PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ELYBOY SO Y ORBES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

On 10
June 1991, Elyboy So was charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for the death of Mario Tuquero.  The information reads:

That
on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Mario Tuquero y
Alas by then and there stabbing him several times with a fan knife on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Mario Tuquero y
Alas mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.

Contrary to law^[1].

On 19 July 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded “NOT GUILTY.”^[2]

After
trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court handed down its decision
on 17 January 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of “Murder”
qualified by treachery, as defined in and penalized by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby condemns the said Accused to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with all the accessory penalties of the law.  The Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mario Tuquero in the amount of
P50.000.00.  The period during which the Accused was detained in the
City Jail shall be credited to him in full provided that he agreed in
writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations
of the City Jail of Manila. With costs against the Accused.

SO ORDERED.^[3]

The facts established by prosecution’s evidence are summarized in the People’s brief as follows:

On
June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So met his lady friend,
Teresita Domingo, in a jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig.  Since Elyboy’s
house which is located in 2969-D Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, is walking distance to Teresita’s house located in 2050 Abad
Santos Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Teresita requested Elyboy to bring her
home (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nov. 12, 1991, p. 7).

While
walking along Araullo Street on their way to Teresita’s house, they
passed by the house of Elyboy’s first cousin, Esteban, Edgar, and Emy,
all surnamed So (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 8-9).

When they
passed by his cousins’ house, he saw his cousin Edgar with Ronnie Tan
and three (3) others and noticed that a drinking spree was taking place
in front of the house (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 9-10).

Upon
seeing Elyboy, Edgar greeted him by saying: “Bingbong Crisologo is
coming” (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 10).  He then invited Elyboy to have a
drink and requested that his lady companion be introduced to them
(t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 11).  Elyboy answered: “I cannot introduce
her to you because she is mine” (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).

Elyboy then proceeded to bring Teresita directly to her house (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).

Immediately
after bringing Teresita to her house, Elyboy passed by his cousins’
house to honor their invitation (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).

After
an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of beer
which the latter declined because it was already past 10:00 p.m. and he
was on his way home already.  Edgar convinced him to drink just a little
and to stay awhile so he could also meet his future brother-in-law,
Mario Tuquero, who will arrive later with his sister Emy.  Elyboy was
prevailed upon to stay on as he was also interested in meeting Mario
(t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 14).

Before Emy and Mario arrived,
Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the dance in the playground
which was part of the fiesta celebration.  At the playground, Esteban
met Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie and informed them that Emy and Mario had
arrived and instructed them to buy beer (t.s.n., October 23, 1991, pp.
15-18).

Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie proceeded to buy beer while Esteban went home ahead of them (t.s.n., October 23, 1991, p. 19).

After
buying beer, they proceeded to the house.  Upon arriving in the house,
Emy introduced Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp.
14-20).

Mario Tuquero worked as a manager of a restaurant in
Paris, France, and arrived in the Philippines on March 7, 1991.  Emy So,
who is a registered nurse, met Mario sometime in March, 1991 and they
started living in as husband and wife in her parents’ house at 1920,
Araullo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, also in the same month until June,
1991.  However, Mario was legally married to a certain Evelyn Tuquero
and this fact was not known to Emy (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 37-39,
42-43, 54-55).

The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy,
Ronnie, Mario and Emy resumed their drinking spree. However, after the
group consumed four (4) cases of beer and before 3:00 a.m.,  Emy felt
sleepy and went inside (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 52; Oct. 23, 1991, p.
21).

While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by
the noise coming from the group outside their house (t.s.n., Sept. 4,
1991, p. 59).

It turned out that Elyboy had a misunderstanding
and altercation with somebody and he was shouting loudly, disturbing the
neighbors in the process (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 59, 63).

After
pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home because his
loud voice was disturbing the neighbors (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp.
62­-63).

After he was pacified and advised to go home, Elyboy ran towards home (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 62-63).

