METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND NENITA CUSTODIO, RESPONDENTS.

This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and
sufficiency of petitioner’s invocation of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees as its defense against liability resulting from a
vehicular collision. With the facility
by which such a defense can be contrived and our country having reputedly the
highest traffic accident rate in its geographical region, it is indeed high
time for us to once again address this matter which poses not only a litigation
issue for the courts but affects the very safety of our streets.

The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by respondent
court, thus —

“At about six o’clock
in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded
as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ
Pilipinas 1979, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his
co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated
located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a machine
operator earning P16.25 a day. While
the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila
Transit Corp. (MMTC, for short) bus bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines)
‘79 driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection
of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their
speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them
occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC
bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff?appellant
Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she)
was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious
physical injuries. She was brought to
the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1)
week. Thereat, she was confined for
twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three
and one half months (3 1/2).”^[1]

A complaint for damages^[2]
was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by
her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to
pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision.

Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the
complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at
fault. Further, herein petitioner Metro
Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC), a government-owned corporation and one of
the defendants in the court a quo, along with its driver,
Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim^[3]
that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo
and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering
that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant
Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should
thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the
fault and negligence of its employees.

Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged in his answer
with cross-claim and counterclaim^[4]
that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants
MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter’s negligence was
the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

By order of the trial court, defendant Calebag was declared in
default for failure to file an answer.^[5]
Thereafter, as no amicable settlement was reached during the pre-trial
conference,^[6]
trial on the merits ensued with the opposing parties presenting their
respective witnesses and documentary evidence.

Herein private respondent Nenita Custodio, along with her
parents, were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. In addition, Dr. Edgardo del Mundo, the
attending physician, testified on the cause, nature and extent of the injuries
she sustained as a result of the vehicular mishap.^[7]
On the other hand, defendant MMTC presented as witnesses Godofredo Leonardo,
Christian Bautista and Milagros Garbo. Defendant Lamayo, however, failed to present any witness.

Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of MMTC, she
was in charge of the selection of the company’s bus drivers, conducting for
this purpose a series of training programs and examinations. According to her, new applicants for job
openings at MMTC are preliminarily required to submit certain documents such as
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, birth or residence
certificate, ID pictures, certificate or diploma of highest educational
attainment, professional driver’s license, and work experience
certification. Re-entry applicants,
aside from the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed to submit company
clearance for shortages and damages and revenue performance for the preceding
year. Upon satisfactory compliance with
said requisites, applicants are recommended for and subjected to a preliminary
interview, followed by a record check to find out whether they are included in
the list of undesirable employees given by other companies.

Thereafter, she continued, if an applicant is found to be
acceptable, a final interview by the Chief Supervisor is scheduled and followed
by a training program which consists of seminars and actual driving and
psycho-physical tests and X-ray examinations. The seminars, which last for a total of eighteen (18) days, include
familiarization with assigned routes, existing traffic rules and regulations,
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG) seminar on defensive driving,
preventive maintenance, proper vehicle handling, interpersonal relationship and
administrative rules on discipline and on-the-job training. Upon completion of all the seminars and
tests, a final clearance is issued, an employment contract is executed and the
driver is ready to report for duty.^[8]

MMTC’s Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista, testified that
it was his duty to monitor the daily operation of buses in the field, to
countercheck the dispatcher on duty prior to the operation of the buses in the
morning and to see to it that the bus crew follow written guidelines of the
company, which include seeing to it that its employees are in proper uniform,
briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, fit to drive
and, in general, follow other rules and regulations of the Bureau of Land
Transportation as well as of the company.^[9]

The reorganized trial court, in its decision of August 1,1989,^[10]
found both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently negligent for
non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to
take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well
as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by
plaintiff Custodio. Defendant MMTC, on
the bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved from liability for
the accident on the ground that it was not only careful and diligent in
choosing and screening applicants for job openings but was also strict and
diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were
in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start
of duty, and that it checked its employees to determine whether or not they
were positive for alcolhol and followed other rules and regulations and
guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of the company.

The trial court accordingly ruled:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint against the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and
ordering defendants Agudo P. Calebag, Victorino Lamayo and Godofredo C.
Leonardo to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:

a). the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical
expenses;

b). the sum of P5,000.00 by way of expenses of
litigation;

c). the sum of P15,000.00 by way of moral
damages;

d). the sum of P2,672.00 by way of loss of
earnings;

e). the sum of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages;

f). the sum of P6,000.00 by way of attorney’s
fees; and

g). costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”^[11]

Plaintiff’s motion to have that portion of the trial court’s
decision absolving MMTC from liability recon­sidered^[12]
having been denied for lack of merit,^[13]
an appeal was filed by her with respondent appellate court. After consideration of the appropriate
pleadings on appeal and finding the appeal meritorious, the Court of Appeals
modified the trial court’s decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other
defendants for the damages awarded by the trial court because of their
concurrent negligence, concluding that while there is no hard and fast rule as
to what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an employer has exercised
the due diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its
employees, based on the quantum of evidence adduced the said appellate court
was not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised the diligence required of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver,
Godofredo Leonardo.^[14]

