BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, AND THE REST OF 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, THRU AND BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, PETITION…

The petition in G.R. No.
104776, entitled “Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et al., v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration’s Administrator, et al.,” was filed under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court:

(1)   
to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555,
L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460;

(2)   
to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said
labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown & Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the
claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty.
Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460; and

(3)   
to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2,
1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).

The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled “Bienvenido M.
Cadalin, et al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,” was
filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:

(1)   
to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555,
L-85-10-777, L-85­-10-799 and L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied
the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines
instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (ii) denied the “three-hour daily average” formula
in the computation of petitioners’ overtime pay; and

(2)   
to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2,
1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-­220).

The petition in G.R. Nos.105029-32, entitled “Asia
International Builders Corporation, et al., v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.” was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:

(1)   
to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85­-10-779 and L-86-05-460, insofar
as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and

(2)   
to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar
as it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59;
61-230).

The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified
the decision of the POEA in the four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2)
directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive
evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence
or proof of employment.

Consolidation
of Cases

G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the
Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second
Division. In the Resolution dated July 26,
1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division
(G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).

In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division
granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said
cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First
Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986, 1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-­30,
Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the
Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. No. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).

I

On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas
contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended
Complaint” with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII
(POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The
claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.

BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston,
Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation
licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino
workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated
prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of
the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage
and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the
license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
13-14).

At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its
answer.

On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and
BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from
receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers within ten days from
receipt of the bill of particulars. The
POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984.

On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their “Compliance
and Manifestation.” On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a “Motion to Strike
Out of the Records” the
“Complaint” and the “Compliance and Manifestation.” On July
25, 1984, the claimants filed their “Rejoinder and Comments,”
averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers
and to attend the pre­-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had
waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file
their answers and to attend the pre trial conference.

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the
“Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the
claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the
order.

On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to
comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an “Urgent
Manifestation,” praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to
submit simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be
deemed submitted for decision. On the
same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money
claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also
claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).

On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their “Compliance”
with the Order dated October 2, 1984 and an “Urgent Manifestation,”
praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their
position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file
its comment on the “Compliance” and “Urgent Manifestation”
of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it
filed a second motion for extension of time to file the comment.

On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that
its motion for extension of time was granted.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the
motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default for failure to file their answers.

On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a “Comment”
praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their
complaint.

On December 27, 1984, the
POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.

On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the
reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and
praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.

On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an “Amended
Complaint and/or Position Paper” dated March 24, 1985, adding new
demands: namely, the payment of
overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave
indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-­16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its
answer to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).

On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an “Urgent Motion For
Summary Judgment.” On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the “Amended Complaint,”
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present evidence
and the case would be resolved on the basis of complainants’ evidence.

On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a “Motion to Dismiss as
Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24,
1985.” Claimants opposed the motions.

On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his
directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.

On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC,
together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the
POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for
the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.

On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to
include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings
of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.

On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a
complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA,
demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon
Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and
BRII.

On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro &
Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the
cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.

On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of
the claim to enforce attorney’s lien.

On May 29, 1986, Atty. De
Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf
of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case
No. 84-06-555.

On December 12, 1986, NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on February
27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.

In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the
Supreme Court by the claimants, namely – G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985
and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in
Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the
issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555 and L­-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate
dispatch.

AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489),
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer
the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition
by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in
the hearings before the POEA.

Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on September 22, 1988 by
claimant Hermie Arguellas and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator
and several NLRC Commissioners. The
Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555. The second was filed on
April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging
AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations
of labor laws.

On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.

On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA
Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or
motion for extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its
motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two
appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en
banc denied the motion for reconsideration.

At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the
complaint. At the same hearing, the
parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit
their respective position papers. On
June 24, 1987, claimants filed their “Urgent Motion to Strike Out
Answer,” alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their
“Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion” to comply with the POEA
Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24,
1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their
position paper. On March 4, 1988,
claimants filed their “Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records”
the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.

On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII
submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its “Reply to Complainant’s
Memorandum.” On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted their “Ex-Parte
Manifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion,” together with 446
individual contracts of employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
“Consolidated Reply.”

On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision
in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded
the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.

On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their “Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion
for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the “Notice of
Appeal” filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.

On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their “Answer to
Appeal,” praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.

On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their “Supplement to
Complainants’ Appeal Memorandum,” together with their “newly
discovered evidence” consisting of payroll records.