At
around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991, Mario and Emy decided to leave for
Fairview Subdivision, Quezon City, in order to get papers of a vehicle
owned by Mario that they will bring out of the Bureau of Customs
(t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30-31, 60).

While Mario and Emy were
waiting for a taxi at the corner of Magsaysay Avenue and Pureza Street,
Elyboy suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed Mario at the back
several times with an eleven inch fan knife with a white handle (t.s.n.,
Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30, 32, 67; Sept. 9, 1991, p. 25).

Emy shouted for help (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).

When
Mario was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on his
back.  Elyboy took advantage of this circumstance and repeatedly stabbed
Mario on the front part of his body (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).

Emy
pleaded to Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario but Elyboy ignored her and
continued delivering stabbing blows at Mario (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p.
34).

Elyboy fled from the scene of the crime and ran to a dark alley (tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 34; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 40).

Emy
called for a taxi that passed by and brought Mario Tuquero to the
University of the East – Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital (tsn., Sept.
1991, p. 34).

Elyboy stayed in the alley for about thirty (30)
minutes until the policemen arrived at the scene of the crime and
shouted at him to surrender.  After a while, Elyboy went out of hiding
and shouted at the policemen not to fire because he is surrendering. 
When Elyboy surrendered, he was blushing and uneasy and naked from the
waist up because he removed his shirt to wipe the blood on his face
(tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 6, 13; Nov. 12, 1991, p. 3).

Elyboy was
then brought by the policemen to Precinct No. 8 of the Western Police
District and the fan knife used was surrendered by Barangay Chairman
Aida de los Santos to the police authorities (tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp.
7, 25).

As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered
several stab wounds numbering eighteen (18) on the different parts of
his body with at least four (4) fatal wounds causing his death (tsn.,
Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 8-23).^[4]

Appellant
vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution.  According to him,
while they were drinking and talking about France, Esteban So suddenly
stood up and said that the reason he was not able to work in France is
because his surname was “So.”  Appellant felt aggrieved as he recalled
the time when he lived with Esteban So and his family and was driven out
by them.  He was told that his only link to them is the surname “So.” 
Then when Esteban So pulled a knife and Edgar So broke bottles of beer
and Mario Tuquero pulled out “something” from his socks, appellant,
fearing for his life, fled.  Appellant claims that Esteban So and Mario
Tuquero chased him but were not able to catch him.^[5]

Appellant
further narrated that when he tried to go back to his cousin’s house
and talk to them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So at the corner of
Pureza and Magsaysay Streets. Suddenly Mario Tuquero attacked him with a
knife but because Tuquero’s thrust was slow, he was able to evade it.
He grabbed the knife and proceeded to stab Tuquero repeatedly.  He
ignored the pleas of Emy So but finally stopped when four (4) persons in
a jeep passed by and shouted at him.  He ran into a dark alley until
the police came and brought him to the police precinct.^[6]

Appellant claimed self-defense and in the instant appeal assigned the following errors:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED SELF-DEFENSE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

II

THE
LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ELYBOY SO IS UNDESERVING OF CREDIT, IMPROBABLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS TREACHERY IN THE INSTANT CASE.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY ON THE PART OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.^[7]

We deny the appeal.

Appellant’s
second assigned error, in essence, raises the issue of credibility of
witnesses.  Whose testimony is more believable and reliable, prosecution
witness Emy So’s narration or appellant’s version? Appellant would like
us to believe that Emy So’s testimony was biased in favor of her
brothers and the victim who was her common-law-husband^[8] and aggravated by an alleged grudge harbored by her family against appellant’s family.

We
give no credence to appellant’s argument.  Long settled in criminal
jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of
the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it
has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.^[9] 
In the instant case, although Emy So readily admitted that her
relationship with appellant was “not close,” she explained that it was
appellant who had ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge. 
The defense has not shown such degree of partiality on the part of
prosecution witness Emy So as would cast doubt on her credibility and
impeach her testimony, especially when said testimony is “not inherently
improbable in itself.”^[10]  Emy So testified thus:

xxx              xxx              xxx

COURT:

You
mentioned of a grudge between your family and that of the Accused and
this referred to the surname, So.  What was the trouble all about?

