RUFINA BAUTISTA, ALFREDO, JR., LUZVIMINDA, MARIZA, JOSEPHINE, ALEJANDRO AND AMELITA, ALL SURNAMED VALDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MARINA L. BUZON; SPOUSES D…

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled “Spouses Alfredo Valdez and Rufina Bautista
v. Spouses Donald Salvador and Cresencia Salvador,” (CA-G.R. CV No.
31620).^[1]

The background facts of the case are as follows:

On August 10, 1983, spouses Alfredo Valdez and Rufina Bautista,
herein petitioners,^[2]
purchased a parcel of land with an area of three hundred twenty six (326)
square meters located in Barrio Maysilo (now Santolan), Malabon originally
registered in the name of Dionisio Santiago.^[3]

Petitioners Valdez bought the subject property from Maria dela
Cruz vda. de Santiago and Jose Santiago. The sale was effected in a deed of extrajudicial settlement with
absolute sale executed in their favor.^[4] In
this instrument, vendors Maria dela Cruz and Jose Santiago, claiming to be the
widow and son respectively of Dionisio Santiago, adjudicated unto themselves,
as the only heirs of the deceased,^[5] the
latter’s one half interest on the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 343919, which together with the one half share thereon of Maria dela
Cruz vda. de Santiago, was sold to spouses Alfredo Valdez and Rufina Bautista
for a consideration of P55,420.00. Consequently,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 343919 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 105231 was issued in the name of spouses Alfredo Valdez and
Rufina Bautista.^[6]

In a letter sent by their counsel dated February 27, 1984,
petitioners demanded that herein private respondents-spouses Donald and
Cresencia Salvador show proof of their right to occupy the subject premises and
to vacate the same.^[7]
After respondents failed to vacate the premises despite intervention by the
barangay officials of the locality,^[8]
petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for
recovery of possession of property on July 1, 1988.^[9]

The actual possessors of the land in question, herein private
respondents, represented by their attorney-in-fact Philip Salvador, claim
ownership over the property after having bought the same on installments from
the registered owner Dionisio Santiago. They allege that half of the property (163 sq. m.) was sold to them on December
20, 1974 for P16,300.00.^[10]
Payment thereon was completed on October 15, 1981.^[11]
On October 20, 1979 the other half of the land was bought for
P20,000.00, payment of which was received by Benjamina Magalong,^[12]
Dionisio Santiago’s wife, allegedly because the latter was already too weak and
sickly.

On February 28, 1991 the trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit and ordering the plaintiffs spouses Alfredo
Valdez to pay defendants Salvador P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees and to pay the
costs of the suit.^[13]

The trial court found that there was a double sale of the
immovable in question. Applying Article
1544 of the New Civil Code, the court a quo held that as to half of the
property in question, private respondents (Salvador spouses) had a preferential
right as against petitioners (Valdez spouses) who were purchasers in bad faith.^[14]
The petitioners were taken to task for failing to make inquiry concerning the
rights of private respondents who were in possession of the property.

“In his testimony, plaintiff Alfredo Valdez stated that before
he bought the property, he inquired from Maria dela Cruz about the house
erected thereon and he was informed by the latter that she had allowed her
relatives to build said house, with the understanding that they would vacate
said property and remove their house should she need the property, and that he
did not inquire from the defendants themselves why they have their house on the
property nor inform them that he was buying said property (tsn, May 11, 1989,
pp. 14-15). He likewise admitted that
the property in question is only about one half kilometer away from his
residence; that the defendants have their house on said property since 1970 and
that Dionisio Santiago likewise had a house on said property where he lived
with his common-law wife, Benjamina Magalong, while his legal wife, Maria dela
Cruz, lives in another place in the same neighborhood, and that he did not talk
to Benjamina Magalong (Ibid, pp. 7 and 10). In other words, plaintiffs merely relied on the statement of Maria dela
Cruz that defendants were her relatives whom she had allowed to build a house
on the property which she was offering to sell to them until such time that she
needed the same, although they knew that Maria dela Cruz did not live on said
property with her husband Dionisio Santiago, who resided thereon with his
common-law wife Benjamina Magalong. Thus,
had plaintiffs inquired from defendants themselves or from Benjamina Magalong
by what right did defendants have a house on the property in question, before
they bought the entire property, they could have been informed of the deed of
sale executed by Dionisio Santiago in defendants’ favor. As held in De Guzman, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 156 SCRA 701, 710:

“The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions
which a prudent man would have taken under the circumstances, specially in
buying a piece of land in the actual, visible and public possession of another
person, other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.

