VIRGILIO CALLANTA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DISTILLERIA LIMTUACO CO., INC. AND/OR JULIUS T. LIMPE, AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Virgilio
Callanta seeks the annulment or setting aside of the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 10, 1991
which reversed the finding of illegal dismissal and order of reinstatement with
backwages by the Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo T. Vasallo.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

From June 18, 1986 to December 31, 1986, petitioner was appointed
as sub-agent by respondent
company under the supervision of Edgar Rodriguez with specific assignment at
Iligan City and Lanao Province.

In October of 1986, or before the expiration of his appointment,
petitioner was promoted to the position of national promoter salesman of
respondent company for Iligan City, Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur (Rollo,
p. 29). On 28 April 1987, however, a “spot audit” was conducted
and petitioner was found to have a tentative shortage in the amount of P49,005.59
(Rollo, p. 30).

On 30 April 1987, petitioner tendered his resignation to private
respondent Julius T. Limpe, effective on the same date. The petitioner’s resignation letter is
herein quoted in toto:

“April 30, 1987

MR. JULIUS T. LIMPE

President & Gen.
Manager

Destilleria Limtuaco
& Co., Inc.

1830 EDSA, Quezon City

“Dear Sir:

“I have the honor to
render (sic) my resignation as National Promoter Salesman effective April 30,
1987.

“I take this
opportunity to thank you for the invaluable experience I gained during my stay
here. As I leave, I take such
experience as a stepping stone in pursuing greener pasture with the same
honesty and integrity I have displayed in the performance of my duties while in
your employ.

“Rest assured
that if problem arise (sic) in the future I shall be happy to assist in any way
I can.

“Respectfully yours,

“(SGD.) VIRGILIO CALLANTA”

Seven months thereafter, petitioner wrote a letter to private
respondent Limpe complaining about his false resignation and demanding for the
refund of the amount of P76,465.81 as well as reinstatement to his
former position.

Respondent company ignored the above demands and on March 21,
1988, petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent company before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. X
for illegal dismissal, unpaid commission and receivable and/or claims due,
non-payment of vacation leaves, holiday pays, 13th month pay, COLA and other
company benefits and damages (Rollo, p. 4).

On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination of
petitioner’s services illegal. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby entered
declaring the termination of complainant by respondent as illegal and ordering
respondent to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position as
National Promoter Salesman with backwages from the time of his dismissal until
actually reinstated plus other benefits which he is supposed to be entitled to
had he not been unlawfully dismissed.

“Ordering respondent to pay and/or refund to complainant the
sum of P76,893.42 as per audit finding of respondent and to pay an
amount equivalent to 10% of the aggregate award as attorney’s fee, plus the sum
of P10,000.00 as the allowance still due to complainant as discussed
above.

“All the other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 21.)

Aggrieved by the decision, respondent company appealed the same
to the Fifth Division of the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City on March 20,
1989. On October 16, 1989 respondent
NLRC issued an Order requiring private respondent company as appellant therein,
to post a cash or surety bond in the amount equal to the monetary award in the
Labor Arbiter’s judgment. Pursuant to
the provisions of the then newly promulgated Republic Act No. 6715, the NLRC
also ordered immediate reinstatement of petitioner to his former position
either physically or in the payroll, at the option of respondent company. Two (2) months from the date of the Order,
private respondent filed the required bond but did not reinstate petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a Motion for
Writ of Execution pending appeal dated November 22, 1990 praying for the
immediate execution of the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision
in accordance with the October 16, 1989 Order of the NLRC as well as Article
223 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 6715. The motion for writ of execution was not acted upon up to the time when
public respondent NLRC decided the appeal on September 10, 1991, which as aforesaid,
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint of
petitioner for lack of merit.

Petitioner now comes to this Court by way of special civil action
of certiorari praying for the nullification of the decision of public
respondent anchored on the following grounds:

I

“THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AND GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR WRIT
OF EXECUTION FOR IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT OF PETITIONER BY RESPONDENT.

II

“THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ALLEGED RESIGNATION LETTER OF COMPLAINANT WAS
VALID AND EFFECTIVE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE SAME
WAS FORCED UPON COMPLAINANT.

III

“THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT COMPLAINANT IS STILL ENTITLED TO THE
PAYMENT AND/OR REFUND OF P76,893.42 AS PER AUDIT FINDING OF RESPONDENT
COMPANY’S AUDITOR PLUS THE SUM OF P10,000.00 AS ALLOWANCE STILL DUE TO
COMPLAINANT.” (Rollo, p. 6.)

To resolve the first issue raised by petitioner, it is imperative
to note the dates involved in the
present case in order to determine whether petitioner was entitled to the
immediate execution of the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s
decision.

