HERMOGENES P. POBRE, PETITIONER, VS. MARIANO E. MENDIETA AND HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 26, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules
of Court were filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the decision dated August 5, 1992 and writ of prohibitory
injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Corona Ibay-Somera, in Civil Case
No. 92-60272 entitled, “Mariano A. Mendie­ta, petitioner vs. Hermogenes P.
Pobre, respondent,” annulling the appointment extended by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre, as Com­missioner/Chairman
of the Professional Regulation Com­mission (hereafter PRC for brevity) and
enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office.

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office
of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the
senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes
P. Pobre was the second Associate Commission­er of the PRC.

On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought
the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether
the Presi­dent’s power to appoint the Commissioner of the Profes­sional
Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as amended,
which provides:

“Sec. 2. Composition. – The Commission shall be headed by one
fulltime Commissioner and two full-time Associate Commissioners, all to
be appointed by the President for a term of
nine (9) years without reappointment to start from the time they assume office,
except the first two Associate
Commissioners who shall be appointed, one for six (6) years and the other for
three (3) years, and thereafter, any vacancy in the Commission
shall be filled for the unexpired term
only with the most senior of the Associate Commis­sioners succeeding the
Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal. No person shall be appointed chairman or
member of the Commission unless he is at least forty (40) years of age,
familiar with the principles and methods of professional regulation and/or
licensing and has at least five (5) years of executive or managerial
experience.

The Executive Secretary wanted to know whether the President may
appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or
any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.

In a Memorandum dated January 22, 1991, Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III answered the queries as follows:

“Based on the foregoing prem­ises, it is our view that Section
2 of P.D. No. 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the
President. A contrary interpreta­tion
would taint the provision with unconstitutionality since it would countenance a
usurpation by the legislature of a power which does not belong to it but
pertains to the executive. It has been
said that ‘those matters which the Constitu­tion specifically confides to the
executive, the legislative cannot directly or indirectly take from his control’
(Gov’t. of P.I. vs. Spring­er, 50 Phil. 259, citing Cooley’s Constitutional
Limitations, 7th Ed., pp. 126-131; 157-162).” (p. 50, Rollo of 106696.)

On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the
petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC
Commissioner/Chairman. He took his oath
of office on February 17, 1992.

Even before Commissioner Pobre’s appointment, the private
respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a
petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary
Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they
be enjoined from appointing, or recommending, the appointment of Associate
Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No.
223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled
to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC. His prayer for a restraining order was set for hearing on February 19,
1992 at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon.

Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because
President Aquino had already appointed him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact,
already taken his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Judge Somera denied the prayer for a
restraining order as well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot
and academic.

Consequently, Mendieta filed a petition for quo warranto contesting Pobre’s
appointment as chairman of the PRC because he (Mendieta) allegedly succeeded
Fran­cia as PRC Chairman by operation of law.

In his answer to the petition for quo warranto,
Pobre disputed Mendieta’s claim on the ground that only the President of the
Philippines, in whom the appointing power is vested by law and the
Constitution, may name the successor of retired PRC Commissioner/Chairman
Francia upon the expiration of the latter’s term of office.

At the pre-trial of the case, the parties agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda and to submit the case for decision on their pleadings.

On August 5, 1992, Judge Somera rendered a decision in favor of
Mendieta which she rationalized as follows:

“The clear intent of Sec. 2 of P.D. 223 is to systematically
pro­vide a law allowing succession to the Office of the Commissioner. More so, the Court could not take credence
on the claim of respondent to the effect that the most senior Associate
Commissioner may only succeed to the Office of the Commis­sioner of the PRC
only for unexpired portion. The unexpired portion emphasized under P.D. 223 merely pertains to that of the
Associate Commissioner’s term and
has precisely nothing to do with the term of
office of the Commissioner. Hence, if the law does
not distinguish neither the Court should distinguish nor may any other person
be allowed to do so.

“The purpose of the law in providing that any vacancy in the
Professional Regulation Commission, not just the Office of the Commis­sioner,
shall be filled ‘for the unexpired term only’ is to ensure that the staggering
of terms will occur every three (3) years as intended to prevent the President
from making more than one or two appointments during his term (Visarra vs.
Miraflor, 8 SCRA 1). A similar purpose
can be found in Presidential Decree No. 223.

