ARNOLD VEGAFRIA, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE CATALINO CASTAÑEDA, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 17, RTC, MANILA, RONILO A. AZARRAGA, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR OF MANILA, AND CARLOS V. DE GUZMA…

The legal consequence of the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, based on an Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complaining witness,
is the crux of this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On 27 May 1991, an Information charging petitioner Arnold
Vegafria with violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed as Crim. Case No. 91-95052,^[1] and
subsequently raffled to Branch 17 presided by respondent Judge Catalino
Castaneda, Jr.

On 4 December 1991, on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance
executed by private respondent Carlos V. De Guzman, the complaining witness,
stating inter alia that he misapprehended the facts surrounding the
issuance of the subject check, preceded by a Memorandum of Agreement signed by
him and accused-petitioner, respondent Judge issued an order provisionally
dismissing the criminal case.^[2]

More than six (6) months later, or on 17 June 1992, private
respondent De Guzman moved to revive the criminal action alleging that “only
recently, upon re-examination of the records, it appears that there was in fact
no error in accounting and that the accused has not fully paid the amount due
on the dishonored check contrary to what was earlier thought”.^[3] Quite obviously, petitioner did not satisfy
the terms of his undertaking.

Meanwhile, pending resolution of the incident, petitioner filed
an “Urgent Motion for Permission to Depart for the United States.”

On 4 August 1992, respondent Judge granted the motion of private
respondent for the reinstatement of Crim. Case No. 91-95052, and on 6 August
1992 denied his urgent motion for leave to go abroad for the reason that his
case was already revived. Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner principally argues that the provisional dismissal of
his case operated as an acquittal on the merits since its basis was the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by private respondent. Therein, the latter admitted that he
misapprehended the facts surrounding the issuance of the check; that there was
an error in accounting, and that he was no longer interested in pursuing the
case. These unequivocal declarations,
petitioner contends, made it impossible for the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, hence, the motion for the provisional dismissal of the
case was inevitable.

We do not agree. The
order of respondent Judge issued 4 December 1991 stresses in no uncertain terms
that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived
at some future date. Thus –

“Lastly, the accused also took the witness stand and declared that
he was agreeable to the provisional dismissal of this criminal case. The Court then informed the accused of the
nature of a provisional dismissal, i.e., that such dismissal could mean a
possible revival of this criminal action against him. Despite this explanation, the accused
insisted on his conformity to the provisional
dismissal of the same” (underscoring ours).^[4]

If petitioner believed that the case against him should be
dismissed with prejudice he should not have agreed to a provisional
dismissal. He should have pressed for a
dismissal with prejudice, or invoked his constitutional right to a speedy trial
so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to
present its evidence, otherwise, the case would be dismissed with prejudice. But, instead of assuming this stance,
petitioner even took the witness stand and expressly agreed to the provisional
dismissal of the case. In fact, as
reflected in the order in question, the court explicitly informed him of the
nature of a provisional dismissal, which could mean a possible revival of the
case against him. Since the case was
dismissed provisionally with his conformity, petitioner as accused therein
cannot thereafter invoke double jeopardy upon revival of the case.^[5]

Moreover, the Affidavit of Desistance on which was based the
provisional dismissal of the case was not the product of precipitate move but
the direct consequence of the Memorandum of Agreement of the parties. Significantly, it may be noted that the
Affidavit of Desistance was executed on 4 December 1991, while the Memorandum
of Agreement was submitted two (2) days earlier. By the very terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, it appears that
private respondent was induced to provisionally
withdraw his complaint because petitioner represented that he would liquidate
all his obligations with the former through the covenants set forth therein not
later than 30 May 1992.^[6] Petitioner apparently failed to settle his
obligations on the due date. Thus, the
reinstatement of the criminal complaint against him. Definitely, it is unfair for petitioner to renege on his
commitment which was the raison d’etre for the provisional dismissal of
his case.

WHEREFORE, there being no abuse of discretion, much less
grave, committed by respondent Judge in issuing his questioned Orders of 4
August 1992 and 6 August 1992, which We here AFFIRM, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Petition, Annex “D”.

^[2]
lbid., Annex “G”.

^[3]
Ibid., Annex “H”.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 40.

^[5]
See Que v. Cosico, G.R. No. 81861, 8 September 1989; 177 SCRA 410.

^[6]
lbid., p. 49.