As borne by the records, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision
in favor of petitioner on February 16, 1989. Private respondent, on the other hand, filed its appeal on March 20,
1989. Ironically, Republic Act No.
6715, which granted the right to immediate reinstatement under Section 12
thereof amending Article 223 of the Labor Code, became effective on March 21,
1989, or the day after the appeal was filed by private respondent company. Meanwhile, the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeal
under Republic Act No. 6715 became effective on September 5, 1989.

Given this factual background, it is apparent that when the Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision and even up to the time when private respondent
company filed an appeal therefrom, Republic Act No. 6715 was not yet in
effect. Thus, the most logical and necessary
consequence was that the execution of the Labor Abiter’s decision as well as
the requirements for the
perfection of the appeal would have to be governed by the rules prevailing
prior to the amendment of the Labor Code by R.A. No. 6715.

Prior to the amendment of Article 223 of the Labor Code by R.A.
6715, “decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission within ten (10) days from
receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions” (underscoring
supplied). There was then no provision
providing for an execution pending appeal. Hence, under the facts of the present petition, petitioner had no right
to ask for the immediate enforcement of the reinstatement aspect of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision, no such right having been granted to him under the old
rules. Instead, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was stayed by the
timely filing of the
appeal by private respondent company.

In the motion for
writ of execution filed by petitioner, he contended that the appeal of private
respondent company was not perfected since there was no bond filed along with
the appeal (Rollo, p. 22).

Petitioner erroneously based his argument on the premise that the
amended provisions of Article 223 of the Labor Code are applicable to his
case. But as previously emphasized,
R.A. No. 6715 was not yet in force at the time the appeal was filed. Neither can R.A. No. 6715 be deemed to have
retroactive effect, prospective application of the law being the rule rather
than the exception (Article 4, New Civil Code). More so in the present case where the law (R.A. No. 6715) itself
did not provide for retroactive application (Inciong vs. National Labor
Relations Commission 185 SCRA 651 [1990]).

Thus, applying the old rules, where perfection of the appeal
involved only “the payment of the appeal fee and the filing of the
position paper containing among others, the assignment of error/s, the
argument/s in support thereof, and the reliefs sought within the prescribed
period” (Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code Book V, Rule I Section
1(s)), there is no doubt that private respondent company’s appeal was duly perfected.

It cannot be denied, however, that upon the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6715, public respondent NLRC ordered private respondent company to post the additional requirement of
cash bond and immediate reinstatement of the petitioner. By this time, the appeal of private
respondent company has already been perfected in accordance with the old
rules. Consequently, the latter’s
failure to timely comply with the bond requirement cannot be deemed in any way
to affect the perfection of the appeal. Besides, considering the factual peculiarities of the present petition
as above-described, compliance
with the bond requirement, although a jurisdictional requirement, should be
liberally construed to give way to substantial justice. The same sentiment was expressed by this
Court in the 1990 case of YBL (Your Bus Line) vs. NLRC (190 SCRA 160), where
the factual background of the case likewise played a vital role in upholding a
liberal interpretation of the rules. In
the aforementioned case, We held:

“The Court finds that while Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, requiring a cash or surety bond in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from for the appeal
to be perfected, may be considered a jurisdictional requirement, nevertheless,
adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing
the appeal on the merits threshed out by the NLRC, the Court finds and so holds
that the foregoing requirement of law should be given a liberal interpretation.”

In rebuffing the
contentions of petitioner involving the issue of immediate execution, public
respondent NLRC correctly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to act upon the
motion for writ of execution. Since it
was the labor arbiter who issued the decision sought to be executed, the motion
for execution should also be filed with the labor arbiter, as explicitly
provided in the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission Rule V Section 16 (3), to wit:

“In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the
Labor Arbiter shall direct the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed
or separated employee even pending appeal. The order or reinstatement shall indicate that the employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll.” (underscoring supplied)

Coming now to the main issue of the present petition, i.e.,
whether the resignation by petitioner was valid and effective, this Court
believes and so holds that the resignation tendered by petitioner was
voluntary, and therefore valid, in the absence of any evidence of coercion and
intimidation on the part of private respondent company.

Petitioner claims that private respondent company thru private
respondent Julius Limpe showed him an alleged “spot audit” report wherein
petitioner appeared to be short of P49,005.59. He was then handed a ready made resignation letter and ordered to
sign the same otherwise an estafa case will
be filed against him (Rollo, p. 8). The
only evidence presented by petitioner to support his contention of coercion was
a letter written by himself and addressed to private respondent Limpe, to wit:

“Nov. 17, 1987

Mr. J.T. Limpe

Distileria Limtuaco & Co. Inc.

