THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO DIO Y BOTABARA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

For non-payment of the meager debt of P100.00, accused-appellant
Ernesto Dio would have Us believe that the alleged victim of a violacion
de una mujer voluntarily offered her body as payment therefor
on October 28, 1990. To bolster this
theory of consent to the sexual conjugation, accused-appellant claims in the
appeal before Us that he and Natividad Bañal are lovers.

Thus, accused-appellant finds it ironic to have been charged with
rape supposedly consummated in this manner:

That on or about the 28th day of October, 1990 at more or less 9:00
o’clock in the morning, at Barangay Bonga-­Lower, Municipality of Bacacay,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with the use of bladed weapon, with lewd design
and intent to lay with NATIVIDAD B. BANAL, a married woman, by means of force,
threats and intimidation did then and there willfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge with the aforesaid Natividad B. Bañal
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

(p. 1, Rollo)

The narration of the factual backdrop by the Office of the
Solicitor General supported as it is by the evidentiary record, is hereby
adopted, to wit:

On October 28, 1990 at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning in Lower
Bonga, Bacacay, Albay, complainant Natividad Bañal was tethering the carabao in
the place where it wallowed in the mud about sixty (60) meters away from her
house. The area was filled with
coconuts and anahaw trees typical of a provincial setting (pp. 6-7, TSN, Jan.
27, 1992).

While she was watching the carabao, appellant suddenly appeared
from behind her and immediately choked her neck. He then removed his left hand and placed it on her mouth. With the use of his right hand, he got a
knife and poked it on her neck. She was
not able to scream as she was overwhelmed by fear. He then dragged her to an area where there were so many anahaw
trees. Upon reaching there, he pushed
her down and pinned her with his body. He then lifted her skirt and tore the panty she was wearing. With the knife still poked at her neck, he
succeeded in raping her in a kneeling position. She tried in vain to push him away but she was overpowered by him
(pp. 7-9, TSN, Ibid.).

After complainant was raped, she was threatened by appellant not to
report the matter to anyone otherwise he will kill all the members of her
family. He then walked away casually
(p. 11, TSN, Ibid.)

After appellant had gone away, complainant went to the house of her
parents-in-law. After arriving thereat,
she was informed that her husband had already left for the cockpit. She then went home without telling them of
the incident (pp. 11-12, TSN, Ibid.).

When complainant’s husband arrived at around 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day, she told him of the incident. Her husband became furious but they could
not decide whether or not they should report the matter to the police for fear
of any retaliation appellant might make (p. 12, TSN, Ibid.).

Finally, on November 29, 1990 they went to report the matter to the
police. Complainant also went to the
Municipal Health Office to have a physical check­-up. Unfortunately, the doctor was not around and a staff member of
the doctor told her that a medical examination was not necessary anymore since
she was already a married woman (pp. 13-14, TSN, Ibid.).

Appellant was subsequently charged with the crime of Rape.

(pp. 71-74, Rollo.)

The defense, on the other hand, came up with its own
diametrically opposed version premised on denial, alibi, and the married
woman’s acquiescence:

Accused Ernesto Dio denied having anything to do with the crime
attributed to him. He testified that on
October 28, 1990, he was at home making mats. He and Natividad Bañal were lovers. Their relationship started on July 22, 1990 when Natividad borrowed
money from him. On July 27, 1990,
Natividad again borrowed money from him. He then told her: “You have
not paid yet the previous loan and again you are borrowing money from me.”
Natividad answered him that she would instead offer herself to him. On several occasions, he and Natividad had
sexual intercourse. This was repeated
for the last time on October 20, 1990 at the anahaw plantation. While there, Natividad told him that her
husband harmed her. Natividad then
proposed to him that they better elope. He did not accede to such request prompting her to inform her husband
about their relationship. Hence, the
crime of rape filed against him. (TSN,
April 3, 1992, pp. 3-8).

(pp. 36-37, Rollo.)

Efforts exerted below by accused-appellant to secure exoneration
from the charge failed to draw the desired reaction from the trial judge who
opined, in the course of pronouncing accused?appellant’s culpability for
the misdeed, that the mass of evidence presented by the People is enough to
negate accused-appellant’s profession of inno­cence.

Accused-appellant now impugns the trial court’s verdict by
arguing that the court erred:

I

. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
COMPLAINANT DID NOT OFFER ANY TENACIOUS RESISTANCE AND THAT SHE DID NOT EXERT
ANY EFFORT TO HAVE HERSELF EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN.

II

. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND IN
NOT GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

. . . IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND THAT HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

(p. 34, Rollo.)

To the general query of whether accused?appellant’s supplication
for exculpation is legally acceptable amidst the factual ambiance of the case
at bar, we recall and re-echo the oft-repeated principle in adjective law that
the Court has almost invariably placed great reliance on the findings of trial
courts based on facts directly available to them as disclosed by the parties
during trial. The findings of trial
courts, are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that the court overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if
considered, would have affected the result of the case (People vs.
Abuyan, Jr. 211 SCRA 662 [1992]). It is this maxim which precisely precludes us from re-evaluating factual
matters which spring from judgment on the credibility of witnesses, inasmuch as
these points are better addressed to the trial judge for his resolution.

