LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG, ALBERT CHUA AND SPS. EDUARDO SOLIS AND GLORIA VICTA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This is a Rule 45 petition for review by certiorari of the
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1991 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 13540.^[1]

The controlling facts supported by the records are stated in the
Decision under review, viz:

“The objects of the controversy are several portions of a
large tract of land located in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. The large tract of land is claimed to be
originally owned by one Juan Cuenca y Francisco, who had it surveyed way back
in 1911. The land itself is traversed
by railroad tracks dividing the land into two (2) parcels. On February 21, 1922, Juan Cuenca was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 (Exhibit “H”) covering the two
parcels, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 was later reconstituted as O.C.T.
No. (1020) RO-9, containing the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2.

On April 14, 1928, a separate original certificate of title for Lot
1, referring to the parcel north of the railroad tracks, was issued to Juan
Cuenca as O.C.T. No. (1898) RO-58 (Exhibit “Z”). Lot 1 itself was divided into thirteen (13)
parcels, eleven (11) of which were described therein as situated in the barrios
of Talaba, Zapote, and Malicsi, while two (2) parcels were situated in the
poblacion of Bacoor, Cavite.

Upon the demise of Juan Cuenca, an action for partition of his
properties was filed by Jose Cuenca, one of the surviving heirs. On February 21, 1969, a project of partition
was approved by the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit “EEE”), and
on April 10, 1969, the court ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite to issue individual titles for twelve (12) parcels of Lot 2 (Exhibit
“GG). Three (3) parcels thereof:
Lot 2-A, 2-K, and 2­-L, were titled (T.C.T. Nos. 35963, 35973 and 35974,
respectively) and registered in the name of Juan Cuenca (Exhibits
“K”, “TTT-1” and “TTT-­2”) on April 21,
1969. All three titles stated that the
lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. RO-9 on February
21, 1922 (Exhibits “K”, “G” and “H”).

Lot 2-A of Juan Cuenca was later subdivided into seven (7) lots in
1969. Of these seven subdivided
parcels, one parcel (Lot 2-A-3) was adjudicated to his heir, Pura Cuenca, who
was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41505 on February 24, 1970
(Exhibit “L). The said T.C.T. No.
41505 states that the land covered therein was originally registered as
Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof. One other parcel (Lot 2-A-4) was adjudicated
to another heir, Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 41506 (Annex “M”) on February 24, 1970. Likewise, T.C.T. No. 41506 stated that the land covered therein
was originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was
cancelled by virtue thereof.

We interpose at this
point the observation that although the transfer certificates of title issued
to Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands covered therein were originally
registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, hence, referring to Lot 1 located at the
northern portion of Juan Cuenca’s large tract of land, the technical
description appearing in said transfer certificates
of title were taken or lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2,
referring to the southern portion of the original tract of land.

In the meantime, Lots 2-K and 2-L (T.C.T. Nos. 35973 and 35974) in
the name of Juan Cuenca, were consolidated and, in turn, were subdivided into
eight (8) lots. Lot 4 was adjudicated
to Pura Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41498 (Exhibit “TTT-5”) on
February 24, 1970. Lot 3 was
adjudicated to Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41497 (Exhibit
“TTT-4”) on the same date. Lot 6 was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41501
with the inscription therein that the land covered by said titles were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No.
RO-58-I was cancelled thereby, referring to Lot 1 of the original tract. However, the technical descriptions inscribed therein were lifted from
O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2 of the original tract of land.

Upon the deaths of Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca, the administrators of
their respective testate estates were given authority by the court to dispose
of some parcels of land. Lot 2-A-3 of
Pura Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No. 41505, and Lot 2-A-4 of Ladislaw Cuenca
covered by T.C.T. No. 41506, were eventually sold to herein appellee Lorenzana
Food Corporation on February 4, 1977 (Annexes, “OOO”, “CCC”
and “UU­-1”). Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41505 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88468 issued to, and
registered in favor of, Lorenzana Food
Corporation (Annex “D”). Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41506 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88467
(Exhibit “2”) on February 18, 1977. Both T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468 also stated that the lands covered
therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, but contained portions
of the technical description appearing in O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9.

