RAMON L. LABO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND ROBERTO ORTEGA, RESPONDENTS.

This is the second time* that this
Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of Ramon Labo, Jr., who,
believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing
his certificate of candidacy on March 23, 1992.

Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on the other hand,
also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992. 

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy,
petitioner Ortega filed on March
26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false representation
when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a “natural-born” citizen of
the Philippines.

Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on
March 27, 1992 to petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992,
requiring him to file his Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the
latter failed to respond.

On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in
default for failure to file his Answer.

On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the
Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4,
1992, the disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the
decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989])
declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not
present any evidence. It was only on
May 5, 1992 that petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby resolves, to grant the petition; respondent’s (Labo’s) certificate of
candidacy is hereby DENIED due course and ordered CANCELLED; the City Election
Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to delete the name of the
respondent (Labo) from the list of candidates for City Mayor of Baguio
City.” (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)

On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of
said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before this Court.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:

“Acting on the ‘Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification’,
filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves
that the decision promulgated on May 9,
1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo
Jr., shall become final and executory
only after five (5) days from promulgation
pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.

“Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still
continue to be voted upon as candidate
for City Mayor of Baguio City on
May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in
the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or
certiorari.” (Rollo, p. 53;
GR No. 105111; underscoring supplied)

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in
the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio, (Rollo pp. 64-65; GR No. 105111).

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for
review docketed as GR No. 105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and
to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he
wins in the contested elections.

On the same date, or on May 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed
before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution canceling
Labo’s certificate of candidacy.

After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec in its
resolution dated May 26, 1992 denied Ortega’s motion in view of the pending
case (GR No. 105111) earlier
filed by Labo of the same nature
before this Court.

On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus
docketed as GR No. 105384
praying for the implementation of the Comelec’s
May 9, 1992 resolution.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and executory.

After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the
Court, on June 16 1992, Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision.

I. GR No. 105111

In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. Alleging lack of trial on
the merits as well as the lack
of opportunity to be heard in Labo v. Commission on Elections (supra),
it is the submission of petitioner that he can prove his Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US
252), wherein it was held that in proving
expatriation, an expatriating act and an intent to relinquish
citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the
Commission on Immigration or the
Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated
proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate oportunity to present a
full-dress presentation of his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was
set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992
the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned
resolution on May 9, 1992.

If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that
of his counsel, records disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec
as early as March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the
same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner
Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due
process, respondent Comelec, issued another order dated April 24, 1992, this
time directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally serve
the summons. The alleged delay in the
resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no
one else. Thus, the respondent Comelec
in its resolution dated May 9, 1992
stated:

“On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called
this case for reception of evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date respondent had not yet filed his
Answer, a lawyer appeared for him.

“The petitioner
(Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of respondent Ramon L. Labo,
Jr., which contained in item 9 thereof the verified statement that respondent
is a ‘natural-born’ Filipino citizen. To prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner submitted
the decision of the Supreme Court in ‘Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner v.
Comelec, et al.,’ GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion of
which states:

“WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the
Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory.”

“No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had
no Answer as of the hearing.

“On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer,
insisting that he is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve
his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an Australian citizenship; that
the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that ‘existing
facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship’
and ‘supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the Labo
v. Comelec case and the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine
citizenship.’

“No evidence has been offered
by respondent to show what these existing
facts and supervening events are to preclude
the application of the Labo decision.”
(underscoring supplied)

“The Commission is bound by the final declaration that
respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Consequently, respondent’s verified statement in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a “natural-born” Filipino citizen is a false
material representation.” (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No. 105111)

Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a
scintilla of proof to shore his claim before this Court that he has indeed
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.

Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to state that petitioner has
already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec (supra; Rollo p. 375). Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no pressing need to
re-examine the same and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.

At any rate, the fact
remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if there be
any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this
Court or the Comelec. On this score
alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Comelec in
cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a
Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec (supra).

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72* of the
Omnibus Election Code “operates as a legislatively mandated special
repatriation proceeding” and that it allows his proclamation as the
winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet
final at the time the election was held.

The Court finds petitioner Labo’s strained argument quixotic and
untenable. In the first place, Sec. 72
of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No.
6646, to wit:

“Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or the Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.” (underscoring supplied)

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the
Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception
of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this
case, Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his
claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in
Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:

“Under CA No. 63, as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation. It does not appear in
the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He
does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization or to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. x x x”.

