G.R. No. 105090. September 16, 1993
BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., (BIMCAI) FSM, AND ITS UNION OFFICERS & MEMBERS, ETC., PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERNIL…
PUNO, J.:
The restoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain
of labor after the EDSA revolution. It
is the employees’ sole weapon which can effectively protect their basic rights
especially in a society where the levers of powers are nearly monopolized by
the propertied few or their franchisees. In recognition of its importance, our Constitution has accorded the
right to strike a distinct status while our laws have assured that its rightful
exercise will not be negated by the issuance of unnecessary injunctions. The impugned Order of the public respondents
in the case at bar infringes petitioners’ right to strike and hence must be
struck down.
The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open when
the petitioner union[1]
struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices
and union busting allegedly committed by the private respondent.[2]
The union picketed the premises of the private respondent at Bagumbayan and
Longos in Quezon City; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando, Pampanga and
San Pedro, Laguna.
The strike hurt the private respondent. On April 8, 1992, it filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction[3]
to stop the strike which it denounced as illegal. It alleged:
x x x
“13. On April 6, 1992, at
around 7:00 P.M., respondents led by its officers and some members staged a
wild-cat strike, without a valid notice of strike, nor observing cooling-off
period, and made even during the pendency of a preventive mediation proceedings which was still
scheduled for April 10, 1992;
“14. And during the said
wild-cat strike, respondents have set-up makeshifts, tents, banners and
streamers and other man-made obstructions at the main plant and offices of
petitioner which effectively impeding, as in fact still effectively impeding
the ingress and egress of persons who have lawful business with the petitioner;
“15. Furthermore,
respondents have resorted, as in fact still resorting to, unlawful and illegal
acts including among others threats, intimidations and coercions against
persons who have lawful business with the petitioner and the non-striking
employees who wish to return to work;
“16. Without complying with the legal requirements for a valid
strike, respondents’ staging of the said ‘wild-cat strike’, is by law
considered as illegal or unlawful act which must be enjoined;
“17. As a direct result of
the aforesaid unlawful and illegal acts of the respondents, petitioner which
has on-going projects for the government and other private entities which
require completion on and agreed schedule, is at great and imminent danger to
suffer substantial damages and injury, which if not urgently redressed, will
inevitably become irreparable;
“18. Said prohibited and
unlawful acts have been threatened and will continuously be committed unless
the injunction or temporary restraining order be issued against the
respondents; (pp. 2-5, Records).
x x x.
“23. The injury and damages
to the government of Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner and other
persons are unavoidable, so much so that the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order without notice becomes imperative, as the police officers or
agents of authority called upon to enforce the right to ingress and egress are
unable to do so; (p. 6, ibid)”
The petition was set for hearing on April
13, 1992 at 3 p.m. The union, however, claimed that it was not
furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address to be at Rm. 205-6
Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila.
On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company
alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30 p.m. where testimonial and documentary
evidence were presented.[4] Some thirty (30) minutes later, an
Ocular Inspection Report was submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative[5] which reads:
“OCULAR INSPECTION REPORT
Authorization dated April 13, 1992 was issued to the effect of
directing the undersigned to conduct an ocular inspection of the premises of
the petitioner located at Bagumbayan, Quezon City.
The inspection was conducted immediately upon receipt hereof.
OBSERVATION
The passage was obstructed with pieces of rock, an old ladder,
pieces of wood and other hard objects that gave rise to a strong indication
that the passage to and from the premises was not free. The barricades and obstruction were put up fifty (50) meters
or less
away from
the main gate.
The business operation was completely paralized (sic) as no person
was noticed inside the company compound. No persons and/or vehicles were seen entering and leaving the
premises. Ingress to
and engress from the company is presumed to be not free.”
Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC
(First Division) issued a temporary restraining order against the union, viz:
“x x x RESOLVED, to
issue a Temporary Restraining Order valid for twenty (20) days, subject to
petitioner’s posting of a cash or surety bond of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos
conditioned to recompense respondents for any loss, expense or damage they may
suffer in the event it is eventually found out that petitioner is not entitled
to the relief sought and herein granted, DIRECTING: a) the respondents, their agents and symphatizers
to remove (subject to their right to conduct a lawful picket) the manmade
barricades/obstructions complained of and to direct from further preventing
and/or impeding the free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s main plant and
office premises of its employees, officials, vehicles, customers or any party
who may want to transact business thereat through the use of any obstructive
means prohibited by law; b) any officer from the Legal Division of this
Commission to ensure compliance of the foregoing restraining order and where
necessary, to enlist in the implementation of this Order, as deputized
enforcement officers, the assistance of peace officers of this government that
has jurisdiction over the strike areas; c) Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Penalosa to
immediately set this case for further hearing with the aim of affording
respondents enough opportunity to contest/oppose the issuance of
temporary/permanent injunction prayed for in the petition and to submit a
report to this Commission within ten (10) days from termination of said
hearing”.
No copy of this Order was furnished the
union. The union learned of the Order
only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the company. On April 21, 1992, it filed its
Opposition/Answer to the petition for Injunction. Among others, it alleged:
x x x
“9. The allegation in paragraph 13 of an alleged illegal
strike for the reasons stated therein is
denied. It is also added that
the question of strike legality is outside the original jurisdiction of the
NLRC except if the labor dispute has
been certified to it for compulsory arbitration. Hence, not only is paragraph 13 denied, denial is made likewise
of paragraph 16 which asks that the strike must be enjoined. Paragraph 16 is irrelevant to the cause of
action in injunction because only the illegal or unlawful acts maybe
enjoined. The strike itself cannot be
enjoined unless certified by the honorable Secretary of Labor to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration.
“9. Paragraphs 14, 15, 17,
18, and 19 of the allegations supporting the cause of action are also denied for being self-serving and premature.
“10. Respondents also deny
the allegation in paragraph 20 as the public officers charged with the duty to
protect the petitioner’s property are able and willing to furnish adequate
protection as shown by the fact that when the temporary restraining order was
served, the police and other law enforcement agency personnel came immediately
to respond and enforced the order peacefully”.
On April 24, 1992, the union also filed
its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company “from asking the aid of
the police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck
establishment.”
The records show that the case was heard on April 24 and 30, May
4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor Arbiter Enrilo Peñalosa.[6] On
April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction wherein it alleged:
“x x x
“7. In the meantime, the
respondents are still committing illegal acts, by resorting to grave threats,
intimidation against the non-striking employees and persons with lawful
transactions with the company since April 20, 1992, continuously up to this
time, either by actual threats and intimidation whenever these persons attempt
to report to work or transact business with the company, or by calling at their
houses or places of residence, and then and there coerce not to report for work
on pain of bodily harm; As proof thereof, petitioner attaches the affidavit of
Atty. Elmer Jolo, Augusto Bautista, Ronnie Mercado, among others, as Annexes
“A”, “B” & “C” and made integral parts thereof.
“8. For these reasons,
said workers and persons are constrained to refrain from reporting for work or
from transacting business with the company;
“9. Finally, no less than
the president of the Union, supported by the leaders of the strikers,
threatened that upon the expiration of the validity of the temporary
restraining order, they will ‘sisimentuhin namin ang gates
ng Concrete Aggregates na kahit ipis ay
hindi makakapasok at makakalabas’ (‘We will cement
the gates of the Concrete Aggregates that even cockroaches could not pass
through’);”
The union got wind of the motion only on
May 4, 1992. The next days, May 5,
1992, it opposed the motion, alleging:
“x x x
“They were never furnished by the petitioner with a copy of the
original petition for injunction filed on April 8, 1992 because as seen from
the petition, petitioner addressed the respondents at Rm. 205-206 Herald Bldg.,
Muralla St., Manila as stated in paragraph
2 of the said petition and they came to know only of the same when
Commission issued a temporary restraining order dated April 15, 1992 which was
served to them at the picket line on April 15, 1992 and thus they opposed the
same on April 20, 1992 (pp. 99-100, Records).
