CESAR E.A. VIRATA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This petition is a sequel to Virata vs. Sandiganbayan^[1] and Mapa vs. Sandiganbayan^[2] which
were jointly decided by this Court on 15 October 1991.^[3]

Petitioner is among the forty-four (44) co-defendants of Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez in a complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines with the respondent Sandiganbayan on
31 July 1987.^[4]
The complaint was amended thrice; the last amendment thereto is denominated as
the Second Amended Complaint, as expanded per the Court-Approved
Manifestation/Motion dated 8 December 1987.^[5]

Petitioner moved to dismiss the said case, insofar as he is
concerned, on various grounds including the failure of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint to state a cause of action. The motion was denied and so was his bid to have such denial
reconsidered. He then came to this
Court via a special civil action for certiorari imputing upon the respondent
Sandiganbayan the commission of grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, finding
that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against him. In Our aforementioned Decision of 15 October
1991, We overruled the said contention and upheld the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan. However, We stated:^[6]

“No doubt is left in Our minds that the questioned expanded
Second Amended Complaint is crafted
to conform to a well-planned outline that forthwith focuses one’s attention to
the asserted right of the State, expressly recognized and affirmed by the 1987
Constitution (Section 15, Art. XI), and its corresponding duty, (Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 207) to recover
ill-gotten wealth from the defendants named therein; the alleged schemes and
devises used and the manipulations made by them to amass such ill-gotten
wealth, which are averred first generally and then specifically; and the extent
of the reliefs demanded and prayed for. However, as shown above, the maze of unnecessary literary embellishments
may indeed raise some doubts on the sufficiency of the statement of material
operative facts to flesh out the causes of action. Be that as it may, We are, nevertheless, convinced that the
questioned pleading has sufficiently shown viable causes of action.

x x x

If petitioners perceive some ambiguity or vagueness therein, the
remedy is not a motion to dismiss. An
action should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or
uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, but rather for
a bill of particulars x x x (Amaro vs. Sumanguit, 5 SCRA 707) x x x.”

Petitioner was thus compelled to go back to the
Sandiganbayan. However, insisting that
he “could not prepare an intelligent and adequate pleading in view of the
general and sweeping allegations against him in the Second Amended Complaint^[7]
as expanded,” while at the same time remaining “steadfast in his position
maintaining his posture of innocence,”^[8] petitioner
filed on 30 January 1992 a Motion For a Bill of Particulars.^[9]
He alleges therein that on the basis of the general and sweeping allegations in
the Second Amended Complaint, to wit:

“a. ‘The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting
singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include the
misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth,
extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described
below, all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people.’ (par. 2, at p. 3).

b. ‘The following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees or agents, by allowing themselves tobe (sic) incorporators, directors,
board members and/or stockholders of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos x x x’

x x x

CESAR E. A. VIRATA

x x x

(par. 7, at pp. 5-7)

c. ‘From the early years of his presidency,
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos took undue advantage of his powers as President. All throughout the period from September 21,
1972 to February 26, 1986, he gravely abused his powers under martial law and
ruled as Dictator under the 1973 Marcos promulgated Constitution. Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with
other Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert
with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligation
as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate
ill-gotten wealth:’ (par. 9 (a) in the section of the Complaint styled ‘General
Averments of Defendants‘ Illegal Acts.’ at pp.
12-13).

d. ‘Defendants, acting singly or collectively,
and/or in unlawful concert with one another, for the purpose of preventing
disclosure and avoiding discovery of their unmitigated plunder of the National
Treasury and of their other illegal acts, and employing the services of
prominent lawyers, accountants, financial experts, businessmen and other
persons, deposited, kept and invested funds, securities and other assets
estimated at billions of US dollars in various banks, financial institutions,
trust or investment companies and with persons here and abroad.’ (par. 12, in
the same section ‘General Averments of Defendants‘ Illegal
Acts‘ at p. 18).”^[10]

which were attempted to be “fully
describe[d]” in that “section of the complaint, styled ‘Specific
Averments of the Defendant’s Illegal Acts,’”^[11] as follows:

“a. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or unlawful (sic) concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and strategies to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others: (par. 14, at p. 19).

x x x

(i) Gave MERALCO undue advantage x x x (ii) with the active
collaboration of Defendant Cesar E.
A. Virata be (sic) reducing the electric franchise tax from 5% to
2% of gross receipts and the tariff duty on fuel oil imports by public
utilities from 20% to 10%, resulting in substantial savings for MERALCO but
without any significant benefit to the consumers of electric power and loss of
million (sic) of pesos in much needed revenues to the government;’ (par. 14(b),
at pp. 22 and 23)