‘In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case,
the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the
purchaser is required to go beyond the certificate of title and mae (sic)
inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him a purchaser
in bad faith. (Incala vs. Mendoza,
CA-G.R. No. 13677-R, November 9, 1965; De Jesus vs. Revilla, CA­-G.R. No.
13562-R, October 5, 1965; Martelino vs. Manikan, CA-G.R. No. 32792-R, June 22,
1956).

‘xxx.

‘One who purchases real property which is in actual possession of
another should, at least make some inquiry concerning the right of those in
possession. The actual possession by
other than the vendor should, at least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarely (sic), in the absence of such
inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessors. (Conspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144).”^[15]

With respect to the other half of the property (163 sq. m.) the
trial court ruled that petitioners had preferential right over the land. The sale made on December 20, 1979 by
Benjamina Magalong in favor of private respondents had no force and effect.

“xxx. Not being the registered owner nor authorized by the registered
owner, Benjamina Magalong had no right to sell the other half portion of the
property covered by TCT No. 343919. Consequently, upon the demise of Dionisio Santiago on November 26, 1982,
the latter’s right over one half portion of the property covered by TCT No.
343919 passed on to his legal heir, i.e., his wife Maria dela Cruz as
appearing on the face of said certificate of title, as the other half was
already sold by him to Donald Salvador, by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 20, 1974 (Exh. “14”).”^[16]

On appeal,^[17]
appellants-spouses Valdez challenged the trial court’s decision to award one
half of the property to private respondents and claimed that they should have
left the parties where they are pursuant to the doctrine of in pari delicto.^[18]

The Court of Appeals held that these points were already raised
and resolved by the court a quo. Nevertheless,
the court proceeded to examine the case. Relief prayed for by appellants was denied and the decision appealed
from was affirmed in toto by
respondent court.^[19]

Hence the instant petition, where the following issues are
elevated:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MISAPPLIED ARTICLE 1544 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE. THEIR HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
ARE IN BAD FAITH AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE BETTER RIGHT OVER THE QUESTIONED
PROPERTY IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE AND ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF LAW.

II

ASSUMING THAT PETITIONERS ARE IN BAD FAITH, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
ERRED WHEN THEY DID NOT LEAVE THE PARTIES WHERE THEY ARE CONSIDERING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHT FOR UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME BY NOT
REGISTERING THEIR ALLEGED DEED OF SALE.^[20]

The trial court already adjudged petitioners as having
preferential right over one half of the subject property.^[21]
Hence the present controversy covers only the remaining one half of the land which
the trial court adjudicated in favor of private respondents.

Petitioners theorize that public respondents (the Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals) erred when they held the spouses Valdez to be purchasers
in bad faith. They claim to have
satisfied the legal requirement that “in order (for) a purchaser of land
with a Torrens Title (to) be considered a purchaser in good faith, it is enough
that he examines the latest certificate of title xxx.”^[22]
Further, they maintain that they inquired from the vendors Maria dela Cruz vda.
de Santiago and Jose Santiago, heirs of Dionisio Santiago, concerning the
rights of private respondents who were in possession of the property.^[23]

The trial court held that plaintiffs spouses Valdez (herein
petitioners) should have inquired from defendants spouses Salvador themselves
or from Benjamina Magalong.^[24] This
requirement, petitioners argue, is unreasonable and pointless.

Firstly, because it exacts more than what the law requires from a
buyer of land covered by a Torrens Title. Secondly, although the private respondents were given the opportunities
to present their claim of title or ownership, the latter repeatedly failed to
support their claim over the property.^[25]
Thirdly, to inquire from Benjamina Magalong would be futile for she had no
right to stay on the property, proof of which is her subsequent eviction.^[26]

We are not persuaded.

Before us is a case involving registered land which had been sold
to two different persons.

The first sale was made by the registered owner Dionisio Santiago
in favor of private respondents (spouses Salvador) on December 20, 1974.^[27]
It was never registered although private respondents have been in uninterrupted
possession since 1970 up to the present, first as lessees and later on as
owners.

The second sale was made by Dionisio Santiago’s heirs, Maria dela
Cruz vda. de Santiago and Jose Santiago, in favor of petitioners on August 10,
1983, nearly a year after the former’s death. It was recorded and TCT No. 106251 was issued in the name of
petitioners.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides:

“If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.”

Where the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires
it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith,^[28]
shall be deemed the owner. The
requirement of the law then, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith. Mere registration of title is not enough,
good faith must concur with the registration.^[29] To
be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only establish prior
recording of his deed but must have acted in good faith, without knowledge of
the existence of another alienation by the vendor to another.^[30]

Who then is a purchaser in good faith?