“x x x. The suspicion is
that same is deliberate in order for the union not to be able to immediately
oppose the petition praying for a temporary restraining order and so petitioner
was scot-free when it presented ex-parte evidence. The motion for the immediate issuance of a
preliminary injunction foisted upon the Honorable Commisssion with affidavits
of employees debunked by cross-examination and officers of the company making
fantastic claims is an attempt to have lightning strike twice at the same
place. We hope this Honorable
Commission is not fooled and therefore we beseech it to examine carefully the
pleadings and the transcript on this question of threat or prohibited acts.
“x x x x x x x x x
“The allegation of damages if no injunction is secured is therefore
premature and irrelevant in this proceedings because there is no proof that the
strike is illegal. For if the strike is
legal then both sides must bear their own losses in an economic contest: the company – loss of income; the workers –
loss of wages. These are the stakes in
an economic dispute. The desperate
company posture to enjoin even the strike itself is shown by its letter to the
Secretary of Labor dated April 6, 1992, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“A”. The Secretary of Labor has
not yet acted
on this request. The company believes
probably that an injunction petition would substitute the provision of Art. 263
of the Labor Code.”
The same day, however, the respondent
NLRC issued its disputed Order[7]
granting the company’s motion for preliminary
injunction. It reads:
“It appears that despite the issuance of a temporary restraining
order on April 14, 1991, the respondents have not ceased in committing the
illegal acts being enjoined. As shown
by petitioner during the hearings of its main petition for preliminary and/or
permanent injunction, held on the first day of the implementation of the
temporary restraining order on April 20, 1992 and the day thereafter,
respondents, thru the formation of human blockade, have prevented the company
vehicles and Employees’ Shuttle Buses from entering the company premises, and
through force and intimidation made the non-striking employees on board the
vehicles and buses to get down: that
even the company’s Assistant Manager for Operations, Mr. Ronnie Mercado, who
tried to help the non-striking employees to enter the company premises was
blocked by the strikers and was even told “wala kaming pakialam sa restraining
order ninyo, basta hindi namin papapasukin para magtrabaho ang sino mang
empleyado ng Concrete Aggregates. Bubugbugin namin kayo pag kayo nagpilit.” He was further told that “Ikaw
Mercado huwag kang mapapel dito baka my mangyari sa iyo.” As a result of the
said blockade, threats and intimidation, more or less 100 non-striking
employees now, have not been able to report for work; moreover, the inability
of the company’s Longos Plant to operate fully had caused it to lose the
contracted RMC Sales of around 10,000 cubic meters worth around P10 million,
not to mention the expected loss in sales for the next three (3) months at P14
million per month since no customers, regular or prospective, could transact
business with the company. But foremost
of all, it has been shown that no less than the President of the Union, Ramos
Banas, with the support of the leaders of the strikers, has threatened that
upon the expiration of the validity of the temporary restraining order on May
5, 1992, they will not only barricade the gates of the company but even seal them
all so that “even cockroaches could not pass through.
“While respondents witnesses, who were mentioned in the
testimonies/affidavits of petitioner’s witnesses, tried to deny the illegal
acts imputed against them, the fact remains undisputed that when the convoy of
the company cars and Employees Shuttle Buses with reporting non-striking
employees on board were about to enter the compound of the company’s Longos
Plant in Quezon City, they were stopped by the respondents on the lame excuse
that they were only to inquire as to who were those on board and that they
asked those who are allegedly non employees of the petitioner to get down. It has been substantially established that
out of the work force of the Longos Plant, about 100 more or less employees
have not been able to enter the plant premises from April 20, 1991 up to the
present, for fear of bodily harm from the strikers. Likewise, if it were true, as claimed, that no threats and
intimidation were committed against the company officials who were to report
for work, then there is no reason why the Manager for Operations, Ronnie
Mercado, should be complaining to the police nearby and for the latter to
advise respondents Ramon Banas and Ernest Lascona behave well. Moreover, there is merit to the claim of
petitioner that even contract workers hired by it who, even before the strike
and up to the present, were assigned to work inside the premises of the Longos
were denied entrance by the strikers for their being alleged scabs. With this admission regarding the contract
worker, there is reason to believe the truth and veracity of the statement as
of petitioner’s witnesses, especially the reasonable fear that after the lapse
of the twenty (20) days duration of the temporary restraining order, the
respondents-strikers will again resort to barricading the entrances of
petitioner’s plants to prevent anyone from entering the said plants’
premises.
