PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT NO. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, AND TH…

An event in this decade, which future generations would likely
come to know simply as the “EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986,”
has dramatically changed the course of our nation’s history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by
it been left alone in their own
personal lives. One such case is that
of the petitioner in this special civil action for certiorari.

The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin
“Kokoy” Romualdez, and nephew
of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance
with his decision to establish his legal
residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte,^[1]
caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon
thereafter also served as a Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986
“snap” Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the Campaign Manager
of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte
where he voted.^[2]

When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were
about to come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal safety,
whether founded or not, “fled” the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate
family, left the Philippines and sought “asylum” in the United States
which the United States (U.S.) government granted.^[3] While abroad, he took special studies on the
development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance.^[4]

In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run
for a congressional seat in Leyte. On
23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the Philippines but
the flight was somehow aborted.^[5]

On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District
Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that
he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992,
thus:

“* * * Failure
to depart on or before the specified date may result in the withdrawal of
voluntary departure and action being taken to effect your deportation. In accordance with a decision made to your
case, you are required to depart from
the United States at your expense on or before 23 August 1992.”^[6]

Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez
departed from the U.S. for the
Philippines, arriving on 23 December 1991 apparently
without any government travel document.^[7]

When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the
registration of voters conducted by Commission on Elections
(“COMELEC”) on 01 February
1992 for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for 11
May 1992, petitioner registered himself
anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspector, who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place
and, in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to registered.

Romualdez’s registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein private respondent Donato
Advincula (“Advincula”) filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying
that Romualdez be excluded from the
list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166.^[8] Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts,
U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just
recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines
and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.^[9]

On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that
he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980’s, and that he
has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during
the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991.^[10]

After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered
a decision^[11]
on 28 February 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to
be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a
voter thereat. Hence, the instant
petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby
ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.”

Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.

On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision^[12], thus:

“WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez
disqualified to register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses
the decision of the lower court on toto.

The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa,
Leyte, is hereby ordered to delete and cancel the name of respondent Philip G.
Romualdez from the list of
qualified voters registered February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

SO ORDERED.”

Hence, this recourse.

On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
directing respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro Espino to cease and
desist from enforcing his questioned decision.^[13]

The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well
synthesized by the Solicitor General into –

(1)    Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over,
respectively, Case No. 01-S. 1992 and Case No. 92-03-42, the petition having
been filed by one who did not allege to be himself a registered voter of the
municipality concerned; and

(2)    Whether or not the respondent court erred in
finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his
residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Anent the first issue, the
petitioner assails for the first time
the jurisdiction of the respondent Court and the MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in
taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of any allegation in the petition filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a
registered voter in Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte
conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code.^[14]

When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the
exclusion of herein petitioner Romualdez, the latter countered by filing his
answer^[15]
and praying for the denial of the
petition, without raising the issue of
jurisdiction. But what can be
telling is that when the MTC decision, denying the petition for
disqualification, went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum,
explicity prayed that the MTC decision be
affirmed. This unassailable
incident leads us to reiterate that “while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in the proceedings before
a court without jurisdiction will estop
such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.”^[16]
Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent court not only by his
active participation in the proceedings thereat but, more importantly, in having sought an affirmative relief
himself when the appeal was made to the latter court whose jurisdiction he, in effect,
invoked. Furthermore, the question is
not really as much the jurisdiction of the courts below as merely the locus
standi of the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that, at this
stage, should be considered foreclosed.

In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether
or not Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for the petitioner.

The Solicitor-General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at this stance given by
the Solicitor-General, respondent Advincula posits non sequitur
argument^[17]
in his comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all,
disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may well be to recall what this
Court said in Rubio v. Sto. Tomas:^[18]

“It is also incumbent upon the Office
of the Solicitor General to present to the Court the position that will legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a
client’s position.”

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: “(t)he
term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with
“domicile”, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention”.^[19]
“Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.^[20] That
residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early
1980’s to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may
be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire
a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.^[21] In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.^[22]

The political situation brought about by the “People’s Power
Revolution” must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes,
as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of
their immediate families. Their going
into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow
stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described
as “voluntary”, or as “abandonment of residence” at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of
“domicile by choice”.

We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much
to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the
Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious
political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and
requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that
the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of
the governed.^[23]
We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort
even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be
abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those
entitled and bound to exercise it.

WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; the Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby REINSTATED and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly
made PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, and
Puno, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., and
Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
RTC decision, Rollo, 48.

^[2]
Rollo, 6; 48; 59.

^[3]
Rollo, 7.

^[4]
Ibid., 8.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
Ibid., 148-149.

^[7]
Ibid., 9.

^[8]
Rollo, 10.

^[9]
Annex “B”, Rollo, 55-56; 10; 68.

^[10]
P. 10.

^[11]
Per Judge Paulino Cabello; Rollo 68-75.

^[12]
Per Judge Pedro
Espina; Rollo 45-54.

^[13]
Rollo, 122-124.

^[14]
“Sec. 142. Petition for exclusion of voters from the
list.

– Any registered voter in a city or municipality may apply at any time except during the period beginning with
the twenty?first day after the last registration day of any election up
to and including election day with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial
court, for
the exclusion of a voter from the list, giving the name and
residence of the latter, the precinct in which he is
registered and the grounds for the challenge. The petition shall be sworn to and accompanied by proof of notice to the
board of
election inspectors concerned,
if the same is duly constituted, and to the challenged voter.”

^[15]
Annex “C”, Rollo,
57-66.

^[16]
Aquino vs. CA, G.R. No. 91896, 204 SCRA 240/1991/; Salen vs.
Dinglasan, G.R. No. 59082, 198 SCRA 623/1991/; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-­21450, 23 SCRA 29/1968/.

^[17]
                                                             x x x                   x
x x

4. That further investigation showed that
Solicitor Edgar Y. Chua is the brother of Ex-Assemblyman Edward Chua (Youth
Representative in the Batasan) a protege of Imee Marcos Manotoc the first
cousin of Philip Romualdez.

x x x              x x x

6. That Edward Chua has influence over his
brother Solicitor Edgar Y. Chua, who favored Philip Romualdez.

^[18]
183 SCRA 371.

^[19]
Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645.

^[20]
Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, G.R.
No. L-20997, 19 SCRA 966 (1967).

^[21]
Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil 453.

^[22]
17 Am. Jur., sec. 16, pp. 599-601.

^[23]
Puñgutan v. Abubakar, G.R. No. L-33541, 43 SCRA 1/1972/.