On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their
“Manifestation,” stating among other matters that there were only 728
named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the
claimants filed their “Counter-Manifestation,” alleging that there
were 1,767 of them.

On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their “Urgent Motion For
Execution” of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII
had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in
the amount of $824,652.44.

On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve
the labor cases.

On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their “Manifestational
Motion,” praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary
claims for failure of private respondents to file their answers within the
reglementary period required by law.

On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in
these consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the
following dispositions:

1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified
and listed in Annex “A” hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;

2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are
hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified
and listed in Annex “B” hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of
payment, of the total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective
names;

3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19
complainants classified and listed in Annex “C” hereof, who appear to
have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.

4. All claims other than those indicated in
Annex “B”, including those for overtime work and favorably granted by
the POEA, are hereby dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support
thereof or are beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.

In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and
authority under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715,
hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon
parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible,
and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of
the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:

(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex
“D” attached and made an integral part of this Resolution, whose
claims were dismissed by the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain
(these complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision
of POEA, subject of the appeals) and,

(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex
“E” attached and made an integral part of this Resolution, whose
awards decreed by the POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial
evidence” (G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-122).

On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992.

Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991
Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The
first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the
claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.

In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the
motions for reconsideration.

Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by
Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro
(G.R. Nos. 104911-­14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).

II

Compromise
Agreements

Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro
and AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for
our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions
insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed
quitclaims).

Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at
a compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the
agreements were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:

1.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio
Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029­-32, Rollo, pp. 470-615);

2.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido
Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 364-507);

3.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose M. Aban
and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
407-516);

4.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T.
Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 530­-590);

5.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio
Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);

6.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A.
Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);

7.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri
Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);

8.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin
Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);

9.)          
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista
and 3 co-claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);

10.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio
R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1066-1183);

11.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J.
Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-­32,
Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; pp. 896-­959);

12.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C.
Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 972-984);

13.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C.
Aceres and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 1280­-1397);

14.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella
and 27 co-claimants dated January 10, 1994
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);

15.)      
Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and
six co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776;
G.R. No. 104911-14).

III

The facts as found by the
NLRC are as follows:

“We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than
fifty volumes now comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the
complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant
AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates
from 1975 to 1983. They were all
deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several
countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates
and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the
Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas
employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would be sparingly made, considering
their chaotic arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the
Philippines. These overseas employment
contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions.

PART B –

(1)    Employment
Position

Classification                     :                                   

(Code)                               :                                  

(2)    Company
Employment                 

Status                                :                                  

(3)    Date
of Employment

to Commence on              :                                  

(4)    Basic
Working

Hours Per Week                :                                  

(5)    Basic
Working

Hours per Month                :                                  

(6)    Basic
Hourly Rate :                                  

(7)    Overtime
Rate

Per Hour                            :                                  

(8) Projected Period

of
Service (Subject toC (1)

of
this [sic])                        :                                  

Months
and/or

Job
Completion

xxx

3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION

a)     
The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate
as set out in Part B of this Document.

b)     
The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer,
and Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe
deemed necessary from time to time.

4. TERMINATION

a) Notwithstanding
any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at his sole
discretion, terminate employee’s service with cause, under this agreement at any
time. If the Employer terminates the
services of the Employee under this Agreement because of the completion or
termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee’s services were
being utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope
of such work, or by change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible for his
return transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy class
accommodation.

xxx

10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS

a)      
After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory
completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave
with pay. This shall be computed at the
basic wage rate. Fractions of a year’s
service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.

b)      
Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for
every year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of such
leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which
said sick leave is granted.

11. BONUS

A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of
gross income will be accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of
this contract.

12. OFFDAY PAY

The seventh day of the week shall be
observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at
the premium rate. However, this offday
pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host Country require
payments for rest day.

In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants
were deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his
Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the
Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This
decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the
claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (underscoring supplied
only for emphasis):

Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment
for each extra hour equivalent to his
wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per
centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum
of fifty per centum thereof for hours
worked during the night which shall be deemed to
being from seven o’clock in the evening until seven o’clock in the morning x x
x.”

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full
pay.

x x x an employer may require a worker,
with his consent, to work on his weekly day
of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of
which an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage shall be
paid to him x x x.”

Art. 81: x x x When conditions of work require
the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional
sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.”

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed
one year’s continuous service with his
employer shall be entitled to leave on
full pay for a period of not less
than 21 days for each year increased
to a period not less than 28 days
after five continuous years of service.”