On the other hand, Lot 3 of the consolidated Lots 2-K and 2-L, as
part of the testate estate of Ladislaw Cuenca, was sold to herein appellee
Jimmy Chua Chi Leong. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 104248 (Exhibit “A”) was issued to and
registered in his name on May 9, 1979, cancelling T.C.T. No. 41497. Lot 4, being part of the testate estate of
Pura Cuenca, was sold to Albert Chua, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-104249 on May
9, 1979 (Exhibit “B”), cancelling T.C.T. No. 41498. Lot 6 was sold by Jose Cuenca to Eduardo
Solis, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-94389, cancelling T.C.T. No. T-­41501. Common to the titles of Jimmy Chua Ching
Leong, Albert Chua and Eduardo Solis is the inscription that the lands covered
therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928.

Another common feature of all these succeeding titles is the
description that the property therein described is situated in the barrio of
Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. Looking back,
the records show that the original tract of land owned by Juan Cuenca was
bounded on the north by Calle Real de Talaba, on the south and southeast by
Sapa Niog, and on the west, by Calle Niog. As mentioned earlier, the land was divided into two (2) by the railroad
tracks running from and going to east and west. The area located north of the railroad tracks, bordering Calle
Real de Talaba was later titled as O.C.T. (1898) 50-58, said parcel straddling
the barrios of Talaba, Zapote and Milicsi, as well as the poblacion proper.

On the other hand, the portion located south of the railroad tracks
was designated as Lot 2. Traversing
this land is what used to be a national road, now called the Aguinaldo Highway,
linking Tagaytay City to Metro Manila. This parcel was later titled as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9. The sub-divided parcels aforementioned, by
their technical descriptions are located at the south to southeast portions of
Lot 2, bounded on the south, by Sapa Niog and Calle Niog on the west. Nevertheless, the said parcels were
described as situated in the barrio of Talaba.

The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same
parcels were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego,
Incorporated. B.E. San Diego’s claim
was based on two (2) titles registered in its name. The first parcel was covered under T.C.T. No. T?17621
(Annex “C”) issued on March 2, 1966, which originated from O.C.T. No.
0-490 registered on December 22, 1965. The said title described “a parcel of land Plan Psu-211245,
pursuant to L.R.C. Case No. N-467, (LRC) Record No. N-27923, situated in the
Barrio of Niog, Municipality of Bacoor.” The second parcel was titled
under O.C.T. No. 0-644, registered on January 5, 1967, pursuant to LRC Case No.
N-557, (LRC) Record No. N-30647, describing “a parcel of land (Lot 1, Plan
Psu-223920), situated in Barrio of Niog.” (Exhibit “9”).

All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims
over the subject properties, three (3) civil suits for quieting of title were
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch XIX. The first case, docketed as BCV-80-17 was
filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation versus B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, and
other defendants. The second civil
case, BCV-81-18, was filed by Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, also
against B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al., as defendants. The last case, BCV-83-79 was filed by B.E. San Diego, Inc.,
against spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, as defendants.

In Civil Case No. BCV-80-17, Lorenzana Food Corporation claimed
exclusive ownership over the two (2) parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and
88468, issued to it on February 18, 1977. Lorenzana Food Corporation alleged that it took immediate possession of
the said property and even contracted to prepare the land for development. It is alleged that it was only years later
that Lorenzana Food Corporation learned that B.E. San Diego, Inc. was claiming
ownership over portions of the said parcels by virtue of O.C.T. No. 0-644. It
is Lorenzana Food Corporation’s contention that the O.C.T. No. 0-644, in B.E.
San Diego’s name is null and void because Lorenzana Food Corporation’s title
emanated from an O.C.T. issued more than thirty-nine (39) years prior to the
issuance of B.E. San Diego’s original certificate of title.

