G.R. No. 104731. October 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENATO PASTORES Y AVILA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court finding
appellant Renato Pastores y Avila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling “shabu”.
Renato Pastores was prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6425,
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
criminal information alleged:
“That on or about the 30th day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any authority of law, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away .65 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, worth P600.00,
Philippine Currency, to one Sgt. Cresendo Molina, who acted as poseur-buyer, in
violation of the aforesaid law.
Contrary to law.”[1]
Appellant on arraignment entered a plea of not guilty, and the case
proceeded to trial.
On 28 January 1992, the trial court convicted the accused and
sentenced him as follows:
“Wherefore, finding the accused RENATO PASTORES Y AVILA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, as defined and penalized under
Section 15, Article III, Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by PD 1683, he is hereby sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, plus costs.
So Ordered.”[2]
Appellant, in his brief,[3]
ascribed the following errors to the trial court:
1. The court a quo erred in
convicting the accused on the basis of doubtful evidence.
2. The court a quo erred in
rejecting the evidence of the defense on the basis of speculation.
3. The court a quo erred in
giving more weight to the disputable presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty than the constitutional presumption of innocence.
4. The court a quo erred in
not acquitting the accused on the basis of reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimonies of four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) P/Sgt. Cresendo Molina, (2) P/Sgt. Rodrigo Ventura, (3) P/Cpl. Jaime
Amor and (4) P/Lt. Elizabeth Ayonon. A
plastic bag containing “shabu”, and six (6) marked one hundred peso
(P100) bills allegedly seized from the accused, were offered in evidence. P/Lt. Ayonon was the forensic chemist who
conducted the laboratory examination of the bag of “shabu” here
involved.
The testimonies of the four witnesses for the prosecution were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:
“P/Cpl Jaime Amor (Cpl. Amor, for short), Sgt. Cresendo Molina
(Sgt. Molina, for short) and Sgt. Rodrigo Ventura (Sgt. Ventura, for short) are
(sic) assigned to the Special Task Force Unit, Quezon City Anti-Drug Abuse
Council, Office of the Vice Mayor, Quezon City Hall. On complaints received by said office which were listed in a
logbook, that a certain “Rey” Pastores (“Rey”, for short) has been selling
prohibited drugs in La Loma, a surveillance was conducted by them. On July 30, 1991 at about 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, a confidential informant called the Quezon City Anti-Drug Abuse
Council, with the information that “Rey” has been peddling “shabu”. Sgt. Molina, Sgt Ventura, Cpl Amor and their
Officer-in-charge Fernando M. Vinculado (Vinculado, for short) set up a
buy-bust operation at the corner of Iba and Cuenco streets, La Loma, Quezon
City. Sgt. Molina was designated as the
poseur-buyer and was given six P100.00 bills which he receipted for and on
which he affixed his initial under the logo of the Central Bank (Exhibits D,
D-1 to D-6). Thereafter, Sgt. Molina
contacted the confidential informant for the latter to arrange the sale with
“Rey”. At about 6:00 o’clock in the
evening of that same day, Sgt. Molina, Sgt. Ventura and a certain Sgt.
Malipayon proceeded to the area of operation at the corner of Iba and Cuenco
streets. Sgt. Molina parked his car at
Cuenco street about 6 meters from the corner and alighted leaving Sgt. Ventura
and Sgt. Malipayon inside to wait for the pre-arranged signal which was the
scratching or touching of Molina’s head. “Rey” arrived in a red Ford Cortina car at about 7:00 o’clock in the
evening. He parked along Iba Street
near the corner. He alighted and talked
with the confidential informer near the corner of Iba and Cuenco streets. Sgt. Molina was about 10 meters away. Then the confidential informant called Sgt.
Molina and introduced him to “Rey” as a friend and buyer. Sgt. Molina told “Rey” that he has
P600. “Rey” went to his car. When he returned to Sgt. Molina, “Rey”
handed a plastic bag containing white crystalline powder suspected for
methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as “shabu” (shabu, for
short). Sgt. Molina in turn handed the
six marked P100.00 bills to “Rey”, who received it, then Sgt. Molina scratched
his head. Thereupon, Sgt. Ventura and
Sgt. Malipayon rushed to them and pounced on the suspect. As they were boarding “Rey” in the car of
Molina, Sgt. Amor arrived. Sgt. Ventura
drove the car of Molina while Molina drove the car of the accused and they all
proceeded to Quezon City Hall. The six
marked P100.00 bill were recovered from “Rey’s” pocket. Sgt. Molina turned him over to Sgt. Amor for
interrogation together with the plastic bag containing suspected “shabu”
(Exhibit G) and the six marked P100.00 bills (Exhibit D-1 to D-6). Sgt. Ventura conducted a search on the car
of “Rey” but did not find anything. During the interrogation “Rey” gave his true name as Renato Pastores but
refused to give his statement. Sgts.