WITNESS:

Actually, there was no grudge with respect to the family name So. They really have grudge in our family, Your Honor.

COURT:

What was that grudge all about?

WITNESS:

Their
family is a broken family and ours is intact, Your Honor. And they live
only from hand-outs from relatives and also from us, Your Honor.

COURT:

So, what was the grudge about? You even help them.  You even helped the Accused.  What was the grudge all about?

WITNESS:

I just do not know really why they have such ill feelings towards us.  I think it’s jealousy “inggit,” Your Honor.

xxx              xxx              xxx

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

You are not concerned with Elyboy he being not a resident in your community?

WITNESS:

No, ma’am.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

That is because you have grudge over this person.  Referring to the Accused, is that correct?

WITNESS:

No, maam, we are not so close that’s why.

xxx              xxx              xxx

COURT:

Another question.  Is it your habit not to be concerned with the welfare of your relatives?

WITNESS:

I have concerned to my other relatives, Your Honor.

COURT:

How about the Accused, you are not concerned with him?

WITNESS:

No, Your Honor.

COURT:

Why, because of the fact between your family and their family?

WITNESS:

It
could be said that way, Your Honor, because since then, he is a problem
child that’s why my feelings towards him is not so intimate anymore.^[11]

The
fact alone that the victim was Emy So’s live-in partner does not impair
her testimony.  The Court has time and again ruled that mere
relationship of the witness to the victim does not automatically impair
his credibility and render the testimony less worthy of faith and
credit.^[12]  In People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and Manolo,^[13] we put it thus:

…
It is settled that the relationship of the key witness to the victim
does not necessarily disqualify him for being biased and interested.  A
son or a wife is not incompetent to testify simply because of his or her
relationship to the victim.  In other words, the relationship of the
witnesses to the victim does not per se affect their
credibility.  Their testimony must be evaluated and assessed according
to its own merit and if not otherwise offset by more credible evidence
on record or any other revealed intrinsic defect should be given credit.

Appellant’s
strategy to discredit Emy So on ground of bias and interest to
exculpate himself from criminal liability cannot succeed.

Appellant
maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-defense and
invokes in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence
claiming that, despite his plea of self?defense, the prosecution retains
the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.^[14] 
This argument deserves no credit in light of the established and
time-honored rule that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of
evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified
and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor.  He must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing.  He must prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to
wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.^[15]

In People v. Jotoy,^[16] we stated:

It
is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.  However, when the accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi
is shifted and he is duty bound to prove the elements of the plea by
clear and convincing evidence otherwise, conviction is inescapable.

We
shall now proceed to determine whether or not appellant has completely
and satisfactorily proven the elements of self-defense.  The initial and
crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim for absent this essential element, no claim of
self-defense can be successfully interposed.  If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second
requisite of self-defense would have no basis.^[17]

Appellant’s
claim that the victim, Mario Tuquero, attacked him with a knife fails
to convince us.  The record reveals glaring and serious inconsistencies
in appellant’s testimony that makes it totally unworthy of credence.

Appellant
testified that he was able to wrest the knife from Tuquero because the
latter’s thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his statement during
the same cross-examination, that the incident happened so fast and that
Tuquero’s attack was sudden.

xxx              xxx              xxx
   

FISCAL PERALTA:

And
the first time that you saw Mario near the corner of Magsaysay and
Pureza, how far were you in relation to him the first time that you saw
him?

WITNESS:

I
think about 1 and 1/2 armslength, sir, because I was on the other side
and Mario was also on the other side and we exactly met at the corner,
sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:

And the first time that you saw bringing out something from his waistline, what did you do?

