DELFIN G. VILLARAMA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when
inflicted by those with moral ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for
separation from service.

First, the facts. On
November 16, 1987, petitioner DELFIN VILLARAMA was employed by private
respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its Materials Manager. His starting salary was P6,500.00 per month,
later increased to P8,500.00.

On July 15 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual
harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to
resign from work. Her
letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads:

“MR.
LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO

President

Golden
Donuts, Inc.

Dear Sir:

I would like to tender my resignation from my post as Clerk Typist
of Materials Department effective immediately.

It is really my regret to leave this company which has given me all
the opportunity I long desired. My five
(5) months stay in the company have been very gratifying professionally and
financially and I would not entertain the idea of resigning except for the most
shocking experience I have had in my whole
life.

Last Friday, July 7, 1989, Mr. Delfin Villarama and Mr. Jess de
Jesus invited all the girls of Materials Department for a dinner when in (sic)
the last minute the other three (3) girls decided not to join the group
anymore. I do (sic) not have second
thought(s) in accepting their invitation for they are my colle(a)gues and I had
nothing in mind that would in any manner prompt me to refuse to what appeared
to me as a simple and cordial invitation. We went to a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our
dinner. Mr. Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and
Mr. Jess de Jesus were drinking while we were eating and (they) even offered me
a few drinks and when we were finished, they decided to bring me home. While on my way, I found out that Mr. Villarama was not driving the way to my
house. I was wondering why we were taking the wrong way until I found out
that we were entering a motel. I was
really shock(ed). I did not expect that
a somewhat reputable
person like Mr. Villarama could do such a thing to any of his
subordinates. I should have left the
company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who might
be similarly situated. I hope that
you would find time to investigate the veracity of my allegations and make each (sic) responsible for his own
deed. (emphasis ours)

Thank you very much and more power.

Very respectfully yours,

DIVINA GONZAGA”

The letter prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden
Donuts, Inc., to call petitioner to a meeting on August 4, 1989. Petitioner was then required to explain the
letter against him. It appears that
petitioner agreed to tender his resignation. Private respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private respondent approved
petitioner’s application for leave of absence with pay from August 5-28,
1989. It also issued an inter-office
memorandum, dated August 4, 1989, advising “all concerned” that
petitioner was no longer connected with the company effective August 5, 1989.^[1]
Two (2) days later, or on August 7, 1989, Mr. Prieto sent a letter to
petitioner confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially
separated from the private respondent. The letter reads:

“Dear Mr. Villarama:

This is to officially confirm our discussion last Friday, August 4,
1989, regarding your employment with us. As per our agreement, you will be officially separated from the company
effective August 23, 1989.

May I, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your
resignation letter on or before the close of business hours of August 22, 1989.

Please see the Personnel & Industrial Relations Office for your
clearance.

Very truly
yours,

(SGD). LEOPOLDO H.
PRIETO, JR.

President”

In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter dated August 16, 1989,
petitioner sought reconsideration of the management’s decision to terminate
him, viz:

“DEAR SIR:

MAY I REQUEST FOR A RECONSIDERATION ON THE
DECISION HANDED DURING OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1989, TERMINATING MY SERVICES
WITH THE COMPANY EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1989.

THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE
MATERIALS DEPARTMENT, WHICH I HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE PAST 21 MONTHS, TO THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPANY FAR OUTWEIGHS THE ERROR THAT I HAD COMMITTED. AN ERROR THAT MUST NOT BE A BASIS FOR SUCH A
DRASTIC DECISION.

AS I AM STILL OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE UNTIL THE
29th, OF THIS MONTH, MAY I EXPECT THAT I WILL RESUME MY REGULAR DUTY ON THE
29th?

ANTICIPATING YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.

VERY
TRULY YOURS,

(SGD.) DELFIN G. VILLARAMA”

For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was
dismissed by private respondent on August 23, 1989. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case^[2]
against private respondent.

In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V.
Nambi held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of petitioner and
there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate petitioner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA
to his former position, without loss of seniority rights, and pay his backwages at the rate of P8,500.00
per month from August 1989, until actual reinstatement; (2) pay petitioner the
amount of P24,866.66, representing his unused vacation leave and proportionate
13th month pay; (3) pay petitioner P100,000.00, as moral damages, and
P20,000.00, as exemplary damages; and (3) pay the attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent of the entire monetary award.

Private respondent
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992, public respondent reversed the
decision of the labor arbiter. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside and a new one entered declaring the cause of dismissal of
complainant as valid; however, for the procedural lapses, respondent (Golden
Donuts, Inc.) is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant (petitioner) in the
form of separation pay equivalent to two month’s (sic) pay (for his two years
of service, as appears (sic) in the
records), or the amount of P17,000.00.

“SO ORDERED.”

Hence, this petition
where the following arguments are raised:

THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

THE MERE ADMISSION OF THE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS ENTITLES
PETITIONER TO REINSTATEMENT.

IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HIS SALARIES FROM RECEIPT
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER ON 4 FEBRUARY 1991
TO (sic) AT LEAST THE PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ON (sic) 16 JULY
1992.

IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ALSO ENTITLED TO HIS UNUSED VACATION
LEAVE AND PROPORTIONATE 13TH MONTH PAY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF P24,866.66,
ADJUDGED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.

THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES BY THE
LABOR ARBITER IS JUSTIFIED.

We affirm with modification the impugned Resolution.

