G.R. No. 104813. October 21, 1993
HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO AND JEANETTE OLILA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA…
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30542,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calauag, Quezon ordering the defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga
(petitioners herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs, heirs of Cornelia Glor (now
private respondents), and to pay attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C883) filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children
against the heirs of Jose
Olviga for reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406 square meters
(5.44 has), more or less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public
Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the
private respondents, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs of Jose
Olviga to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of Cornelio
Glor Sr.; condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs
attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the suit. The counterclaim interposed by the
defendants is dismissed.” (p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the
defendants who raised several factual issues regarding possession and fraud, as
well as legal issues involving prescription and purchaser in good faith, but
the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
It was established by the evidence on record that the land in
question was, in 1950, still forest land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve
years old, and his father cleared and cultivated it. In 1954, they introduced improvements such as, coconut trees,
jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed
the same in 1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo Olviga, a son
of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey but only with
respect to a one-half-hectare portion “sa dakong panulukan ng Amihanan
Silanganan.” This protest or “tutol” (Exh. B) of Godofredo
Olviga, brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of
public record in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In said document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot
belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed by him
(Godofredo) which was included in the survey of Pureza’s Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot
13. Without his application having been
acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelio Glor in
1961. Neither the homestead application
of Eutiquio nor the proposed
transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the Director of Lands
for reasons that the records of the Bureau of Lands do not disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of
the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family, who were
the real and actual occupants of the land.
What must have happened, as found by the Court of Appeals, is
that since Cornelio Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita
Glor, was unschooled, they failed to follow up Pureza’s homestead application over Lot 13 in the cadastral
proceedings in the Municipal Court of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision,
Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-Foa). In fact,
they were not aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice was
ever posted on Lot 13
about the proceedings nor
did anyone, not even the barangay captain, tell her about them. Neither did she receive any notice from the
court sheriff or any court employee. This non-posting of the notice of the cadastral hearing on the land, or
in the barangay hall, was confirmed by petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself who
testified that he did not notice any papers posted on the property in question
(tsn., October 18, 1990, pp. 83-84). On
the other hand, petitioners’ father, Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13,
which are adjoining lots, in the same cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted in his answer mention of
the fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse
interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza,
the former occupant who sold his interests to private respondents’ parent,
Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was
Olvigas’ neighbor. As a result, both
Lots 12 and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7),
and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original Certificate of Title, No.
0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga
requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into
two (2) TCT’s, one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were issued for lots 12 and 13,
respectively. Jose Olviga later
transferred Lot 13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila and daughter, Lolita Olviga
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-03824 and the issuance of TCT No.
T-241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita
Olviga Olila, were not innocent purchasers for value of the land from their
father, and have never been in possession. The Glors and their predecessors-in-interest (Cornelio Glor Sr., and
Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones found to be in possession of the property.
From said findings and conclusions, the appellate court in its
decision dated January 13, 1992, resolved the issues presented, thus:
“x x x whether or not plaintiffs’ action is really one for
quieting of title that does not
prescribe; or assuming that their demand for the reconveyance of the lot in question
prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust, whether their cause
of action should be counted from the date of the issuance of the late Jose
Olviga’s title over said lot in 1967 and has, therefore, already prescribed, or whether
the prescriptive period should be counted from the date plaintiffs acquired
knowledge of said title sometime in 1988.
“The first question should be answered in the
affirmative. x x x.
“xxx xxx xxx.
“But even assuming that plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance, being
based on an implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower
court again correctly ruled that their cause of action should be considered to
have accrued not from the date of registration of the title of Jose Olviga,
defendants’ predecessor-in-interest, over the lot in question in 1967, but only from the time plaintiffs learned of such title in 1988. x
x x.
“xxx xxx xxx.
“All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not
err in holding that plaintiffs’ action against defendants-appellants for the
reconveyance of the lot in question filed on April 10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned of
the issuance of a title over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-in-interest
of defendants, has not yet prescribed.
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against defendants-appellants.” (pp. 48-51,
Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that: (1) the present action has already prescribed; (2) the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the private respondents’ cause of action
accrued not in 1967 but in 1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to
consider that private respondents as mere homestead transferees cannot maintain
an action for reconveyance; (4)
that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases have no bearing and direct
application to the case at bar; and (5) that private respondents have not
proven by preponderance of evidence their ownership and possession of the
disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a
number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs.
IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property, since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title
to the property, does not prescribe.
In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683,
686-687, appellants’ predecessors sold to appellees in 1931 a parcel of
land. The sale was approved by the
Provincial Governor of Davao
but was never registered. Possession of
the land was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in
possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover
the land. This Court in affirming the
validity of the sale in favor of appellee (Fabiana) held:
“No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the
delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and
transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being
indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to
remove the cloud cast upon appellee’s ownership by the refusal of the
appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellants
initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence
(made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that
actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland
Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).”
In Faja vs. Court of Appeals,
75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise reiterated the ruling that:
“x x x. There is
settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this
rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was
in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was
suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and
cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right
to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate
of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made
aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory
period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.”
In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 1988
disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their
findings of fact on the testimonies of the parties and their witnessess. It can be said therefore that those
conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of decisions,
it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings of facts
different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML
Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except
when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of
Appeals, 158 SCRA 307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA
705). The case at bar does not fall
under the exceptions.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.