WITNESS:

The
incident happened so fast, sir.  After pulling out something from his
waistline, immediately thereafter, he made a thrust on me but I was able
to grab the knife from him, sir. (Underscoring ours.)^[18]

xxx              xxx              xxx

Further, we share the incredulity of the trial court that the victim stabbed appellant in slow motion:

Even
the testimony of the Accused denigrated his claim that he acted in
self-defense.  For, when he testified before the Court, the Accused
claimed that Mario Tuquero stabbed him but that Mario Tuquero failed to
hit the accused because Mario Tuquero stabbed the accused slowly and the
Accused was able to evade the thrust and that the latter, thereupon,
wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero.  It is sheer lunacy for the
Accused to asseverate that Mario Tuquero stabbed the Accused in slow
motion…^[19]

Even if
we allow appellant’s contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful
aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense.  After
appellant successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful
aggression had ceased.  After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the
one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor.^[20]

As correctly pointed out by the trial court:

…More,
there is no evidence in the record that, after the Accused wrested the
knife from Mario Tuquero, the latter still did any overt act to indicate
that he still tried to grab or wrest back the knife from the Accused
or, in any manner, persist in inflicting any harm on the Accused.  On
the contrary, after the Accused wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero,
the Accused repeatedly stabbed Mario Tuquero in the front portions of
his body even after Mario Tuquero embraced the Accused to hang on for
dear life.  At the time the Accused stabbed Mario Tuquero, the latter’s
initial unlawful aggression had already ceased and that there was,
therefore, no more need for the Accused to still stab Mario Tuquero and
stab him with impunity…^[21]

We reiterated the same rule in People v. Jotoy:^[22]

But
even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused
with a knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still hold that
there was no self-defense because at that point when accused was able to
catch and twist the hand of the deceased, in effect immobilizing him,
the unlawful aggression had already ended.  Thus, the danger having
ceased, there was no more need for the accused to start stabbing the
deceased, not just once but five (5) times.

and in People v. Gomez:^[23]

There
was no self-defense where the accused was able to obtain possession of
the weapon from the deceased and there was no necessity to stab the
latter for aggression had already ceased.

Appellant’s claim of
self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and negated by the physical
evidence on record. The victim sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds on
different parts of his body.  Of the eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal
stab wounds.^[24]  The presence
of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and
location disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort
to kill the victim.^[25]

We quote with favor the observations of the trial court in this regard:

In
this case, the evidence in the record buttresses the testimony of Emie
So, on the one hand, and belied and deprecated the testimony of the
Accused on the other.  As can be gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Florante Baltazar, (Exhibits “B” and “C”), the deceased sustained no
less than eighteen (18) stab wounds.  Four (4) of the stab wounds
sustained by the deceased were on the posterior aspects of his body,
namely, stab wounds No. 4 (Exhibit “C-4”), stab wound No. 13 (Exhibit
“B-13”), stab wound No. 15 (Exhibit “C-15”) and stab wound No. 18
(Exhibit “C-18”) and the rest of the stab wounds sustained by the victim
were on the anterior portions of his body.  These jibe with the
testimony of Emie So that the Accused suddenly darted from behind Mario
Tuquero and stabbed him on the posterior aspects of his body and, when
Mario Tuquero slipped because his shoe slid, and fell on the ground,
face up, the Accused then stabbed Mario Tuquero anew successively on the
anterior aspects of his body.

On the other hand, if the Accused
acted merely on self-defense, it is incomprehensible that he would stab
Mario Tuquero no less than eighteen (18) times (Exhibits “B” and “C”),
not only on the anterior but also on the posterior aspects of his body.^[26]

Considering
the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by appellant on the
victim, the testimony of the prosecution witness Emy So that appellant
unexpectedly and suddenly attacked the victim from behind and the fact
that appellant suffered not a single injury, we agree with the trial
court that the killing was attended by treachery. This clearly
illustrates that appellant, in the commission of the crime, employed
means, methods and form in its execution which tended directly, and
especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the victim might make.^[27]

Not
content with a self-defense plea the defense likewise seeks to exempt
appellant from criminal liability by claiming that appellant was insane
at the time he stabbed the victim.