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration
may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty
days’ prior notice before such termination, in writing, in
respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating
a contract without giving the required
notice shall pay to
the other party compensation equivalent to
the amount of wages payable to the
worker for the period of such notice
or the unexpired portion thereof.”

Art. 111: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker,
upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the
period of his employment calculated on
the basis of fifteen days’ wages for
each year of the first three years
of service and of one month’s wages
for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of
leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his
service completed within a year.”

All the individual
complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at the
time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).

IV

The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:

First: – Whether or not complainants are entitled to the
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;

(a) Whether or not the complainants who have
worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.

(b) Whether or not
Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment of
alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits.

Second: – Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is
applicable in these cases, whether or not complainants’ claim for the benefits
provided therein have prescribed.

Third: – Whether or not the instant cases qualify
as a class suit.

Fourth: – Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the
POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed
with the requirements of due process;

(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was
denied its right to due process;

(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by
the POEA after these cases were submitted for decision was valid;

(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired
jurisdiction over Brown Root International, Inc.;

(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial
evidence;

(e) Whether or not
the awards based on the averages and formula presented by the
complainants-appellants are supported by substantial evidence;

(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond
what the complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these
awards are valid.

Fifth: – Whether or not the POEA erred in holding
respondents AIBC and Brown & Root jointly and severally liable for the
judgment awards despite the alleged finding that the former was the employer of
the complainants;

(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired
jurisdiction over Brown & Root;

(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC
was a licensed construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown &
Root is liable for complainants claims.

Sixth: – Whether or not the POEA Administrator’s failure to
hold respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.

Seventh: – Whether or not the POEA Administrator
erred in dismissing the following claims:

a.   
Unexpired portion of contract;

b.   
Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;

c.   
Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;

d.    War
Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;

e.   
Area Differential Pay;

f.     
Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;

g.   
Salary differential pay;

h.   
Wage differential pay;

i.      
Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;

j.      
Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;

k.     Fringe
benefits under B & R’s “A Summary of Employee Benefits” (Annex
“Q” of Amended Complaint);

l.      
Moral and exemplary
damages;

m. 
Attorney’s fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;

n.    Other
reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and
the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;

o.    Penalty for violations of Article 34
(prohibited practices), not excluding reportorial requirements thereof.

Eighth: – Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not
dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51­-55).

Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign
law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 (Labour Law for the
Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample
discretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
should form part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.

NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to
the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA
Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.

On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided
in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided
in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that
not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of
the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or
general interest to all the complainants.

On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the
cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the
evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence; and
(3) some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed
to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.

On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA
Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the
complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or
at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.

NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.

On the sixth issue, NLRC
held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying the Motion to Declare
AIBC in default.

On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based
on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:

(1)   
that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the
claims for refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the
claimants should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate
government agencies;

(2)   
that claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to
the claims which are not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;

(3)   
that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims
for moral and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said
damages was not established;

(4)   
that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of their contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year
prescriptive period;

(5)   
that the allegation that complainants
were prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration of their overseas
contract was not established; and

(6)   
that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for the suspension or cancellation
of the AIBC’s recruitment license and the cancellation of the
accreditation of BRII.

NLRC passed sub
silencio the last
issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on
the ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No.
(L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing
POEA Case No. (L) 86-65- 460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims
in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In
other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.

V

G.R. No. 104776

Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari
on the following grounds:

(1)   
that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to
a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers in two years
(on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on April 2,
1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;

(2)   
that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC
and BRII in default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of
the pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants;

(3)   
that NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the
labor cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;

(4)   
that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is
ten years; and

(5)   
that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed
POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo,
pp. 31-40).

AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
argued:

(1)   
that they were not responsible for the delay in the
disposition of the labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all
the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the
complaints and the addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;

(2)   
that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it
was impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the
NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July
19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and that considering the
staggering amount of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the
complicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not
fair and reasonable;

(3)   
that the claimants failed to refute NLRC’s finding that there
was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy –
which was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied,
some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the
contracts while others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to himself
and depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case;

(4)   
that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that
prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years)
and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(ten years); and

(5)   
that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between
the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).

Attorney’s Lien

On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike
out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and
11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise
agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were his clients and that
Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said
agreements. He also claimed that the
claimants were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De
Castro collected additional attorney’s fees on top of the 25% which he was
entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise
agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
838-810). In the Resolution dated
November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint
Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. No. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 608-609).

On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a “Notice and
Claim to Enforce Attorney’s Lien,” alleging that the claimants who entered
into compromise agreements with AIBI and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De
Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).