“The Court finds it necessary to reiterate its findings
regarding the reason and spirit of the law in enacting P.D. 223. A careful perusal of Sec. 2 of said decree
would reveal that the then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued this Decree with intent to give
no room for unreasonable vacancies in
the Commission. This is
clearly empha­sized by mere cursory reading of Sec. 22, P.D. 223. The Presidential Decree, however, had by
mere impli­cation, intended that vacancies in the position
of Associate Commis­sioners may only be
filled up by means of a
Presidential appointment.” (pp. 39-40, Rollo of G.R. No.
106677; Underscoring ours.)

On August 19, 1992, she issued a writ of prohibi­tory injunction
directing the Deputy Sheriff of Manila to stop Pobre from discharging the
functions and duties of the Chairman/Commissioner of the PRC, and from enjoy­ing
the rights and privileges of that office.

In due time, Pobre came to this Court for relief by a petition
for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order which the Court issued on September 5, 1992, ordering respondent Judge to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the decision dated August
5, 1992 and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992; and
respondent Mariano A. Mendieta to cease and desist from exercising the powers
and duties of the Office of the PRC Chairman/Commissioner (G.R. No. 106696).

The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of
the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that: “x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners
succeeding the Commis­sioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or
removal,” whereby the legality of Pobre’s appointment as PRC Chairman may
be determined.

In interpreting this section of P.D. No. 223, consideration
should be accorded the provision of the Constitution vesting the power of
appointment in the President of the Philippines.

Section 10, Article VII of
the 1973 Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973 (per Proclamation
No. 1102) was the source of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ authority to
issue P.D. No. 223 on June 22, 1973, because under that constitutional
provision, the President was empowered to “appoint the heads of bureaus
and offices.” The chairman of the PRC is the head of an office.

“Sec. 10. The
President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices,
the officers of the armed forces of the Philippines from the rank of brigadier
general or commo­dore, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. However,
the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, courts,
heads of agencies, commissions, and
boards the power to appoint inferior officers.”

Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was modified by
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

“Sec. 16. The
President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval cap­tain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agen­cies, commissions,
or boards.”

This provision empowers the President to appoint “those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law that authorizes him to
appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section
2, which provides that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC
are “all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years,
without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office x x x.”

In holding that Mendieta, as
the senior PRC asso­ciate commissioner, has a valid claim to the office
of chairman/commissioner vacated by Francia, Judge Somera relied on what she
called the “succession clause” (p. 38, Rollo) in Section 2, P.D. No.
223 which provides that:

“x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commission­ers
succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his
term, resignation or removal.” (Sec. 2, P.D.
223.)

She rejected Pobre’s theory that said
provision refers to a vacancy in the office of Commissioner/Chairman
caused by the latter’s retirement, resignation or remov­al (also death or
incapacity) before the expiration of his 9-year term, thereby leaving
“an unexpired term” which shall be served by “the most senior among
the Associate Commissioners.”

We do not agree with Judge Somera’s opinion that the filling up
of the vacancy “for the unexpired portion of the term only” refers to
the unexpired portion of the term of the successor (the “most senior
Associate Com­missioner”) rather than the unexpired portion of the
Chairman’s term. The Court holds that
the succession clause operates only when there is an “unexpired term”
of the Chairman/Commissioner to be served. Otherwise, if the Chairman’s term had expired or been fully served, the
vacancy must be filled by appointment of a new chairman by the President.

It may be candidly admitted that the language of Section 2, P.D.
223 leaves much to be desired for clari­ty. For instance, the provision speaks of “any vacancy in
the Commission” but it obviously refers only to a vacancy in the position
of Commissioner or Chairman for it is only he (or she) who may be succeeded by
the “most senior Associate Commissioner.” Furthermore, the same
section speaks of “the most senior of the Associate Commissioners
succeeding the Commissioner.” Only the Chairman of the Commission
bears the title of “Commissioner;” the others are “Associate
Commissioners.”

The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the
Commission (except they position of “junior” Associate Commissioner)
shall be filled by “succession” or by “operation of law”
for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners – “all to be appointed by the
President” under P.D. No. 223. The
absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his
appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate
Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not
presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped
his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself
to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying
the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an ab­surdity may not be presumed, the Court should so con­strue
the law as to avoid it.