In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of owner of
the subject property for more than fifty (50) years prior to Lorenzana Food
Corporation’s purchase of the two (2) parcels. It also argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-644 was not null
and void since it was issued upon application and proper proceedings in (LRC)
Case No. N-557 and N-30647, before the then Court of First Instance of
Cavite. Pursuant to its issuance, the
said property was declared by B.E. San Diego for tax purposes (Exhibits
“Q” and “5-F”) since June 22, 1966.

B.E. San Diego claims it bought the subject property from Teodora
Dominguez on February 6, 1966 (Exhibit “5-D”) and the absolute deed
of sale was submitted in (LRC) Case No. N-577. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously
claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana’s titled property is
described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego’s property is
situated in Barrio Niog. Denying that
Lorenzana Food Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of
the subject property, B.E. San Diego claimed that in 1979, by force,
intimidation, threat, stealth, and strategy, Lorenzana Food Corporation entered
and occupied the subject property, despite barbed wire fencing with warning
signs, and security guards posted by B.E. San Diego.

In Civil Case No. BCV-81-18, plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and
Albert Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from the
heirs of Juan Cuenca, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
T-104248 and T-104249, issued on January 20 and 30, 1979, respectively. B.E. San Diego, for its part, claimed the
property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621 issued on March
2, 1966, which cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 0-490 originally
issued to Teodora Dominguez, who sold the same property to B.E. San Diego. Again, B.E. San Diego argued that, as
appearing in their respective titles, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong’s and Albert Chua’s
properties were located in Barrio Talaba while that of B.E. San Diego was
located in Barrio Niog.

The last case, BCV-83-79 was initiated by B.E. San Diego against
the Solis spouses who, according to the former, unlawfully entered a portion of
its property titled under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621. The Solis spouses, meanwhile, claim the said
portion by virtue of their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389, issued
pursuant to their purchase of said portion from Jose Cuenca.

In light of these factual findings, the respondent court decided
in favor of the private respondent, B.E. San Diego, Inc. It rejected petitioners’ titles because of
the following defects, viz:

“(a) The appellees’ (petitioners) titles are annotated
with the inscription that the land described therein was originally registered
under OCT No. 1898, but the technical descriptions found therein were lifted
from OCT No. (1020) RO-9.

(b) The
appellees (petitioners) titles state that the properties are located in the
barrio of Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the
Barrio of Niog.”

On the other hand, it found the titles of
private respondent unblemished by any defect. It also considered in private respondent’s favor its open, adverse and
continuous possession of the disputed land since 1966. The respondent court gave little weight to the
verification survey of Felipe Venezuela, Chief of the Technical Services Section
of the Bureau of Lands favoring the claims of the petitioners on the ground
that the “survey was just based on the technical descriptions appearing in
the opposing parties’ titles.”^[2]

The dispositive portion of the disputed Decision decreed:^[3]

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Joint
Decision dated July 15, 1986 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered ordering:

1. The nullification and cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-88467 and T-88468 in the name of appellee
Lorenzana Food Corporation, and dismissing Civil Case No. BCV-80-17;

2. The nullification and cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-104248 and T-104249 in the names of
appellees Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, and dismissing Civil Case No.
BCV-81-18; and

3. The nullification and cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389 in the names of appellees-spouses
Eduardo and Gloria Solis, who are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the
subject property.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”

Petitioners assail the Decision in this petition for review on certiorari
as having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Lorenzana Food Corporation and the spouses Eduardo
Solis and Gloria Victa raise the following:

“ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
and grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court to
uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent in spite of the
fact that these were issued some forty six (46) years later than the titles of
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
and grave abuse of discretion in giving more significance to the annotation
than the technical description in identifying the lots in dispute.

III

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous
conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible error of law and grave abuse of
discretion in holding in its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration that petitioners failed to make proper correction of their
titles.

IV

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estate of Pura Cuenca
and Ladislaw Cuenca, predecessors-­in-interest (sellers) of the
petitioners.”

