G.R. No. 105285. June 03, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENATO FIDER Y DIMALANTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FELICIANO, J.:
Renato D. Fider appeals from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City convicting
him of violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant Fider was charged, together with Ma. Sarah Garcia y
Francisco de Domondon, with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an
information which read as follows:
“The undersigned accuses SARAH GARCIA y FRANCISCO DE DOMONDON
and RENATO FIDER y DIMALANTA for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION
TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of February 1990, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually [aiding one
another] feloniously sold and delivered 100 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride commonly known as ‘SHABU’, a prohibited drug [sic], to NBI agents
[acting as] ‘poseur-buyers’, without authority of law to do so, in violation of
the above cited provision of the law.
Contrary to law.”[1]
(Brackets supplied)
The trial court, acting on motion of the defense and on the
recommendation of Dr. Rosa Tibayan and Dr. Perfecto Micu, both accredited
physicians of the Dangerous Drugs Board, suspended the proceedings against
appellant Fider and ordered his temporary confinement for purposes of treatment
at the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”) Treatment and
Rehabilitation Center, Tagaytay City, for drug dependency. On 9 May 1991, Fider was arraigned on the
amended information quoted above and a plea of not guilty was entered on his
behalf. Ma. Sarah Domondon, in
contrast, was not arraigned. She jumped
bail after the amended information was filed. She has remained at large to date, so far as the record here shows.[2]
The evidence for the prosecution, as summarized by the trial
court in its decision, tended to establish the following as relevant facts:
“x x x on February 26, 1990, at about 10:30 a.m., the NBI
Office, Baguio City, received information from their confidential informant
that Maria Sarah Domondon and her companion, Renato Fider [accused-appellant
herein], were engaged in the illicit trade (sale) of drugs at her residence in
No. 1 Military Cut-Off, Baguio City. Upon receiving this information, the NBI, Baguio [office] conducted
surveillance and discreet inquiries and found the information [to be]
true. After confirming the same, a buy
bust operation was planned and a team for that purpose, composed of 8 persons,
was formed. The team was to be led by
Atty. Edward Villarta, an NBI agent, who was to plan the operation. Atty. Bensheen Apolinar, another NBI agent
was a member of the team. Paul Laita,
an NBI informer and Artemio (Temy,) Panganiban, NBI Ballistician, were tasked
to pose as buyers. The other 4 members
whose identities were not given on record were confidential agents of the NBI.
At about 2:00 p.m. of the same day of February 26, 1990, Paul Laita
and Artemio Panganiban went to the residence of Sarah Domondon upon
instructions of Atty. Edward Villarta to make contact for the purchase of
shabu. And upon coming back that same
afternoon to the NBI Office from the residence of Sarah Domondon, Paul Laita
and Artemio Panganiban told [Atty.] Edward Villarta that Sarah Domondon and
Renato Fider agreed initially to sell shabu at P1,200 per gram but later
changed their mind when they closed the deal as the accused ultimately agreed
to sell and deliver shabu in exchange for two handguns (revolvers) homemade
which will be available anytime that night when the handguns are delivered in
exchange.
And so, Atty. Edward Villarta asked their Chief for two handguns
(revolvers) homemade paltiks worth P1,500 each or a total worth of P3,000.00
and marked them. [At around] 9:00 p.m.,
the NBI buy bust team proceeded to the Domondon residence with the
understanding that Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban, [acting] as
poseur-buyers, were to enter the Domondon house bringing with them the two
handguns and after swapping or exchanging it with the shabu, they would then go
out. And if Paul Laita and Artemio
Panganiban will go out without the handguns, that will then be the signal that
the exchange was consummated and for the rest of the buy bust team, who will be
positioned and waiting outside the Domondon residence, to go in and apprehend
the accused.
Arriving at the Domondon residence at No. 1 Military Cut-Off,
Baguio City at about 9 p.m., the NBI buy bust team had to wait however as they
noted [that] there were several persons inside the house [at] that time. Thus, they waited until 1:30 a.m., x x x of
February 27, 1990 when the visitors in the Domondon residence left.
