PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS, AS JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 41, THE HONORABLE RICARDO DIAZ, AS JUDGE, REGI…

This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23338, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by herein petitioner, assailing the orders of (a) respondent Judge Domingo D.
Panis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No.
90-53531, and (b) respondent Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution
dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
decision.

Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a
non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation and is engaged in the business of
providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner’s office and facilities are
located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of
land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner.

Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel
of land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were
duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila.

In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against
herein private respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said
occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable compensation
therefor. This judgment was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 85262.

As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment,
which was granted on April 9, 1990. A
writ of demolition was later prayed for and likewise issued by the same court
on May 30, 1990.

On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, a
petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner
herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the
demolition of their houses on the premises in question.

On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53531 against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the expropriation of
the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectment proceedings in Civil
Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that
the City of Manila had no power to expropriate
private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that
the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million
of the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was
insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.

On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Manila, denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and entered an order of
condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in accordance with
law. The court also ordered the parties
to submit, within five days, the
names of their respective nominees as commissioners to ascertain just compensation
for the land in question.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying its motion to dismiss, and later a motion to defer compliance with the
order directing the submission of the names of nominees to be appointed commissioners. The City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject lot, mentioning the P2 million deposit
with the Philippine National Bank, representing the provisional value of the
land.

In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued
the writ of possession, and at the same time, denied petitioner’s motion to
defer compliance and motion for reconsideration.

On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation
proceedings, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No.
90-53346 issued an order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by private respondents. A motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied.

Petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders dated September 14, 1990,
and October 5 and 8, 1990 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court, and the
Order dated September 21, 1990 of Branch 27 of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No.
23338). The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution on July
30, 1992, denying reconsideration thereof.

Hence, this petition.

The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot,
which was formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to
expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through
negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and
distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof.

The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was
sold in 1977 by its owner,
Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been
occupied by private respondents.

On May 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the approval of
the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90
square meter lot.

Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper
because: (1) the City of Manila has no
specific power to expropriate private property under the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) assuming that it has such power, this was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the
public use requirement and petitioner’s right to due process.

Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be
a law expressly authorizing local governments to undertake urban land reform
(Art. XIII, Sec. 9).

Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to “condemn private
property for public use” (Sec. 3) and “to acquire private land x x x
and subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents”
(Sec. 100).

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the
City of Manila general powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the
power of eminent domain, thus:

“General powers.– The city may have a common seal and alter
the same at pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey,
and dispose of real and personal property for the general interest of the city,
condemn private property for public use, contract and be
contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and
exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred” (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Italics supplied).

Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila
to undertake urban land reform,
thus:

Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands
in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots
for sale on easy terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and
low-salaried employees. For the purpose
of this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of
general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation
proceedings in accordance with
law, with the approval of the President xxx” (Italics supplied).

The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has
the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the
city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of
the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter
for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is
not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of
Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason
and Co. Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no moment that the land
sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido
v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain
has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions
(Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150
SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion
of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land
reform and housing.

This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution
which provides that:

x x x                                                         x
x x                                                          x x x

“The state shall,
by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make
available at affordable
cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens
in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall
also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the
State shall respect the rights of small property owners” (Art. XIII, Sec.
9; Italics supplied).

x x x                                                         x
x x                                                           x
x x

The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been complied
with. Although the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the court is required to do
(National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1998]), it never
questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner
raises the issue of due process.

Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order, denying its motion to
dismiss.

The Court of Appeals, in
determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its
motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.

The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of
the land is an amount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both
parties. The fact remains that
petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped from assailing the
same. It must be remembered that the
valuation is merely provisional. The
parties still have second stage in the proceedings in the proper court
below to determine specifically the amount of just compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 2?? SCRA
520 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.