Petitioners Albert Chua and Jimmy Chua
Chi contend:

1. In the face of its own admission that
petitioners (including Albert Chua and Jimmy Chua Chi Leong) ‘can trace their
titles as having been originally registered on February 21, 1922’, the
respondent Court of Appeals obviously erred and gravely abused its discretion
in nullifying and ordering the cancellation of petitioners’ transfer
certificates of title and dismissing their complaints (including those of
Albert Chua and Jimmy Chua Chi Leong), and in upholding private respondent’s
title.

2. The respondent Court gravely erred and
abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ titles (including Albert
Chua’s and Jimmy Chua Chi Leong’s) are annotated with the inscription that the
land described therein was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the
technical description found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9.

3. The mother title of petitioners’ lots is
Original Certificate of Title No. (1020) RO-9 and not 1898.

4. The respondent court gravely erred and
abused its discretion in not finding that private respondent’s title is rooted
in a fake or spurious title.

5. The respondent court
gravely erred and abused its discretion in discrediting the verification survey
conducted by Engr. Felipe Venezuela, Chief of the Technical Service Section of
the Bureau of Lands, who was commissioned to conduct said survey, by order of
the Court, which confirmed the fact that petitioners’ lots originated from Lot
2, Psu-1075, covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9 and that they are overlapped by the
lots of respondent, as evidenced by his Report (Exhibits “F”,
“F-1” and “F-2”).

6. Even private respondent expressly admitted
that based on the technical descriptions of the lots of petitioners, three are
overlappings of said lots and respondent’s lots, and the respondent court
gravely erred and abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

7. The entries in the second paragraph of
petitioners’ titles are mere clerical errors which can not defeat the fact that
petitioners’ titles originated from Lot 2, Psu-1075, covered by OCT No. (1020)
RO-9.

8. The respondent court’s holding that there
could be no overlapping because in petitioners’ titles it appears that their
lots are situated in Barrio Talaba, while its lots are situated in Barrio Niog,
is devoid of merit.”

We find no merit in the petition.

A perusal of the petition will reveal that it does not raise any
question of law of sufficient significance to warrant the interposition of the
power of review of this court. Neither
does the petition demonstrate that the disputed Decision is anchored on factual
findings so grossly misappreciated by the respondent court, as to result in a
wanton distortion and denial of the legal rights of petitioners.

The case at bench started as actions to quiet petitioners’ titles
over certain parcels of land filed against private respondent.^[4]
The disputed lots are in the possession of the private respondent who has
consistently paid their taxes since 1966. The lots are located in barrio Niog, municipality of Bacoor, province of
Cavite. They are covered by private
respondent’s titles, TCT No.T-17621 and OCT No. 0-644. As noted by the respondent court, the titles
of private respondent are “… not blemished by any defect and were
regularly issued.”

Private respondent’s titles were assailed by the
petitioners. They allegedly cast a
cloud of doubt on their titles. Petitioners’ evidence showed that their titles were derived from the
original title of Juan F. Cuenca issued on February 21, 1922. The origin of their titles was traced by
Eng. Felipe Venezuela of the Bureau of Lands.

The basic question is whether petitioners were able to discharge
their burden of proving the superiority of their titles over the titles of the
private respondent. The respondent
court found the quantum and quality of evidence presented by the petitioners
insufficient. We find no compelling
reason to reverse this ruling. The
defects appearing on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too glaring
to escape the naked eye. These are
recited in detail in the Resolution of the former Special Sixth Division of the
respondent court thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr.,^[5] when
it denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, to wit:

“From the evidence, the appellees derived their titles from
the defective titles of their vendors, namely Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca. Although the titles issued to Pura and
Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands covered therein were originally
registered as OCT No. 1898 hence referring to Lot 1 located at the northern
portion of Juan Cuenca’s large tract of land, the technical descriptions
appearing in the certificates of titles were taken or lifted from OCT No.
(1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2, referring to the southern portion of the original
tract of land. The land covered by OCT
No. 1898 is not the land covered by the title of the appellees Lorenzana,
because the title of the lot was derived from OCT No. 1898 but its technical
description was drawn from OCT No. 1020. The land covered by OCT No. 1898 is located in the northern portion of
the land covered by OCT No. 1020.

