TOMAS B. CARLOS, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC), AND ROGELIO A. DAYAN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A GENERAL MANA…

This
is an amended petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and Article IX–A, Section 7 of the
Constitution to nullify: (a) Resolution No. 91-1314 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which set aside the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) holding that the Department
of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) has no jurisdiction to
discipline petitioner, an
employee of Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) and (b) Resolution No. 92-534 of the CSC, which denied the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner.

On November 8,
1976, petitioner was appointed as an Engineer
of the PPA and in 1988, he was promoted to the position of Supervising Civil Engineer.

On September 19,
1988, respondent Rogelio A. Dayan,
the PPA General Manager, filed with the DOTC Secretary an administrative
complaint against petitioner and
Cristelo E. Dinopol, for dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Administrative Case No. AAB-016-88). On
the same day, petitioner and Dinopol were placed under preventive suspension.

On November 23, 1988, the DOTC Secretary rendered his decision in the administrative case,
finding petitioner and Dinopol guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.

On August 3, 1989, the DOTC Secretary denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner appealed the
DOTC decision to the MSPB.

On March 25, 1991,
the MSPB rendered a decision setting
aside the decision of the DOTC for lack of
jurisdiction and holding that it is the PPA, not the DOTC, that has
jurisdiction to discipline PPA employees. Respondent Dayan, as complainant
in the administrative case, appealed from the decision of the MSPB to
the CSC.

On October 25, 1991, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 91-1314,
reversing the decision of the MSPB and reinstating
the DOTC Secretary’s decision.

Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the CSC resolution was denied by the CSC in its Resolution
No. 92-534.

Hence, this petition.

Asked to comment on the
petition, the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the DOTC Secretary
has no original jurisdiction to discipline
petitioner and that he should be reinstated pending the administrative investigation by the PPA General
Manager. The Solicitor General cited
the decision of this Court in Beja v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 689 (1992), holding that under P.D. No. 857, the power to
investigate employees of the PPA below the rank of Assistant Manager belongs to
the General Manager, subject to the
approval of the Board of Directors.

The Solicitor General manifested
that following the Beja case, the PPA had set aside the
decision of the DOTC Secretary dated
November 23, 1988 and that it would conduct a reinvestigation of the case of petitioner. The Solicitor General, however, commented that petitioner
was not entitled to back wages because the merits of the charges against him
had not yet been ventilated.

In reply to the
Comment of the Solicitor General, petitioner insisted that he was entitled to
the payment of back wages because he
had been cleared of the charges against him.

This Court, in Beja v.
Court of Appeals, supra, held that the DOTC Secretary can not initially
investigate PPA personnel below the
rank of Assistant Manager because under P.D. No. 857, the power to investigate
said personnel belongs to the General Manager
of the PPA. The decision of the PPA
General Manager is subject to
the approval of the Board of Directors. An employee adversely affected by the decision of the PPA General
Manager and the Board of Directors, at his option, may appeal to the DOTC
Secretary or to the Civil Service Commission. Beja made clear that the PPA General Manager should first conduct
an investigation of any complaint against a PPA employee and recommend to the
Board of Directors the appropriate penalty.

Beja was reiterated in Corona v. Court of Appeals,
214 SCRA 378 (1992) where we stressed that under the PPA Charter and the Civil
Service Law, the DOTC Secretary, whose jurisdiction is merely appellate, does
not have the power to initially conduct administrative investigation of
subordinate officials of the PPA.

The questioned CSC
resolutions, must perforce, be set aside.

The remaining issue to be decided is whether petitioner should be
paid his back wages. The Solicitor
General’s position is that the payment of petitioner’s back salaries be
withheld, considering that he has not yet been cleared of the administrative
charge against him. Petitioner counters
that he has been cleared of the administrative charge by the PPA and of the
criminal case by the Sandiganbayan (Rollo, pp. 94-97; pp. 107-155).

Petitioner relies on the following pronouncement of the
Administrative Action Board of the DOTC (AAB-DOTC) dated November 23, 1989,
stating:

“The mere fact therefore, that both respondents have allegedly
been cleared by the Philippine Ports Authority did not make said resolution
final, for the same had not been confirmed by the Secretary, Department of
Transportation” (Rollo, p. 35).

As the Solicitor General argued, the AAB-DOTC simply made
reference to petitioner’s allegations and the reason as to why said allegations
were rejected (Rollo, p.159).

There is therefore, no evidence on record as to the existence of
any decision of the PPA General Manager, dismissing the administrative
complaint against petitioner, much less a resolution of the PPA Board of
Directors approving the action of the PPA General Manager.

Neither can the decision of the Sandiganbayan in People v.
Dinopol, Criminal Case No. 15268, Oct. 30, 1991, be used to dismiss the
administrative case against petitioner. In that decision, the Sandiganbayan acquitted the co-respondent of
petitioner in the administrative case of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The quantum of evidence required in an administrative case is
less than that required in a criminal case. While both criminal and administrative proceedings may involve the
same operative facts, the former requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt while the latter only requires a preponderance of evidence (Icasiano, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377 [1992]).

Petitioner’s recourse
lies with the PPA.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.