ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ AND MANUEL P. REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AN…

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,^[1]
otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992,” under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order “to
prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries
and other operational expenses attached to the office x x x x”^[2]
Paragraph (d) reads –

“(d) Chairman/Administrator
– The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio
chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority: Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority” (italization supplied).

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S.
Facility at Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U. S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of
Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that “[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure,”^[3]
because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject
posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which
provides that “[t]he President shall xxx x appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint”,^[4]
since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who
appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;^[5]
and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which says:

“Sec. 261. Prohibited
Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense: x x x x (g)
Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving
salary increases. – During the period of forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or
appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether
national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual,
or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not
grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election. As an exception
to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent
need: Provided, however, That notice of
the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any
appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and
void. (2) Any government official who
promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any
government official or employee, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations x x x x”

for the reason that the appointment of
respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary
on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May
1992 Elections.

The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227 which states, “Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City
of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority,” violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

“No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of
several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee
may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of
public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an executive
department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip
Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815,^[6]
“x x x x should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which
may result in haphazardness and inefficiency x x x x”

Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7,
“(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government,
and thus neglect his constituents x x x x”^[7]

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President
to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the
fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.^[8]
But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the the constitutionality
of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land. Moreover,
since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that
section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its
validity. Neither can we invoke a
practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed
to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office,
ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of
Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the
first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to
the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning
agency;^[9]
the Vice?President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet;^[10]
and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.^[11]

The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec.
7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by the drafters of
the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus –

“MR.
MONSOD. In other words, what the
Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more
strict with respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive
officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions.

“MR.
FOZ. Yes. I suggest we make that difference, because in the case of
appointive officials, there will be certain situations where the law should
allow them to hold some other positions.”^[12]

The distinction being clear, the
exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio
to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance,
citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,^[13]
where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or
employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII,
of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required
by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in
an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.

This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
“appointed” and, instead, “ex officio” would
have been used.^[14]

Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware
that subject proviso may contravene Sec.7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless
passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the
courts. Indeed, the Senators would not
have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered
the SBMA posts as ex officio.

Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the
subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that “if the
Conference Committee just said ‘the Mayor shall be the Chairman’, then that
should foreclose the issue. It is a
legislative choice.”^[15]
The Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription against
appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress
attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the
President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state
that Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the
argument that they are ex officio.

The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila
Authority made by respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality
of the challenged proviso since it is not put in issue in the present
case. In the same vein, the argument
that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another post
then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double
compensation^[16]
would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect
the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who
may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the
compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by
law.

Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint
the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he
really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.

As may be defined, an “appointment” is “[t]he
designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to
discharge the duties of some office or trust,”^[17]
or “[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons
having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the duties of the same.”^[18]
In his treatise, Philippine Political Law,^[19]
Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as “the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office.”

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J.,^[20]
“the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence
of his appointment,”^[21]
and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an “[a]ppointment to office is
intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion.”^[22]
In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court^[23]
we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of
the appointing power x x x x”

Indeed, the power of choice is the heart
of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial
act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own
choice. Consequently, when the
qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.^[24]

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts
be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of
Olongapo City. Since only one can
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising
his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of
choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA,
i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no
other, can qualify. Accordingly, while
the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment
remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however
resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional
Commission is enlightening:

“MR.
DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I
propose the substitution of the word “term” with TENURE.

“MR.
FOZ.        The effect of the proposed
amendment is to make possible for one to resign from his position.

“MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that prerogative.

“MR.
FOZ.       Resign
from his position to accept an executive position.

“MR.
DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say,
incapacity, he may leave the service, but if he is prohibited from being
appointed within the term for which he was elected, we may be depriving the
government of the needed expertise of an individual.”^[25]

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official
remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective
official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government
posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to
the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid
in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with
Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where “(n)o Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government x x x during his term without forfeiting his seat x x x x” The
difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have
been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective
officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus
running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to
the other post. It is therefore clear
that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. “x x x x The effect is quite different
where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be
ineligible to another. Such a provision
is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a
second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258;
McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or
appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn
147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107
Okla 272, 232 P 388, 40 ALR 941).”^[26]
“Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one
office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office,
either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to
incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any
attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. – State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan,
218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).”^[27]

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible
for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, “one whose acts, though not
those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will
hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons,
where the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a known
election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible,
or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want
of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of
an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499;
Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan’s Case, 122
Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).”^[28]

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any
and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which may have been received
by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be retained by him.

The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now
evident, other matters affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well
as the appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be
discussed.

In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen.
Sotero Laurel which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648,
precursor of R.A. 7227, when he articulated –

“x x x x (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of
Olongapo City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are creating;
(much) as I, myself, would like to because I know the capacity, integrity, industry
and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we would like to give him this
terrific, burdensome and heavy responsibility, we cannot do it because of the
constitutional prohibition which is very clear. It says: ‘No elective
official shall be appointed or designated to another position in any
capacity.’”^[29]

For, indeed, “a Constitution must be firm and immovable,
like a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the
raging of the waves.”^[30]
One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., “its
capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate
needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional
infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities x x x x Such a Constitution
is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political expediency, personal
ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change.”^[31]

Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no choice.

WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227,
which states: “x x x Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,” is declared
unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor
of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL
and VOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received
by respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may
be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the
exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby
UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., on official leave.