The claim is unmeritorious.

The
law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving
it.^[28]

In order that
insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or
that the accused acted without the least discernment.  Mere abnormality
of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.^[29]

The
testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent
Service of the National Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and attending
physician of appellant when he was confined at the National Center for
Mental Health from June 8, 1985 to December 2, 1985, only established
the previous confinement of appellant at the NCMH and that appellant
showed signs of psychosis or insanity at the time. The rest of his
testimony consisted merely of assumptions, possibilities and
generalities:

xxx              xxx              xxx

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Why did you attend to this Elyboy So?

WITNESS:

He was admitted June 8, 1985 to the service of the Child and Adolescents Service, maam.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Why?

WITNESS:

He showed signs of psychosis or insanity, maam.

xxx              xxx              xxx

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

What are the characteristics of this kind of illness Mr. Witness?

WITNESS:

Even
this illness it is assumed that this patient will have episodes of
insanity for the rest of his life especially if he will not take the
medicines that will prevent the episodes of insanity.  (Underscoring
ours.)

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

And
you said that this patient per your record was discharged on December
3, 1985.  Do we understand that from the time of his discharge, he was
already healed or recovered from that kind of insanity?

WITNESS:

I
can only say that at the time of the last check up he was doing well
three (3) months after that, he was discharged because he failed to come
back for his check-up, maam.  (Underscoring ours.).

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

You mentioned that this will be for the rest of his life.

WITNESS:

For
many patients, it is like that.  It is very exceptional that they will
be able to recover or completely cured from it, maam.  (Italics ours.)

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

When you say for the rest of his life, do we understand that this will be recurrent?

WITNESS:

Yes, maam.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

What are the causes that will trigger the recurrency of this kind of illness?

WITNESS:

Generally,
the main characteristic of this patients who are suffering from this
illness is, they are very sensitive to any kind of social censures and
criticisms.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Could you enlighten what do you mean by social censures?

WITNESS:

If
they were told about a behaviour that they are showing that is
inacceptable, they will react to that in a disproportionate way, maam.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

What do you mean by disproportionate way?

WITNESS:

It will not proportionate that the amount of stimulus meaning, to say that they will over react.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Is violence a kind of over reaction to a given stimulus?

WITNESS:

Patients who are suffering from this condition has more proclivity to violence than the general population.

xxx              xxx              xxx

COURT:

Doctor, you told that he was discharged.  Was he told to come back for further treatment?

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor, that is standard that we tell to everybody. (Underscoring ours.)

COURT:

And how often is he supposed to come back for treatment in the case of the Accused Elyboy So?

WITNESS:

After
six (6) months he failed to come.  He was supposed to come every month
after his passe which was given on August 1, 1985, Your Honor.^[30]

xxx              xxx              xxx

Further
and more importantly, the testimony of Dr. Galvez is bereft of any
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or
discernment at the time or at the very instant when he stabbed the
victim.

Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental
state of appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at
the very moment the act was committed.^[31]  In the present case, the testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to appellant’s treatment six (6) years before the incident happened.

Moreover,
Dr. Galvez admitted that after appellant’s last check-up sometime in
1985, or six (6) years before the crime was committed, he was doing well
and relieved from psychosis:

xxx              xxx              xxx

COURT:

When he came back, after his discharge, was he given medication?

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

How did you find his behaviour when he came back for medication?

WITNESS:

As per record, he was doing well, Your Honor. (Underscoring ours.)

COURT:

When you say doing well, what exactly do you mean by that?