Molina and Ventura gave their written statements (Exhibits A, A-1, B,
B-1). On the following day Sgt. Amor
turned over the plastic bag containing suspected “shabu” and the letter request
for laboratory examination signed by Vinculado, addressed to the chief, PNP
Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Crame (Exhibits C, c-1, H-2, H-3). Laboratory examination was conducted by
Forensic Chemist P/Lt. Elizabeth L. Ayonon on the contents of the plastic bag
and was found positive for 0.65 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug (Exhibits E, H). In a
referral letter, the matter was referred to the Quezon City Prosecutors Office
for proper disposition (Exhibit F). Sgts. Molina and Ventura drew and sketched the buy-bust area (Exhibits
I, J).”[4]
The accused-appellant presented another version of the facts
leading to his arrest on 30 July 1991 which was summarized by the trial court
as follows:
“… On July 30, 1991 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, accused
left his house to go to his sister-in-law at Mariveles street to borrow money
for the registration of his wife’s car (Exhibits 13, 14, 17, 17-a to 17-c) in
addition to the P400.00 which he had in his pocket then. His sister-in-law gave him P2,940.00. Thereafter, he went to the house of John
Corpus also at Mariveles street and chanced upon Rafael and Dindo Antonio who
arrived there earlier. They talked
about the fighting cock that they will use in the San Juan Derby. After about 30 minutes accused left but when
he was at Cuenco Street he remembered that he forgot to relay to his
sister-in-law his wife’s message for his sister-in-law. Instead of turning back he decided to park his
car in front of Iba and Cuenco Streets and just walk back to his
sister-in-law’s house which was about 20 meters away. Before he could step out of the car, a red Toyota car blocked his
car in front; another vehicle parked right on accused car’s side and another
vehicle, a Ford Fiera at the back. Armed men, among them, Sgts. Molina and Ventura, alighted. Sgts. Ventura and Molina poked a gun at him
and forced him to step out of the car. Accused followed and was ordered to place his hands on top of his car
while Sgt. Molina searched his body but did not find anything. They dragged him and boarded him at the back
seat of Sgt. Molina’s car. This
incident was allegedly witnessed by Layag and de la Pasion who executed their
affidavits (Exhibits 8, 8-A, 9, 10, 10-a).
Sgt. Molina took the accused’s Citizen diver’s watch worth
P6,000.00. His car was driven by Sgt.
Molina while Molina’s car was driven by Sgt. Ventura. He sat at the back with Sgt. Ventura and Cpl. Amor. While inside the car Cpl. Amor took the
P400.00 from the accused’s pocket. They
proceeded to the SOU, NARCOM, Camp Crame. Msgt. Jose C. Pedrosa was there. While at said office, Sgt. Molina ordered him to undress and took the
P2,940.00 which he borrowed from his sister-in-law. Sgt. Molina asked him where he was hiding the “shabu”. Thereafter he was directed to dress up and
board the back seat of Sgt. Molina’s car. MSgt. Pedrosa, Sgts. Molina and Ventura likewise boarded the car. They proceeded to the police headquarters at
EDSA where Sgt. Molina dropped off. Then they drove to the gasoline station at Timog. After 15 minutes Sgt. Molina arrived and
accused was directed to remove his T-Shirt, handcuffed and blindfolded with his
T-shirt which the police officers tore. The car moved and he heard someone asking where they will throw
him. Accused pleaded to them not (sic)
do it because he is innocent. They
stopped for a while and Vinculado arrived and the accused was transferred to
another vehicle. They proceeded to Camp
Crame. His blindfold was removed in
Camp Crame and he was brought to Vinculado. Vinculado asked him if he knew Bebot Remolacio and Gary Sugid but when
he answered no he was blindfolded again and maltreated for more than more or
less one hour. He sustained injuries
but was not brought to a doctor despite his request. He was detained at the NIU detention cell for 2 months.”[5]
The version of the accused, with respect to the circumstances
leading to his arrest by the special task force, was corroborated by Mrs. Salud
Layag and Mr. Danilo de la Pasion.
