DOMINGO GELINDON, VIOLETA HERRERA, LEON RODRIGUEZ, CORAZON DIONISIO, RONNIE JASPE, MAGDALENA BAGRO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JOSE DE LA RAMA AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC,…

Forty-eight
(48) petitioners filed this
special civil action for certiorari, with prayer for restraining order,
injunction and damages, “on both questions of law and facts,” seeking
to annul the decision,^[1] dated 5 February 1992, of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 78,
ordering, among other things, herein petitioners to vacate the subject premises
and to surrender peacefully the possession thereof to the private respondent.

This controversy began
when, on 10 July 1989, herein private respondent Real Estate Investors, Inc.
(“Investors”), filed a complaint,^[2] docketed as Summary Proceeding No. 7719, for
forcible entry against the petitioners before Branch 78 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (“MTC”) of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

The petitioners filed
their consolidated answer to the complaint except for petitioner Violeta
Herrera, who filed her own answer and moved for the dismissal of the case
against her on the ground that she had legal grounds to stay in the premises.

After the preliminary
conference, the parties were requested to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from receipt of the court’s order. The petitioners and the private respondent
submitted their position papers,^[3] respectively, on 19 October 1989 and 6
November 1989.

The petitioners moved to
“set aside” the respondent’s position paper for having been filed out
of time. On 19 July 1990, the MTC
issued its order, stating that the issue of the late filing of the private
respondent’s position paper had become academic in view of the so varied
defenses raised by the numerous petitioners that thereby warranted the case to
be covered by the regular, instead of the summary, procedure.

On 16 August 1990,
respondent Investors filed a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint
to include lot 1-E, a parcel of land being occupied by one of the petitioners,
Violeta Herrera, and prayed that its amended complaint be admitted. The motion was granted by the court in its
order^[4] of 17 August 1990. On 15 July 1991, after a hearing, the MTC issued an order,^[5] denying the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration; viz:

“WHEREFORE, x x x; that since this case is covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure as manifested by the defendants thru counsel in the motion
for reconsideration, let a copy of the Amended Complaint be furnished the
defendants and for them to file their answer within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.”

A
motion to dismiss, filed by the petitioners, was denied by the MTC in an order
of 4 September 1991.

For failure of the
petitioners to file their answer to the amended complaint within the
reglementary period, respondent Investors filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to
Render Judgment.” In an order, dated 25 November 1991, the MTC deemed the
case submitted for decision pursuant to the rules on summary procedure.

On 29 January 1992, a
petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the Regional
Trial Court (“RTC”) of Makati, Branch 139, to enjoin the MTC from
rendering a decision on the case and to annul the several orders of the same
court. The petition was dismissed by
the RTC in its order^[6] of 3 February 1992.

Finally, on 5 February
1992, the MTC rendered its questioned decision^[7], thus –

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the latter and
all persons claiming rights under them:

a.       To immediately vacate
the subject premises and surrender peacefully the possession thereof to the
plaintiff;

b.       To pay the plaintiff
the sum of P1,000.00 monthly (each defendant) for the use and occupancy of the
subject premises starting 10 July 1989 which is the date of the filing of the
complaint and up to the time that the subject premises are actually vacated;

c.       To pay the plaintiff
the sum of P20,000.00 jointly and severally as and for attorney’s fees; and

d.       To pay the costs of
suit.”

Upon the receipt of the
above decision, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal^[8], dated 3 March 1992, before the MTC,
contending that the questioned decision was biased, oppressive and not in
accordance with the procedure and the evidence presented.

On 23 April 1992,
respondent Investors filed a motion for execution pending appeal^[9] which was opposed by the petitioners.

On 7 May 1992, the
instant petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners, claiming
that there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to stop the MTC judge from issuing a writ of execution save this
petition.

The petitioners have
raised the following issues:

“1.      Whether a case
being tried under summary procedure and submitted for decision after the
parties filed their position paper be changed
to regular procedure;

2.      Whether a case originally tried under summary procedure and
changed to regular procedure be restored to summary procedure after prohibited
pleadings were filed and admitted;

3.      Whether the amended complaint which include additional lot and
did not reproduce the original complaint is admissible;

4.      Whether the 48 defendants (petitioners) who had a family and a
separate house can be consolidated in one complaint.”

The petition should be
dismissed. The indispensable elements of
a petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.^[10] Quite often, this Court has warned that for
the extraordinary writ to issue, it must be clearly established^[11] that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[12] It, therefore, follows that before a
petition for certiorari can be instituted, all remedies available in the
trial court must have first been exhausted.^[13]

True, we have on certain
occasions entertained petitions for certiorari despite the existence of
the remedy of appeal; in those exceptional cases, however, either public
welfare and the advancement of public policy have dictated^[14] or the broader interests of justice have demanded,^[15] or when the orders complained of are found
to be patent nullities,^[16] or
that an appeal is considered clearly an inappropriate remedy.^[17] In the instant case, however, the questions
raised are issues evidently within the normal precincts of an appeal that
cannot be peremptorily addressed by an extraordinary writ. It appears, in fact, that the petitioners
have timely filed their notice of appeal, which is an adequate remedy; indeed,
it is a bar to this petition.^[18]

Let it also be emphasized
that while this Court^[19] has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Appeals,^[20] as well as with the Regional Trial Courts^[21] (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari,
the litigants are well advised, however, not to disregard the policy that has
heretofore been set by us. In Vergara,
Sr. vs. Suelto,^[22] the Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, said:

“We now turn * * * to the propriety of a direct resort to this
Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a
municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the
Regional Trial Court of the district or the Court of Appeals, both of which
tribunals share this Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse
to this Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the
task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. * *
*. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court,
it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement
must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the prayer
for temporary restraining order is DENIED. This case in remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque,
Branch 78, to allow the timely appeal of the petitioners to take its ordinary
course in law. Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, and
Romero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Hon. Vivencio G. Lirio, Presiding Judge.

^[2]
Annex “A”, Rollo, 12-16.

^[3]
Annexes “B” and
“C”, Ibid., 17-26.

^[4]
Annex “8”, Rollo, 110.

^[5]
Annex “14”, Ibid., 125.

^[6]
Per Judge Jose De La Rama; Annex “21”, Ibid., 144.

^[7]
Annex “O”, Ibid., 46-54.

^[8]
Annex “P”, Ibid., 55.

^[9]
Annex “23”, Rollo, 146-148.

^[10]
Rule 65, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court; Cochingyan, Jr. vs. Cloribel,
76 SCRA 361.

^[11]
Tan vs. Director of Forestry, et
al., 125 SCRA 302, 322.

^[12]
Jose vs. Zulueta, 2 SCRA 574.

^[13]
Telephone Engineering & Service Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., 104 SCRA 354, 360; De
Gala-Sison
vs. Maddela, 67 SCRA 478.

^[14]
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385; People vs. Zulueta, 89
Phil. 752, 756.

^[15]
Tirona vs. Nañawa, 21 SCRA 395, 400.

^[16]
Fernando vs. Vasquez, 31 SCRA 288, 294, citing Clemente vs.
Lukban, 53 Phil. 931, 934.

^[17]
Fernando vs. Vasquez, ibid., citing Leung Ben vs. O’
Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 188; Rocha vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil. 355.

^[18]
People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465,469; Matute vs. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 768; Jose vs. Zulueta, 2 SCRA 574; Daiz vs.
Elosida, 1 SCRA 990; Bacabac vs. Delfin 1 SCRA 1194.

^[19]
Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution.

^[20]
Sec. 9, B.P. 129.

^[21]
Sec. 21, B.P. 129.

^[22]
156 SCRA 753.