“On the bases of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, the
First Division of this Commission, after due deliberation hereby RESOLVED: (pending conclusion of the hearing on
petitioner’s main petition of April 24, 1991), to issue preliminary
injunction: a) enjoining the
respondents, their representative and symphatizers, if any, without prejudice
to their right to conduct a peaceful and lawful picket, from preventing the
non-striking employees, officials of the company and their vehicles, customers
and visitors free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plant and premises;
directing them to make the ingress to and egress from said premises free from
any and all obstruction at all times; and requiring them to desist from further
threatening and intimidating at their houses or elsewhere the non-striking
employees who up to now could not report for work and to allow them to report
for work unmolested: b) directing them,
despite the union president’s statement that none of the feared illegal acts
will be committed after the lapse of the temporary restraining order, to refrain
from doing any illegal act which will exacerbate the situation upon the
expiration of the temporary restraining order: c) applying the cash or surety bond of P20,000.00 posted by
petitioner for the temporary restraining order that will expire on May 5, 1992
as the case or surety bond for this preliminary injunction: d) deputizing any officer from the Legal
Division of this Commission to effectively enforce and implement this
injunctive order and, if necessary, to enlist the assistance of the PNP or
other peace officers having jurisdiction over the strike areas in the
enforcement and implementation of this Order.
Let two (2) copies of this injunctive order be posted in two (2)
conspicuous places of each of the strike areas by the Bailiff of this
Commission for the information and proper guidance of all concerned.
SO ORDERED.”
The union then filed the instant petition for certiorari
and mandamus raising the following issues:
“x x x
“3. Whether or not the
respondent NLRC can issue a preliminary injunction, as it did issue, after the
lapse of a twenty day temporary restraining order without regard
to the specific provision of Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code, x x x,
considering that in the Order dated May 5, 1992 (attached as Annex “E” of this
petition) there is no finding of fact by the respondent NLRC in any of
the five pages of the aforesaid Order,
to the effect that, as required by
law, “(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (5) That
the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are
unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection.
“4. Whether or not public
respondent NLRC and Labor Arbiter have unlawfully neglected the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from office considering that
after petitioner also filed on April 24, 1992 a petition asking a temporary restraining order and injunction against
the escorting by police authorities of
individuals ‘who seek to replace the strikers
in entering or leaving the premises of
a strike area or work in the place
of the strikers and that the police
force will keep out of the picket
lines unless actual violence or other
criminal acts occur therein’ as provided by Article
264 (d) of the Labor Code, considering that the Labor Arbiter reluctantly allowed
petitioners to present their evidence in support of their petition to enjoin
the scabs being escorted by the police; WHILE in contrast, it continuously set
the motion for immediate issuance of preliminary injunction of private
respondents on April 30, 1992, May 4 and 5, 1992 and issued a temporary
restraining order in favor of the respondent corporation in an hour.”
We ordered the public and private respondents to comment on the
petition.[8]
In its 29-page Comment, Solicitor General Raul I. Goco[9] took
the position that the petition is impressed with merit. In contrast, the private respondent company,
defended the validity of the Order dated May 5, 1992 of the NLRC.[10]
Similarly, the NLRC contended that it did not abuse its discretion in issuing
the disputed Order.[11]
We find for the petitioners.
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in
protecting the rights of employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. It may be that in highly
developed countries, the significance of
strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more
peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries, however, where the economic crunch
continues to enfeeble the already marginalized working class, the importance of
the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has proved many a time as
the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great equalizer.
