ORLANDO T. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AND JOSE G. MACAPINLAC IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF TARLAC, TARLAC, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to annul and set aside Resolution No. 92-213 dated
February 4, 1992 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ordered the
dismissal of petitioner from the government service.

We dismiss the petition.

I

Petitioner, was a Senior Revenue Inspector serving under a
permanent appointment in the Office of the Treasurer of Tarlac, Tarlac.

In a letter dated March 10, 1989, Jose G. Macapinlac, the
incumbent Municipal Mayor of Tarlac, ordered petitioner to explain within 72
hours from receipt thereof why no administrative and criminal charges should be
filed against him for falsification of realty tax receipts and unauthorized
collections of real estate taxes. The
said letter-complaint was sent on March 16 by registered mail to petitioner’s
office at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Tarlac (Registry Receipt No.
5151). The return card showed that the
letter-complaint was received on March 17.

Respondent Mayor, not having received any answer from petitioner,
rendered a letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, dismissing petitioner from the
service. A copy of the letter-decision
was sent to petitioner by registered mail on April 7 (Registry Receipt No.
6486). The return card showed that the
letter-decision was received on April 11.

According to petitioner, when he was not able to draw his salary
by the third week of April, he made several inquiries. It was then that he was handed the
letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, ordering his dismissal from the service
(Rollo, p. 13).

In a letter dated April 18, 1989, petitioner asked for a
reconsideration of the letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, alleging that he
was never furnished a copy of the letter-complaint dated March 10, 1989 and
that he was not afforded the right to
present his evidence at a formal hearing (Rollo, p. 15).

According to respondent Mayor, he did not act on the motion for
reconsideration because, while it was dated April 18, 1989, it was filed only
on July 4, 1989.

On May 30, 1990, petitioner appealed the letter-decision dated
April 6, 1989 of respondent Mayor to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB). Petitioner reiterated before
the MSPB the same arguments contained in his motion for reconsideration dated
April 18, 1989 filed with
respondent Mayor (Rollo, pp. 16-20).

Respondent Mayor moved for the dismissal of the appeal,
contending that it was filed 395 days after the letter-decision appealed from
had become final and executory. The
MSPB denied the motion to dismiss the appeal and directed respondent Mayor to
file his comment to petitioner’s appeal.

Not receiving any comment from respondent Mayor, the MSPB
considered the matter submitted for decision. On May 31, 1991, it rendered a decision setting aside the
letter-decision dated April 6, 1989 and reinstating petitioner to his former
position. It held that the period for
appeal of petitioner from the letter-decision dated April 6, 1989, was
suspended by the filing of the motion for reconsideration dated April 18, 1989
and that petitioner was denied due process when the letter-decision dated March
10, 1989, dismissing him was rendered ex–parte.

On July 12, respondent Mayor appealed the decision of the MSPB to
the CSC (Rollo, pp. 27-39).

On February 4, 1992, the CSC reversed the decision of the MSPB,
holding that petitioner’s appeal to the MSPB was filed out of time and that at
any rate, petitioner was accorded due process.

Hence this petition.

II

Petitioner raises the following issues:

“WHETHER OR NOT HIS DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE VIOLATED DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.

WHETHER OR NOT HIS APPEAL TO THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD WAS
PERFECTED ON TIME” (Rollo, p. 5).

As to the first issue, we agree with the CSC that petitioner was
afforded due process and opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner insists that he was never furnished a copy of the
letter-complaint of March 10, 1989, which directed him to answer the charges
contained therein within 72 hours from receipt thereof.

The CSC believed otherwise, relying on the evidence on record
showing that the letter-complaint was sent by registered mail to petitioner’s
address at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Tarlac on March 16, 1989 as
shown by the Tarlac Post Office Registry Receipt No. 5151 and was received by
someone in that office on March 17, 1989 as shown by the registry return
card. It is a common practice that
letters addressed to an official or employee in a government office are
received by an employee assigned to handle mail matters.

In his motion for reconsideration dated April 18, 1989, petitioner
did not question the failure of respondent Mayor to serve him the
letter-complaint. Instead, he claimed
that while the letter-complaint directed him “to answer the adverse
allegations contained therein,” it did not apprise him of his right to
counsel and therefore was constitutionally defective. Another telling point in his motion for reconsideration is his
admission therein that he may be deemed to have waived his right to answer the
complaint.