Petitioner Labo’s status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as
a candidate for being an alien. His
election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the
possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office
(Sec. 39, Local Government Code).

Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the respondent
Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the Solicitor General
pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270* (Rollo,
pp. 116-119; GR No. 105111).

To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the
Solicitor General, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon
said application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is even admitted by petitioner. In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities,
a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.

II. GR No. 105384

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a
temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already
become final and executory. Ortega
further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio
City.

We agree with Ortega’s first proposition.

At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on
May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his
(Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day
earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner
Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim
no restraining order was issued by this Court.

Thus, Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:

“Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy —

x x x

“(e) The
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be
final and executory unless stayed by the
Supreme Court.” (underscoring supplied)

A similar provision
is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of
procedure, to wit:

“Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. —Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course
to or cancel certificates of candidacy,
to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and
to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5)
days from their promulgation, unless restrained
by the Supreme Court.” (underscoring supplied)

The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality
on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of
Baguio City.

To begin with, one
of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of
the Philippines. Thus, the Local
Government Code provides:

“Sec. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.”
(underscoring supplied)

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks
the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: “An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines.”

The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo’s alienage – the very
essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo’s qualification to
assume the contested office, he being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by the majority
of the electorate is of no moment. As
we have held in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):

“x x x. The fact that
he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employmetn only to the citizens
of this country. The qualification
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic
of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.”

This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega,
i.e., whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate
(Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the
winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the mayor of Baguio City.

We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he
alleges that:

“x x x the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein
petitioner (Roberto Ortega) and respondent LABO having been voted for the
position of Mayor and unofficial results indicate that if the name
of respondent LABO were deleted from the
list of candidates, herein petitioner (Ortega)
will be entitled to be proclaimed as
Mayor-elect of Baguio City.” (Rollo, p. 7, GR
No. 105384; underscoring supplied)

and further prays this Court “to
proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City the candidate who may have garnered
the most number of votes after the exclusion of the name of respondent
candidate LABO.” (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore is petitioner
Ortega’s desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City.

As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega’s prayer
devoid of merit.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes
for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of
the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his
subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the
mayor-elect. This is the import of the
recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

“While it is true that SPC
No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of
candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the
fact remains that the local elections
of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted
and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that
petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. x x
x What matters is that in the
event a candidate for an elected position
who is voted for and who obtains
the highest number of votes is disqualified
for not possessing the eligibility requirements
at the time of the election as provided
by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the
same position cannot assume the vacated
position.” (underscoring supplied)

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar
and we see no compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny
due course to Petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then was allowed
by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus
Election Code).

And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:

“Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained
only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.

“The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded
as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente,
with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and
Aquino, JJ. concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J.,
Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana
and Gutierrez, Jr.,). One was on
official leave (Fernando, C.J.)

“Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds,
that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos
(136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine
first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court
(Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay,
JJ., concurring), without any dissent, x x x. There the Court held:

‘x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they did not choose him.

‘Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that
no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243,
p. 676)

‘The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office
or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.’”

The rule, therefore, is the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849
(State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has
been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and
void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people
of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without
any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of
the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot
assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or
cannot be installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated
candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger
number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the
Election Registrar of Baguio City: rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).

The rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware
in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which
case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged,
that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much
less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than
the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10,1992 to be voted for the
office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course
to petitioner Labo’s certificate of candidacy
had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.

As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. Ortega failed
to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a majority
or mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in public office as mayor
of Baguio City. Having lost in the
election for mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.

As a consequence of petitioners’ ineligibility, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:

“Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession

“SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies
in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor
or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned
shall become the governor or mayor. x x x (underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the
instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both being ineligible for the
Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in
said office, the vice-mayor
elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is hereby declared Mayor of
Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez Jr., J., concurring and dissenting opinion.

*
The first time was in Ramon L. Labo, Jr., v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989])

* “Sec. 72 Effects of
disqualification cases and priority. – The Commission and the courts shall give
priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the
end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before
the election in which the disqualification is sought.

“Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions
of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office.”

* PD 725 authorizes the Special
Committee on Naturalization (created under LOI 270) to accept and process
petitions for repatriation, as follows: “(1) Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens: and (2) natural born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration shall thereupon cancel certificate of registration.”

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