VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-­IN-FACT, MARIBEL MAMARIL, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER FOURTH DIVISION AND BIG MAK BURGER, INC., RESPONDENTS.

The proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for
ejectment filed by petitioner Victoria D. Bayubay in the Municipal Trial Court
of Los Baños, Laguna, on April 11, 1990, on the ground of expiration of the
contract of lease.

Private respondent Big Mak Burger argued in its answer that it
had the option to renew the term of the lease contract “under such conditions
as may be agreed upon by the parties” and set up the defense of estoppel. It also alleged a counterclaim for damages
and reimbursement of expenses allegedly incurred by it on the leased premises.

The Municipal Trial Court issued summons with the notification
that the case would be heard under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

After three pre-trial meetings and the marking of the exhibits,
which included the lease contract and the exchange of letters between the
parties, Judge Romulo G. Carteciano rendered a decision holding that the
contract of lease had expired because no extension had been agreed upon by the
parties as required by the agreement.^[1]

The private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, on the ground that “the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure by rendering judgment without ordering the parties
to submit their respective position papers and affidavits of their respective
witnesses, as a consequence of which, defendant’s right to due process was
violated.” ^[2]

On December 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the
appealed decision in toto.^[3]
However, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the remand of
the case to the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings.^[4]

The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us. The petitioner contends that the respondent
court erred in ruling that: (1) the
failure of the MTC to give the private respondent the opportunity to submit its
position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due
process; (2) the questions raised were not only questions of law because the
answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly
made by the lessee on the premises, and damages; and (3) there was still a
necessity for the MTC to issue an order following the close of the pre-trial
conference.

In its Comment, the private respondent refutes these contentions
and argues that (1) the petition raises questions of fact as well as law, such
as the expenses incurred by the lessor in the improvement of the leased
premises and the damages sustained by it as a result of the filing of the
complaint; (2) it was deprived of the opportunity to submit its position paper
and/or affidavits of witnesses and so denied due process; and (3) there was a
need to remand the case to the MTC so that evidence could be presented to prove
the factual issues through position papers and affidavits.

We see nothing wrong with the decision of the Court of Appeals
remanding the case to the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings. The respondent court was merely enforcing
the mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take
into account the following pertinent provision of the Rule:

Sec. 6. Preliminary
Conference. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed,
the case shall be calendared for a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the parties fail
to arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must clarify and define the
issues of the case, which must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order
to be issued immediately after such preliminary conference, together with the
other matters taken up during the same.

Sec. 7. Submission of
affidavits. – Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall
submit the affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual issues
defined therein, together with a brief statement of their positions setting
forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

The above provisions require that immediately after the
preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial Court should issue an order
clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of the case and the other
matters taken up during the preliminary conference.

The order is an important part of the summary procedure because
it is its receipt by the parties that begins the ten-day period to
submit the affidavits and other evidence mentioned in Sec. 7.

The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 22, 1989,
contained a notation that the pre-trial had been “terminated” and that the
parties were to submit position papers.^[5]
However, there was no order to this effect nor was there an indication of when
the position papers were to be submitted for the purpose of discussing the
factual questions raised.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals ?

We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the
opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses
constituted a denial of due process. True, between August 22, 1989 and December 18, 1989, when the MTC
rendered its decision was a period of more than three months. But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
ten-day period for submitting affidavits and position papers did not commence
to run until receipt by a party of the order of the court embodying the results
of the pre-trial conference. Here, as
already stated, the MTC never issued such an order and so the ten day period
never started to run.

It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions raised
were questions of law. The petitioner’s
answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly
made by it on the premises, as well as claim for damages for alleged bad faith
of private respondent in bringing the case — ­questions which obviously
required at least the affidavits of witnesses.

The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the
remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court. While the municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in
speeding up the resolution of the case, he nevertheless cannot be sustained for
his non-observance of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

We conclude with the following reminder:

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial
and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to
each other or, as has been often suggested, that enforcement of procedural
rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact the policy of the courts
is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the
just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and
procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.^[6]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo, and Quiason,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 55-61.

^[2]
Ibid, p. 80.

^[3]
Id., pp. 79-80.

^[4]
Id., pp. 32-45; Mendoza, J. ponente with Herrera and
Sempio Diy, JJ. concurring.

^[5]
Id., p. 40.

^[6]
Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597.