VALIANT MACHINERY AND METAL CORPORATION AND JIMMY LUA SING, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), ELENO C. PONCIANO AND FERDINAND TRIA, RESPONDE…
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Valiant Machinery and Metal Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Valiant Machinery and Metal Corporation and its president and general manager, Jimmy Lua Sing, against the National Labor Relations Commission and two of the company's former machinists, Eleno Ponciano and Ferdinand Tria. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, which had reversed the Labor Arbiter and found the two workers illegally dismissed, ordering their reinstatement with backwages. The case matters because it draws the line between an actual dismissal and a constructive dismissal, and because it restates two working rules every labor lawyer must carry: the employer bears the burden of proving a valid cause for termination, and an award of attorney's fees must be justified in the body of the decision, not merely announced in the dispositive portion.
Procedural History
The two machinists filed complaints for illegal dismissal with the Department of Labor. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints, crediting the account of the company's security guard that the workers had not been prevented from returning to work. The workers appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the Labor Arbiter and held the company guilty of illegal dismissal, ordering reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights, or, if reinstatement was no longer feasible, separation pay with full backwages for three years, plus ten percent of the total award as attorney's fees. The Commission later modified its decision as to the amount of the monetary awards. Still unsatisfied, the company and its president brought this petition for certiorari with a prayer for a preliminary injunction or restraining order, and the Supreme Court resolved the case on the merits.
Facts
Eleno Ponciano and Ferdinand Tria worked as machinists at the Valiant Machinery and Metal Corporation, a machine and foundry shop in Grace Park, Kalookan City. Ponciano was employed in January 1987 and Tria on April 4, 1988. At the time of their separation on April 25, 1990, Ponciano was receiving a daily wage of 117 pesos and Tria, 95 pesos.
On April 18, 1990, the two obtained salary advances, locally called a vale, from Jimmy Lua Sing, the company's president and general manager. They were absent the next day, but reported back for work on April 20 and April 21. April 22 was a Sunday, and April 23 was a Monday. Although that Monday was not a holiday, the two again did not report for work, taking advantage of a company rule that gave workers the option not to work on Mondays when there was no electricity in the area. When they reported for work on April 24 and April 25, they claimed they were not allowed to enter the company premises.
On April 26, 1990, they filed complaints for illegal dismissal. The company denied the charge. It claimed that the two had asked for additional cash advances on April 20 and 21, and that when their request was denied they went on an indefinite leave, ignoring pleas not to abandon their work because they were badly needed in the factory. The company added that their names were included in the payroll for April 1990, and submitted the affidavit of its security guard, Bernardino Busbus, who claimed that the two did not report for work from April 23 to April 29, 1990 and were not prevented from entering the premises. The workers, for their part, denied asking for additional advances and claimed that the tactic of the president was to force them to resign so that the company would not have to give separation pay, especially after the business was changed from a single proprietorship into a corporation and some highly paid employees were laid off with separation pay.
Issues
- Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter and holding that the private respondents were illegally dismissed.
- Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in ordering reinstatement with full backwages, or separation pay with full backwages.
- Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
Applicable Provisions
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 6715, provides:
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
This is the provision the Court applies in modifying the award, because the dismissal occurred after March 21, 1989, the date of the effectivity of the amendment, so the workers are entitled to full backwages rather than backwages limited to three years.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: x x x When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
This is the exception the Commission relied on in awarding attorney's fees, and the Court holds that it does not apply because there is no showing that the petitioners acted willfully or in bad faith.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court found substantial evidence supporting the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission that the private respondents were dismissed without cause. There was no open termination, but the Court believed the company barred them from work because they had been absent practically for one week when they were badly needed in the factory. The Court found it more probable that the two tried to report for work on April 24 and April 25 but were not allowed into the premises, and that they filed the case the very next day. It rejected the claim that they had gone on indefinite leave, since they had reported for work on April 20 and 21 after the first advance. The Court then corrected the Commission's label: the petitioners are liable for illegal dismissal, not constructive dismissal. A constructive discharge is a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as in an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. Here there was no resignation at all, but a dismissal without cause.
On the second issue, the Court held that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to reinstatement and full backwages, and if reinstatement is not possible, to separation pay and full backwages. It modified the award of backwages for three years in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, by giving them full backwages, subject to the right of the petitioners to prove and deduct whatever income the workers may have earned in the interim.
On the third issue, the Court agreed with the petitioners that the award of attorney's fees was improper. There was no showing that the petitioners acted willfully or in bad faith and practically compelled the private respondents to litigate and incur expenses. Awards of attorney's fees are the exception rather than the rule, and the Commission had to make express findings of fact and law bringing the case within the exception. The matter cannot be touched upon only in the dispositive portion; the text itself must state the reasons. As the decision stated no basis for the award, it was deleted.
Doctrine
First, when there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal, and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Second, constructive dismissal means quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as in a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; where the employee did not resign but was barred from work, the dismissal is actual and illegal, not constructive. Third, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to full backwages under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 6715, for dismissals occurring after March 21, 1989, and to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement where reinstatement is no longer feasible. Fourth, attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code are the exception rather than the rule; they must rest on express findings of fact and law in the body of the decision, not merely in the dispositive portion, and cannot be awarded absent a showing that the employer acted willfully or in bad faith in compelling the employee to litigate.
Disposition
The petition was denied. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission and its resolution were affirmed with modification: the full backwages are subject to the right of the petitioners to prove and deduct whatever income the private respondents earned in the interim, and the award of attorney's fees was deleted.
Remember This
The line to memorize is that the employer bears the burden of proving a valid cause for dismissal, and that attorney's fees must be justified in the text of the decision, not merely decreed in its fallo. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between actual and constructive dismissal, the computation of full backwages under Article 279 as amended by Republic Act Number 6715, and the strict requirements for awarding attorney's fees.