At the outset, we note that the Petition was not accompanied by a
certified true copy of the assailed July 16, 1992 NLRC Resolution,^[3]
in violation of Revised Circular
No. 1-88. Neither was there any certification
under oath that “petitioner has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that to
the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any
other tribunal or agency,” as required under Circular No. 28-91. It is settled, that non-compliance
with the provisions of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91, would
result in the outright dismissal of the petition.^[4]

In addition, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
special civil action for certiorari is available in cases where the
concerned “tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions had acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In Antonio v. National
Labor Relations Commission,^[5] we held that the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by
law is a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed decision, and the resolution thereof, which is not only
expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more speedy remedy
than a petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is to
enable the court or agency concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes
without the intervention of a higher
court.^[6]
In this case, the assailed July
16, 1992 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission was received by petitioner’s counsel
on July 23, 1992.^[7]
Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead, he commenced
this special civil action for certiorari. Be that as it may, we allowed the petition
to enable us to rule on the significant issues raised before us, viz: (1) whether or not petitioner’s right to
procedural due process was violated, and (2) whether or not he was dismissed
for a valid or just cause.

The procedure for
terminating an employee is found in Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, viz:

“x x x

“(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for
a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
counsel if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause shall rest on the employer. xxx” (emphasis supplied)

This procedure protects
not only rank-and-file employees but also managerial employees. Both have the right to security of tenure as
provided for in Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the case at bench, petitioner decided to
seek reconsideration of the termination of his service thru his August 16, 1989
letter. While admitting his error, he
felt that its gravity did not justify his dismissal. Considering this stance, and in conformity with the aforequoted
Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, petitioner should have been formally charged
and given an opportunity to refute the charges. Under the facts in field, we hold that petitioner was denied
procedural due process.

We now come to the more
important issue of whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.

Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was
unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed. We hold otherwise. The
records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be
separated from the company. He took a
leave of absence preparatory to his separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto
dated August 7, 1989. A few days after, petitioner reneged on the
agreement. He refused to be terminated
on the ground that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant his
separation from service. So he alleged
in his letter to Mr. Prieto dated August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner admitted his
“error” vis-a-vis Miss
Gonzaga. As a manager, petitioner should
know the evidentiary value of his admissions. Needless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his
separation.

Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for
dismissing a managerial employee. It
can be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at
bench. As further observed by the
Solicitor General:

“x x x assuming arguendo that De Jesus and Gonzaga were
sweethearts and that petitioner merely acceded to the request of the former to
drop them in the motel,
petitioner acted in collusion with the immoral designs of De Jesus and did not
give due regard to Gonzaga’s feeling on the matter and acted in chauvinistic
disdain of her honor, thereby justifying public respondent’s finding of sexual
harassment. Thus, petitioner not only
failed to act accordingly as a good father of the family because he was not
able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority over the group in the
matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively
facilitated the commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving
his car into the motel.”

(Comment, April 29, 1993,
p. 9)

As
a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he
succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a
justifiable ground for his dismissal
for lack of trust and confidence. It is
the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors.

To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in
terminating the employment of managerial employees on the ground of lack of
trust and confidence.^[8]

We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding
separation pay of P17,000.00 as indemnity for his dismissal without due process
of law. The award of separation pay is
proper in the cases enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code,^[9]
and in cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and
reinstatement is no longer feasible. But this is not to state that an employer cannot be penalized for
failure to give formal notice and conduct the necessary investigation before
dismissing an employee.^[10]
Thus, in Wenphil vs. NLRC^[11] and Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo,^[12] this Court awarded P1,000.00 as
penalty for non-­observance of due process.

Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary
damages. There was no bad faith or
malice on the part of private respondent in terminating the services of
petitioner.^[13]

Petitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick
leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as held by the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner
and should be unaffected by his separation from the service.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
resolution of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
award of separation pay is DELETED. Private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00
for non-observance of due process, and the equivalent amount of his unused
vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The effectivity of petitioner’s separation was August 23, 1989, but he was no
longer considered connected with private respondent effective August 5, 1989,
as per the office memorandum.

^[2]
Docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-01-04771-89.

^[3]
Petitioner, however, submitted a certified xerox copy of the “Notice of
Decision or Resolution Entered,” (re: Resolution dated July 16, 1992).

^[4]
Gallardo v. Rimando, G.R. No. 91718; Adm. Mat. No. RTJ?90-577,
Gallardo v. Quintos, 18 April 1991, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Imperial
Textile Mills Inc., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
First Division, January 13, 1993, Minute Resolution.

^[5]
G.R. No. 101755, Minute Resolution, January 27, 1992.

^[6] Zurbano vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al,
G.R. No. 103679, December 17, 1993.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 2.

^[8]
Dolores vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
87673, January 24, 1992; SMC vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 88088, January 24, 1992, 205
SCRA 348.

^[9]
In Del Monte Philippines,
Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 87371, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 370, 375, we reiterated the rule that “separation pay
shall be allowed as a social justice only in those instances where the employee
is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character.”

^[10]
Aurelio vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 99034, April 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 443.

^[11]
G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69.

^[12]
G.R. No. 78090, July 26, 1991, 199 SCRA 617.

^[13]
Suario vs. BPI and NLRC, G.R. No. 50459, August
25, 1989 176 SCRA 689; Dolores vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 87673, January 24,
1992; SMC vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 88088, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 348.