JAIME LEDESMA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner has filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Court’s resolution of March 24, 1993 which denied
his petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show
that respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment.

On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation filed Civil Case No. 38287 in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No.
7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which petitioner had failed to
comply with. As summons could not be
served on the
latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981. On December 2, 1988, private respondent bank
instituted Civil Case No. 88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 133, against petitioner on the same cause of action and subject
matter.

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was
denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent by the court a
quo ordering petitioner to pay private respondent P168,000.00 with interest
thereon of 12% per annum from December 2, 1988 until full payment of the
obligation, P16,800.00 as attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. Said judgment was affirmed by respondent
Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29406 in its decision promulgated on January 7, 1992,^[1]
and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution
dated August 6, 1992.^[2]

Petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari of the said
judgment was denied in our aforesaid resolution, hence its present motion for
reconsideration, dated May 5, 1993. Contending that the second action filed by private respondent bank had
already prescribed, petitioner invokes the rulings in Vda. de Nator, et al.
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.^[3] and Fulton Insurance Co. vs.
Manila Railroad Co., et al.^[4] and
invites us “to give a second look at the apparently conflicting or
divergent jurisprudence.”

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of
an action, involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for
filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is
interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor. The effects of the last two
instances have already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should
necessarily apply to the first.

The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by
reason of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas
Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al.^[5] in this wise:

“x x x. The interruption of the prescriptive
period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would
commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere
suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.

x x x

“A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has
already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. x x
x.

x x x

“That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted
in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the
interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand
means that ‘the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the
cessation of the suspension.’ When prescription is interrupted by a judicial
demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation
of the interruption. x x x.”

The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in Philippine
National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,^[6]
thus:

“Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the ‘prescription
of actions is interrupted’ inter alia, ‘when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.’ This simply means that the period of
prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment, begins to run
anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already elapsed from the
accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered
inefficacious. x x x.

x x x

“x x x. The effect of the
interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to make
prescription run again from the date of the interruption x x x.”

Based on the aforecited cases, Article 1155 has twice been
interpreted to mean that upon the cessation of the suspension of the
prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to run
anew. Petitioner, on the other hand,
insists that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is
merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the
remaining period available for the filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to
adopt it, would result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155 would be
interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is interrupted
in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of a debt,
but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.

In Vda. de Nator, it
was held that:

“x x x The
filing of the case with the CFI arrested the period of prescription (Art. 1155
NCC), and the interruption of said period lasted until the time that the dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction became final. ‘When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time
for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption’ x x x. The whole period during which the case had been pending cannot be
counted for arriving at the prescriptive period. In other words, the running of the period of prescription in this
particular case was interrupted on August 6, 1953, when the case in the CFI was
filed and began to run again on August 30, 1958, when the same Court had
dismissed the case. As the complaint
was filed with the CIR on December 5, 1958, the action has not yet
prescribed.”

This case obviously appears to have made
conflicting statements since it proceeds upon a certain premise but arrives at
a different conclusion. Hence, we
cannot agree that the statements therein sufficiently support the thesis of
petitioner.

The case of Fulton
Insurance Company is not clear either on the matter of the
interruption of the prescriptive period where an action is filed in court. It was there held that:

“There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of
the cessation of the interruption by an intervening action upon the period of
prescription. There is the view
expressed and perhaps, not without reasons, that the full period of
prescription should start to run anew, reckoned from the date of the cessation
of the interruption. The contrary view
is, that the cessation of the interruption merely tolls the running of the
remaining period of prescription, deducting from the full period thereof the
time that has already elapsed prior to the filing of the intervening
action. Nevertheless, all discussion on
this point is academic; considered in the light of either view, We find that
the second action is not barred.”

In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the
dismissal of the second case alleging that the filing of the first case neither
tolled nor interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. This Court ruled that the filing of the
first action interrupted the running of the period, and then declared that at
any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of the period
remaining. It concluded that the issue of whether the filing of the action
merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second action was
still filed within the prescriptive period. Consequently, the Fulton case cannot also sustain the thesis of
petitioner.

On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold
that the correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are
reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank
of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company, not only because
they are later in point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a
decisive and logical manner therein. Petitioner’s submission would result in a bifurcated interpretation of Article 1155, aside from the
irrational conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot produce the same
result on the prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an
acknowledgment of the debt.

Accordingly, petitioner having failed to adduce any cogent
reason or substantial argument to warrant a reconsideration of our resolution
of March 24, 1993, the present motion is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and
Nocon, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., on leave.

^[1]
Justice Segundino G. Chua, ponente; Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and
Luis L. Victor, concurring.

^[2]
Rollo, 24.

^[3]
4 SCRA 727 (1962).

^[4]
21 SCRA 974 (1967).

^[5]
94 SCRA 937 (1979).

^[6]
177 SCRA 740 (1989).