Mrs. Layag testified that at about 7:00 in the evening of 30 July
1991 she saw the accused about to park his car in front of her sari-sari
store. She noticed three vehicles
quickly close-in on accused’s car. Plainclothesmen with long and short firearms alighted from these
vehicles. Two armed men on board the
red car which led the pack of vehicles directed appellant to step out of the
car and raise his arms behind his head. These men bodily searched appellant. Mrs. Layag was about three (3) meters away from the accused and the men
who searched appellant. After the
precipitate search, accused was placed on board the red car and the team drove
away.
Danilo de la Pasion testified that he was relaxing on a bench of
Mrs. Layag’s store some four (4) meters away from accused’s car when a red
Toyota cut across the path of the accused and two (2) other vehicles hemmed in
closely behind accused’s car. De la
Pasion declared that two (2) armed men from the red Toyota went over to accused
who was seated inside the car and without any companion. The accused stepped out of his vehicle upon
orders of the two (2) men. De la Pasion
noticed that these men were searching for something. De la Pasion declared that he could clearly see the faces of the
men who searched accused and the car because of the bright fluorescent light of
Mrs. Layag’s store that night. After
the search, the accused was placed on board the red Toyota. One of the two (2) armed men drove accused’s
car and the team of four (4) cars sped away.
Clearly, there is here an irreconcilable conflict between the
testimonies of the police officers, on the one hand, and the statements given
on the witness stand by the accused, Mrs. Layag and Mr. Pasion, on the
other. The trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe the detailed demeanor of all witnesses and to listen to
their respective testimonies, gave “full faith and credit” to the declarations
made by the prosecution witnesses. The
narration given by law enforcers outweighed that of the witnesses for the
defense because, according to the trial court, the witnesses for the
prosecution were Narcom agents presumed to have regularly performed their
duties while accused-appellant was a notorious drug pusher. The trial judge concluded that the defense of
extortion was the accused’s attempt to taint with illicit motives the acts of
on the Narcom agents.[6]
This Court, ordinarily, would rely upon the settled principle
that “findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by appellate courts.”[7]
There are of course well-recognized exceptions. When (1) the conclusion was a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; or, (2) the inference drawn was
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; or, (3) there was grave abuse of
discretion; or (4) the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts; or (5)
the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and the appellee, the Court
has not hesitated to disregard the trial court’s rulings on questions of fact.[8]
We have carefully scrutinized the evidence on record and it
appears to us that there was some misapprehension of facts in this case and
either a deriving of inferences from the facts which are manifestly mistaken or
a failure to draw reasonable inferences from the facts shown on the record.
Firstly, the Court notes that the testimonies, both oral and
documentary, of the prosecution’s witnesses were replete with inaccuracies and
inconsistencies which engender serious doubts as to the veracity of the Narcom
agents’ narration of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused.
Sgts. Molina and Ventura, as well as Cpl. Amor, testified that
the accused was arrested during a buy-bust operation carefully planned by their
Officer-in-charge, Capt. Vinculado. During the supposed planning meeting, these witnesses were present and
were assigned specific tasks. Sgt.
Molina was designated as poseur-buyer while Sgt. Ventura and Cpl. Amor were
directed to provide the necessary back-up. The team used two cars: Sgt.
Molina, Sgt. Ventura and Sgt. Malipayon were on board one, while Cpl. Amor and
his driver were in the other.[9]
Yet, the responses elicited from the three witnesses at the witness stand
reveal that Cpl. Amor was not present during the actual operation. In fact, he arrived only after the accused
had been apprehended and he proceeded to the premises for the purpose of
conducting an investigation of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the
accused.