Contempt of
Court

On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del
Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and
for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The said lawyers
allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered
into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in
fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1560-1614).

On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges
against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of
the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.

G.R. Nos.
104911-14

The claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the grounds that
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of
the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant’s formula based on an average
overtime pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).

The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself
during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in
Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum
dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).

BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in
G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the
Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.

As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the
method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not
bound by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a
subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was approved by
the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was discussed in the
course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any
offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo,
pp. 228-236).

G.R. Nos. 105029-32

In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it: (1)
enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of
the employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave
indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence admitted in contravention of
petitioners’ constitutional right to due process; and (3) ordered the POEA
Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been
dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming that the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply
the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29- 30).

VI

G.R. No. 104776

G.R. Nos. 104911-14

G.R.
Nos. 105029-32

All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although
they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period.

To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years,
applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the
prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.

The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911­-14,
invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the
prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten
years, as found by the POEA Administrator.

The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the
prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC
that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.

The POEA Administrator
held the view that:

“These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code)
refer to those arising from the employer’s violation of the employee’s right as
provided by the Labor Code.

In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights
of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the
workers’ contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions which
specifically provide for the increase of the workers’ rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four months
after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this
same claim, when respondent AIBC’s contracts have undergone amendments in
Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent’s Exhibit 7).

Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to
this instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:

‘Article 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten
years from the time the cause of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written
contract;

(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;’

Thus, herein money claims of the
complainants against the respondents shall prescribe in ten years from August
16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were
filed within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the infirmity
of being prescribed” (G. R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 89-90).

In overruling the POEA
Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is three years as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC
argued as follows:

“The Labor Code provides that ‘all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations xxx shall be filed within three years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred’ (Art. 291,
Labor Code, as amended). This
three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied here and which should
be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each individual complainant,
considering the fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA Administrator
that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to money claims
specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants’
cause/s of action to have accrued from a violation of their employment
contracts. There was no violation; the
claims arise from the benefits of the law of the country where they
worked” (G. R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 90-91).

Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as
provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability
of said law was one of characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the
foreign law on prescription or statute of limitation as “substantive”
or “procedural.” NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a
case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have
prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of
New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
“specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive
period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed:

“… And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of
limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the
statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as
within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the
statute pertains, we think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was
the purpose this test is the most satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining
into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal
systems…”

The Court further noted:

xxx                                                                     xxx                                                                       xxx

“Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is
entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the
particular rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having
broad objectives, viz: ‘The present Code regulates the relations between
capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without
injuring any of the parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary
conditions for a normal life and to capital an equitable return to its
investment.’ In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives laborers various
rights against their employers. Article
623 establishes the period of limitation for all such rights, except certain
ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Panamanian
legislature gave special consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the
particular rights sought to be enforced here, as distinguished from the other
rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were we confronted with the question of whether the limitation
period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a
shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’
under the rule of ‘specifity’ we might have a different case; but here on the
surface of things we appear to be dealing with a ‘broad,’ and not a ‘specific,’
statute of limitations” (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 92-94).

Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14
are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which
was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims “arising from the employer’s
violation of the employee’s right as provided by the Labor Code.” They
assert that their claims are based on the violation of their employment
contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the
claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).

AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a “borrowing
law,” which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where
such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law conflicts rule
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).

First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine
law on prescription that shall be the governing law.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the
contract” (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied
in the forum. Procedural matters, such
as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal,
and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga,
Private International Law 131 [1979]).

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that
there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on
prescription of actions.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a
“borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A
“borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]). While
there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides
that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be
enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it
(Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is
of this kind. Said Section provides:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine
Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which
were inconsistent with it. There is no
provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine
Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen,
252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public
policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987
Constitution emphasized that:

“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development” (Sec. 10).

“The state affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987
Constitution provides:

“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing
the filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten
years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon on obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.”

NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision
is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part
provides:

“Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall
be forever barred.

xxx.”

The case of Philippine
Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the
claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo,
p. 21). The said case involved the
correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining
agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

As noted by the Court:
“That is precisely why petitioners did not make any reference as to the
computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA
No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective
bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is
primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should
govern.”

Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:

“Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act
shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued
otherwise such action shall be forever barred, xxx”.

The Court further explained:

“The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials
for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective
bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much
because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but because the claim is a demandable right of the
employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining
agreement.”

Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive
period for filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said
law.” On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims arising from
employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench all arose
from the employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims
arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.

