fact, and that jurisprudence forbids the entertainment of questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, a rule that applies with greater force where the facts were established in administrative proceedings and confirmed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Doctrine

A contract of partition or consolidation executed within the five-year period prohibiting the sale, assignment, encumbrance, mortgage, or transfer of land acquired under free patent or homestead is void from the beginning under paragraph 7 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it is expressly prohibited by law. Being void, it cannot be ratified, and a later agreement revoking it is entirely proper. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law; questions of fact established in administrative proceedings and confirmed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals will not be entertained.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of any showing of reversible error, with costs against the petitioners, and the titles of Jose Seradilla were left undisturbed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a void contract cannot be ratified, so a partition made inside the five-year homestead restriction is void from the beginning and the later revocation stands. Examiners use this case to test the five-year prohibition on public land patents and the rule that Rule 45 admits only questions of law.