(ii) ‘Secured, in a veiled attempt to justify
MERALCO’s anomalous acquisition of the electric cooperatives, with the
active collaboration of Defendants Cesar E.
A. Virata, x x x and the rest of the Defendants, the approval by
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cabinet of the so-called ‘Three-Year
Program for the Extension of MERALCO’s Services of Areas within the 60
kilometer Radius of Manila,’ which required government capital investment amounting to millions of pesos;
(par. 14(g), at p. 25)

(iii) ‘Manipulated with the support, assistance
and collaboration of Philguarantee officials
led by Chairman Cesar E. A. Virata
and the senior managers of EMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, J. Jose M. Mantecon and Kurt S.
Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc., without
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of making it assume the
obligation of Erectors, Inc. with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71
with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors, Inc. to
appear viable and to borrow more capitals (sic), so much so that its obligation
with Philguarantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of
June 30, 1987. (par. 14(m) P. 29)

(iv) ‘The following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to be used as instruments in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or
policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators, directors, or
members of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained: x x x Cesar E.A. Virata x x x.’ (par. 17, at pp.
36-37)

b. ‘The acts of Defendants, singly or
collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official and fiduciary
obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of right and
power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic the (sic) Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people’ (par. 18, at p. 40).”^[12]

the plaintiff, Republic of the
Philippines, asserts four (4) alleged “actionable wrongs” against the
herein petitioner, to wit:

“a.     His alleged ‘active collaboration’ in the
reduction of the electric franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts and the
tariff duty of fuel oil imports by all public utilities from 20% to 10%, which
— as this Honorable Court will take judicial
notice of — was effected through the
enactment of Presidential Decree 551:

b.       His alleged ‘active collaboration’ in
securing the approval by defendant Marcos and his Cabinet of the ‘Three-Year
Program for the Extension of MERALCO’s Services to Areas Within the
60-Kilometer Radius of Manila’ which — as this Honorable Court
will likewise take judicial notice of
— the present government continuously sanctions
to date.

c.       His alleged ‘support, assistance and
collaboration’ in the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc.

d.       His alleged acting as ‘dummy, nominee,
and/or agent by allowing’ himself ‘(i) to be used as instrument(s) (sic) in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or
policies prejudicial to Plaintiff’ or (ii) to be an incorporator, director, or
member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Romualdez’ in
order ‘to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.’”^[13]

Petitioner claims, however, that insofar
as he is concerned, the “foregoing allegations x x x and the purported
illegal acts imputed to them as well as the alleged causes of actions are vague
and ambiguous. They are not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity as would enable defendant Virata
to properly prepare his answer or responsive pleading.”^[14]
He therefore prays that “in accordance with Rule 12 of the Rules of Court,
plaintiff be directed to submit a more definite statement or a bill of
particulars on the matters mentioned above which are not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity.”^[15]

In its Comment, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines opposed
the motion. Replying to the opposition,
petitioner cited Tantuico vs. Republic^[16] which this
Court decided on 2 December 1991.

In its Resolution promulgated on 4 August 1992,^[17]
the respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) partially granted the Motion for
a Bill of Particulars. The dispositive
portion thereof provides:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant ‘Motion For Bill
of Particulars’, dated January 30, 1992, is hereby partially granted. Accordingly, plaintiff is hereby ordered to
submit to the Court and furnish defendant-movant with a bill of particulars of
the facts prayed for by the latter, pertaining to paragraph 17 (sic) and 18 of
the Expanded Complaint, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. Failure of plaintiff to do so would mean
automatic deletion and/or exclusion of defendant-movant’s name from the said
paragraphs of the complaint, without prejudice to the standing valid effect of
the other specific allegations against him.”^[18]

In granting the motion with respect to paragraphs 17 and 18 of
the expanded Second Amended Complaint — which it erroneously referred to as
the Expanded Complaint — the Sandiganbayan
stated:

“In deference to the pronouncement made by the Highest
Tribunal in Tantuico, We rule and so hold that the foregoing allegations
need further amplifications and specifications insofar as defendant-movant is
concerned in order for him to be able to properly meet the issue therein x x
x.”^[19]

However, in denying amplification as to
the rest of the allegations, the Sandiganbayan declared that:

“Albeit We are fully cognizant of the import and effect of the
Supreme Court ruling in Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic,
et. al., supra, however, We are not prepared to rule that
the said case applies squarely to the case at bar to warrant an absolute ruling
in defendant­-movant’s favor. The
thrust of the ruling in said case, although possessing a semblance of relevance
to the factual setting of the instant incident, does not absolutely support
defendant-movant’s stance. As
implicitly admitted by defendant-movant, there are certain specific charges
against him in the Expanded Complaint which are conspicuously absent in Tantuico, to wit: (i) his alleged ‘active collaboration’ in
the reduction of the electric franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts and
the tariff duty on fuel oil imports by all public utilities from 20% to 10%,
which was effected through the enactment of Presidential Decree 551; (ii) his
‘alleged collaboration’ in securing the approval by defendant Marcos and his
Cabinet of the ‘Three-Year Program for the Extension of Meralco’s Services to
Areas Within the 60-Kilometer Radius of Manila’; and (iii) his alleged ‘support,
assistance and collaboration’ in the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc.
(EHI).

