CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, RESPONDENTS.
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Aniag versus Commission on Elections
The Case
This is a petition brought by Congressman Francisco Aniag, Junior, against the Commission on Elections and the Department of Justice Special Task Force, asking the Supreme Court to strike down as unconstitutional a Commission resolution that directed the filing of criminal charges against him and to restrain the proceedings that flowed from it. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement on two everyday constitutional guarantees: the limits of a warrantless search at a police checkpoint, and the right to a preliminary investigation as a component of due process. It is a favorite of examiners because the Court resolves the petition without ever reaching the constitutional attack on the gun ban itself, teaching the discipline of deciding on the narrowest available ground.
Procedural History
The matter began before the Office of the City Prosecutor, which conducted a preliminary investigation of the driver, Arellano, and recommended that the case against the driver be dismissed and that the unofficial charge against the congressman also be dismissed. The Commission on Elections, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, disregarded that recommendation and issued a resolution directing the filing of an information against both the congressman and his driver, and directing the congressman to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for office. The congressman moved for reconsideration and to hold the administrative proceedings and the filing of the information in abeyance; the Commission denied the motion. He then came to the Supreme Court on a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition, and the Court issued a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court resolved the petition directly as an original action.
Facts
In preparation for the synchronized elections of May 1992, the Commission on Elections issued a resolution known as the Gun Ban, regulating the bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms during the election period. It followed this with another resolution providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, in using and transporting firearms, in organizing special strike forces, and in establishing spot checkpoints. On the tenth of January 1992, the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives wrote the congressman, who then represented the first district of Bulacan, requesting the return of the two firearms the House had issued him. When his staff advised him of the request on the thirteenth of January, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house and return them to Congress.
At about five o'clock that same afternoon, the Philippine National Police set up a checkpoint some twenty meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex. About thirty minutes later, the policemen flagged down the car driven by Arellano. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk. Arellano was apprehended and detained, and he explained that he had been ordered to return the firearms to the Sergeant-at-Arms. The police referred his case for inquest, but the referral did not include the congressman. The City Prosecutor later ordered Arellano's release after finding his sworn explanation meritorious.
The City Prosecutor then invited the congressman to shed light on the circumstances. He appeared, confirmed his driver's statement, and wrote the prosecutor urging that the driver be exonerated, explaining that the driver was complying with the gun ban by returning the firearms and was a driver, not a security officer or bodyguard. The City Prosecutor recommended dismissal of both the case against the driver and the unofficial charge against the congressman. The Commission on Elections nonetheless directed the filing of an information against both of them for violation of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the firearms provisions of the election law, and directed the congressman to show cause why he should not be disqualified.
Issues
- Whether or not the question of the congressman's disqualification from running for office had been rendered moot by the elections.
- Whether or not the warrantless search of the car at the checkpoint was valid, and whether or not the firearms seized may be admitted in evidence.
- Whether or not the congressman's right to due process, including the right to a preliminary investigation, was violated when he was made a respondent without being so informed.
Applicable Provisions
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This is the guarantee the Court holds was violated by the extensive search of the car.
Section 3, paragraph 2, of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
This is the exclusionary rule that keeps the seized firearms out of any proceeding against the congressman.
Section 261, paragraph (q), of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. Any person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or aircraft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
This is the election offense the Commission charged the congressman with, and it is the charge that falls with the illegal search and the denial of preliminary investigation.
Section 32 of Republic Act Number 7166 provides:
During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period.
This is the statutory firearms ban that the checkpoint was set up to enforce.
Section 33 of Republic Act Number 7166 provides:
During the election period, no candidate for public office, including incumbent public officers seeking election to any public office, shall employ, avail himself of or engage the services of security personnel or bodyguards, whether or not such bodyguards are regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines or other law enforcement agency of the Government.
The congressman invoked this provision to show that his driver was a civilian employee, not a bodyguard, so no violation arose on that score.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the question of disqualification had been rendered moot when the congressman lost his bid for a seat in Congress, so it declined to discuss the implications of the charge on his qualification to run. It likewise found no need to pass upon the constitutional infirmity of the disqualification resolution, since the petition could be resolved without deciding that issue.
On the second issue, the Court ruled the warrantless search illegal. A valid search as a rule requires a warrant, but the Court acknowledged recognized exceptions: a search incident to a lawful arrest, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, and searches at police or military checkpoints, which are not illegal per se so long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search. An extensive search without warrant may be resorted to only if the officers had reasonable or probable cause, before the search, to believe that the motorist was a law offender or that they would find evidence of a crime in the vehicle. Here the checkpoint was set up to enforce the gun ban, but there was no confidential report pointing to gunrunning, and nothing in the package or in the driver's behavior could have triggered suspicion. The Court held that the search unreasonably intruded into the congressman's privacy and the security of his property, and that the firearms obtained in violation of his right cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Court also rejected the argument of implied waiver. The driver did not know the purpose of the checkpoint, and in the face of fourteen armed policemen, a lone employee could not have mustered the courage to protest. Any acquiescence was mere passive conformity, and the Court held that consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
On the third issue, the Court held that due process was violated. The congressman was not among those charged by the police, nor was he subjected to a preliminary investigation for the offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent violated due process, which requires that the procedure established by law be obeyed. Quoting its earlier ruling, the Court stressed:
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice.
The Court explained that the essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of one's defense, and that the congressman was merely invited to corroborate his driver's explanation, believing he was not a respondent. His motion for reconsideration was not a waiver, since it vigorously insisted on his right from the moment he learned of his inclusion in the charge.
Doctrine
A checkpoint search is not illegal per se, but it must remain a visual search; an extensive search of a vehicle without a warrant requires probable cause, judged by the facts of each case, that the motorist is a law offender or that evidence of a crime will be found. Evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent. The right to a preliminary investigation, though statutory in origin, is a component part of due process in criminal justice, and a person cannot be bound over for trial without being apprised that he is a respondent.
Disposition
The petition was granted; the warrantless search was declared illegal, the firearms were excluded as evidence in any proceeding against the congressman, the Commission resolution directing the filing of the information was set aside as violative of the Constitution, and the temporary restraining order was made permanent.
Remember This
Memorize the line that a checkpoint is valid only as a visual search, and that an extensive warrantless search needs probable cause existing before the search. Examiners use this case to test the checkpoint exception, the exclusionary rule, and the rule that preliminary investigation is part of due process.