The title of the appellant’s predecessors­-in-interest showed that
the land acquired by the appellant and for which title was issued in the
appellant’s name was described in said title as being located in Barrio Niog,
while the appellees’ title described the property covered by their title as
located in Barrio Talaba. But appellees
claim a parcel of land that is located in Barrio Niog. These two barrios of the town of Bacoor,
Cavite, are located poles apart and were never one and the same town in the
history of the province. The appellees
are claiming property not located in the barrio as described in the technical
description:

To be sure, these defects were judicially
admitted by the petitioners. They
attached their defective titles to their complaints in the trial court. As aforestated, their titles showed on their
very face that they covered lots located in barrio Talaba, municipality of
Bacoor whereas the lots of private respondent are in barrio Niog of the same
municipality. The two barrios are one
and a half kilometers away from each other. Likewise, the face of their titles show that they emanated from OCT No.
1898 or from Lot 1 constituting the northern portion of Juan Cuenca’s property
before its subdivision. Nonetheless,
the technical descriptions of the lots appearing in their titles were lifted
from OCT No. (1020) RO-9 or from Lot 2 forming the southern portion of Juan
Cuenca’s land. No less than
petitioners’ witness, Eng. Venezuela, confirmed these blatant defects when he
testified, thus:

“BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (to the witness)

Q          You
said you referred to these titles in connection with your verification?

WITNESS:

A           Yes, sir.

Q          Now,
I presume you also saw the matters stated in the second paragraph of the first
page of the titles, I am referring . . . particularly to the fact that as
stated in both of these titles, this land was originally registered on April
14, 1928 as Original Certificate of Title 1898 pursuant to Decree No. 338259
LRC Record No. 29214, did you notice those?

WITNESS:

A           I noticed that, sir.

x x x

BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)

Q          In the report that you submitted to
this Court on your verification survey, we find in paragraph 8, No, paragraph
4, subparagraph f, the following statement which I read, “THAT AS PER
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS APPEARING ON TCT NO. 88467 AND TCT NO. 88468 REGISTERED
IN THE NAME OF. . . . . . LORENZANA
FOOD CORPORATION, THE PROPERTY FALLS IN THE BARRIO OF NIOG, BACOOR,
CAVITE,” CONTRADICTING TO THE LOCATION STATED IN THE TITLE WHICH IS BARRIO
TALABA, I READ FURTHER, “IT MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID TITLE
ORIGINATED FROM ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE NO TITLE NO. 1898 DECREED UNDER NO. 338259
WHICH IS ACTUALLY LOCATED IN BARRIO TALABA, BACOOR, CAVITE.

MY
QUESTION IS, BARRIO TALABA AND BARRIO NIOG ARE DIFFERENT BARRIOS?

WITNESS:

A           YES, SIR.

Q          And you have apparently noticed that the
statement contained in the second paragraph of the title of plaintiff stating
that the land supposed to be covered by said titles is derived from OCT No.
1898?

A           Yes, sir.

Q          Are we to understand that the land covered by OCT No. 1898 is not the
same land covered by the titles of the Lorenzana?

x x x

A          In a sense it is not actually, the
title OCT 1898 is located on northern portion of OCT No. 1020, in fact I made
here a working sheet showing the titles, the one Original Certificate of Title
1020 and Original Certificate …. of Title 1898 and I have here a sketch plan
of the positions. x x x .

x x x

BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)

Q          You are mentioned OCT No. 1898 and OCT
No. 1020, you will tell the Court of these two (2) titles cover different
parcels of land?

WITNESS:

A          As per my sketch sheet plan, Original
Certificate of Title No. 1020 is located at the southern portion of the
Original of Title No. 1898, meaning to say that they are far apart from each
other.

Q          Now, this technical description that
you utilized to plot the land described in the title or titles of the
plaintiff, which title did you use, 1898 or 1020?