Sgt. Molina, the poseur-buyer, appeared uncertain about several
aspects of the transaction between himself and the accused. In his sworn affidavit, marked and offered
in evidence as Exhibit “A”[10]
and executed on the night of the buy-bust operation, he declared that he handed
the marked bills to the accused before the bag of white powder was
delivered to him. On direct examination
in open court, he testified that he delivered the marked money after the
bag was handed to him by the accused.[11]
The defense counsel pointed out to Sgt. Molina the apparent discrepancy between
the statements contained in Exhibit “A” and those made on the witness
stand. Sgt. Molina agreed with the
defense counsel that his (Molina’s) memory was accurate at the time he executed
his affidavit. Yet when Fiscal Gabriel,
in the latter’s attempt to re-instate the credibility of the witness, asked
Sgt. Molina on re-direct examination which of his statements — those contained
in his affidavit and those made on the witness stand — were true and correct,
Sgt. Molina declared that his statement on the stand was the true and correct
narration of the events. His testimony
was recorded as follows:
“Prosecutor Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct examination:
Q: Which is true, which truth do you want the
Court to understand, that which is placed in your affidavit, or that which you
testified the last time around?
A: Sir, in my affidavit sir.
Q: You are retracting again what you said in
open court?
A: What was the question before?
Court to the interpreter:
You translate for the second time, or third
time.
A: No sir, the one I am
testifying here in Court is the truth.” (Underscoring supplied)
Later, however, Sgt. Ventura, who was allegedly just a few meters
away from the supposed negotiation and whose testimony was offered to
corroborate the testimony of Sgt. Molina, contradicted the testimony of the
supposed poseur-buyer Sgt. Molina. The
testimony on direct examination of Sgt. Ventura, in pertinent part, follows[12]:
Prosecutor Gabriel:
“Q: When the accused talked
to Sgt. Molina, what happened next?
A: I saw Sgt. Molina gave (sic) something to the
suspect which I am very sure that it was the buy-bust money. Binonot niya po sa bulsa niya ‘yong
pera. He was taking out the money from
his pocket.
Q: After Sgt. Molina drew the money from his
pocket, what happened?
A: He gave it to the suspect.
Q: After he gave the money to the suspect,
what next transpired?
A: The suspect went back to his car and got
something from the compartment and returned to Molina.
Q: After that what happened?
A: I saw him gave a transparent plastic bag
to Molina.
Q: How far were you from Molina and the accused
at the time that was happening?
A: Just near, sir, about seven to 10 meters.”
(Underscoring supplied)
Sgt. Molina also gave conflicting accounts of incidents which allegedly
transpired prior to his encounter with accused-appellant. Sgt. Molina, during his direct examination,
outlined the relevant events: first, a
tip from an informer was phoned-in; then, the operation was mapped out by Capt.
Vinculado; thereafter, the “asset” (i.e., informer) was again contacted by
phone to set-up a meeting between accused and Sgt. Molina. The following testimony of Sgt. Molina is
pertinent:
Prosecutor Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct-examination:
“Q: About 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that
day, do you remember of anything to which your attention was called?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: When our confidential informant called us in
our office that a certain alias Rey Pastores was engaged in the delivery of
metamphetamine chloride, commonly known as shabu.”[13]
x x x x
x x x
x x
Q: What did you do when he revealed that
information?
A: I asked (sic) my commanding officer Capt.
Fernando Vinculado that one alias Rey Pastores was selling shabu and delivering
metamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: And what was the reaction of your superior?
A: He set a buy-bust operation, along corner Iba
and Cuenco Streets, Laloma.
x x x x x x x
x x
Q: Now what actually was the pattern set forth by
the buy-bust operation?
A: I was designated as poseur-buyer, by our
commanding officer.
Q: And being designated as poseur-buyer, what was
your designated mode of action or activity? What were you supposed to do as poseur-buyer?
A: To
receive the money and contact again the confidential informant.[14]
x x x x x x x
x x
Q: After receiving the six one hundred peso
bills from Capt. Vinculado, what did you do?
A: We set the operation, sir.
Q: How did you set it up?
A: I was to act as poseur-buyer. We contacted the confidential informant
to set-up the buy-bust operation.
Q: What time was the buy-bust operation set-up?
A: At around past 6:00 o’clock.
Q: I see. How were you able to contact your confidential informant?
A: Through telephone sir.[15]
Yet, on cross-examination, Sgt. Molina recalled that their
informant had tipped them off about the illegal activities of the accused, and
had informed the Narcom agents that a meeting had been arranged between accused
and Sgt. Molina. Sgt. Molina said
on cross-examination:
“Atty. Crecini to Sgt. Molina on cross-examination:
Q: And so, how were you able
or from whom were you able to obtain the information that the supposed sale
between you, pretending to be the buyer, and the accused, would take
place at 7:30 in the evening of that date?
A: My informant, sir.