We are of the considered opinion that the foregoing charges in the
Expanded Complaint are clear, definite and specific enough to allow
defendant-movant to prepare an intelligent responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial. Considering the tenor of the
Supreme Court ruling in Tantuico, the nature and composition of the
foregoing factual allegations are, to Us, more than enough to meet the
standards set forth therein in determining the sufficiency or relevancy of a
bill of particulars. Alleging the specific nature, character,
time and extent of the phrase ‘active collaboration’ would be a mere surplusage
and would not serve any useful purpose, except to further delay the proceedings
in the case. Corollarily, any question
as to the validity or legality of the transactions involved in the charges
against defendant-movant is irrelevant
and immaterial in the resolution of the instant incident, inasmuch as the same is a matter of defense
which shall have its proper place during the trial on the merits, and on they
determination of the liability of defendant-movant after the trial proper. Furthermore, the matters which
defendant-movant seeks are evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate
or personal knowledge, may be denied or admitted by him or if deemed necessary,
be the subject of other forms of discovery.”^[20]

In short, of the four (4) actionable
wrongs enumerated in the Motion for a Bill of Particulars, the Sandiganbayan
favorably acted only with respect to the
fourth.^[21]

Not satisfied with the partial grant of the motion, petitioner
filed the instant petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not totally granting his Motion
for a Bill of Particulars.

After thorough deliberations on the issues raised, this Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit. We therefore rule for the petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan’s favorable application of Tantuico vs. Republic of the Philippines^[22] with respect to the fourth
“actionable wrong,” or more particularly to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the
expanded Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035, and its refusal to
apply the same to the first three (3) “actionable wrongs” simply
because it is “not prepared to rule that the said case (Tantuico) applies squarely to the case at bar
to warrant an absolute ruling in defendant-movant’s favor,” is quite
contrived; the ratiocination offered in support of the rejection defeats the
very purpose of a bill of particulars.

It is to be
observed that Tantuico vs. Republic of
the Philippines also
originated from Civil Case No. 0035. Tantuico, herein petitioner’s co-defendant in the said civil case, filed
a motion for a bill of particulars to seek
the amplification of the averments in paragraphs 2, 7, 9(a), 15 and 17
of the Second Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in
nature.^[23]
This Court eventually overruled the Sandiganbayan and forthwith directed the
respondents therein to prepare and file a Bill
of Particulars embodying the facts prayed for by Tantuico; this was
based on Our finding that the questioned allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Tantuico “are deficient because the averments therein are
mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by factual premises.”^[24]

As in the earlier case of Virata
vs. Sandiganbayan, We have
carefully scrutinized the paragraphs of the expanded Second Amended Complaint
subject of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars and find the same
to be couched in general terms and wanting in definiteness or
particularity. It is precisely for this
reason that We indirectly suggested in the said decision that the petitioner’s
remedy is to file a motion for a bill of particulars and not a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the basis of the distinction
made by the respondent Sandiganbayan between the allegations in support of the
first three (3) “actionable wrongs” and those in support of the fourth is as imperceptible as
it is insignificant in the light of its admission that the ruling in Tantuico possesses “a semblance of relevance to the factual setting
of the instant incident.” As We see
it, there exists not only a semblance but a striking similarity in the
crafting of the allegations between the causes of action against Tantuico and
those against the petitioner. And, as
already stated, such allegations are general and suffer from a lack of
definiteness and particularity. As a
matter of fact, paragraphs 2, 7, 9 and 17 — four of the five
paragraphs of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 which was resolved in Tantuico –– are likewise involved in the instant case. Tantuico’s applicability to the instant case is thus ineluctable and the
propriety of the motion for a
bill of particulars under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court is
beyond dispute. Said section reads:

“SEC. 1. Motion for bill of particulars. — Before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten
(10) days after service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.”

As this Court enunciated in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan:^[25]

“It is the office or function, as well as the object or
purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more
minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party
and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the
cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite
party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial
may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and
needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party
may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the
function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize,
and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and
assist the court. A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the
case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill.

It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material
allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of
action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or
defense other than the one stated. Also
it is not the office or function, or a proper object, of a bill of particulars
to set forth the pleader’s theory of his cause of action or a rule of
evidence on which he intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information
whether such information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to
introduce or of facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other party
or which will enable the
opposite party to establish an affirmative defense not yet pleaded.”