Finally, Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban, as planned, entered the
Domondon residence bringing with them the two handguns to swap with the shabu
as agreed. After a few minutes inside
the house, both Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban came out without the two
handguns with Paul Laita likewise already in possession of shabu of about
50 grams wrapped in transparent plastic bag which was the signal for the NBI
team to move in.
Immediately, the NBI team waiting outside swooped down on the
Domondon residence. But before they
could enter the door of the house, Renato Fider closed the door and prevented
them from entering. So the NBI fired a
warning shot and then pushed open the door. And upon the door being opened, they all entered. Atty. Edward Villarta stayed at the sala
monitoring the operation while Bensheen Apolinar, Paul Laita and Temy
Panganiban searched the house proceeding to the room of Sarah Domondon where
they recovered the two handguns previously swapped, another shabu contained in
a can with the label ‘blue diamond’ wrapped in white plastic cover and shabu
paraphernalia for sniffing composed of a glass pipe and aluminum foil (Exhibit
E to E-4-a).”[3]
The defense disputes the above facts presented by the prosecution
and accepted by the trial court. The
defense presented the following as its own version of the facts:
“Aside from being a freelance interior designer, accused
Renato Fider is also engaged in a small business of supplying construction
materials that are not readily available in Baguio City. At the time of his arrest, he was earning
around P6,000.00 to P8,000.00 a month.
Sometime in December 1989, Renato Fider visited a friend of his,
whose house is located behind the St. Joseph Church in Pacdal, Baguio
City. There he met Dennis Domondon, the
husband of Maria Sarah Domondon.
Subsequently, after Dennis Domondon had learned that Renato was an
interior designer, the former asked the latter (through their friend who
introduced them together) to go to the Domondon house at #1 Military Cut-off
Road, Baguio City, because the Domondons were planning to renovate their house
with the assistance of an interior designer.
x x x x. He commenced
working in late December 1989, just before the New Year, and in the course of
his work, he met Maria Sarah Domondon, who together with her husband, and their
two young children, were then living in that house.
x x x x x x x
x x
As of February 26, 1990, Renato was already through with the
renovation work, with just a few finishing touches that remained to be
done. x x x x.
x x x x
x x x
x x
At around lunchtime of February 26, 1990, Renato Fider received a
telephone call x x x from Maria Sarah Domondon inviting him to dinner at the
Domondon house as she wanted him to meet some friends of hers from Manila who
could become his prospective clients. Eager to meet potential clients, Renato decided to go to that
dinner. x x x x. [H]e proceeded to the Domondon house by
taxicab, arriving there sometime between 8:30 to 9:00 p.m.
x x x x
x x x
x x
Sometime later, the guests left, with some leaving at 11:00 p.m.,
others around 12:00 midnight, and the rest at around 1:00 a.m.
After the party broke up, Renato thinking that it was the polite
and proper thing to do, and feeling indebted to the Domondons for having
engaged him for the renovation of their house, volunteered to help in the
cleaning up of the mess left by the party [sic].
Renato helped the Domondon houseboy, named Mario, in cleaning up
the mess. After helping some, Maria
Sarah Domondon asked to be excused, and left Renato and the houseboy
downstairs, and neither Renato nor the houseboy knew where she went
thereafter. This is so because from the
kitchen of the house where the houseboy and Renato were cleaning at that time,
one could not see the sala, the front door nor the stairs going up the second
floor because the dining room and the sala are separated by a wall that go all
the way up to the ceiling. In fact, one
could enter the sala through the front door, climb the stairs and proceed to the
second floor without being seen by the people in the kitchen.
