COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PETITIONER, VS. ERNESTA CABAGNOT VDA. DE HIO, FOR HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN-AD-LITEM OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, DIONISIO, JR., ERNESTO, RAUL, AND ESTER, ALL SURNAME…

The petitioner, Compañia Maritima, is a domestic corporation
organized under Philippine laws for the purpose of engaging in
interisland trade, while the respondent Pablo Velez Special Watchmen’s
Agency is a single proprietorship owned and operated by Mr. Pablo
Velez, engaged in the business of supplying watchmen and protective
services to shipping companies requesting such services. The watchmen
supplied by the said agency are recruited from the Manila Bay
Watchmen’s Association, a duly registered labor organization with whom
Velez had a collective bargaining contract under which fifteen per cent
(15%) of the total wages of the watchmen are collected by the latter as
commission. The members of the Manila Bay Watchmen’s Association
compose the membership of the Pablo Velez Watchmen’s Agency.

On or about the later part of August, 1954, a strike was staged by
the Marine Officer’s Guild and the petitioner contracted with the Pablo
Velez Special Watchmen’s Agency for the latter to give security to the
officers of the said petitioner who did not join the strike. Among the
members of the Pablo Velez Watchmen’s Agency detailed with the company
was the late Dionisio Hio. On September 4, 1954, the said Dionisio Hio
was on a night shift duty as gangwayman of the M/V BASILAN, a vessel
owned by petitioner. At about 8:30 o’clock in the evening of that same
day, the said Dionisio Hio and several others were picked on a jeep by
the Chief Engineer of the vessel in order to escort him to his home at
Perla, Harrison, Pasay City. Upon their arrival at his residence, the
said engineer offered some drinks to the deceased and the other
watchmen who accompanied him home. After having several rounds of
liquor, the watchmen left the engineer’s house and they arrived at
their respective posts at about 2:00 a.m. the following day, September
5. At about (6 o’clock that morning, the body of Dionisio Hio was found
floating near the side of the M/V BASILAN along the gangway of which he
was assigned for duty.

The deceased is survived by his wife Ernesta Cabagnot Hio and three
minor children all of whom were dependent on his wages at the time of
his death.

Upon a claim for compensation made by the widow, in her behalf, and
in behalf of her children, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
finding that Dionisio Hio died of an accident that occurred in the
course of his employment, and declaring the Compañia Maritima as
employer thereof, ordered that company to pay these survivors the sum
of P4,000.00 as death compensation, P200.00 as reimbursement for burial
expenses and P41.00 as fees required under section 55 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended.

In this appeal, we are asked to rule on (1) whether or not the
deceased was an employee of the Compañia Maritima, entitled to
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act; and (2) whether or
not the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as watchman
at the time of his death.

The petitioner claims that it never had any employer-employee
relationship with the deceased. The claim is without merit. While it is
true that no written employment contract between the petitioner and the
deceased was presented in evidence, it is not disputed that the
petitioner company owns the vessel where the deceased was assigned as
gangwayman, and it was found by the Commission that the salary of the
deceased was paid directly from the funds of petitioner. From these
circumstances, it would appear that at the time of the accident the
deceased was under petitioner’s employ.

There is nothing to the contention that the deceased was but a
casual employee whose services were engaged only for the duration of
the strike and, therefore, not entitled to compensation. The section of
the law cited by the petitioner in support of this contention reads:

“SEC. 39 (b). ‘Laborer’ is used as a
synonym of ’employee’ and means every person who has entered the
employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for
an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely
casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the
employer. * * *.”

It is clear from the above that for an employee to be excluded from
the term “laborer” or “employee” under the Act, his employment must be
“purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business
of the employer”. In a case (Cajes vs. Philippine
Manufacturing Co., 40 Off. Gaz., p. 1251), where this Court had
occasion to interpret the above-quoted section, it was held that the
casual service that the law speaks of must be construed, interpreted
and concluded by the circumstance of whether or not the aforesaid
service is related with the occupation or business of the employer. We
have reason to believe that the work of the deceased in the case at bar
was in connection with the business of petitioner. It has been shown
that it was not only during the strike that the Compañia Maritima
needed the services of watchmen. In fact, the petitioner admitted
having its own permanently employed watchmen doing the same duties as
that of the deceased. The duties referred to must be that of giving
security not only to the cargo of the vessel but also to the lives of
its officers and crew, and they are, undoubtedly, in connection with
the business of the petitioner. Without security, any shipping company
could not possibly go on with its maritime business.

In disclaiming liability, the petitioner further insists that the
deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as gangwayman in the
early morning of September 5, 1954. The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, however, upon, examination of the evidence on this point,
noted serious contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses. While
one witness for the Pablo Velez Watchmen’s Agency testified that after
the alleged drinking spree at the house of the Chief Engineer of the
M/V BASILAN the deceased together with his companions proceeded to
their respective posts at Pier 8, another witness averred that they
went to other night spots in Pasay City. On the other hand, the
testimony of the claimant widow that the deceased never got drunk while
on duty, and the autopsy report and testimony of Dr. Cabreira of the
Manila Police Department to the effect that there were no indications
of alcohol in the body of the deceased would show that the deceased was
not drunk at the time of his death. There is authority to the effect
that where the testimony or evidence shows a conflict in the testimony
as to whether or not the deceased was intoxicated at the time of the
injury, it is not error to fail to find, that the deceased was
intoxicated, for such ruling is necessarily included in a finding that
the accident arose out of the employment (Napoleon vs.
McCullough, 89 N.J.L. 716; 99 Atl. 385, cited in Labor Laws by
Francisco, Vol. 2, p. 156). The defense of drunken ness in workmen’s
compensation cases must be supported by clear and convincing proof to
the effect that such intoxication or drunkenness rendered the employee
incapable of doing his work so that he could not be said to be engaged
in his employment. The accident or injury must be shown to have arisen
out of his drunken condition and not out of the work. No such evidence
was adduced in the present case.

It is worthy to note that the witnesses who testified on the alleged
drunkenness of the deceased were witnesses for the Pablo Velez
Watchmen’s Agency, and not for petitioner. The latter could have
presented as witness its Chief Engineer to bolster its defense of
drunkenness, but it failed to do so. It has been ruled that the burden
of establishing intoxication and that it caused the injury is on the
employer (Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm.
860; 12 N.C.C.A. 79, cited in The Workmen’s Compensation Law by Morabe
and Inton, p. 115). Having failed in this case to prove that the
deceased died in a state of drunkenness, the petitioner is not excused
from its obligation as employer to pay compensation to the widow and
children of the deceased.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed at petitioner’s costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Montemayor, J., reserves his vote.