In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a
rhetoric than a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity
of the right to strike. Its struggle to
gain the right to strike has not been easy and effortless. Labor’s early exercise of the right to
strike collided with the laws on rebellion and sedition and sent its leaders
languishing in prisons. The spectre of
incarceration did not spur its leaders to sloth; on the contrary it spiked
labor to work for its legitimization. This effort was enhanced by the flowering of liberal ideas in the United
States which inevitably crossed our shores. It was enormously boosted by the American occupation of our
country. Hence, on June 17, 1953,
Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA
875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. For nearly two (2)
decades, labor enjoyed the right to strike until it was prohibited on
September 12, 1972 upon the declaration of martial law in the country. The 14-year battle to end martial rule
produced many martyrs and foremost among them were the radicals of the labor
movement. It was not a mere
happenstance, therefore, that after the final battle against martial rule was
fought at EDSA in 1986, the new government treated labor with a favored
eye. Among those chosen by then
President Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987 Constitution were recognized
labor leaders like Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople and Jaime S.L.
Tadeo. These delegates helped craft
into the 1987 Constitution its Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human
Rights. For the first time in our
constitutional history, the fundamental law of our land mandated the State to
“… guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with
law.”[12]
This constitutional imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal
victory for labor. Our Constitutions of
1935 and 1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution did not
elevate the right to strike to a constitutional level. With a constitutional matrix, enactment of a
law implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715 came into being on March 21,1989, an intentional replication of
RA 875.[13] In light of the genesis of the
right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a
libertarian latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a distinguished
commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission “x x x the constitutional
recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions,
should be reduced to the barest minimum”.[14]
In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent
NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and
(5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides
both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be
complied with before a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor
dispute, viz:
“ART. 218. Powers of the
Commission. — The Commission shall
have the power and authority:
x x x x x x x
x x
(e) To enjoin or restrain
any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts
or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which,
if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined
in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses,
with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a
complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and
only after a finding of fact by the commission, to the effect:
“(1) That prohibited or
unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued
unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the
person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing
the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same
after actual knowledge thereof;
“(2) That substantial and
irreparable injury to complainants property will follow;
“(3) That as to each item
of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by
the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of
relief;
“(4) That complainant
has no adequate remedy at law; and
“(5) That the
public officers charged with the duty
to protect complainants property are unable
or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
“Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof
has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known
persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and
other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have
been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s
property: x x x” (Underlining ours)
In his Comment, the Solicitor General cited various evidence on
record showing the failure of public respondents to fulfill the requirements,
especially of paragraphs four (4) and five (5) of the above cited law. We quote with approval the pertinent
portions of the Comment:
x x x
“It must be noted that to support the claim of threats,
intimidation, unlawful and prohibited acts, etc. allegedly committed by the
union against the non-striking employees, the company even submitted a joint
affidavit signed by Joselito Concepcion, Renato Trambulo and Armando
Arcos. Said affidavit reads-
‘JOINT AFFIDAVIT
‘We, ARMANDO ARCOS, CESAR NAVARRO and RENATO TRAMBULO residents of
Dasmarinas, Cavite and JOSELITO CONCEPCION of Binangonan, Rizal all of legal
age, Filipino after having been sworn hereby depose and say:
‘That we are contract worker (sic) of CAC under Engr. Mercado;
‘That last April 20, 1992 at around 8:00 A.M. we were denied entry
at the Longos Plant by striking workers particularly Ramon Banas, Ricardo Manalang,
Rodrigo Manalang, Rodrigo Lauihon and Ernesto Lascona;
‘That the abovenamed persons stopped us at the gate of Longos
Plant, told us to get off the bus, and in threatening manner told us to leave
and vacate the premises otherwise something bad will happen to us;
‘That because of this unlawful, illegal and felonious acts of the
said persons we were compelled to do something against our will that is to leave
without being able to report for work;
‘That the abovenamed person and the herein complainants are
residents of barangays in different cities and municipalities hence the matter
is not covered by PD 1508;
‘That we are executing this affidavit
to charge Ramon Banas, Ricardo Manalang,
Rodrigo Lauihon and Ernesto Lascana with
Grave Coercion.’ (Exh. “I”, p. 896, Records) (Underscoring
Supplied).