Around 10-15 minutes after Maria Sarah Domondon had left, and while
Renato and the houseboy were still in the kitchen cleaning, there was a loud
banging on the door with somebody shouting: ‘Buksan and pinto, buksan and
pinto.’ Apparently, there were many people outside the door and they were
shouting so loud that they didn’t hear Renato telling them to wait, and then
they just shot at the door. Frightened,
Renato instinctively stayed down on the floor to avoid being hit should they fire
again. The men outside then barged in,
grabbed Renato’s hand and put them at his back, handcuffed him holding a gun at
the back of his head. The houseboy,
apparently frightened, ran to his room, where he was found, but was released
afterwards when Maria Sarah Domondon later said he was just a houseboy. The men who barged in were all over the
place, running around the house, opening doors. Later, Renato inquired from the person who handcuffed him what
was this all about and why he was being arrested but they just replied: ‘Teka
lang, teka lang, tingnan natin.'”[4]
As earlier noted, appellant Fider was found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) plus cost.[5] In
finding Fider guilty, the trial court relied upon the following process of
reasoning which it set out in its decision:
“1. There was
direct evidence as well as circumstantial evidence to show that accused Renato
Fider together with Sarah Domondon were caught in flagrante delicto delivering
shabu to Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban who posed as buyers in a buy bust
operation conducted by an NBI team of Baguio City early in the morning of
February 27, 1990 at about 1:30 a.m. at No. 1 Military Cut-Off, Baguio City.
It was immediately after accused Sarah Domondon and Renato Fider
delivered the shabu contained in a transparent plastic bag to Paul Laita and
Artemio Panganiban who posed as buyers in exchange for two handguns that they
were arrested.
And in addition to the shabu in a transparent plastic bag delivered
by Sarah Domondon and Renato Fider to Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban in
exchange for the two handguns, the NBI still found another shabu
contained in a can labelled ‘blue diamond’ in a white plastic cover inside
the room of Sarah Domondon when the NBI went in.
It must be stressed that the shabu in a transparent plastic bag delivered by Renato Fider and Sarah
Domondon to Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban in exchange for the two handguns
is different from the other shabu contained in a can inside a white plastic
cover found in the room of Sarah Domondon when the NBI swoop down on the
Domondon house after Paul Laita and Artemio
Panganiban came out without the two handguns thereby giving the signal that the
exchange of the shabu for the two handguns was consummated. [sic]
There is no doubt therefore that Sarah Domondon and Renato Fider
had shabu with them and delivered the same in a transparent plastic bag to Paul
Laita and Artemio Panganiban and still had some left in a can labelled ‘blue
diamond’ in a white plastic cover inside the house.
2. The pretense of Renato Fider that he was not
involved in the illegal delivery of the shabu in exchange for the two handguns
and that only Sarah Domondon delivered the same to the NBI poseur buyers could
not be given credence as:
First, Renato Fider is admittedly a drug user as in fact, the trial
of the case was suspended for sometime for him to be treated and
rehabilitated. And only after he was
treated and rehabilitated were the proceedings continued. The claim therefore that the idea of the
treatment and rehabilitation was that of his lawyer only is false as the
petition of Atty. Mandapat [defense counsel below] was very clear that it was
in behalf of accused for him to be treated as he was a drug dependent.
In fact, the Medical Certificates issued by Dr. Rosa Tibayan dated
October 10, 1990, and the letter dated October 11, 1990, of Dr. Perfecto Micu
to the NBI Rehabilitation Center were very clear that being a drug dependent
Renato Fider needs further treatment and rehabilitation (see page 58 and 59,
Record). Being a drug dependent, Renato
Fider therefore is no stranger to possessing and handling drugs.
Second, the information given to the NBI named both Renato Fider
and Sarah Domondon as engaging in illicit trade of drugs at No. 1 Military Cut
Off, Baguio, which the NBI, after surveillance and discreet inquiries,
confirmed and so a buy bust operation was planned. At this stage, therefore, even before the actual sale or delivery,
Renato Fider was already mentioned as involved in the trade of drugs.
Third, when Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban were initially sent
to make contact for the purchase of drugs, they came back confirming to Atty.
Villarta, their team leader, that Sarah Domondon and Renato Fider were willing
to exchange shabu for two (2) handguns after initially offering to sell shabu
at P1,200.00 per gram. Going by the
tenor of what Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban said to Atty. Edward Villarta,
after coming from their mission to initiate contact on the purchase of drugs,
Renato Fider was involved together with Sarah Domondon. At this stage, Paul Laita and Artemio
Panganiban had no motive to falsify their report to Atty. Edward Villarta.
Fourth, Renato Fider was present inside the Domondon house at the
time Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban delivered the two (2) handguns and got the shabu in a transparent
plastic bag in exchange.
Renato Fider therefore was present at the place and on the time the
shabu was delivered.