The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies
only to money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find
support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. No. 104911-14
that said Article refers only to claims “arising from the employer’s
violation of the employee’s right,” as provided by the Labor Code
supported by the facial reading of the provision.

VII

G.R. No.
104776

A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No.
104776, claimants aver: (1) that while
their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided
only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition
of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared
AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35).

Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

“Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.”

It is true that the constitutional right to “a speedy
disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.,
153 SCRA 153 (1987), “speedy disposition of cases” is a relative
term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of “speedy trial” accorded to the accused in all criminal
proceedings, “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the right to a “speedy
disposition of cases” has been violated, thus:

“In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy
trial’ has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of
delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it,
and prejudice caused by the delay. The
same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or
not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated
the speedy disposition of cases.”

Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199
SCRA 298, (1991), we held:

“It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy
disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.”

Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served
with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and
BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers within the
ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA. At that time,
there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint and the
“Compliance” of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to
submit a bill of particulars.

The cases at bench are
not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the
administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate
the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of complainants.

The amended complaint
filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several
amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.

The claimants were hired
on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups
outside of, Bahrain. The monetary
claims totalling more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo,
included:

“1. Unexpired portion of contract;

2.    
Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;

3.    
Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;

4.    
War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;

5.    
Area Differential pay;

6.    
Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;

7.    
Salary differential pay;

8.    
Wage Differential pay;

9.    
Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;

10.
Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal
Revenue (B.I.R.);

11.
Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root’s “A Summary of
Employees Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex “Q” of Amended
Complaint);

12.
Moral and Exemplary Damages;

13.
Attorney’s fees of at least ten percent of amounts;

14.
Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license
to recruit of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and

15.
Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof” (NLRC Resolution, September 2,
1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).

Inasmuch as the complaint
did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts, the
claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of
particulars. When claimants filed their
“Compliance and Manifestation,” AIBC moved to strike out the complaint
from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of
particulars. While the POEA
Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the
claimants “to correct the deficiencies” pointed out by AIBC.

Before an intelligent
answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of employment
of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in
the Middle East. Some of the records
dated as far back as 1975.

The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA
Administrator were interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to
NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.

Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases
were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another
complaint was filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-­460). NLRC, in
exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never been
completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p.
57). All the three new cases were
consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.

NLRC blamed the parties
and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the proceedings, thus:

“These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route
towards resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in
pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a
fanatical reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is
remarkable. As late as last month, this
Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the
parties (this Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown
& Root’s resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory
stance. Even this failed” (Rollo,
p. 58).

The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay
in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:

“It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in
these consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on
the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the complainants, Atty.
Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to settle the right of
representation, each one persistently claiming to appear in behalf of most of
the complainants. As a result, there
are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels’ conflicting claims of
their respective authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these two counsels are
reflected in their pleadings. In the
charges and countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures, and in
the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large extent, abetted in confounding the
issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation of evidence, and even
derailed the prospects of an amicable settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel, unwittingly,
perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the proverbial pot of
gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the
claims in these cases. It is, likewise,
not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw
all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and
evidence” (Rollo, pp. 58-59).

Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the
listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two
lawyers. As noted by NLRC, “the
problem created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is
dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents would not know which
claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not.”

B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be
consolidated in a “class suit” because “all the named
complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective
of whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya
or in any part of the Middle East” (Rollo, pp. 35-38).

A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).

While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain
law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia
under different terms and conditions of employment.

NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that
inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only
logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their
claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature
of the claims is the same (for employee’s benefits), there is no common
question of law or fact. While some
claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never
worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not
in the claims of the other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or particular interest in
specific benefits completely different from the benefits in which the other
named claimants and those included as members of a “class” are
claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in collecting
his own claims. A claimant has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered
into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of
“class suit” is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly
represent and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed
to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court is
to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 3, Sec. 6).

The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they
are the exceptions to the condition, sine qua non, requiring the
joinder of all indispensable parties.

In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem
if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the
others who were impleaded by
their self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.

C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of
“forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities, falsification, duplicity
and other unprofessional activities” and his appearances as counsel for
some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).

The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28­-91) is
intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple
petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with the result that the
courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled “Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or
Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants.” The first sentence of
the circular expressly states that said circular applies to and governs the
filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application
of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative
agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.

POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for
unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no
jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.

Attorney’s Lien

The “Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney’s Lien” dated
December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim
for attorney’s fees for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810; 1525).

A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with
the court or administrative agency which renders and executes the money
judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to
his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec.
37). The statement of the claim for the
charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative
agency that rendered and executed the judgment.