Q: So, after calling you at
4:00 o’clock are you saying that he called you again?
A: No, sir. He did not call me up again.
Q: Are you saying that
when he called you at 4:00 o’clock, July 30, 1991, he already told you that he
has made an appointment to meet with the accused at 7:30 in that evening?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you very sure
about it?
A: Yes, sir.”[16]
(Underscoring supplied)
There are other gaps and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses relating to the buy-bust operation that Narcom agents
claimed to have planned and executed. Notably, for instance, the prosecution witnesses could not agree on
whether or not, or by whom, the car driven by appellant Pastures was searched
by the police for drugs or other contraband items. The extraordinary testimony of the prosecution witnesses on this
point is summarized by the defense in the following terms:
“Cpl. Amor testified that he did not search the car
driven by appellant because he was told by Sgts. Molina and Ventura that
they already searched it and found nothing inside (t.s.n., October 7, 1991,
pp. 28-30). Sgt. Molina, however,
said that he never searched the appellant’s car either at the site of the
operation or at their office at City Hall (t.s.n., October 15, 1991, pp.
25-26). Sgt. Ventura gave an
entirely opposing version. He said
that at the scene of the operation, they did not search the car of the accused,
but when they reached their headquarters, he, Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Amor
searched the car! (t.s.n., October 21, 1991, pp. 49-50).”[17]
(Underscoring supplied)
Even the very composition of the police team sent to carry out
the operation, and the participation of each member, became the subject of
murky and inconsistent testimony from the police witnesses which has been
summarized by appellant’s counsel as follows:
“x x x [Sgt. Molina] has never satisfactorily explained why
in his affidavit (Exhibit ‘A’), he placed Cpl. Amor as a member of the
back-up team when he (and Sgt. Ventura) knew only too well that the
other member was Agent Malipayo, not Cpl. Amor. The versions of these three as to the presence of Cpl. Amor at
Iba Street are at head-on collisions. Cpl.
Amor said that he proceeded to Iba Street because Sgts. Molina and Ventura
called him at their office and that was after appellant had been
arrested (October 7, 1991, p. 20).
For his part, Sgt. Molina said that he was surprised when he saw
Cpl. Amor arrive at the scene of the buy-bust operation because Cpl. Amor, as
investigator, was supposed to be on duty in their office at City Hall awaiting
the outcome of their operation. He said
he never told Cpl. Amor to join them there at Iba Street either before or after
the operation (October 15, 1991, pp. 23-24).
Sgt. Ventura gave a different account. He said that Cpl. Amor was supposed to be with him as back-up but
Cpl. Amor was just delayed along the way (October 21, 1991, p. 26). But in answer to the question of the court,
Sgt. Ventura said that when they went to the place of the buy-bust operation,
he was with Sgt. Molina and Malipayon in one car, and in the other, Cpl. Amor
and his driver (Id., p. 27). Asked by
Pros. Gabriel what was the participation of Cpl. Amor in the buy-bust
operation, Sgt. Ventura admitted that Cpl. Amor arrived after the arrest of
the appellant (Id., pp. 38, 51). Sgt.
Ventura categorically denied having called Cpl. Amor by telephone to follow
them at the area of operation (Id., p. 51.).”[18]
(Underscoring supplied)
We must note that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to
address and reconcile the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which appellant’s counsel had underscored.[19]
Generally, we have declared that minor inconsistencies in the
testimony of witnesses do not affect their credibility.[20]
In the case at bar, however, as pointed out by counsel de parte of
appellant, the inaccuracies do not, in the aggregate, just refer to collateral
matters. Each individual inconsistency
or inaccuracy pointed out by appellant’s counsel might, if considered by
itself, not appear serious; when, however, these inconsistencies and
inaccuracies are viewed in their totality, they appear to the Court
substantially to erode the credibility of the Narcom officers and raise a not
insubstantial doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution’s theory that the
accused had in fact been arrested as a result of a buy-bust operation.[21]
The doubt which has been generated in our mind relates, not to whether the
accused had been arrested, but to whether or not a buy-bust operation had
indeed been mounted and carried out and the accused’s arrest effected in the
course of such operation. It is very
difficult for the Court to understand why, if a buy-bust operation had indeed
been planned and executed by the Narcom officers, an operation which does not
seem unusually complex and difficult, the testimonies of the Narcom officers
about that operation and the modality thereof should not have been more
forthright and specific and consistent with each other in relevant detail.