Fifth, when Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban went out without the
two (2) handguns thereby giving the signal that the exchange was consummated
and the NBI operatives outside the Domondon house waiting [sic] swooped down on
the house to make the arrest immediately, the accused Renato Fider on seeing
them closed the door to prevent them from going in prompting the NBI team to
fire a warning shot and to push the door to open it.
Certainly, this act of Renato Fider of closing the door to prevent
the NBI team from going in, testified to by both Apolinar and Villarta, was
very indicative of the guilty knowledge on the part of Renato Fider of what has
just transpired inside between them (Fider and Domondon) on the one hand and
Laita and Panganiban on the other, on the exchange of the shabu with the two
handguns.
Sixth, after the door was opened and the NBI came in, they found
shabu in a can labelled ‘blue diamond’ in a white plastic cover, shabu
paraphernalia and the two handguns inside the room of Sarah Domondon. This shows that aside from the shabu
delivered to the NBI poseur buyers, there were shabu still left with Fider and
Domondon inside the house.
Obviously, with all these facts, with Renato Fider, a drug user and
drug dependent, being present in the exchange of the handguns with the shabu, closing the door when the NBI
agents came rushing in to make the arrest prompting the NBI to force open, with
shabu and shabu paraphernalia still found inside thereafter, it cannot be said
that Renato Fider was an babe lost in the forest. It is not hard to see that Renato Fider is a confederate of Sarah
Domondon not only in the use of drugs but also in her illicit trade or delivery
to others. In fact, while all the
visitors of the house [had already left], Renato Fider, on his part stayed
thereby indicating [that] he is a confederate. His claim that he remained in the house to help clean the mess when
there is a houseboy, [in the person of one] Mario, to do the cleaning, is hard
to believe.
His pretense therefore that it was only Sarah Domondon who
delivered the shabu to the NBI poseur buyers, given these overwhelming facts,
cannot be given credence.
x x x x
x x x
x x
4. True, Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban who
posed as buyers did not testify. But
then the delivery of the two handguns in exchange for the shabu was testified
to by Atty. Bensheen Apolinar and Atty. Edward Villarta, both members of the
NBI team which conducted the buy bust operation. Apolinar and Villarta at least knew that at the time Laita and
Panganiban entered the Domondon house [that the latter] were carrying two
handguns with them to be swapped with shabu x x x and that the handguns were
delivered as Laita and Panganiban came out of the Domondon house without the
handguns [in their possession] and instead Laita was carrying the shabu wrapped
in a transparent plastic bag. Surely,
any rational man can readily infer that the two handguns were swapped with the
shabu, as previously agreed upon with Renato Fider and Sarah Domondon, under
the circumstances.[6]
In his brief, appellant Fider pleads the following assignment of
error:
“1.
The trial court erred in finding that there was direct as well as
circumstantial evidence showing that the accused-appellant Renato Fider was
caught in flagrante delicto delivering shabu to poseurs-buyers Paul
Laita and Artemio Panganiban in the buy-bust operation conducted on February
1990 (Decision 9-10).
2.
The trial court erred in rejecting the version of the
accused-appellant Renato Fider as well as the character evidence proffered in
his defense (Decision 10-13).
3.
The trial court erred in basing the conviction of the
accused-appellant on the actuations of Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban,
alleged poseur-buyers, who were not even presented as witnesses (Decision
13-14)
4.
The constitutional rights of the accused-appellant Renato Fider
have been violated (Decision, 14-16).
5.