WITNESS:

He was relieved from psychosis at that time, Your Honor.  (Underscoring ours.)

xxx              xxx              xxx

FISCAL PERALTA:

If
the patient was discharged in 1985 and finished his college degree in
four (4) years, do you think that by that time he was already cured of
his sickness?

WITNESS:

It will look like that, sir. (Italics ours.)

FISCAL PERALTA:

What do you mean it will look like that?

WITNESS:

It
will look that while there are various types of clinical courses,
meaning, the development of an illness in a patient and if the patient
was able to finish college, then the outcome of the treatment that was
given to him in 1985 was quite good.

FISCAL PERALTA:

And
do you think doctor that could have been the reason why he already
failed to report on a monthly basis considering that he was already in
college and actually finished his college degree?

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

That
might be misleading, Your Honor, considering that the testimony of the
doctor, he said that he should report six (6) months after the discharge
but he took his college degree for several years thereafter.

COURT:

The
only point of the fiscal is that, is that an indication of having been
cured.  If he was able to take and finished even college.  Go ahead.

WITNESS:

It
would look that during that period, he would have been cured and there
are some also who although that they may not be entirely cured would be
able to get a degree, make the standards of education and there are some
who could also get the standard of employment despite their craziness. 
“Medyo naitatago or nakakaya.”  Psychosis is something in many patients
it is very obvious.  You could see that they are really grossly
disorganized “talagang sira.”  But there are some who has some ability
to keep it just there and maintain a proper social behaviour and be able
to achieve socially acceptable functioning in society.

COURT:

In other words, that illness is dormant.

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

And it emerges in some point of time?

WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

So, it is possible doctor that the decease is there but at the same time, the patient is able to study?

WITNESS:

Yes,
Your Honor.  The possibilities are these, he was cured, entirely cured
during the period or the decease is just there and it is not affecting
his behaviour. So there are two (2) possibilities. ^[32] (Italics ours)

A
perusal of appellant’s testimony further negates his plea of insanity. 
His recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the
stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony,
does not betray an aberrant mind.  His memory conveniently blanks out
only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the victim.  This,
appellant attributes to insanity but we are far from convinced.  A man
may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he
is legally so.^[33]

xxx              xxx              xxx

FISCAL PERALTA:

Afterwards, when you got hold of the knife, you repeatedly stabbed him?

WITNESS:

Yes,
sir, because after I got hold of the knife, I was able to wrest it from
him.  And with the use of my right hand, I repeatedly stabbed him.  At
the time his left arm was embracing me and I repeatedly stabbed him with
my right hand from the left swinging it to the right infront, hitting
him on the front of his body, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:

How many times did you stab him on the front portion?

WITNESS:

I don’t know, sir, because I was out of myself.

FISCAL PERALTA:

After repeatedly stabbing the front portion of his body, you said that you also stabbed him at the back?

WITNESS:

When he was already embracing me, sir, my right hand was freed and that was the time when I stabbed him at the back.

FISCAL PERALTA:

And how did you stab him at the back?

WITNESS:

Like this, sir.  He was embracing me, my right hand was freed.

INTERPRETER:

Witness demonstrated by stretching his right hand, swinging it from the right side to the front towards his body.

FISCAL PERALTA:

And how many times also did you stab the back portion of the body of the victim?

WITNESS:

I could not recall also, sir.

FISCAL PERALTA:

And when you stopped stabbing the victim when you said four (4) men boarded a jeep and shouted “itigil na, itigil na”?

WITNESS:

It
was during the time when both of us fell down. I was on top of him and I
stabbed him on his chest, sir.  That was when four (4) persons arrived
and shouted “itigil na, itigil na,” and I stopped, sir.^[34]

xxx              xxx              xxx

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

And what did you do when you were not hit?

WITNESS:

By the time I evaded his thrust I was able to get hold of his palm, ma’am.

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

And when you were able to get hold of his palm, what happened?

WITNESS:

Because I was so made of what he did, when I was able to grab and get hold of the knife, I hit him, ma’am.