Contempt of Court

The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty.
Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate
proceeding.

G.R. No.
104911-14

Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting
their formula of “Three Hours Average Daily Overtime” in computing
the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the
formula during the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain
and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).

Claimants presented a
Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in
pertinent part states:

“After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and
the Area Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of
the compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of vacation
leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto e.e.., minutes of the
meetings between the Representative of the employees and the management of the
Company, the complaint filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they have
claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract executed between
one of the employees and the company through its agent in
(sic) Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation
where it has been provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of
12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.

x x x

The Company in its computation reached the
following averages:

A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months
for the Philippino (sic) employees x x x.

2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino
(sic) employee is US$2.69 x x x.

3. The average hours for the overtime is 3
hours plus in all public holidays and weekends.

4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of
service as compensation for the difference of the wages of the overtime done
for each Philipino (sic) employee xxx” (Rollo, p. 22).

BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them but by a subordinate
official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that
the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the
offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an amicable settlement of
the claims and therefore it was not admissible in evidence to prove that
anything is due to the claimants.

While said document was presented to the POEA without observing
the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided
in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be
admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said
memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.

The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an
offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.

Said Rule provides:

“Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.”

This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering
of the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public interest in having the
protagonists settle their differences amicably before these ripen into
litigation. Every effort must be taken
to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is
a step in the right direction. But to
bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do, would
def      eat the salutary purpose of the
Rule.

G.R. Nos.
105029-32

A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides
for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts
of the claimants. It was of the belief
that “where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial
to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas
employment contract.” It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA
Administrator that “xxx in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor” (Rollo, pp. 90-94).

AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically
when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the
law of the parties. They contend that
the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to
provisions of a Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in the
Philippines.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC
and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became
applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable
than those stipulated therein. It was
stipulated in said contracts that:

“The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer,
he will not engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment
with anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and
attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance of such
duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be
subject to the direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits
provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of all other
benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation
or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws establish that
fringe benefits, or other such benefits additional to the compensation herein
agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such compensation will be
adjusted downward so that the total compensation hereunder, plus the
non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation herein
agreed” (Rollo, pp. 352-353).

The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof
provides that the compensation to the employee may be “adjusted downward
so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation” therein agreed, another part of the same provision
categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits do not fall
below that of the host country regulation and custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-­Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).

Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of
adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of
the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave
it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against
the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that
reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25
SCRA 70 [1968]).

Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment
contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 as part and parcel thereof.

The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private
International Law, 187 [7th ed]). In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am
Jur 2d, 150-161).

Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a
foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of
contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws 702-703, [8th ed.]).

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the
parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and
Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving
effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen
Co. Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties
or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts
sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain
law because the services were rendered in that country.

In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v.
National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the “Employment
Agreement,” between Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the
private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury
to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due
to his own misconduct, “compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker’s Insurance Act of registry of
the vessel, whichever is greater.” Since the laws of Singapore, the place
of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent
served at the time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we
applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.

The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 135
SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the
cases at bench. The issue in that case
was whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should be
determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines
or the Hongkong law. Holding that the
shipboard employment contract was controlling, the Court differentiated said
case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case
there was an express stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign
law would be applicable if it afforded greater compensation.

B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their
right to due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay
differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave
indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution of
the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the POEA
Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA
Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of the evidence
were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the
POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay in the
termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII
complain of as being irregular and a “reversible error.”

They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence
submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been
“unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse
parties” (Rollo, pp. 37­-39).

NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were
submitted to the POEA Administrator by the claimants after the cases were
deemed submitted for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving
the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no
opportunity to rebut said evidence of the claimants before the POEA
Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to
present their counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which
they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.

Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is
enjoined to “use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.”

In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the
basis of the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator
and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not expedient to remand the cases
to the POEA Administrator for that would only prolong the already protracted
legal controversies.

Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence,
where the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on
record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127
SCRA 463 [1984]).

C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when
it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed
in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims had been
denied by the POEA Administrator “for lack of proof” and for 69
claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found
by NLRC itself as not “supported by evidence” (Rollo, pp. 41-45).

NLRC based its ruling on Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which empowers it “[to] conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction,
xxx.”

It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority
under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been
dismissed because such provision contemplates only situations where there is
still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the
technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings
conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping
Agency Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This
principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and
is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.

Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of
procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules
which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply with the due
process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

VIII

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.