The Court of Appeals was resolute in its conclusion and denied
the motions for reconsideration of appellee Custodio and appellant MMTC in a
resolution dated February 17, 1982,^[15]
thus prompting MMTC to file the instant petition invoking the review powers of
this Court over the decision of the Court of Appeals, raising as issues for
resolution whether or not (1) the documentary evidence to support the positive
testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista are still necessary; (2) the
testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista may still be disturbed on appeal;
and (3) the evidence presented during the trial with respect to the proof of
due diligence of petitioner MMTC in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly driver Leonardo, is sufficient.

Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness of the
filing of the petition at bar in view of the procedural stricture that the
timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. This is a legitimate concern on the part of
private respondent and presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify
this point as there appears to be some confusion in the application of the
rules and interpretative rulings regarding the computation of reglementary
periods at this stage of the proceedings.

The records of this case reveal that the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1991, was received by MMTC on November 18,
1991^[16]
and it seasonably filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof on November
28, 1991.^[17] Said motion for reconsideration was denied
by respondent court in its resolution dated February 17, 1992, which in turn
was received by MMTC on March 9, 1992.^[18]
Therefore, it had, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
fifteen (15) days therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within which to file a
petition for review on certiorari. Anticipating, however, that it may not be able to file said petition
before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion on
March 19, 1992 for an extension of thirty (30) days to file the present
petition, with proof of service of copies thereof to respondent court and the
adverse parties. The Court granted said
motion, with the extended period to be counted from the expiration of the
reglementary period.^[19] Consequently, private respondent had thirty
(30) days from March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, or up to April
23, 1992, and the eventual filing of said petition on April 14, 1992 was well
within the period granted by the Court.

We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we
continue to receive, that in the case of a petition for review on certiorari
from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified in Lacsamana vs. The
Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,^[20] allows the same to be filed “within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time the
corresponding docket fee.” In other words, in the event a motion for
reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen (15) days begins to
run all over again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a motion for
reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date
the party who intends to appeal received the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.^[21]
Furthermore, a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review may
be filed with this Court within said reglementary period, paying at the same
time the corresponding docket fee.

1. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be
correlatively discussed in view of their interrelation.

In its present petition, MMTC insists that the oral testimonies
of its employees who were presented as witnesses in its behalf sufficiently
prove, even without the presentation of documentary evidence, that driver
Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had
undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual
employment, and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure
for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the
field. It underscored the fact that it
had indeed complied with the measure of diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees as enunciated in Campo, et al. vs. Camarote, et
al.^[22]
requiring an employer, in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family, to carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, experience and record service, and not merely be satisfied with
the possession of a professional driver’s license.

It goes on to say that since the testimonies of these witnesses
were allegedly neither discredited nor impeached by the adverse party, they
should be believed and not arbitrarily disregarded or rejected nor disturbed on
appeal. It assiduously argues that
inasmuch as there is no law requiring that facts alleged by petitioner be
established by documentary evidence, the probative force and weight of their testimonies
should not be discredited, with the further note that the lower court having
passed upon the relevancy of the oral testimonies and considered the same as
unrebutted, its consideration should no longer be disturbed on appeal.^[23]

Private respondent, on the other hand, retorts that the factual
findings of respondent court are conclusive upon the High Court which cannot be
burdened with the task of analyzing and weighing the evidence all over again.^[24]

At this juncture, it suffices to note that factual findings of
the trial court may be reversed by the Court of Appeals, which is vested by law
with the power to review both legal and factual issues, if on the evidence of
record, it appears that the trial court may have been mistaken^[25]
particu-larly in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of
the Court of Appeals.^[26]
The general rule laid down in a plethora of cases is that such findings of fact
by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of
the Supreme Court.^[27]
However, it is now well-settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times, that rule is
not inflexible and is subject to well established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition,
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.^[28]

When, as in this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals and
the trial court are contrary to each other, this court may scrutinize the
evidence on record,^[29]
in order to arrive at a correct finding based thereon.^[30]

A perusal of the same shows that since there is no dispute as to
the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the defendant Calebag, the
driver of the passenger jeepney, and co-defendant Leonardo, the bus driver of
petitioner MMTC, both of whom were solidarily held liable with defendant
Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney, we are spared the necessity of determining
the sufficiency of evidence establishing the fact of negligence.^[31] The contrariety is in the findings of the
two lower courts, and which is the subject of this present controversy, with
regard to the liability of MMTC as employer of one the erring drivers.

The trial court, in absolving MMTC from liability ruled that -?