In the early case of
Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson,^[31]
we explained the matter in this wise:

“One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or
lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in
good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and
the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint
him with the defects in title of his vendor. xxx. Good faith, or the lack of
it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but in ascertaining the
intention by which one is actuated in a given occasion, we are necessarily
controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone
the inward motive may, with safety be determined. So it is that “honesty of intention,” “the honest
lawful intent,” which constitutes good faith implies a “freedom
from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry,”
and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good
faith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of proof to the
contrary. “Good faith, or the want
of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather
a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied
tokens or signs.” (Wilder vs. Gilman, 55 Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs.
Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Breaux-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La.
Ann., 2094­-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs. Bromley, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.)

And more succinctly in Cui and Joven v. Henson^[32],
we said:

“A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest
in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. Good faith
consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage of another. Good faith is an
opposite of fraud and of bad faith, and its non existence must be established
by competent proof.

Being a question of intention, good faith or the lack of it can
only be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the
land. We shall now analyze whether or
not petitioners bought the land in good faith.

According to the trial court, petitioners should have inquired
from the actual possessors, including private respondents, “by what right
did they have for having a house on the property, before purchasing the entire
property” and not merely from the vendors.^[33]

They claim that such a requirement is unreasonable and that their
inquiry with the vendors is sufficient to make them buyers in good faith.

It is true that petitioners examined the certificate of title of
Dionisio Santiago before they bought the lot and found it clean and without
annotation of any encumbrance. And it
is equally true that a person dealing with the owner of registered land is not
bound to go beyond the certificate of title as he is charged with notice of
burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or on the
certificate of title.^[34]

However, it is important to note that petitioners did not buy the
land from the registered owner, Dionisio Santiago. They bought it from his heirs, Maria dela Cruz and Jose Santiago.

Where a purchaser buys from one who is not the registered owner
himself, the law requires a higher degree of prudence even if the land object
of the transaction is registered. One
who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not
only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him
to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the land.^[35]

The trial court correctly cited our pronouncement that
“(o)ne who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of
others should at least, make some inquiry concerning the rights of those in
possession. The actual possession by
others (sic) than the vendor should, at least, put the purchaser upon
inquiry. He can scarcely, in the
absence of such inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessors.”^[36]

In order to fulfill the requisite of good faith, it is imperative
for a purchaser of land which is possessed by persons not the vendor to inquire
and investigate into the rights or title of those in possession. The absence of such an inquiry will remove
them from the realm of bona fide acquisition.

Although petitioners made inquiry regarding the rights of private
respondents to possess the subject property, this case involves certain
peculiarities which lead us to affirm the respondent trial and appellate
courts’ finding that petitioners are not purchasers in good faith.

While petitioners claim to have so inquired, they did so from the
vendors who were not the registered owner. As we have seen from jurisprudence previously cited, buying land from
one not the registered owner should have put the buyer on guard concerning
facts which would acquaint him with defects in the title or capacity to
transfer of the vendor.^[37]

In addition, petitioners admit that they reside only half a
kilometer away from the property in question. This fact greatly facilitates such inquiry from the actual possessors
and not only from the vendors. Furthermore, petitioner’s husband Alfredo Valdez (plaintiff in the lower
court) knew that private respondents have a house on the property in question
which they have been occupying since 1970.^[38] At
the very least, they would have been apprised of the reputation of private
respondents’ possession since they are neighbors residing in the same locale.

As aptly put by the respondent court:^[39]

“As records bear it out, appellants had knowledge of
circumstances which ought to have put them on an inquiry but they did not. Such failure to exercise ordinary care
expected of real estate buyers necessarily means bearing the consequences of
their own acts. xxx.”

Regarding private respondents’ failure to present evidence of
their claim of title despite several opportunities to do so, the trial court
adequately accounted for the same. It
found that private respondent Cresencia Salvador was not a proper party in the
barangay conciliation proceedings and that Donald Salvador was abroad at the
time. Hence, her failure to present
such evidence does not militate against private respondents’ inculpability.^[40]

Next, petitioners argue that the land in question has not been
properly identified and described in evidence for private respondents [viz.
Exhibits 14 & 14­-A (Deed of Sale dated December 20, 1974) do not describe
which portion of land they refer; receipts of payment executed by Dionisio
Santiago vary with respect to their subject lots; the deed of sale was executed December 1974 when payment was only
completed on October 15, 1981; private respondents’ evidence does not show that
the land has been fully paid for because a number of Exhibits (16-A; 16-E;
16-F; 16-M; 16-DD; 16-EE; and 16-GG) are no evidence of payments. They are incompetent and hearsay for not
being properly identified.]^[41]

