🎧 Case Brief Lecture

EDWARD T. MARCELO, DIONILO D. MARFIL, CELIA C. CABURNAY, AND DANIEL T. PASCUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, IN …

G.R. No. 106695. August 04, 1994 August 4, 1994

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Marcelo versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review filed by Edward Marcelo, Dionilo Marfil, Celia Caburnay, and Daniel Pascual against the Court of Appeals, the People of the Philippines, Judge Pedro Santiago, and the private complainant Jose Marcelo, Jr. The petitioners were charged with falsification of public documents for allegedly forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements. The case matters because it settles a question of first impression: whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case, based on a review committee's reversal of the investigating prosecutor's resolution, bars the filing of a new information after the Secretary of Justice reverses that review committee. The Supreme Court en banc resolved the novel and important issue.

Procedural History

Jose T. Marcelo filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo Israel found sufficient evidence and recommended filing. An information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge Bersamin. The petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the City Prosecutor. The Bersamin court deferred the arraignment and directed the City Prosecutor to conclude the review. The Review Committee reversed the Israel resolution and recommended withdrawal of the information. On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin granted the motions to dismiss and to withdraw the information, dismissing the case.

The private complainant appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who on 27 January 1992 reversed the Review Committee and ordered the filing of a new information. A new information was filed, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, and raffled to Branch 101 presided by Judge Santiago. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, which Judge Santiago denied on 20 March 1992, holding it was not based on any ground in Section 3, Rule 117. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied due course on 11 June 1992, holding that certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash. Reconsideration was denied on 31 August 1992. Hence, this petition.

Facts

In a complaint-affidavit sworn on 18 March 1991, Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents by forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements. The National Bureau of Investigation and the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory found that the signature on the agreements and the specimen signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. were not written by the same person. The agreements were purportedly executed in Quezon City and acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a notary public.

After preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Israel recommended filing. An information was filed on 30 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 96. The petitioners filed a Motion for Review on 6 June 1991. Warrants were issued, and the petitioners posted bail. The Bersamin court deferred the arraignment and directed the City Prosecutor to conclude the review. On 15 November 1991, the Review Committee recommended reversal and withdrawal of the information. The petitioners moved to dismiss, and the prosecutor moved to withdraw the information. On 13 December 1991, Judge Bersamin granted both motions and dismissed the case.

Meanwhile, on 10 December 1991, the private complainant appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On 27 January 1992, Secretary Bello reversed the Review Committee and ordered the filing of a new information. The new information was filed on 5 February 1992, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, and raffled to Branch 101 presided by Judge Santiago. The petitioners posted bail and filed a Motion to Quash, which was denied. They went to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The Santiago court continued with the proceedings and arraigned the petitioners, who pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented several witnesses.

Issues

  • Whether or not the pre-arraignment dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court, based on the Review Committee's reversal of the investigating prosecutor's resolution, bars the filing of a new information after the Secretary of Justice reversed the Review Committee.
  • Whether or not the prosecutor who filed the new information had authority to do so, considering the doctrine in Crespo versus Mogul that the Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with the trial court's disposition of a criminal case after it has taken cognizance thereof.
  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the special civil action for certiorari against the order denying the motion to quash.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Department Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990, of the Department of Justice provides:

Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Regional State Prosecutor, and the Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice, except as otherwise provided in Section 4 thereof.

This provision governs appeals from resolutions of prosecutors and bears on whether the Review Committee's resolution was final and appealable.

Section 4 of Department Circular No. 7 provides:

A resolution of the aforesaid prosecutors finding probable cause may be appealed only upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion; however, even with such showing, the appeal shall not be entertained if the appellant had already been arraigned, and if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

This provision governs appeals from resolutions finding probable cause and bears on the finality of the Review Committee's resolution.

Ruling

The Court denied the petition. On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court, which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review or reinvestigation and defers arraignment until resolution, must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken to the Department of Justice. The Court ruled that the Bersamin court acted with precipitate haste in granting the motions to dismiss and to withdraw the information, because the Review Committee's resolution was not final, the offended party had appealed to the Secretary of Justice, and the period to appeal had not yet lapsed. The Court also noted that the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the motion to dismiss.

On the second issue, the Court held that nothing in Crespo versus Mogul forecloses the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of subordinates. The Secretary is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review once a complaint or information is filed in court. The grant of a motion to dismiss is subject to the court's discretion. The Court quoted Crespo versus Mogul:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

The Court further held that no jeopardy had attached because the petitioners had not been arraigned and had asked for dismissal for a cause other than double jeopardy. The filing of the new information straightened the course of criminal justice. The prosecutor who filed the information had authority to do so.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the special civil action, not necessarily for the reason it relied upon, but because the Santiago court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash.

Doctrine

A trial court that takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the investigating prosecutor's resolution or for reinvestigation and defers arraignment until resolution must act on the resolution reversing the prosecutor's finding, or on a motion to dismiss based thereon, only upon proof that the resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken to the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of subordinates; the Secretary is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review once a complaint or information is filed in court. The grant of a motion to dismiss is subject to the court's discretion. A pre-arraignment dismissal based on a non-final resolution does not bar the filing of a new information after the Secretary of Justice reverses the review committee, and no jeopardy attaches where the accused had not been arraigned and had asked for dismissal for a cause other than double jeopardy.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: a trial court may act on a resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding only upon proof that the resolution is already final, with no appeal taken to the Department of Justice. Examiners use this case to test the finality requirement for pre-arraignment dismissals and the interplay between the Secretary of Justice's review power and the trial court's discretion under Crespo versus Mogul.