INTERPRETER:

Witness demonstrating by raising his right hand upward on the level of his breast, swinging his right hand towards the right.^[35]

xxx              xxx              xxx

In People v. Renegado,^[36] we held thus:

By
his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he
was unaware or unconscious of what he was doing, that he ‘regained his
senses’ when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: ‘Loreto, don’t
do that,’ and only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira.  That,
to Us, is incredible.  For it is most unusual for appellant’s mind which
was in a perfect normal state on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly
turn blank at that particular moment when he stabbed Lira.  Appellant
himself testified that he was acting very sanely that Monday morning, as
shown by the fact that he went to the canteen in a jovial mood
‘singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand’; he saw the persons
inside the canteen namely, Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco, Benita
Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the
last one, testified for the prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira
who banged his folders on the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud
voice: ‘ano ka’, he saw Lira put his right hand inside his pocket and
with the other hand push a chair towards him; he became ‘confused’
because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill him if he would see
him again; at this point he ‘lost his senses’ and regained it
when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: ‘Loreto, don’t do that’, and
he then found out that he had wounded Lira.  If
appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot understand
why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed
Lira to return at the snap of a finger as it were, after he accomplished
the act of stabbing his victim...  (Italics our.)

and in the later case of People v. Aquino,^[37]  we ruled:

The
clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon
his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic
centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana
before the commission of the crime. This admission substantially affirms
his prior extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of
marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion
thereof, killed her. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming
appellant had some form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive
him of intelligence.  The presence of
his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment
and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently
discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the
dastardly felonies.  The annals of crime are replete with
documented records, and we are not without our share in this
jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to
provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution. (Italics
ours.)

In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to overthrow the presumption of sanity.  The State,
thus, continues, its guard against sane murderers who seek to escape
punishment through a general plea of insanity.^[38]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[2] Rollo, p. 12.

^[3] Id., p. 29.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 92-99.

^[5] TSN, October 23, 1991, pp. 26-31; TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 7-10.

^[6] TSN, October 23, 1991, pp. 32-36, 38-40; TSN, November 12, 1991, p. 4.

^[7] Rollo, p. 64.

^[8] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 18-19.

^[9] People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and Manolo, G.R. No. 111003, December 15, 1994; People v. Nemeria, G.R. No. 96288, March 20, 1995; People v. Deunida, 231 SCRA 520 (1994); People v. Alapide, 236 SCRA 555 (1994); People v. Genial, 228 SCRA 283 (1993).

^[10] People v. Bragaes, 203 SCRA 555 (1991).

^[11] TSN, September 4, 1991, pp. 50-51; 64-66.

^[12] People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801 (1993).

^[13] Supra, see Note 9.

^[14] Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 8.

^[15] People v. Rivero, G.R. No. 112721, March 15, 1995.

^[16] Supra, see note 12.

^[17] People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 (1993).

^[18] TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 12-13, 17.

^[19] Rollo, p. 26.

^[20] People v. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991).

^[21] Rollo, p. 26.

^[22] Supra, see note 12.

^[23] 235 SCRA 444 (1994).

^[24] TSN, September 4, 1991, p. 21.

^[25] People v. Rivero, supra.

^[26] Rollo, p. 26.

^[27] Art. 14(16) Revised Penal Code; People v. Rivero, supra.

^[28] People v. Catanyag, 226 SCRA 293 (1993).

^[29] People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 (1980).

^[30] TSN, December 9, 1991, pp. 4-6; 8.

^[31] People v. Catanyag, supra.

^[32] TSN, December 9, 1991, pp. 8, 10-12.

^[33] People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 [1980].

^[34] TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 13-15.

^[35] TSN, October 23, 1991, pp. 35-36.

^[36] 57 SCRA 275 [1974].

^[37] 186 SCRA 851 [1990].

^[38] People v. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 (1991).