A          I just followed the title as issued,
as ordered by the Court.

I
based my verification based on the title as required by the Court.

Q THE QUESTION IS, ACCORDING TO YOU . . . . VERIFICATION, THE
LAND BEING CLAIMED BY THE PLAINTIFF; IS IT COVERED BY 1898 OR 1020?

WITNESS:

A          WELL, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR ON THE TITLE
THAT IT WAS TAKEN FROM OCT 1898.

Q          I will not argue to that fact that the
title of Lorenzana was taken from 1898 but I am asking you the plotting of the
technical description as described on the title of the plaintiff is referring
to a land covered by original certificate of title 1898 or 1020?

A          It is very clear on my plan that the
two (2) titles of Lorenzana happened to fall to Original Certificate of Title
No. 1020.

Q          IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE GO BY THE TITLE,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS TITLE OF THE LORENZANAS WAS DERIVED FROM 1898 BUT THE
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION . . . . . WAS FROM ANOTHER TITLE SPECIFICALLY 1020?

WITNESS:

A          YES, SIR, BY USING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION (pp. 34-35, 37-40, 41-43, tsn, 12-9-80, bold letters supplied).

His attempt to reconcile the defects and inconsistencies
appearing on the faces of petitioners’ titles did not impress the respondent
court and neither are we. His opinion
lacks authoritativeness for his verification survey was not made on the land
itself. It was a mere table survey
based on the defective titles themselves.

Petitioners would minimize the import of the defects in their
titles by describing them as “clerical.” The plea does not persuade
for the self-contradictions in petitioners’ titles infract their
integrity. Errors that relate to the
lots’ mother title, their technical descriptions and their locations cannot be
dismissed as clerical and harmless in character. With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve
the sanctity given to torrens title. These errors precisely created and cast the cloud of doubt over
petitioners’ titles and precipitated the case at bench.

Petitioners also missed the thrust of the assailed Decision with
their argument that the respondent court gave more importance to the misleading
annotations in their titles rather than to their technical descriptions. In pointing
out the discrepancies in petitioners’ titles, the respondent court was simply
stressing that these titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of
the private respondent. The case at bench is not one where
petitioners are correcting the defects in their titles by reconciling the
annotations therein and the technical descriptions of the lots. Rather, the case involves actions for
quieting of titles where petitioners are urging that their error-filled titles
should be adjudged as superior to the regularly issued titles of the private
respondent. Petitioners would also oust
private respondent from the lots it has occupied from 1966 and whose taxes it
has paid since then.

In a last swing against the disputed Decision, petitioners
contend that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estates of Pura Cuenca and
Ladislaw Cuenca, their predecessors-in-interest. The contention deserves scant attention. The records show that the trial court
dismissed petitioners’ Complaint against the Estates of Pura Cuenca and
Ladislaw Cuenca in Civil Cases No. BCV-80-17 and BCV-81-18. They alleged that the said Estates breached
their warranties as sellers of the subject lots. Petitioners Lorenzana Food Corporation as well as Jimmy Chua Chi
Leong and Albert Chua did not appeal the dismissal of their Complaints against
these Estates. The dismissal has become
final and petitioners cannot resurrect the Estates’ alleged liability in this
petition for review on certiorari.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is DISMISSED
there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent court in deciding CA-G.R. CV No. 13540. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Sixth Division composed of Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr., (Chairman),
Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr., (ponente) and Filemon H. Mendoza, (member).

^[2]
At page 13, Decision.

^[3]
It reversed the Joint Decision dated July 15, 1986 of the RTC of Bacoor,
Cavite, Br. 19 in Civil Cases No. BCV-83-17,
BCV-81-18 and BCV-83-79.

^[4]
Except Civil Case No. BCV-83-49 where the private respondent was the one who
sought to quiet his title vis-a-vis the title of the spouses Solis.

^[5]
Concurred by Associate Justices Alfredo Marigomen and Quirino D. Abad Santos,
Jr.