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant
Renato Fider.”[7]
After careful examination of the evidence that was submitted
before the trial court, and deliberating on the arguments made by appellant
Fider in his Appellant’s Brief and those made by the Solicitor General in his
“Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief” dated 22 February 1993,
where he recommended that this Court acquit appellant Renato Fider, the Court
considers that the evidence against appellant Fider is insufficient to sustain
the judgment of conviction and that
accordingly, appellant is entitled to be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
The Court has, in numberless instances, stressed that the burden
of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged, lies upon the
prosecution and that burden must be discharged on the strength of its own
evidence and not upon the weakness or upon non-existence of the evidence
submitted by the defense. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is indispensably necessary if the constitutional presumption
of innocence is to be overturned in any given case and the evidence must
produce moral certainty on the part of the court, or that certainty which
convinces and satisfies the reasoning and conscience of those who are to act
upon the instance that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.[8]
Thus, even if the evidence submitted by the accused is weak, as where, for
instance, it consists merely of bare denials, the judgment of acquittal must
follow if the prosecution fails to discharge its onus probandi.[9]
In drug-related crimes, that is, in violations of the provisions
of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, or the Dangerous Drugs Act, it is essential that
the prosecution establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the particular
circumstances constituting the offense charged, e.g., the time or date, place
and the chemical material involved and other details which comprise the fact of
the unlawful possession, sale, use or delivery of the prohibited or regulated
material.[10]
In the case at bar, the evidence for the State consisted solely
of the testimony of the arresting NBI agents (i.e., the two [2] NBI agents who
had waited outside the house of Ma. Sarah F.G. Domondon) and the NBI Forensics
specialist. The two (2) handguns which
were allegedly bartered or exchanged for 100 grams of “shabu“,
and which were supposedly obtained from the NBI itself, were not
presented in evidence by the prosecution; no explanation was offered for this
obvious hiatus in the prosecution’s case. For reasons which also do not appear on the record of this case, the
two (2) NBI agents who had acted as poseur-buyers were not presented before the
trial court. The result was that
important questions bearing upon the specific culpability of appellant Renato
Fider vis-a-vis the other accused Ma. Sarah Domondon, remained unanswered:
e.g., was appellant Renato Fider actually present in the room during the
consummation of the guns-for-shabu transactions between co-accused Ma. Sarah
Domondon and the poseur-buyers? What
was the precise participation of appellant Fider in respect of the
guns-for-shabu transactions? Did he
physically receive the guns? Did he
hand over the “shabu” to the poseur-buyers? Or was appellant Fider, albeit a drug user,
essentially an innocent house guest of co-accused Ma. Sarah Domondon, being
merely in the wrong place at the wrong time?
We must note in this connection the statements made by Atty.
Edward A. Villarta, NBI Team Leader of the buy-bust operation, on
cross-examination:
ATTY. ORACION:
And at the precise time of the raid you saw Renato Fider inside
that house?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
Q: And would it be fair
then to say that the reason why you arrested Renato Fider was because at the
time you raided the house he was inside the house?
A: He was inside the
house.
Q: You said that the
alleged shabu was found inside the bedroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The bedroom was upstairs?
A: Yes, sir, the bedroom
of Sarah Domondon.
Q: And was there anybody
inside that bedroom when the alleged contraband were found there?
A: When the handguns
were recovered and the shabu were found inside the room, only Sarah Domondon
was there.
Q: How about Renato Fider,
where was he at the time?
A: He was at the sala.
Q: The sala is downstairs,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were with Renato
Fider at the sala?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Atty. Villarta, under
oath, have you ever actually seen Renato Fider in possession of either the two
handguns or the shabu, subject of this case, or the shabu paraphernalia which
were seized when you conducted the raid?
A: During the transaction I
was outside the residence so I could not see it.
Q: Did you ever see Renato
Fider in actual possession of the shabu, the subject of this case?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever see Renato
Fider in possession of the shabu paraphernalia, the subject of this case?
A: No. It was the two poseur-buyers who can testify
on that.
Q: You cannot testify on
that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It is correct to say
that when Paul Laita and
Panganiban went to the house at Military Cut-off road on February 26, 1990 in
the afternoon you were not with them?
A: I was not with them.
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q: And also, you were
not with Paul Laita and Panganiban when they entered the house at about 1:30
in the morning of February 27?
A: Yes. We were outside the residence.
Q: And you cannot see
what was happening inside the house.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, therefore, your
have no personal knowledge as to whether or not there was really a swapping of
handguns and shabu when Laita and Panganiban entered the house?
A: Yes, sir. We only relied on the two poseur-buyers
because we cannot enter.