The phrase “to enable him properly to prepare his responsive
pleading x x x” in Section 1 of Rule 12 implies not just the opportunity to properly
prepare a responsive pleading but also, and more importantly, to prepare
an intelligent answer. Thus, in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court also said:

“The complaint for which a bill for a more definite statement is sought, need only inform the
defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to enable him,
the defendant, to prepare an intelligent
answer x x x.”^[26]
(Emphasis supplied)

The proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires
information as to the precise nature, character, scope and extent of the cause
of action in order that the pleader may be able to squarely meet the issues
raised, thereby circumscribing them within determined confines and preventing
surprises during the trial, and in order that he may set forth his defenses
which may not be so readily availed of if the allegations controverted are
vague, indefinite, uncertain or are mere general conclusions. The latter task assumes added significance because defenses not
pleaded (save those excepted in Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court
and, whenever appropriate, the
defense of prescription)^[27] in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. It was, therefore, grave error for the Sandiganbayan to state
that “[a]lleging the specific nature, character, time and extent of the
phrase ‘active collaboration’ would be a mere surplusage and would not serve
any useful purpose”^[28] for
precisely, without any amplification or particularization thereof, the
petitioner would be hard put in meeting the charges squarely and in pleading
appropriate defenses. Nor can We accept
the public respondent’s postulation that “any question as to the validity
or legality of the transactions involved in the charges against
defendant-movant is irrelevant and immaterial in the resolution of the instant
incident, inasmuch as the same is a matter of defense which shall have its
proper place during the trial on the merits, and on the determination of the
liability of defendant-movant after the trial proper.”^[29]
This is absurd, for how may the
petitioner set up a defense at the time of trial if in his own answer he was
not able to plead such a defense precisely because of the vagueness or
indefiniteness of the allegations in the complaint? Unless he pleads the defense in his answer, he may be deprived of
the right to present the same during the trial because of his waiver thereof;
of course, he may still do so if the adverse party fails to object thereto or
if he is permitted to amend his answer pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules of Court, but that is another thing.

We also find the
Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that “the matters which defendant-movant seeks are
evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate or personal knowledge, may
be denied or admitted by him or if deemed necessary, be the subject of other
forms of discovery,”^[30] to
be without basis as to the first aspect and gratuitous as to the second. The above disquisitions indubitably reveal
that the matters sought to be
averred with particularity are not evidentiary in nature. Since the issues have not as yet been joined and no evidence
has so far been adduced by the parties, the Sandiganbayan was in no position to
conclude that the matters which the petitioner seeks are “within his intimate or personal
knowledge.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan of 4 August 1992, to
the extent that it denied the motion for a bill of particulars with respect to
the so-called first three (3) “actionable wrongs,” is SET ASIDE but
affirmed as to the rest. Accordingly, in addition to the specific bill of
particulars therein granted, respondent Republic of the Philippines, as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, is hereby ordered to
submit to the defendant (herein petitioner) in the said case, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a bill of particulars
containing the facts prayed for by the latter insofar as the first three (3)
“actionable wrongs” are concerned.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo, Campos, Jr., and Quiason,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., in the result.

Narvasa, C.J. and
Romero, J., no part.

^[1]
G.R. No. 86926.

^[2]
G.R. No. 86949.

^[3]
202 SCRA 680 [1991].

^[4]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 38-78. The complaint is for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and is
denominated as one for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages.

^[5]
Annex “D”, Id.; Id.,
127-174.

^[6]
Pp. 693-695; entries within parentheses
appear as footnotes in the decision.

^[7]
Rollo, 9.

^[8]
Id.

^[9]
Annex “E” of Petition; Id.,
175-182.

^[10]
Rollo, 175-177.

^[11]
Rollo, 177.

^[12]
Rollo, 177-180.

^[13]
Rollo, 180-181.

^[14]
Rollo, 181.

^[15]
Id.

^[16]
204 SCRA 428 [1991].

^[17]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, op, cit., 24-37.

^[18]
Id., 36-37.

^[19]
Rollo, 34-35.

^[20]
Rollo, 32-34.

^[21]
Id., 14.

^[22]
Supra.

^[23]
Supra., at page 435.

^[24]
Supra., at page 448.

^[25]
180 SCRA 34, 42-43 [1989], quoting 71 C.J.S. 376, cited in Tantuico vs.
Republic, supra.

^[26]
Supra., at page
43, omitting footnote.

^[27]
Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766
[1969]; Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250 [1980]; Gulang vs.
Nadayag, G.R. No. 82630, 30 September 1992.

^[28]
Supra, footnote no. 20.

^[29]
Id.

^[30]
Supra,
footnote no. 20.