Secondly, we do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that
sufficient evidence had been adduced establishing accused’s notoriety as a drug
pusher. Sgt. Molina’s bare testimony is
not sufficient to establish the charge that the accused had regularly peddled
or traded “shabu” along Iba and Cuenco Streets, La Loma, Quezon City.[22]
Neither does an allegation by Sgt. Molina that accused’s name was included in
the Order of Battle, a police logbook said to contain the names of notorious
drug pushers, sufficiently prove that accused had in fact been involved in
illegal activities. The surveillance
supposedly conducted by Narcom agents had apparently been carried out in such a
relaxed and casual manner as to render the state’s witnesses unable to answer
elementary questions about the accused, much less questions concerning the
extent of the drug trade going-on in Iba and Cuenco Streets. The testimony of Sgt. Molina as to the
nature and extent of the surveillance said to have been carried out prior to
appellant’s arrest, was as follows:
“Fiscal Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct examination:
Q: In this statement Exhibit
A, you stated among other things that you conducted surveillance over the
accused before the buy-bust operation. Why was it necessary for you to conduct a
surveillance?
A: Because of the many
reports to us, sir, about him.
Q: How long did you place
him under surveillance before the buy-bust operation?
A: More or less, one (1) month, sir.[23]
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Crescini to Sgt. Molina on cross examination:
Q: During the one month
surveillance that you conducted, you (sic) were never able to
determine or find out where the accused was living?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you exert effort to
locate where the accused was living considering that there were many complaints
against him? did you exert efforts?
A: We exerted efforts, sir.
Q: What effort did you
exert?
A: To find out those who
know him.
Q: All right. You received numerous complaints. Were you able to determine the identities
of these complainants to verify the truth of their complaints?
A: No sir. It was reported through the telephone.
Q: So these complaints were anonymous
telephone calls?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was never anyone who gave his name to
you so that you could verify how true or how false the complaint was?
A: No, sir. Nobody gave a name. That is why we conducted a surveillance.
Q: Very good. What did the surveillance consist of. Did you go to that area of Iba and Cuenco street to make
inquiries about these alleged activities of the accused?
A: Yes, sir. I went there twice.
Q: Did you talk to anyone
who provided you with positive information?
A: Yes, sir, a
certain Rudy.
Q: What is the full name
of Rudy?
A: Hindi ko po maano.
Q: What do you mean “hindi
maano”?
A: I do not know the
full name.
Q: But you talked to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ask him what
is his full name?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you not ask him where
he lives?
A: I asked him, sir.
Q: Did he give you his
address? his exact address?
A: No, sir.
Q: I am asking whether Rudy
gave you his address?
A: Yes, I asked him.
Q: Did he refuse to give
you?
A: No, sir. He did not refuse to give his address,
but he just told me that he is from that place.
Q: And you were satisfied with
listening to the story of this Rudy whose address you did not even bother to
find out?
A: No, sir.
Q: All right. If you were not satisfied with the
statement of Rudy did you obtain additional information to satisfy you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who else did you
interview from that place? name (sic)
names if you can.
A: I cannot remember
anymore, sir.”23 (Underscoring supplied)
The amount of “shabu” allegedly confiscated from appellant
at the time of the bust detracts from the trial court’s conclusion that accused
was a notorious drug pusher. We note
that the anonymous informant had advised the Narcom operatives that heavy drug
trafficking was going-on in Iba and Cuenco Streets. Yet, only a fraction of a gram was confiscated from accused. No other substance was found in the vehicle
driven by the accused.
Thirdly, the testimony of accused was corroborated by two
disinterested witnesses. As earlier
noted, the trial court seriously doubted the credibility of the defense
witnesses because their testimonies were apparently in conflict with respect to
the precise actual positions of the vehicles that boxed-in accused’s car.[24]
We do not understand why such an inaccuracy should have completely destroyed
the credibility of the witnesses for the defense. The judge should have simply subjected their testimonies,
specially that of Mrs. Salud Layag and Mr. Danilo de la Pasion, to the ordinary
processes of evaluation and accordingly assigned to such testimony the weight
and probative value called for.
The testimony of accused, as corroborated by Salud Layag and
Danilo de la Pasion, was to the effect that no buy-bust operation had in fact
been conducted. The accused had just
pulled over to the corner of the street and was about to alight from his car
when three (3) vehicles came and boxed his car in between; he was forthwith
arrested. The character of the accused
may not be unblemished. He admitted
using “shabu” before. His chosen
occupation may not be admirable either. He admitted that he was engaged in loaning large sums of money to
gamblers. But these circumstances, by
themselves, do not disqualify accused-appellant as a competent witness. Moreover, his testimony, independently of
his bad or good moral character, was not inherently improbable. The trial court had no adequate basis for
concluding that the testimonial evidence of appellant was “absurd, illogical
and incredible.”[25]
We are also concerned over the perfunctory way the trial court
disregarded appellant’s charges of maltreatment. The accused, during the preliminary investigation conducted upon
his request, filed counter charges against the Narcom agents for grave threats,
grave coercion, robbery and perjury.[26]
During the trial of the case, the accused gave a straightforward and detailed account
of his experiences while in the custody of his captors for more than two (2)
months.[27]
The trial court completely ignored the testimony of the accused, saying only
that if the Narcom agents had maltreated the accused, the latter should have
sought the help of his wife and his father who was also a police officer.[28]
We do not see any necessary relationship between failure to seek assistance
from one’s relative and a finding that there was no maltreatment of a detainee
by the detaining officers. Clearly, the
inference reached by the trial judge was not sufficiently grounded on facts
established during the trial.
Finally, we are aware that “frame-up” is a common defense in drug
and other cases.30
Frame-up, like alibi, may be a weak defense that is easily alleged.31
The accused in the case at bar stated that he had been subjected to harassment
and extortion on at least two (2) previous occasions at the hands of police
officers despite his innocence. Accused
was, in other words, asserting that in the instant case he had been arrested,
charged and jailed because he was unable to comply with extortionate demands of
police officers. What is remarkable
here is that the accused’s testimony to this effect, as well as to the effect
that he had been divested of cash and personal property he had with him at the
time of his arrest, was very specific and concrete: names; dates; the values of particular personal property; and
amounts demanded from and given by him to police officers, were specified. As summarized by the trial court, the
testimony of appellant on these matters was as follows:
“Accused testified that Cpl. Amor robbed him of P400.00 cash and
Sgt. Molina his diver’s watch worth P6,000.00 and P2,940.00 cash which he
borrowed from his sister-in-law for the registration of his wife’s car. He claimed that he is a casino financier
with a capital of up to a million and thereabout and that he lends money to
casino gamblers from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 with cars and checks as
collateral. He has been in the business
since 1985 until July 30, 1991 but at the time of the arrest he had no
money. He cried (sic) to explain his
seemingly pathetic financial state by saying that he had just lent P100,000.00
in May, 1991 to Mandy Antonio with the agreement that he shall pay him before
Christmas of 1991 at 2% a day interest. Mandy Antonio is bankrupt, has a recruiting agency, and has gone to
Japan but accused lent the money to him just the same without collateral
because he simply trusted him. Unfortunately, Mandy Antonio has not paid him.
x x x x x x x
x x
Accused testified that there were previous occasions when he was
apprehended because of ‘shabu.’ The first was in 1988 when Lt. Jimmy Carbonell,
Pat. Basco and Patrolman San Jose entered his house to arrest him for
possession of ‘shabu’ but the arrest was not pursued because he gave them
P101,000.00. The second occasion was on
February 23, 1991 when Lt. Rey Arceo, Cpl. James Baldomera and many others
arrested him at the corner of Luna St. and Tacio Street also because of ‘shabu’
but they did not file a case against him because he gave them P30,000.00. The third occasion happened on April 10,
1991 when he was arrested by Sgt. Jack Jacinto, Cpl. Caballes Arturo, Amy Yerro
and Sgt. Quitoriano. This time he did not
give any money because his father P/Col. Alfredo Pastores intervened by talking
with General San Diego. His father and
General San Diego allegedly agreed that the accused was not released and
instead a case was filed in court which is still pending before Judge Tirso
D.C. Velasco. He claims that he is not
guilty in all cases. He cannot give
money anymore because he does not have any since his money worth P300,000.00
was lent to Mandy Antonio, a friend, who went to Japan and has not paid him
yet. He executed a counter-affidavit
(Exhibit 15). He found later that his
wife’s car was divested of its stereo, amplifiers, 4 speakers, spare tires,
antenna, one pack of blue seal cigarette, Bally shoes and 35 pieces of cassette
tapes. x x x.”32
Again, appellant’s testimony on the above matters might not, by
itself, suffice to tilt the balance of proof in his favor; the prosecution did
not try to rebut appellant’s detailed testimony, and the trial court airily
waived away appellant’s statements about having been robbed and about the
extortion sought to be exercised on him. But his above testimony must be considered in conjunction with the
weakness of the evidence given by the prosecution’s witnesses previously
discussed. Upon the one hand,
appellant’s defense of frame-up tends to reinforce the doubt already engendered
by the weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence about the supposed buy-bust
operation; upon the other hand, it was not indispensably necessary to inquire
into the truthfulness of appellant’s allegations concerning frame-up and
extortion where, as in this case, the evidence of the prosecution is weak.33
It was incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate accused’s culpability
beyond reasonable doubt. Independently
of whatever defense has been offered by the accused, the evidence of the
prosecution must survive the test of moral certainty. Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence, not merely on the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty, and certainly not on the weakness of the accused’s defense;
otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence will be reduced to a
conspicuous futility.
In the light of the facts and circumstances on record, the Court
finds that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was insufficient to support
accused’s culpability. The presumption
of regularity of the performance of the official duty does not by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence to which accused is entitled. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden of proving accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the Court’s mind and
conscience remain vexed and uneasy.
WHEREFORE, for failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt of
his guilt, the accused Renato Pastores is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The decision of the trial
court dated 28 January 1992 is hereby REVERSED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero, Melo, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 6; 3 Records, p. 1.
[2]
Id., p. 32; Certified Xerox Copy of the decision dated 28 January 1992 is
attached to Appellant’s Brief, p. 46.
[3]
Id., p. 46
[4]
Id., pp.
20-23; see also Certified Xerox Copy of the Decision in Appellant’s Brief, p.
46.
[5]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 9-12 ; Rollo, p. 46.
[6]
See Decision dated 28 January 1992; Records, p. 46.
[7]
See People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991); People vs. Natan,
193 SCRA 355 (1991); People vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 (1991); Concepcion vs.
CA, 193 SCRA 586 (1991); People vs. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36 (1991);
People vs. Arenas, 198 SCRA 172 (1991).
[8]
People vs. Deocariza, G.R. No. 103396, 3 March 1993; People vs.
Salcedo, 195 SCRA 345 (1991); People vs. Yutuc, 188 SCRA 1 (1990);
People vs. Taruc, 157 SCRA 182 (1988); Arcado Cortes y Vengson vs.
Court of Appeals and People, 163 SCRA 139 (1988).
[9]
See TSN, 7 October 1991; 1 Records, p. 32. TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 27; Records, p. 129; TSN, 15 October 1991, p.
7, Records, p. 68.
[10]
See 2 Records, p. 1.
[11]
TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 13; Records, p. 74.
[12]
TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 32; 1 Records, p. 134.
[13]
TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 6; Records, p. 67.
[14]
Id., p. 7; Records, p. 68.
[15]
Id., p. 9; Records, p. 70.
[16]
TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 3; Records, p. 106.
[17]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 20.
[18]
Id., pp. 21-22.
[19]
Appellee’s Brief, Rollo. p. 57.
[20]
See People vs. Barba, 203 SCRA 436 (1991); People vs. Bragaes,
203 SCRA 555 (1991).
[21]
See also People vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350 (1991); People vs.
Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991).
[22]
See Testimony of Sgt. Molina, TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 6; Records, p. 67.
[23]
TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 17; Records, p. 78.
23 TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 34; Records, p. 95.
[24]
See Decision, pp. 28, 29; Records, p. 46.
[25]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 28.
[26]
3 Records, pp. 3, 4.
[27]
TSN, 4 December 1991, p. 2-10; 1 Records, p.232-238.
[28]
Decision dated 28 January 1992, p. 14; Records, 46.
30 See People v. Tejada, 170 SCRA 497 (1989).
31 People vs. Madarang, L-70569, 147 SCRA 123
(1987); People vs. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 170 SCRA 681 (1989), see also
People vs. del Pilar, G.R. No. 86360, 188 SCRA 37 (1989); People vs.
Vocente, G.R. No. 80533, 188 SCRA 100 (1990)
32 Trial Court Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, 25-26.
33 People v. Salguero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991).