Q: You were relying on them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And whatever you know
of the alleged agreement to sell shabu and the subsequent agreement to swap
guns with shabu was based on the information given to you by Laita and
Panganiban?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
x x x
x x”[11]
(Underscoring added)
In his “Manifestation,”[12] the
Solicitor General pointed out that the two (2) principal prosecution witnesses,
Atty. Edward Villarta and Atty. Benshee Apolinar, both of the NBI, were not
privy or actual or eye witnesses to the claimed guns-for-shabu transaction,
although they may have been the arresting officers of the buy-bust
operation. The Solicitor General
concluded that the evidence of the prosecution in respect of the exact
participation of appellant Fider in that transaction, was plainly hearsay:
“The testimonies of Laita and Panganiban on the supposed
exchange was a vital link that could have held the prosecution’s case
together. Without them, the charges
against the accused would inevitably fall apart. Had their testimonies been merely corroborative of a transaction
which has already been established by other evidence, then these
poseur-buyers need not be presented in court to sustain the appellant’s
conviction (People v. Como, 202 SCRA 200, People v. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA
416). Sadly, this is not true in the
instant case.
In view of the absence of evidence on the actual exchange of shabu
for guns, the failure of the prosecution to present during trial the two
handguns allegedly used by the NBI operatives to exchange for shabu creates
another void in its case against the appellant. The marked money, or in this case the handguns supposedly
exchanged for the shabu, need not be presented if there is independent
testimony evidencing the fact of exchange (People v. Aletra, 198 SCRA
656). Since there was no such testimony,
the inference that can be drawn from the failure of the prosecution to present
the handguns in evidence is that the claimed guns for shabu transaction never
occurred.”[13]
(Underscoring added)
We have held in many cases[14] that
the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes material and well-nigh indispensable
when the accused denies having committed the prohibited act. Without the testimony of the poseur-buyer,
more often than not, there is not convincing evidence that the accused did sell
or possess the prohibited or regulated drug.
In People v. Tantiado,[15] for
instance, the accused sold marijuana sticks to one Nestor Agudo, a Philippine
Army officer acting as a poseur-buyer. The prosecution argued that the NARCOM agents surrounded the house of
the accused while the poseur-buyer went into that house to purchase P9.00 worth
of marijuana. A few minutes later, the
poseur-buyer went out of the house and gave the pre-arranged signal — the
tapping of his head — to the
NARCOM agents. The agents thereupon
swooped down on the house of the accused and arrested the latter. The trial court convicted the accused on the
strength of the testimony of the arresting NARCOM agents. On appeal, the Court reversed the
conviction, saying:
“In view of the NARCOM agents’ failure to witness the
alleged transaction between their poseur-buyer and the accused, which thus
renders their testimonies in respect thereto as hearsay and the inability
of the prosecution to establish when and how the agents obtained possession of
the three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes from the poseur-buyer, the
testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes significantly material and indispensable;
therefore, the same should not be considered as a merely cumulative or
corroborative evidence. Without such
testimony, it is inconceivable that the prosecution would be able to discharge
its burden of rebutting the presumption of innocence which every accused
enjoys under the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. Otherwise stated, the alleged sale of the three (3) sticks
of marijuana cannot be established without the testimony of the poseur-buyer. Thus, the instant case presents a situation
which is to be viewed as an exception to the general rule that the
non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is not essential for the conviction of the
accused if the testimony of the former is merely cumulative or
corroborative. (citations omitted).
In People vs. Olaes (188 SCRA 91 [1990]),
this Court held:
‘Secondly, this case exemplifies the instance where the
non-presentation of the supposed poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution’s
case. The records show that the alleged
sales transaction took place inside the house of appellant. In other words, the transaction was
supposedly witnessed only by the poseur-buyer, Manuelito Bernardo. Only he has personal knowledge of such
transaction which is the subject matter of this prosecution. In People
v. Ramos, (186
SCRA 184, [1990]) where the alleged informant and poseur-buyer was one and the
same person, we stressed that without the testimony of said poseur-buyer,
there is no convincing evidence pointing to the accused as having sold
marijuana. In this case, the police officers did not
see the actual sale of marijuana. For
the culprit to be convicted, the element of sale must be unequivocally
established. Yet, the alleged
poseur-buyer in the ‘buy-bust’ operation, the only one who allegedly dealt
directly with appellant in the purchase of marijuana, was not presented at all
at the trial. Under such circumstances,
we have repeatedly held that the failure of the prosecution to present the
alleged buyer was a fatal blow to the case against the accused.’