“However, when presented before the Labor Arbiter, the affiants
themselves controverted the allegations in said joint-affidavit. They innocently divulged having signed the
prepared affidavit
without first reading the same. Likewise, they admitted that they did not see or hear Banas, Manalang,
Lacuna and Lacejon threatened the group of “non-strikers” inclduing themselves
of bodily harm (pp. 13-14, 20-21, 35-37, 46-47, 49-50, 54-61, TSN, April 24,
1992). They testified, thus –
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF JOSELITO CONCEPCION
‘ARBITER
PEÑALOSA:
The
question is . . . who prepared the affidavit? Alam mo raw ba kung sino ang gumawa ng affidavit na ito?
ATTY.
ESPINAS:
Sinong
gumawa?
ATTY.
MACARUBBO:
Para
sa iyo?
MR.
CONCEPCION:
Si
Attorney po.
(pp.
20, 21, ibid)
‘DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
RENATO TRAMBULO
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
Mr. Witness, did you
sign an affidavit dated April 24, 1992?
MR. TRAMBULO:
Yes, Sir.
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
Have you read this
affidavit?
MR. TRAMBULO:
Hindi pa ho.
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
Perhaps, what you
meant is . . .
ATTY. ESPINAS:
No, no, no, . . . You
can ask another question. His answer is
– Before I, signed it but I have not read it yet.
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
What do you mean that
you have not read this?
MR. TRAMBULO:
Sa
akin lang po, iyong sinabi sa akin na . . . iyong hinarang kami, pinababa kami
. . . iyon lang po ang alam ko. Wala na
po akong ibang alam.
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
Hinarang ka?
MR. TRAMBULO:
Hinarang kami,
pinababa kami dahil hindi daw kami empleyado sa kompanya.
ATTY. MACARUBBO:
At iyon ang ibig
sabihin nito?
MR.
TRAMBULO:
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION OF RENATO
TRAMBULO
ATTY. ESPINAS:
What did Lacejon said
(sic)
MR. TRAMBULO:
Pinababa
na lang po kami sa service. Sabi niya,
bumaba na kayo dahil hindi naman kayo empleyado ng Concrete, kaya bumaba na
lang po kami.
(pp.
46-47, 49-50, id)
‘TESTIMONY OF ARMANDO ARCOS:
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Cross-examination. Sinabi ba ng mga
taong ito na kung hindi
kayo bababa, masama ang mangyayri sa inyo? Meron bang sinabing ganoon?
ATTY. ARCOS:
Wala ho.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Dito
sa second paragraph which says . .
. told you to leave and vacate
the premises otherwise something bad will
happen to us. Kung
hindi kayo umalis . . . walang
sinabing ganoon?
MR. ARCOS:
Wala naman
ho.
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Sino ang nagsabi sa
inyo na “Hindi naman kayo empleyado, bumaba na kayo?”
MR. ARCOS:
Si Lacejon. Iyong may salamin.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Pero walang
sinabi si Lacejon na kung hindi kayo bababa may masamang mangyayari sa inyo?
MR. ARCOS:
Wala
naman ho.
(pp.
59-61, id)
Moreover, no less than Mr. Ronnie Mercado, the Assistant Manager
for Operations of the Company, testified that after the issuance of the ex
parte temporary restraining order, the barricade blocking the gates were
removed and people were allowed free ingress and egress (please see also pp.
70-71, 96, TSN, April 30, 1992). He
stated, thus –
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR.
MERCADO
ATTY. ESPINAS:
So after
the temporary restraining order, were the
barricade removed?
MR. WITNESS:
Those blocking
the gates, yes.
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. ESPINAS:
But the barricades
blocking the gates were already removed.
