ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DANILO RUPISAN, RESPONDENTS.

TODAY employment is no longer just an ordinary human
activity. For most families the main
source of their livelihood, employment has now leveled off with property rights
which no one may be deprived of without due process of law.

Termination of employment is not anymore a mere cessation or
severance of contractual relationship but an economic phenomenon affecting
members of the family. This explains
why under the broad principles of social justice the dismissal of employees is
adequately protected by the laws of the state. Hence, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Sec. 33, R.A. 6715, provides –

Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under
Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement
of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he
so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination
pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the appropriate official of the
Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the
termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass
lay-off.

Rule XIV, Book V, of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code outlines the procedure for
termination of employment –

Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. –
No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by
law and after due process.

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. – Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omissions constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at
the worker’s last known address.

x x x x

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. – The worker may answer the
allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable
period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representatives, if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. – The employer shall immediately notify
a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal.
– Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.

x x x x

Sec. 11. Report on dismissal. – The
employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work all dismissals effected by him during the
month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their
dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the
positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by
the Ministry (Department) for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

We declared in Salaw v. NLRC^[1] –

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful
dismissal of an employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid
or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-284, New Labor
Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due process – notice and hearing –
must also be observed before an employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
concurrence, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal (San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78277, May 12, 1989,
173 SCRA 314).

The inviolability of notice and hearing for a valid dismissal of an
employee can not be overemphasized. Those twin requirements constitute essential elements of due process in
cases of employee dismissal. The
requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the
employer’s intent to dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on
the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee the opportunity
to answer his employer’s charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither one of these two requirements can be dispensed with without running
afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution (Century Textile
Mills, et al. v. NLRC, et al., No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 528).

On 27 June 1987,
petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc. (ALHAMBRA for brevity), a Filipino cigar
and cigarette manufacturing and distribution company, employed private
respondent Danilo C. Rupisan as salesman on a six-month probationary
basis. From 9-12 December 1989,
ALHAMBRA conducted a surprise audit of the records of Rupisan. He was then called to the Head Office on 3
January 1990 where alleged violations of company rules purportedly committed by
him were brought to his attention. On 8
January 1990, Rupisan was placed under a one-month preventive suspension for
serious violations of company policies, rules and regulations, as reflected in
the results of the surprise audit.

On 22 January 1990, Rupisan protested his suspension, reiterating
vehement denial of the charges against him and exposing the threat of
termination at their meeting of 3 January 1990. He alleges that as of 30 December 1989 the charges against him
had become academic when he was given a clearance of all his accountabilities.

On 6 February 1990, a day before the end of his suspension,
ALHAMBRA wrote Rupisan terminating his services effective 8 February 1990.

On 23 March 1990, Rupisan sued ALHAMBRA for illegal dismissal and
unpaid wages or commissions. The suit
was later amended on 24 April 1990 to include charges of illegal suspension and
damages.

After trial, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., found that the
termination of Rupisan was for a just cause.^[2]
However, he also ruled that there was a violation of Rupisan’s right to due
process, particularly the failure of ALHAMBRA to furnish him copy of the audit
report on which his dismissal was based. Consequently, judgment was rendered directing ALHAMBRA to pay Rupisan
P23,040.00 in backwages covering the period 8 February to 19 November 1990,
P600.00 in unpaid salary from 1-7 January 1990, P2,650.00 for separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement, and commissions for the sales generated in the months of
November and December 1989.

Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission which on 29 May 1992 affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s findings of lack
of due process but added that since Rupisan could have explained fully the
charges against him had he been given the chance to do so, his reinstatement
was instead ordered in lieu of separation pay.

In this extraordinary recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, ALHAMBRA seeks a declaration that Rupisan was validly dismissed and, in
any case, he should no longer be reinstated but paid separation pay
instead. In his comment, Rupisan also
seeks payment of separation pay and no longer reinstatement.

The crux of the controversy is whether respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that Rupisan was
illegally dismissed but directing at the same time his reinstatement for the
reason that he could have explained the charges had he been given the
opportunity to be heard. NLRC however
appears to have skirted the issue on the existence of a just cause for
dismissal and disposed of the case only on the basis of absence of due process.

The error is consequential. A termination without just cause entitles a worker to reinstatement
regardless of whether he was accorded due process. On the other hand, termination of a worker for cause, even
without procedural due process, does not warrant reinstatement, but the
employer incurs liability for damages.

Since the Labor Arbiter found a valid ground for dismissal,
taking into consideration the controverting evidence of the parties, which
finding was not set aside by NLRC, the
latter was in grave error when it directed reinstatement. Where, on the basis of the evidence of the
opposing parties the validity of the dismissal is determinable at the level of
the Labor Arbiter, the latter should resolve that issue. And if the Labor Arbiter finds just cause in
the termination, reinstatement would no longer serve any purpose. After all, a finding by the Labor Arbiter as
to the validity of the ground for dismissal is much more impartial and
trustworthy than a determination by the employer who assumes the role of
accuser and judge at the same time.