There is also merit in the accused’s contention that the buy-bust
money should have been presented in evidence. In the absence of an eyewitness to the sale of the three (3)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes, the identification and submission in
evidence of the buy-bust money was necessary, if not indispensable, to prove,
even if only circumstantially, the fact of sale. In previous cases, this Court ruled that the prosecution need not
present in evidence the buy-bust money if the sale of the prohibited drug had
been adequately proven by other independent evidence.” (Citations omitted;
underscoring added)
Close examination of the decision of the trial court shows that
in the absence of the testimony that should have been given by the two (2) NBI
operatives, i.e., Messrs. Paul Laita and Artemio Panganiban, the trial court
relied upon the testimony given by the remaining two (2) NBI operatives who had
arrested appellant Fider and Ma. Sarah Domondon, i.e., Atty. Edward Villarta
and Atty. Bensheen Apolinar and upon evidence of a circumstantial nature. Turning first to the testimony given by the
two (2) arresting NBI officers, who testified, among other things, to what the
trial court described as
“x x x the information given to the NBI [which] named both
Renato Fider and Sarah Domondon as engaging in illicit trade of drugs at No. 1
Military Cut-Off, Baguio which the NBI, after surveillance and discreet
inquiries, confirmed and so a buy-bust operation was planned, “[16]
we must note that that testimony was
hearsay in character. The prosecution
did not present the informer who presumably passed on to the NBI information
pertaining allegedly to Fider and Domondon. In any case, the information passed on to the NBI and testified to by
NBI agents Atty. Bensheen Apolinar[17] and
Atty. Edward Villarta[18] was
in the nature of rumor and speculation. Precisely, the alleged buy-bust operation here involved was designed to
confirm and concretize that information. The testimony to the effect that Messrs. Laita and Panganiban had
confirmed to the NBI Team Leader Atty. Villarta that Sarah Domondon and Renato
Fider were willing to enter into a barter transaction involving “shabu”
for two (2) handguns, was, again, clearly hearsay in nature. For, as already noted, Messrs. Laita and
Panganiban were not presented by the prosecution as witnesses. The net result, therefore, of setting to one
side the hearsay evidence upon which the trial court relied, will be seen to be
that the trial court had only circumstantial evidence upon which to fall back.
Conviction by circumstantial evidence requires that the proven
circumstances, of which there must be more than one, constitute an unbroken
chain of evidence which, taken together, lead to but one fair and reasonable
conclusion: that the accused was guilty
of the crime charged.[19] We
have reviewed in detail the evidence of record here and have concluded that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against appellant Fider
was insufficient to constitute the quantum of proof necessary to sustain his
conviction.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court
consisted of the following:
1. Appellant Fider was present at the house of
his co-accused Ma. Sarah Domondon at the time of their arrest;
2. Appellant Fider had allegedly closed the
door of Ma. Sarah’s house in the faces of the NBI agents;
3. Appellant Fider was a drug-user and a
rehabilitated drug dependent; and
4. The arresting NBI
officers found additional “shabu” (additional to the 100 grams
which had allegedly been bartered for the two [2] handguns) inside the room of
Ma. Sarah in the Domondon house, in a can labeled “Blue Diamond” with
white plastic cover.
We do not consider that these
circumstances, taken together, necessarily lead to only one (1) definite
conclusion that appellant Fider was in fact guilty of the crime charged.