Even then, and if only to rectify accused?appellant’s
misimpression, We nonetheless have to stress that Natividad Bañal’s story
inspires belief for it is highly improbable for her, a married woman with a
young child, to expose herself to humiliation and embarrassment, if her
accusations were not true (People vs. Avila, 192 SCRA 635
[1990]). This was graphically, if a bit
ungrammatically, depicted by the court a quo in its decision, to
wit:

It is not an easy and comfortable act to face authorities and
report in details, divulge and demonstrate of a heinous crime – rape, committed
on oneself. This was done so by
Natividad Bañal, the victim, bravely in front of her husband, authorities,
investigators and the public. She was
attacked, dragged and savagely raped by the accused herein, a ‘de sangre’ of
that sort, in an uncalled for portion of the earth. After the savage act, the accused resorted to threats for the
victim not to squeal the incident. The
filthy moment has to be tided up, hence, this redress of grievances the victim
has to hold on.

(p. 19, Rollo.)

Nor does the failure of complainant to report the incident
immediately detract from her credibility, her hesitation being attributable to
accused-appellant’s death threats, not to speak of the natural reluctance of a
woman having to admit in public her having been raped (People vs.
Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596 [1992]).

Accused-appellant invokes alibi by saying that on October 28,
1990, he was then at home making mats.

This Court has consistently ruled that alibi is a weak defense
because it can easily be fabricated or concocted. In order for this form of exculpation to prosper, it is not
enough that the accused proves that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Bernardo,
et. al., G.R. No. 97393, March 17, 1993, citing People vs.
Caday, 208 SCRA 781, [1992]). Here, accused-appellant has not shown by clear and convincing evidence
that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime, considering
that, by his own admission, his house was only one kilometer away from
Natividad’s house which, in turn, was more or less 60 meters from the place
where the alleged rape was committed. Furthermore, accused-appellant’s denial cannot prevail over his positive
identification by Natividad as her rapist.

Accused-appellant contends that complainant did not exert
sufficient resistance to his sexual advances which primarily shows that the
sexual act was voluntary. Verily,
accused-appellant himself admits that Natividad tried to resist his lewd
advances, only, so he argues, this resistance is not sufficient. This argument is bereft of merit for in rape
cases it is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death (People
vs. Aquino, 197 SCRA 578, [1991]). And, death was not too far away from Natividad, pointed as the
knife was at her jugular. This
circumstance constituted indeed sufficient threat or intimidation to make her
submit to accused-appellant’s sexual assault for fear of her life. (People vs. Olivar, 215
SCRA 759 [1992]).

Accused-appellant also argues that the crime ascribed against him
is bereft of credence because Natividad failed (a) to exert efforts to have
herself medically examined and (b) to present in court her torn pair of
panties.

A medical examination is not an indispensable element in a
prosecution for rape (People vs. Saldivia, 203 SCRA 461
[1991]). Thus, the absence thereof will
not by itself result in accused?appellant’s exoneration because a
judgment against an accused depends upon the evidence offered and as long as
such evidence convinces the court of the guilt of the accused, a conviction
therefor is proper (People vs. Orteza, 116 Phil. 424
[1992]; 3 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 ed., p. 1701). In fact, the lack of medical examination on
Natividad cannot be ascribed to any negligence on her part. This matter was adequately explained by her
during her cross examination, to wit:

Q. – You did not submit any medical certificates to show if you had
injuries sustained in your vagina or any parts of your body, is it not?

A. – We went to the Municipal Health Office
but we were not able to see the doctor. But the woman there told us that a medical certificate is no longer
needed since I am already married.

(p. 14, TSN, Jan. 27,
1992.)

Too, the non-presentation of complainant’s torn pair of panties
is not fatal to the prosecution’s case inasmuch as Natividad herself narrated
in detail and in a straightforward manner how accused-appellant was able to
rape her, and despite the rigorous cross-examination by accused?appellant’s
counsel, she remained consistent in her testimony.

As a last ditch effort, accused-appellant concocted a love-affair
script to the effect that he and Natividad were lovers, claiming that their
amorous relationship started sometime on July 22, 1990. Such defense cannot be accorded any credence
(People vs. Sarol, 198 SCRA 286, [1991]) for if
complainant and accused-appellant had in fact been lovers, complainant would
not have immediately reported the matter to her husband, such demeanor being
anathema to an illicit affair (People vs. Sarol,
supra.) Moreover, it is unthinkable for
complainant, who has some means for livelihood, to borrow money from accused?appellant
who was struggling for survival together with his nine children and wife. Equally unacceptable is accused?appellant’s
thesis that Natividad was a willing participant to the sexual congress as
payment for the petty loan of P100.00, inasmuch as there was no indication that
Natividad is a barrio temptress who will go to the extent of giving her body to
every creditor upon demand for liquidation of her debt.

In view of the foregoing considerations, We find that the court a
quo did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. However, in
addition to the imprisonment sentence imposed, accused-appellant should
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00 (People vs.
Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 [1991]).

WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as indemnity to the victim, with costs against accused?appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.