We are satisfied with the analysis and decision of the trial
court regarding this matter. Apart from
petitioners’ tenuous allegations, the identity of the subject property cannot
be seriously doubted. It held:

“The circumstance that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 20, 1974, covering one half portion of the property stated that the
consideration of P16,300.00 was received by Dionisio Santiago from defendant
Donald Salvador (Exh. “14”), whereas said amount was actually paid in
installment for a period of almost seven (7) years, as shown by the receipts
therefor (Exhs. “16”, “16­-A”, to “16-TT”), does
not affect the validity of the transaction. As explained by Philip Salvador, after the deed of sale was executed,
Dionisio Santiago wanted a full payment of the consideration but since he and
Donald Salvador did not have money, they agreed to have the consideration paid
in installment and that the copy of said deed of sale was given to him and
Donald Salvador by Dionisio Santiago only upon full payment of the
consideration of P16,300.00 (tsn September 21, 1990, pp. 6-7). Moreover, defendant Donald Salvador started
paying the realty taxes on the property owned by Dionisio Santiago beginning
with the year 1975-76 (Exhs. “8”, “9”, “11”,
“12” and “13”).

“In their Memorandum, plaintiffs pointed out the property
allegedly sold by Dionisio Santiago to defendant Donald Salvador was not
properly identified as the deed of sale refers to one half portion of Lot 14-B
situated at Maysilo St., Municipality of Malabon, whereas TCT No. 343919
covering said property states that it is situated in Barrio Maysilo,
Municipality of Malabon and there is a wide difference between street and
barrio. No significance can be
attributed to such circumstance. The
deed of sale expressly mentioned that the one half portion of the property (Lot
14-B) sold to Donald Salvador by Dionisio Santiago is covered by TCT No.
343919. In fact plaintiffs’ (herein
petitioners) tax declaration covering the property in question, attached as
Annex “B” to their Complaint, also states that the property is
located at Maysilo Street. And as
alleged in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Barangay Maysilo is now called
Santulan.”^[42]

Lastly, petitioners advance the theory that, even assuming
petitioners to be purchasers in bad faith, public respondents should have left
the parties where they are since both are at fault. Private respondents are equally to blame for failing to register
the alleged sale from the time they possessed the Deed of Absolute Sale
(October 15, 1981) to the time petitioners purchased the property (August 10,
1983), an unreasonable period of one year and ten months. It is because of this omission that the
present controversy arose, hence private respondents should be held responsible
and the parties held to be in pari
delicto.^[43]

The circumstance between the parties cannot qualify as being in pari delicto for they are not
similarly situated.

The trial court already held worthy of credence private
respondents’ testimony that they were not able to register said deed of sale
after they had paid the last installment to Dionisio Santiago because the
latter could no longer locate his copy of the transfer certificate of title.^[44]
We respect the findings of the trial court on this factual matter, it being a
better judge of the witness’s demeanor at the time he is called to the stand.

We also do not find private respondents equally blameworthy for
failing to register during the period of time cited above by petitioners. Their uninterrupted possession of the
property may have fostered complacency but their omission to register within
this period cannot constitute a situation of in pari delicto.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Segundino G. Chua and concurred in by Justices Jose A.R. Melo
and Artemon D. Luna; Rollo, pp.
31-43.

^[2]
During trial, Alfredo Valdez died. He was substituted by his heirs Alfredo,
Jr., Luzviminda, Mariza, Josephine, Alejandro and Amelita, all surnamed Valdez.

^[3]
Lot 14B consisting of 326 sq. m. situated in Barrio Maysilo, Municipality of
Malabon; covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 343919 of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, in the name of Dionisio Santiago, married to
Maria dela Cruz; Exhibit “15”; Records, p. 127.

^[4]
“Kasulatan ng Partihang Labas sa Hukuman
at Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa”; Exhibit “A”; Records, p. 8.

^[5]
Dionisio Santiago died November 26,
1982.

^[6]
November 30, 1983; Exhibit
“B”; Records, p. 5.

^[7]
Exhibit “C”; Records, p. 10.

^[8]
“Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman”; Exhibit “D”; Records, p. 11.

^[9]
Civil Case No. 1111-MN; RTC Malabon,
Branch 170; Hon. Marina L. Buzon, presiding.