MR. WINTESS:
The
barricades blocking the gates were already
removed.
(pp.
66-67, TSN, April 30, 1992)
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY.
ESPINAS:
Let us go to
Antipolo. After the restraining order
the people were able to enter?
MR. WITNESSS:
After the
restraining order the people can already
enter.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
They were
escorted by the
police?
MR. WITNESS:
No, sir. (P. 75, ibid) (Underscoring ours)
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. ESPINAS:
O, lahat ng gustong
pumasok, makakapasok na ngayon?
MR. WITNESS:
Yes,
sir.’
(p.
85, ibid)
“Furthermore, Atty. Elmer Jolo, the Personnel Manager joined by Mr.
Mercado, disclosed that the public authorities charged to protect the company’s
properties were neither unwilling or unable to furnish adequate
protection. As a matter of fact, the
police regularly patrolling the area, was never requested assistance. Thus ?
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ATTY.
ELMER JOLO
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Did
you not ask the assistance of the
San Pedro policemen on this matter of
obstruction and other similar activities in
obstructing the gates of the plant?
MR. WITNESS:
I did not.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Did
you not ask the policemen of Angono, Rizal to help you on this matter again of extracting
the trucks which were supposed to deliver pre-stress material of that day?
MR. WITNESS:
Personally I did not
because I leave this police matter to my chief security officer.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Did your chief
security officer ask the assistance of the policemen of Quezon City with
respect to the Longos Plant?
MR. WITNESS:
That I do not know.
ATTY. Espinas:
Did you ask the aid of
the policemen at Bagumbayan, Quezon City to help you regarding the incident of
April 6, 1992 at 7:00 p.m.?
MR. WITNESS:
I did not personally
because I instructed this police matter to my chief security officer.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Did your chief
security officer seek the aid of the policemen?
MR. WITNESS:
That
I do not know.
(pp.
41-43, TSN, April 30, 1992)
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
MR. MERCADO
ATTY. ESPINAS:
The policemen are from
Quezon city.
MR. WITNESS:
I think so, kasi
nagpa-patrol sila.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
Nagpatrol? They were called by the company?
MR. WITNESS:
No, sir, kaya lang
parati silang umiiikot diyan.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
So the policemen were
present patrolling?
MR. WITNESS:
Paminsan-minsan
sumulpot lang.’
(pp.
85-86, id)
The foregoing testimonies of the senior
officers of the company are further buttressed by the admission of one of the
laborers, also presented as witness by the company, who testified that –
‘CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AUGUSTUS BAUTISTA
ATTY. ESPINAS:
But they were not
bodily stopped from entering after the
21. Were they?
MR. WITNESS:
No.
(p. 124, TSN, April 30,
1992)
x x x x
x x x
x x
ATTY. ESPINAS:
In other words, aside from the police
there is a security office detained?
MR. WITNESS:
Yes, we have our own.
ATTY. ESPINAS:
And the security officer
can request the aid of the policemen?
MR. WITNESS:
Yes.’
(pp. 128-129, id)
“Verily, the factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that
there was no concurrence of the five (5) prerequisites mandated by Art. 218 (e)
of the Labor Code. Thus there is no
justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction.”
The Comments of the private and public
respondents did not dispute the correctness of these documentary and
testimonial evidence.
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair
strategies to secure ex parte temporary restraining orders
against striking employees. Petitioner
union did not receive any copy of private respondent’s petition for injunction
in Case No. 000249-92 filed on April 8, 1992. Its address as alleged by the private respondent turned out to be
“erroneous”.[15]
Consequently, the petitioner was denied the right to attend the hearing held on
April 13, 1992 while the private respondent enjoyed a field day presenting its evidence ex
parte. On the basis of
uncontested evidence, the public respondent, on the same day April 13,
1992, temporarily enjoined the petitioner from committing certain alleged
illegal acts. Again, a copy of the
Order was sent to the wrong address of the petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came to the
petitioner only when its striking members read it after it was posted at the
struck areas of the private respondent.