Petitioner claims that he had filed his motion for
reconsideration dated April 18, 1989 of the letter-decision within the
reglementary period and said filing suspended the period for appeal to the
MSPB.

The records of respondent Mayor show that a copy of the
letter-decision dated April 6, 1989 was sent by registered mail on April 7,
1989 and received on April 11, 1989. Petitioner therefore had only until April 26, 1989 within which to file
said motion for reconsideration.

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration on or before April
26, 1989, petitioner filed such a motion only on July 4, 1989. The rubber-stamp mark of the date of receipt
of the motion for reconsideration dated April 18, 1989 by the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Tarlac showed the date “7-4-89.” Petitioner could
have easily refuted this stamped date by showing his own copy, bearing the date
of receipt thereof, if it was personally delivered, or the registry receipt and
return card, if it was posted. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner never mentioned in any of
his pleadings the date when he filed said motion.

This prompted a berating from the CSC which noted:

“The commission upon verification of this crucial factual
issue, found the above contention not only to be devoid of merit but likewise
discovered in the process a deliberate attempt on the part of the appellee
Mendoza and his former counsel to mislead the MSPB and the commission in
arriving at the true facts of the case. This conclusion is based on two factual findings, namely: 1) The copy of the aforesaid letter of
reconsideration attached by the appellee in his pleadings does not bear any
stamp mark indicating as to when the same was received ‘by the addressee,
whereas in the copy furnished by the appellant of the same letter of
reconsideration, the stamp mark being adverted appears on the upper right
portion thereof; 2) The pleadings filed by the appellee is (sic) bereft of any
allegation specifically indicating the date when the said letter of
reconsideration actually filed or received by the appellant. In view of these circumstances, the
commission is more inclined to believe that said letter of reconsideration was
actually filed and received by the appellant on July 04, 1989. Such being the case, appellant is therefore
correct in saying that the said letter of reconsideration cannot operate to
interrupt the running of the period to appeal because at the time of its
filing, the decision had already become final and executory” (Rollo pp.
43-44).

Even assuming that petitioner received a copy of the
letter-decision only in the third week of April 1989, his filing a motion for
reconsideration thereof only on July 4, 1989 was tardy. Under Section 49(1), Title I(a), Book V of
E.O. No. 292, a party aggrieved by a decision in an administrative disciplinary
proceeding has only 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to appeal
or file a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner also contends that even if his appeal was filed beyond
the prescriptive period, his case still falls within the ambit of our ruling in Mangubat v. De
Castro, 163 SCRA 608 (1988). In that
case, we held that administrative rules of procedure shall be construed
liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties in claiming just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.

But, before procedural rules can be relaxed to give way to
substantive justice, it is implicit
that such liberality be applied in a proper case (Sps. Luis Ilasco Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, G. R. No. 88983, December 14, 1993). We do not consider the instant petition a proper case.

Aside from claiming that the charges against him were politically
motivated, petitioner never explained the discrepancies in the official
receipts he had issued and the apparent tampering thereof. In a motion wherein movant seeks the
relaxation of procedural rules in order to allow him to present evidence in his behalf, he has to show prima facie that he has a meritorious defense.

Petitioner has only himself to blame for his present
predicament. It is too late in the day
for him to claim that his separation from the service was done ex–parte and without affording him an opportunity to be
heard on his defense.

III

We decided this case with full awareness of the decisions in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, (1990) and Mendez v. Civil
Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965 (1991), where we held that only
the respondent in the administrative disciplinary case, not the complainant,
can appeal from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (See also
Magpale v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 398 [1992]). These decisions were anchored on the
interpretation of Section 39(a) of P. D. No.
807, the “Philippine Civil
Service Law,” which provides that appeals to the CSC shall be made by
“the party adversely affected by the decision.” We interpreted the
quoted phrase as referring to the respondent in the administrative case.

When private respondent appealed the decision of the MSPB to the
CSC, petitioner never questioned the propriety of the appeal and preferred to
defend the correctness of the decision. Likewise, petitioner failed to question before this Court the right of
private respondent to appeal from the decision of the MSPB. We treat such inactions of petitioner as a
waiver on his part to question the authority of the CSC to review the decision
of the MSPB. A law limiting the right
to appeal to the respondent in the administrative case is a rule of procedure,
not of substantive law. Failure to invoke
timely a rule of procedure in favor of a party constitutes a waiver thereof (Republic v. Judge Villanueva, G.R. No.
83333, February 13, 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.