^[10]
Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 20,
1974; Exhibit “14”; Records, p. 126.

^[11]
Trial Court Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p.
22.

^[12]
Receipt signed by Benjamina Magalong, dated
October 20, 1979; Exhibit “17”; Records, p. 178.

^[13]
Decision of the Trial Court; Rollo, pp.
25 – 30.

^[14]
Ibid, p. 6; Rollo, p. 25.

^[15]
Ibid, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 26-27.

^[16]
Ibid pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 28-29.

^[17]
CA-G.R. CV No. 31620.

^[18]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp.
21-22. Decision of the Court of
Appeals, p. 7; Rollo, p.
37.

^[19]
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1992; Rollo, p. 37.

^[20]
Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p.
10.

^[21]
The sale effected by Benjamina Magalong on December 20, 1979 was held to be invalid. See p. 10 of the decision of the trial
court; Rollo, p. 29.

^[22]
Citing Hernandez v. Katigbak vda. de Salas, 69 Phil 744; Flores et. al. v.
Plasino, G.R. No. L-5727, Feb. 12, 1954; Revilla, et. al. v. Galindez,
G.R. No. L-9940; March 30, 1960; Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11. cf. Decision of the Trial Court, first
paragraph, p. 7; Rollo, p. 26.

^[23]
“xxx. At the time he bought the property, he was told by Maria dela Cruz
that defendants were allowed by Dionisio Santiago to build their house on the propety
in question because they were relatives, with the understanding that defendants
would vacate said property in case the same would be needed by the owner.”
(Decision of the Trial Court, p. 3); Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.

^[24]
“Thus had plaintiffs inquired from defendants themselves or from Benjamina
Magalong by what right did defendants have a house on the property in question,
before they bought the entire property, they could have been informed of the
deed of sale executed by Dionisio Santiago in defendant’s favor.”; Ibid.
p. 7; Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12.

^[25]
Petitioners’ counsel wrote a letter private respondents spouses Salvador
informing them that the petitioners had purchased the land and demanding that
they vacate the land. Private”
respondents likewise did not claim they had purchased the land in three
conciliation meetings before the barangay. Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12.

^[26]
Exhibit “J”; Ibid., p.
12; Rollo, p. 13.

^[27]
Exhibit “14”, Records, p. 126.

^[28]
Nuguid v. CA, 171 SCRA 213
(1989); Vda. de Jomoc v. CA, 200 SCRA 74 (1991); Gatmaitan v. CA,
200 SCRA 37 (1992); Bucad v. CA, 216 SCRA 422 (1992); Abarquez v.
CA, 213 SCRA 414 (1992).

^[29]
Bergado v. CA, 173 SCRA 497, 505 (1989) citing Arcenas v. Del
Rosario, 67 Phil. 238.

^[30]
A. Baviera, SALES (1981 Edition), p. 72
citing Paylago v. Jarabe, G.R. No. 20046, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1247
(1968) citing the cases of Bernas v. Bolo, G.R. No. CA-650, May 14,
1948, 81 Phil. 16 (1948), Obras Pias v. Ignacio, 17 Phil. 45 (1910),
Emas v. De Zuzuaregui, 53 Phil, 197 (1929); Ignacio v. Santos
Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940 (1929); Gustilo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442
(1925); Ramos v. Dueño, 50 Phil. 786 (1927).

^[31]
37 SCRA 644, 651 (1918).

^[32]
51 SCRA 606, 612 (1928); Also
Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. CA, 213 SCRA 516
(1992).

^[33]
Trial Court Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p.
26.

^[34]
Revilla and Fajardo v. Galindez,
107 Phil. 480,484 (1960) citing Quimson v. Suarez, 47 Phil 901 and
Anderson and Co. v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506; Also Pino v. CA, 198
SCRA 434 (1991); Lopez v. CA, 169 SCRA 271 (1989); Lu v. IAC, 169
SCRA 595 (1989).

^[35]
Revilla v. Galindez, supra, at p. 485.

^[36]
Conspecto v. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144,
149 (1915)

^[37]
Supra, note 34.

^[38]
Decision of the Trial Court, p. 3; Rollo, p. 22.

^[39]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 12; Rollo, p. 42.

^[40]
Decision of the Trial Court, p. 10; Rollo,
p. 29.

^[41]
Petition, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp.
14-16.

^[42]
Decision of the Trial Court, p. 9; Rollo,
p. 28.

^[43]
Ibid., pp. 15-17; Rollo, pp. 16-18

^[44]
Ibid., p. 4; Rollo, p. 23.