“The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning
where the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an adherence
to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction may arise
when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the lan­guage is an unjust,
absurd, unrea­sonable, or mischievous result, or one at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the real meaning of the
statute is to be ascertained and
declared, even though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute.”
(82 CJS 589­-590; Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of fact, the history of the PRC dis­proves Judge
Somera’s “succession-by-operation-of-law” theory, for when the first
PRC chairman, Eric Nubla, stepped down on June 16, 1986 (after more than 12
years in office^[1]) he was not automatically succeeded by the
senior Associate Commissioner Numeriano Tanopo (who served as such up to March
23, 1987) but by Julio Fran­cia, Jr., an outsider, whom the President appointed
as the new PRC chairman.

When Luis Tomacruz’s term as senior Associate Commissioner
expired on January 1, 1989, he was not automatically succeeded by the Associate
Commissioner Domiciano Natividad. Instead, the President appointed Mariano Mendieta as senior Associate
Commissioner on March 9, 1990. On
February 13, 1991, Hermogenes Pobre was appointed junior Associate Commissioner
vice Domi­ciano Natividad.

Apparently, during the past 19 years that the PRC has existed
(since January 2, 1974), it has not been the practice to fill the unexpired
term of a departing PRC Commissioner or Associate Commissioner by “automatic
succession.” Instead, the incumbent was allowed to “hold over”
beyond his 9-year term until someone (not necessarily the next-in-rank) was
appointed by the President to succeed him.

What then is the meaning of the underlined portion of the provision
that:

“x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commission­ers
succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of
his term, resigna­tion or removal.” (Sec. 2, P.D. 223; emphasis supplied.)

In view of our ruling that said provision of P.D. 223 applies
only to the unexpired term of the
Chairman/Commissioner, the underlined clause: “at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal” can
not possibly refer to the Chairman/Commissioner for it would contradict the
first clause providing that he will be succeeded by the senior Associate
Commissioner “for the unexpired portion of his term only.” There
can be no more “unexpired term” to speak of if the Chairman stepped
down “at the expiration of his term.” It is more logical to assume
that the underlined clause refers to the senior Associate Commissioner who
should serve only up to “the expiration of his term, resignation or
removal.” Hence, the preposition “at,” which appears to have been
used inadvertently, should be understood to mean “until” so that the
provision will read thus:

“x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners
succeeding the Commissioner until the expiration of
his term, resignation or removal.”
(Sec. 2, P.D. 223.)

The substitution of a word in the statute is allowed to avoid an
absurdity or contradiction.

“The       rule of  construction according to the spirit of the
law is especially applicable where adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity or injustice or where adherence to the letter of the law would lead
to contradictions or defeat the plain purpose of the act, or where the
provision was inserted through inadvertence. In following this rule, words may be modified or rejected and others
substituted, or words and phrases may be transposed. So the meaning of general language may be restrained by the
spirit or reason of the statute, and may be construed to admit implied
exceptions. Apparent inaccuracies and
mistakes in the mere verbiage or phraseology will be overlooked to give effect
to the spirit of the law.” (82 CJS 618-621.)

The substitution of “until” for “at” in this
case is justified for the following reasons:

(1)      
the term of the commissioner and associate commissioners is
fixed at nine (9) years without reappointment. Hence, the senior Associate Commissioner who serves the unexpired term
of the chairman, may not exceed his own 9-year term.

(2)      
to preserve the staggering of the 9-year term of the Commis­sioner
and Associate Commissioners so that the president need not appoint a
Commissioner or Associate Commissioner except once every three (3) years.

(3)      
to fix the “expiration of the term” of the
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners on a definite date which is January
2nd every three (3) years, beginning January 2, 1974 when the PRC was first
organized.

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC
Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his
term did not violate any provi­sion of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with
the Chief Executive’s interpretation and implementation of the law, the
legality of said appointment should be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned decision dated
August 5, 1992 and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992
issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 92-60272 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The appointment of
petitioner Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional
Regulation Commission is declared lawful and in order. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Puno and Vitug, JJ., no part.

^[1]
Nine (9) years as his regular term and three (3) 3 years in a hold-over
capacity.