Firstly, appellant Fider had explained that his presence at the Domondon
house on the evening of 27 February 1990 was due to a party hosted by Ma. Sarah
Domondon, to which party Fider, then engaged in interior decoration work in the
Domondon house, had been invited and which party he attended in the hope of
meeting potential clients who might have occasion to require his services as an
interior designer. This explanation was
not in itself unbelievable or implausible and the prosecution did not
controvert it. Secondly, the only
evidence of Fider’s closing the door against the NBI operatives consisted of
the statements of the NBI operatives themselves. But assuming that the door of the Domondon residence had indeed
been closed by Fider in the faces of the NBI operatives, it is far from clear
that this was in itself a badge of guilt. The prosecution had not shown that the appellant had been warned
beforehand that the four (4) men suddenly charging into Ma. Sarah’s house in
the early morning hours were in fact NBI operatives and not malefactors intent
on robbery, or kidnapping or worse felonies. Thirdly, the fact that appellant Fider was a drug dependent or a drug
user does not inevitably yield the conclusion that he was, at that
particular time and place, in possession of some prohibited or regulated
drugs for the purpose of selling or delivering the same. There was simply no evidence that there was
some such “shabu” or some other drugs on his person, or
otherwise subject to his physical control, at the time of his arrest. Fourthly, the additional “shabu”
found by the NBI operatives inside the Domondon house was, as noted above, in
fact located at the time of discovery thereof inside Ma. Sarah’s room. The prosecution did not suggest that
appellant Fider had shared that room with her, and that somehow such additional
material was owned by or subject to the control of Fider.
Where the circumstances shown to exist yield two (2) or more
inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while
the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Court must
acquit the accused: for the evidence
does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to
support a judgment of conviction. It is
scarcely necessary to add that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, in the case at bar the buy-bust operation conducted by the
NBI raiding team against the two (2) accused in Ma. Sarah’s residence, cannot by
itself overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence which is
accorded to each accused. The presumption
of regularity of the performance of official duty does not, of course, relieve
the prosecution of the burden of affirmatively proving the guilt of the
accused.
In view of the conclusion we have here reached, there appears no
need to address the other issues assigned as error by appellant Fider.
WHEREFORE, without prejudice to the separate trial of
co-accused Ma. Sarah Domondon at some time in the future, the decision dated 3
February 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal
Case No. 7679-R is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant Renato D. Fider
is hereby ACQUITTED, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 10. Metamphetamine
hydrochloride is a regulated drug and not a prohibited
drug as alleged in the amended information. R.A. No. 6425 as amended distinguishes between regulated drugs and
prohibited drugs. “Shabu”
is the street or vulgar name for metamphetamine hydrochloride which, this Court
has held, is a regulated drug covered by R.A. No. 6425 as amended (People v.
Macasling, G.R. No. 90342, promulgated 1993; People v. Angeles, 209 SCRA
801 [1992]; People v. Del Mar, 210 SCRA 448 [1992]; People v.
Buendia, 210 SCRA 531 [1992]).
[2]
Decision of the Trial Court, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[3]
Id., pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 61-67; Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-8.
[5]
Decision of the Trial Court, p. 19; Rollo, p. 37.
[6]
Id., pp. 9-14; Rollo, pp. 27-32.
[7]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3.
[8]
E.g., People v. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, dated 4 November 1992; People
v. Viray, 202 SCRA 320 (1991).
[9]
People v. Labarias, G.R. No. 87165, 25 January 1993; People v.
Martos, 211 SCRA 805 (1992).
[10]
People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805 (1992); People v. Rojo, 175 SCRA
119 (1989).
[11]
TSN, dated 3 October 1991, pp. 33-37. Prosecution witness Atty. Bensheen Apolinar, who was similarly situated
as Atty. Edward Villarta, likewise stated that he had no personal knowledge of
the claimed guns-for-shabu transaction between the accused-appellant and
poseur-buyers; TSN, dated 25 September 1991, p. 12, 14, 20.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 161 and 189.
[13]
Solicitor General’s Manifestation, pp. 18-19; Rollo, pp. 177-178.
[14]
People v. Sillo, G.R. No. 91001, dated 18 September 1992; People v.
Tantiado, 213 SCRA 365 (1992); People v. Fulgarillas, 212 SCRA 76
(1992); People v. Olaes, 188 SCRA 91 (1990); People v. Ramos, 186
SCRA 184 (1990); People v. Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91 (1990); People v.
Rojo, 175 SCRA 119 (1989); People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 (1986).
[15]
213 SCRA 365 (1992).
[16]
Decision of the Trial Court, p. 11; Rollo, p. 29. See above page 8.
[17]
TSN, 25 September 1991, p. 6.
[18]
TSN, 3 October 1991, pp. 26-27, 37-38.
[19]
Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence.