INOCENCIA INGARAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FEDERICO RAMELO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for the cancellation of a
homestead patent.

Plaintiffs first filed their complaint in the court below on
February 20, 1953 against the defendant Federico Ramelo. The complaint
was subsequently amended on December 17, 1953 to include the Director
of Lands as party defendant. On July 20, 1954, plaintiffs filed a
second amended complaint, including, this time, Felix Guiang as party
defendant. Said complaint alleges that in 1936 Prudencio Bumanglag,
plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest, filed a homestead application for
a tract of land in Echague, Isabela, which was given due course by the
defendant Director of Lands who acknowledged receipt thereof; that
Bumanglag and his family entered the land and cultivated “a greater
portion” thereof; that having worked the land for sometime, he intended
to submit final proof of his right to a patent, but the war broke but;
that after Bumanglag’s death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, continued
possession of the land applied for; that on October 26, 1945, plaintiff
Inocencia Ingaran filed a new homestead application for the same tract
of land; that in 1946 defendant Ramelo entered the land through force
and deceit, whereupon plaintiff Ingaran complained to the local
District Land Officer who wrote a letter dated September 14, 1946 to
said Ramelo advising him to desist from his occupation of the land
because Homestead Application No. 217124 of Prudencio Bumanglag was
still subsisting; that Ramelo refused to vacate the land; that on
October 11, 1947 the District Land Officer rendered a decision
rejecting Bumanglag’s homestead application (as renewed by plaintiff
Inocencia Ingaran, his widow) and gave due course to defendant Ramelo’s
application for the same land; that while plaintiff’s appeal to the
Bureau of Lands from said decision was still pending, the Director of
Lands on October 18, 1949 ordered the issuance of Homestead Patent No.
V-3650 in the name of Ramelo on the strength of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1004 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Isabela in the name of said Federico Ramelo; that plaintiffs’
subsequent appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
was of no avail because a patent had already been issued to Ramelo;
that plaintiffs had acquired a “vested right” over the land in
litigation; that Ramelo’s title and patent were secured through “fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation * * * and by mistake, collusion, with grave
abuse of discretion” of the land officials; and that the land in
question was sold to defendant Felix Guiang by defendant Ramelo within
the prohibited period of 5 years provided in the Public Land Laws. By
way of relief, plaintiffs pray, among other things, that the various
decisions and orders of the District Land Officer of Isabela, the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources be declared null and void; that defendant Ramelo’s patent and
certificate of title to the land in question be cancelled; and that the
land be restored to them, with damages against defendants Ramelo and
Guiang.

The defendant Federico Ramelo opposed the filing of the second
amended complaint and moved to dismiss the same on the grounds that it
did not state a cause of action against him and that it was “evidently
an attempt by plaintiffs to have the court interfere with the purely
administrative and jurisdictional functions of the Executive Department
of the Government as exercised by the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.” The court, however,
without acting on the motion to dismiss, overruled defendant Ramelo’s
opposition and admitted the second amended complaint.

In their separate answers, the defendants set up affirmative
defenses which constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss, to wit: that
the homestead controversy between the, defendant Federico Ramelo arid
Prudencio Bumanglag, represented by his widow, herein plaintiff
Inocencia Ingaran, had long been settled in favor of the former in a
decision rendered by the District Land Officer, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; that plaintiffs’ complaint states no cause of
action; and that plaintiffs have no personality to assail the validity
of the homestead patent and certificate of title issued to defendant
Ramelo.

At the instance of the defendants, a preliminary hearing was had,
pursuant to section 5 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, on the special
and affirmative defenses set up by the said defendants. Thereafter, on
June 30, 1955, the court below issued an order dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint “with prejudice”. Plaintiffs in due time filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same having been denied, they appealed
directly to this Court.

The appeal is without merit.

It is not disputed that in a decision rendered by the District Land
Officer at Ilagan, Isabela, on October 11, 1947, the homestead
application of herein plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest Prudencio
Bumanglag for the land in question was rejected and the application of
defendant Federico Ramelo for the same tract of land was given due
course. That decision was rendered after the District Land Officer,
upon investigation of the conflict between the homesteaders, found that
Federico Ramelo had since 1939 continuously occupied and cultivated the
land, ultimately converting the entire area into a productive
ricefield, without having been molested by Bumanglag or by his widow;
that said Bumanglag and his widow cleared only a very insignificant
portion thereof; and that the last time the said spouses saw the land
was in 1940, thereby practically abandoning the same. (See Annex A,
Answer of the defendant Director of Lands.) The above decision of the
District Land Officer was confirmed by the Director of Lands in his
order of November 29, 1949. (Annex B, Id.) Not satisfied, Inocencia
Ingaran, representing her deceased husband Prudencio Bumanglag, filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. (Annex C, Id.) On
appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, that
official in his decision dated November 29, 1950 affirmed the decision
of the District Land Officer and the orders of the Director of Lands.
(Annex D, Id.) Inocencia Ingaran then filed a motion for a
reinvestigation of the case, but the motion was denied. Her motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the Secretary on September 7,
1951. (Annexes E and F, Id.)

The authenticity of the above documents annexes A to F of the answer
of the defendant Director of Lands has not been assailed in the
proceedings below. As a matter of fact, the parties agreed, that they
be considered for the purpose of resolving the grounds for the motion
to dismiss pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answers of the
defendants. In the circumstances, we see no valid reason why they
should not be taken into account by the court.

Plaintiffs, in effect, seek a judicial review of the administrative
decision above mentioned. Obviously, plaintiffs’ action must fail. It
is well settled that the decision rendered by the Director of Lands
when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
final and conclusive upon all questions of fact concerning homesteads
which fall within his scope and authority, in the absence of a showing
that such decision was rendered in consequence of a fraud, imposition
or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating the value or
effect of evidence. (Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil., 422; Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440; De Guzman vs. De Guzman, et al., 104 Phil., 24, 56 Off. Gaz., [4] 753.).

Plaintiffs claim that they had acquired a “vested right” over the
land in question and that defendant Ramelo’s patent and title thereto
were secured through fraud and deceit and “by mistake, collusion, with
grave abuse of discretion” of the lands officials. We find the claim to
be unfounded. An applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right
over the homestead only when his application has been perfected by the
presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of
Lands. (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic of the Phil. vs.
Diamon, et al., 97 Phil., 838.) In the present case, plaintiffs merely
alleged in their complaint that an “intention to make final proof was
submitted to the proper authorities.” No such final proof appears to
have actually been presented to show compliance with the requirements
of the law as to warrant the issuance of a patent. Indeed, the
homestead application of Prudencio Bumanglag, as renewed by plaintiff
Inocencia Ingaran, had not even been approved.

As to plaintiffs’ allegation of fraud or mistake, it will be
observed that the complaint does not state the circumstances
constituting the fraud or mistake as required by section 12 of Rule 15.
In this connection, it should be stated that plaintiff Inocencia
Ingaran in her appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in the administrative case involving the homestead in
question, raised for the first time the question of “fraud” by alleging
that there was no investigation conducted in the case and that “if ever
* * * (she) affixed her thumbmark on the alleged report or minutes of
investigation, it was done thru fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.”
The Secretary, however, expressly found that an investigation was duly
conducted and that Inocencia Ingaran even signed the portion of the
minutes of the investigation containing her testimonies.

We also note that, as stated in plaintiffs’ complaint, Homestead
Patent No. V-3650 was issued to defendant Ramelo as far back as October
18, 1949 on the strength of which an original certificate of title was
thereafter issued in his name. That certificate of title partakes of
the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and became
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the issuance thereof. (See Lucas vs.
Durian, et al., G. R. No. L-7886, September 23, 1957.) The present
complaint having been filed more than 3 years after the issuance of the
homestead patent to defendant Ramelo, it is apparent that the lower
court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain it.

Finally, the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent, as
prayed for by plaintiffs, and the consequent reversion of the property
to the state, are matters between the state and the grantee or his
heirs, and until the government has taken steps to annul the grant and
assert title to the homestead, the rights of the homesteader stand and
must be recognized in the court of law. (Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido et al., 97 Phil., 41).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Barrera, JJ., concur.