1830 Edsa Balintawak

Quezon City

“Sir:

“The basic inspiration why you dismissed or forced me to
resign was that I was identified with Mr. R.S. Chua the Sales Manager for
Visayas & Mindanao. Your so called
‘post audit’ was but a
convenient afterthought and was designed to give semblance of legality to your
otherwise illegal acts. As a matter of
fact and contrary to the finding of such ‘post audit’, I had an average or
amount refundable to me to be exact P76,465.81. From March 1986 up to Sept. 30, 1986 I do
not have any accountability with Limtuaco what so ever as I was sub-agent of
E.V. Rodriguez. The refusal of Mrs.
Lourdes Galang to show me the records/audit of Mr. E.V. Rodriguez and of L.
Pong, Jr. raise doubts as to what your intentions are.

“I therefore demand of you to refund me such amount and
reinstate me from my position as “National Promoter” otherwise I will
be constrained to file against you a labor case.”

“Very truly yours,

“V.P. CALLANTA
(SGD.)” (Rollo, p. 18)

We agree with
public respondent NLRC that petitioner “failed to adduce evidence that may
prove that said resignation was obtained by means of coercion and
intimidation” (Rollo, p. 33). The
aforequoted letter depicting the coercion allegedly imposed upon him as well as
the reason therefore, was
nothing but a self-serving assertion which has so little or no value at all as
evidence for the petitioner.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle that for intimidation to
vitiate consent, petitioner must have been compelled by a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property,
or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants
(Article 1335, par. 2 New Civil Code). In the present case,
what allegedly constituted the “intimidation” was the threat by
private respondent company to file a case for estafa against petitioner unless
the latter resigns.

In asserting that the above-described circumstance constituted
intimidation, petitioner missed altogether the essential ingredient that would
qualify the act complained of as intimidation, i.e. that the threat must be of
an unjust act. In
the present case, the threat to prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act
(P.P. Agustinos vs. Del Rey, 56 Phil. 512 [1932]), but rather a valid and legal
act to enforce a claim, cannot at all be considered as intimidation. A threat to enforce one’s claim through
competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent (Article 1335, par.
4 New Civil Code).

Furthermore, and
on top of the absence of evidence adduced by petitioner to the contrary,
the Court also finds it unbelievable that petitioner was rattled and confused
into signing a resignation letter on account of a mere “spot audit”
report. It is highly unlikely and
incredible for a man of
petitioner’s position and educational attainment to so easily succumb to
private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even defending himself
nor demanding a final audit report before signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted against him, there was no urgency for
petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature of the letter that he was signing, for
as argued by respondent company, petitioner being “a man of high educational attainment and
qualification, x x x he
is expected to know the import of everything that he executes, whether written
or oral” (Rollo, p. 124). In view
of the foregoing factual setting, petitioner cannot now be allowed to withdraw
the resignation which, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
Court believes was tendered voluntarily by him.

Anent the claims for refund, petitioner once again failed to
convincingly prove the authenticity of his claim against private respondent
company. Petitioner claims that the
amounts of P76,893.42 and P10,000.00 allegedly owed to him by
private respondent company were matters proved during the hearings before the
Labor Arbiter (Rollo, p. 10). However,
the records show that no hearing for the
reception of evidence was ever conducted by the Labor Arbiter. At most,
what transpired were preliminary hearings which had to be reset for five (5)
times due to the absence of counsel for private respondent (Rollo, p.
4). In fact, because of the absence of
counsel for respondent company, the Labor Arbiter just ordered the parties to
submit their respective position papers in lieu of actual hearings. This having been the case, the Court is not convinced that the money
claims of petitioner have really been proven during the alleged hearings before
the Labor Arbiter, if any, especially in
the present case where the money claims are even refuted by private
respondent.

In support of its claims for refund, petitioner presented a
written summation of accounts reflecting the amounts allegedly owed by private
respondent company to him. However, the
aforestated summation is undated
and unsigned, thus inadmissible and uncertain as to its origin and
authenticity. Further kindling the
flame of suspicion as to the origin of the summation in question is the context
of the November 17, 1987 letter of petitioner to private respondent Limpe. Quite unusual is the fact that in refuting
the findings of the alleged “post audit” conducted by private
respondent company, petitioner did not even bother to mention the source of his
conclusion that private respondent
company still owes him P76,893.42, while at the same time complaining that somehow he is being refused access to and
disclosure of some
of the company records, particularly the records/audit of E.V. Rodriguez and J.
Pong, Jr. These facts are inconsistent
with petitioner’s contention that it was the auditor of private respondent
company itself who made the written summation.

Finally, the claim of petitioner for unpaid allowances amounting to P10,000.00
was satisfactorily refuted by evidence presented by private respondent company
in the form of vouchers proving
payment of the same (Rollo, p.
98). Thus, petitioner has no more right
to demand payment of the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.