To order reinstatement and compel the parties to start the
procedure from step one would be circuitous because almost invariably that same
issue of validity of the ground of dismissal would be brought back to the Labor
Arbiter for adjudication. To avoid this
runabout process, we laid down in Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC^[3]
that an otherwise justly grounded termination without procedural due process
would only sanction payment of damages –

The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of
a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws (BLTB Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 470). The standards of due process in judicial as
well as administrative proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law
simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered (Lopez v. Director of Lands,
47 Phil. 23) x x x x

However, it is a matter of fact that when the private respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner he was afforded the right to an
investigation by the labor arbiter. He
presented his position paper as did the petitioner x x x x The labor arbiter concluded that the dismissal of private
respondent was for just cause x x x x The Court is bound by this finding of the
labor arbiter x x x x

By the same token, the conclusion of the public respondent NLRC on
appeal that private respondent was not afforded due process before he was
dismissed is binding on this Court. Indeed, it is well taken and supported by the records. However, it cannot justify a ruling that
private respondent should be reinstated with backwages as the public respondent
NLRC so decreed. Although belatedly,
private respondent was afforded due process before the labor arbiter wherein
the just cause of his dismissal had been established. With such finding, it would be arbitrary and unfair to order his
reinstatement with backwages.

The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to
the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment of his
wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement x x x when it appears he was not
afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and
authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be reexamined. It
will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him
the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that
warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not
undesirable, remains in the service x x x
x

However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for
failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before
causing his dismissal. The rule is
explicit as above described. The
dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due
process (Section 1, Rule XIV, Implementing Regulations of the Labor
Code). Petitioner committed an
infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal
notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing
petitioner from the employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the
private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the
gravity of the omission committed by the employer.

In the case at bench, the decision to dismiss Rupisan did not
state the reason for his termination, in disregard of Sec. 6, Rule XIV, Book V,
of the Omnibus Rules. But, having been found guilty of
serious misconduct,^[4]
private respondent cannot demand reinstatement nor separation pay. However, he is entitled to damages for
petitioner’s non-observance of procedural due process which is not only
required by statute but enshrined in the Constitution. For this purpose, the amount of P10,000.00
is considered fair, reasonable and realistic.^[5]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of NLRC dated 29 May 1992 is SET ASIDE. The decision of Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., dated 19
November 1990 is REINSTATED except
as to the award of separation pay which is deleted. In addition, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent
Danilo Rupisan P10,000.00 for having been denied procedural due process.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
G.R. No. 90786, 27 September 1991, 202 SCRA 7, 12.

^[2]
The Labor Arbiter explained: ‘Complainant x x x admitted that (Alhambra) conducted an audit for his
accountabilities x x x but what (Rupisan) is insisting is that he was not
furnis(ed) a copy of this audit report and denies having committed the
irregularities imputed to have been committed by him. But complainant as shown in his position paper, had admitted to
have committed most of the charges leveled against him but tried to justify the
same x x x x’ As found by the arbiter, the charge of ‘(i)ncurring a cash
shortage in the amount of P7,416.88’ was admitted by Rupisan explaining that
‘he had reimbursable expenses’ due from Alhambra. Further, the shortage is evident from Rupisan’s Accountability
Report for the month of November and December 1989 he himself presented.

As to the charge that he ‘(k)ept
company-owned stocks worth P9,856.93 in his residence which were not reflected
in the report of his stock accountabilities.’ Rupisan alleged that the
arrangement of allowing a salesman ‘to keep some stocks at their residence
without yet including the same in their report of stock accountability x x x is
a common and tolerated practice’ since ‘it is oftentimes difficult to withdraw
stock from (Alhambra’s) field bodega.’

On the charge that ‘(h)e lost the
original copies for collection of Invoices Nos. 7986 and 7990 in the total
amount of P6,844.65,’ Rupisan retorted, ‘who is the person who has never lost a
thing?’

The charge that ‘(h)e over-reported
in his account charge sales Invoices Nos. 85256 and 44488’ was never disputed
by Rupisan.

As regards the charges that ‘(h)e
extended credit to V. Chan store for P22,542.00 per Invoice No. 7991 despite
his knowledge that it still had an uncleared bounced check with him in the
amount of P15,000.00 and x x x to several stores for more than 30 days although
he is aware that this is strictly prohibited under the company policy,’ Rupisan
claimed that these ‘have long been the practice in the company and such were
tolerated to (sic) by the management.’

The Labor Arbiter then concluded
that the charges find basis for termination under Art. 282 of the Labor Code,
specifically, the first charge is ‘fraud,’ the second and third, are considered
‘neglect;’ the fourth is ‘serious misconduct;’ and, the last two fall under ‘willful
disobedience.’

^[3]
G.R. No. 80587, 8 February 1989, 170 SCRA 69, 74-76.

^[4]
See Note 2.

^[5]
See Reta v. NLRC, 27 May 1994.