JOSELITA SALITA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR. 107, AND ERWIN ESPINOSA, RESPONDENTS.

Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the
Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on
the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.

The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code.^[1]
Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for
annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in
amplification of the petition.

The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that “[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to
realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at
the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter.”^[2]
Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of
particulars which the trial court granted.^[3]
Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that –

x x x at the time of their marriage,
respondent (Joselita Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession – that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine – upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of
Particulars. She argued that the
“assertion (in the Bill of
Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel
and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of
Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred x x x x”^[4] But finding the questioned Bill of
Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file
her responsive pleading.

Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us. However, we referred her petition to the
Court of Appeals for resolution.

On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her
petition thus –

In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s
alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars x x x x

In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the
Rules’ requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting
a plaintiff’s cause of action. To
require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time,
place and person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary
matters. To obtain evidentiary details,
Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery provided by the
Rules of Court (Rules 24 to 28).

Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a question
that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the merits of the
case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition.^[5]

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed
by Joselita Salita questioning
the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying due course to her petition.

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations
she allegedly was not able to
perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant
to her husband’s cause of action. She
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct
or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does
not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details
she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.

Private respondent on the other hand believes that his
allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the
Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as –

x x x important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly
make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements
are to be established. It refers to
principal, determinate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of
action rests.^[6]

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and
evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions
from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded
are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement
of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove,
and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those
facts x x x x^[7]

Private respondent further argues that “[c]onclusions of law
and evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of pleading limit the statement of
the cause of action only to such operative facts as would give rise to the
right of action of the plaintiff
to obtain relief against the
wrongdoer. The details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be stated.”^[8]

In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars
submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity
as to enable herein petitioner
to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.

A complaint only needs
to state the “ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes
of action.”^[9]
Ultimate facts has been defined as
“those facts which the expected evidence will support.”^[10]
As stated by private respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the details
of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements
are to be established.” It
refers to “the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required
to prove the existence of those facts.” And a motion for bill of
particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite,
nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action.^[11]
A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form
part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.^[12]

We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill
of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details
from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary
matters. Indeed, petitioner has already
been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her
thus –

x x x x (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession – that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine – upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that
petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that
“she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands made by
his profession x x x upon his time and efforts x x x x” Certainly, she can
respond to this. To demand for more
details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts – facts
necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.^[13] For
sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular
acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is
not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.^[14]

We distinguish the
instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v.
Republic^[15] where we said –

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as names of persons,
names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint
in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made
against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant
case. That ruling involves alleged
“misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power.” The respondents
therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. There, the alleged illicit
acts should be fully documented. The
instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling,
to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have to
prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.

Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the
immediate resumption of the annulment proceedings which have already been
delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its trial
stage. Whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated should be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying
the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple
who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful
life either alone or in the company of each other.

A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code.^[16]
We do not see the need to define or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are not called upon to do so, the
actual controversy being the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture
would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that petitioner in her
memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio­-Diy,
formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, explains –

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.^[17]

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the
instant petition is DENIED and
the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated 21 July 1992 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization
(As amended by E.O. 227).

^[2]
Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed by Erwin Espinosa, par. 3; Rollo,
p. 20.

^[3]
Order issued by Judge Delilah
Magtolis, Regional Trial Court, Br, 107, Quezon City; Rollo, p. 26.

^[4]
Opposition to the Supposed Bill of
Particulars Submitted by Petitioner, p. 2, par. 6; Rollo, p. 30.

^[5]
Resolution penned by Associate Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Associate Justices Fidel P. Purisima and
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., of the
Ninth Division.

^[6]
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 435.

^[7]
Id., citing 71 C.J.S. 34.

^[8]
Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 10; Rollo, p. 197.

^[9]
Sec. 3, Rule 6, Rules of Court.

^[10]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed.,
citing McDuffie v. California Tehama Land Corporation, 138 Cal. App.
245, 32 P. 2d 385, 386.

^[11]
Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, Vol. I,
Second Ed., 1989, p. 320.

^[12]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1979 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 397, citing W.J. Dillmer Transfer Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 8
Fed. Rules Service, p. 163, US Dist. Ct., W.D. Pa., 6 October 1944.

^[13]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed.,
citing People ex rel. Hudson
& M.R. Co. v. Sexton, Supp.,
44 N.Y. S.2d 884, 885.

^[14]
Paras, See Note 11, citing Graffius v. Weather-Seal Inc., 9 Fed. Rules Service 12e, 231, Case No. 13.

^[15]
G.R. No. 89114, 2 December
1991, 204 SCRA 428.

^[16]
See Note 1.

^[17]
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988, p. 37.