^[1]
“An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for
this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes,” approved
13 March 1992, to take effect upon its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

^[2]
See “Action to Declare Unconstitutional Provisions of R.A. 7227 with
Prohibition and Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” dated 7
April 1992, p. 6; Rollo p. 7.

^[3]
Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, provides: “No
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

“Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.”

^[4]
Sec. 16, Art. VII, provides: “The
President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are not vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

“The President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”

^[5]
Petitioners allege that the proviso constitutes a “limitation to the power
of appointment of the President and therefore violates the separation of
powers” and that “Congress cannot create the position and at the same
time specify the person to fill up such position” (Petition, pp. 4-5; Rollo,
pp. 5-6).

^[6]
G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815 were consolidated and decided jointly on 22 February
1991, 194 SCRA 317, 339.

^[7]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 546.

^[8]
“Sec. 94. Appointment of
Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in an Election.
– (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.

“Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or appointive
local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

“(b) Except for losing
candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall,
within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of
their subsidiaries.”

^[9]
Sec. 9, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

^[10]
Sec. 3, second par., Art. VII, of the Constitution.

^[11]
Sec. 8, par. (1), Art. VIII, of the Constitution. This particular provision was approved in anticipation of a
unicameral legislature. However, as it
turned out, we adopted instead a bicameral form of government so that the seat
allocated to the representative of Congress has to be split between a member of
the Senate and a member of the House of Representative. Each being entitled to one-half vote in the
deliberations of the Judicial and Bar Council.

^[12]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 156.

Section 4 of the Proposed
Resolution No. 468, the precursor of the first paragraph of Sec. 7, read:
“Unless otherwise provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity to any public
office or position during his term” (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 524).

The following were reactions on the
floor:

“FR. BERNAS. On page 3,
Section 4, line 5, the provision begins with the phrase ‘Unless otherwise
provided by law’ which does not exist in the 1973 Constitution. This was inserted in a 1981 amendment. We know the reason why this was put
here. It practically renders the
provision useless because the whole matter becomes discretionary with the
legislature. It is one of those
instances in the 1973 Constitution, as amended and constantly reamended, where
they threw in the phrase ‘Unless otherwise provided by law’ precisely to give
the President a free hand in his decree-making power.

x x x x

“MR. FOZ. As presently worded now, the provision would
allow the legislature to really provide otherwise, meaning, to allow an
elective official to be appointed to an executive office. (Ibid., Vol. I, p. 539.)

x x x x

“MR. COLAYCO. x x x x The way I understand
this is that we are giving the legislature the power to authorize the
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity of an elective
official to any public office or position during his term. Am I right?

“MR. FOZ. If a law is passed regarding this matter,
then such law may reverse this provision as worded, but we have said earlier
that we will entertain suggestions from the floor.

“MR. COLAYCO. Personally, I find the policy established in
this provision meritorious. To make it
a firm policy, I suggest that we delete the prefatory phrase ‘Unless otherwise
provided by law.’

“MR. FOZ. We agree with the Commissioner” (Ibid.,
Vol. I, p. 549).

As revised, known later as Sec. 4
of Resolution No. 10, and approved on third reading, the subject section
read: “No elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure” (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 788).

^[13]
Supra, p. 335.

^[14]
“x x x When, in the exigencies of government, it is necessary to create and
define new duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine
whether additional offices shall be created, or these duties shall be attached
to and become ex officio duties of existing offices. The power extends to the consolidation of offices resulting in
abolishing one and attaching its powers and duties to the other. It matters not that the name commission or
board is given to the body created x x x x” (Tayloe v. Davis, 212
Ala 282, 102 So. 433, 40 ALR 1052, 1057).

^[15]
Transcripts of Session Proceedings, Senate, 6 February 1992, p. 57.

^[16]
Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, provides: “No
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind from any foreign government.

“Pensions or gratuities shall
not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.”

^[17]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 128, citing In re Nicholson’s
Estate, 104 Colo. 561, 93 P.2d 880, 884.

^[18]
Ibid., citing State v. Braman, 173 Wis. 596, 181 N.W. 729, 730.

^[19]
1987 ed., p. 180.

^[20]
Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers
(1890), p. 48, citing In Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N.H. 205, 9 Am. Dec. 50.

^[21]
Mechem, ibid., citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137;
Craig v. Norfolk, 1 Mod. 122.

^[22]
Concepcion v. Paredes, No. 17539, 23 December 1921; 42 Phil. 599, 603,
citing Keim vs. U.S. (1900), 177 U.S., 290.

^[23]
G.R. No. 65439, 13 November 1985; 140 SCRA 22, 35.

^[24]
While it is inarguable that Congress has plenary authority to prescribe
qualifications to a public office, it “may not however prescribe
qualifications such that the President is entirely stripped of discretion, thus
converting appointment to a mere ministerial act” (Gonzales, Neptali A., Administrative
Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 1966 ed., p. 173, citing
Manalang v. Quitoriano, No. L-6898, 30 April 1954; 94 Phil. 903).

^[25]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 591.

^[26]
63 Am Jur 2d 678-679.

^[27]
67 CJS 295.

^[28]
Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, No. 12647, 26 November 1917,
37 Phil, 186, 192 (italization supplied).

^[29]
Transcripts of Session Proceedings, Senate, 29 January 1992, pp. 89-90.

^[30]
Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 1 L. ed. 391, cited in Cruz, Isagani A.,
Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 7.

^[31]
Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, supra.