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order in a labor dispute is not per se
prohibited. Its issuance, however,
should be characterized by care and caution for the law requires that it be
clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e., when the
commission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injury to
company properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an adequate remedy
at law. This is as it ought to be, for
imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of employees
engaged in a legal strike. Often times,
they unduly tilt the balance of a labor warfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects
of a wrongfully issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on
the rights of striking employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simple
monetization. Moreover, experience
shows that ex parte applications for restraining orders are often
based on fabricated facts and concealed truths. A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore, demands that such ex
parte applications should be more minutely examined by hearing officers,
lest, our constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but a
synthetic shibboleth. The immediate
need to hear and resolve these ex parte applications does not
provide any excuse to lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the
issuance of indiscriminate injunctions. Stated otherwise, it behooves hearing officers receiving evidence in
support of ex parte
injunctions against employees in strike to take a more active stance in seeing
to it that their right to social justice is in no way violated despite their absence. This equalizing stance was not taken in the
case at bar by the public respondents.
Nor do we find baseless the allegation by petitioner that the
public respondents have neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch its own
Petition for Injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order dated
April 25, 1992. The petition invoked
Article 264 (d) of the Labor Code[16] to
enjoin the private respondent from using the military and police authorities to
escort scabs at the struck
establishment. Sadly contrasting is the
haste with which public respondents heard and acted on a similar petition for
injunction filed by the private respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its prayer for an ex parte
temporary restraining order was heard on April 13, 1992 and it was granted on
the same day. Its petition for
preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and was granted on May 5,
1992. In the case of petitioner, its
petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date, the records
do not reveal whether the public respondent has granted or denied the
same. The disparate treatment is
inexplicable considering that the subject matters of their petition are of
similar importance to the parties and to the public.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari and mandamus
is granted. The Order dated May 5, 1992
of the public respondent in NLRC NCR IC No. 000249-92 is annulled and set
aside. The public respondents are
likewise ordered to hear and resolve, with deliberate speed petitioner’s
petition for injunction filed on April 30, 1992.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), J.,
on leave.
[1]
Hereinafter referred to as Union.
[2]
Hereinafter referred to as company.
[3]
NCR-IC No. 000249-92
[4]
Atty. Elmer Jolo, Mr. Aurelio Isidro
and Mr. Camilo Tolentino testified. Offered as evidence were Exhibits “A” to “H”
[5]
Comment of the OSG, p. 126
[6]
In the hearing of April 24; 1992, Messrs. Joselito Concepcion, Renato Trambulo
and Armando Arcos testified for the company. In the hearing of April 30, 1992, the witnessses who testified for the
company on April 13, 1992 were cross examined; in the hearing of May 4, 1992,
Mr. Ramon Banas testified for the union while Messrs. Jose Gonzales and Camilo
Tolentino testified for the company.
[7]
It was signed by Chairman
Bartolome S. Carale and
Commissioner Romeo B. Putong. Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso was on leave.
[8]
Resolution of May 25, 1992.
[9]
He was assisted by Asst. Solicitor General
Deusdedit B. Quijano and Solicitor Nyriam Susan O. Sedillo
[10]
Comment dated August 24, 1992
consisting of thirteen (13) pages.
[11]
Comment signed by Atty. Florentino R.
Darlucio consisting of eight (8) pages.
[12]
Par. 2, sec. 3, Art. XIII; underlining supplied.
[13]
Compare sec. 9 of the RA 875 with Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code.
[14]
The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Vol II, 1988
ed., p. 473. In this regard, Art. 254
of the Labor Code provides: “Art.
254. Injunction prohibited – No
temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity,
except as otherwise provided in Article 218 and 264 of this Code.”
[15]
Comment of OSG, p. 128 Rollo;
Par. 6 of Petition, p. 10, Rollo;
[16]
“(d) No public official or employee,
including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or
escort in any manner any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering
or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the
strikers. The police force shall keep
out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur
therein: x x x”