“On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful
in proving its defense that indeed it had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of defendant Leonardo, this
Court finds that based on the evidence presented during the trial, defendant
MMTC was able to prove that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing
and screening applicants for job openings but also strict (and) diligent in
supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper
uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty,
checked employees to determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed
other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation
as well as its company. Having
successfully proven such defense, defendant MMTC, therefore, cannot be held
liable for the accident.

“Having reached this conclusion, the Court now holds that
defendant MMTC be totally absolved from liability and that the complaint
against it be dismissed. x x x.”^[32]

whereas respondent court was of the
opinion that —

“It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not
testify nor present any evidence that defendant-appellee’s driver, defendant
Godofredo Leonardo has complied with or has undergone all clearances and
trainings she referred to. The
clearances, result of seminars and tests which Godofredo Leonardo submitted and
complied with, if any, were not presented in court despite the fact that they
are obviously in the possession and control of defendant-appellee. Instead, it resorted to generalities. This Court has ruled that due diligence in
(the) selection and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere
testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company
requirements before one is admitted as an employee but without proof
thereof. x x x.

“On the part of Christian Bautista, the transport supervisor
of defendant-appellee, he testified that it is his duty to monitor the
operation of buses in the field; to countercheck the dispatchers duty prior to
the operation of the buses in the morning; to see to it that bus crew follows
written guidelines of the company (t.s.n., April 29, 1988, pp. 4-5), but when asked
to present in court the alleged written guidelines of the company he merely
stated that he brought with him a ‘wrong document’ and defendant-appellee’s
counsel asked for reservation to present such written guidelines in the next
hearing but the same was (sic) never presented in court.”^[33]

A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case
reveals that the conclusion of respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly
grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than
that of the court below.

It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his
own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law.^[34]
In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support
his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff
who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to
buttress its claim that it is not liable.^[35]

In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount
of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment.^[36]
It is entirely within each of the parties’ discretion, consonant with the
theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural
strategy followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its or his
disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove
its or his position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the
quantum of evidence required by law. In
making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most
complete evidence be formally entered.^[37]

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which
requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the
witnesses’ testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same
as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.^[38]
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias
in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail
as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.^[39]

Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the
required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in
the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of Central Taxicab
Corp. vs. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co., et al.,^[40]
set amidst an almost identical factual setting, where we held that:

“x x x. This witness spoke of an ‘affidavit of experience’ which a
driver-applicant must accomplish before he is employed by the company, a
written ‘time schedule’ for each bus, and a record of the inspections and
thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn; yet no
attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents, despite
the fact that they were obviously in the possession and control of the
defendant company.

x x x

“Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary
and final tests given him as well as a record of the qualifications and
experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in
court the all important record of Roberto, the driver involved in this case.

“The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any
‘record’ or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial
court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

“We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the
quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the diligence of a good
father of a family as would constitute a valid defense to the legal presumption
of negligence on the part of an employer or master whose employee has by his
negligence, caused damage to another. x
x x (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its proper proportions, we do not
have enough trustworthy evidence left to go by. We are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the believable
evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in the selection
and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not legally sufficient to
overcome the presumption of negligence against the defendant company.”

Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has
been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances
in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on
record as would overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure to
submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence
thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.

2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by
petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a
family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate,
to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the
observance.

Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company’s procedure
for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field,
through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and
Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly
testified for MMTC. It then concluded
with its sweeping pontifications that “thus, there is no doubt that
considering the nature of the business of petitioner, it would not let any
applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection
and training process with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general
and its passengers in particular; x x x thus, there is no doubt that applicant
had fully complied with the said requirements otherwise Garbo should not have
allowed him to undertake the next set of requirements x x x and the training
conducted consisting of seminars and actual driving tests were satisfactory
otherwise he should have not been allowed to drive the subject vehicle.”^[41]

These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature
of petitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any
supporting evidence to boost their verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not but express surprise,
and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo neither testified nor presented
any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the
clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed clearances, results of seminars
and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with were never
presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in
the possession and control of petitioner.^[42]

The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Articles 2176
and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on
quasi-delicts, as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2)
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff.^[43]
It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver
Leonardo under Article 2180, the pertinent parts of which provide that:

“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

x x x

“Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

“The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.”

The basis of the employer’s vicarious liability has been
explained under this ratiocination:

“The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue
of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons
made responsible under the article, derived from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing
damage. Negligence is imputed to them
by law, unlesss they prove the contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility
ceases if it is proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family (diligentissimi patris
familias) to prevent damage. It is
clear, therefore, that it is not representation, nor interest, nor even the
necessity of having somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons
devoid of personality, but it is the non-performance of certain duties of
precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by
civil bond uniting the actor to them, which forms the foundation of such
responsibility.”^[44]

The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is an
employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer
be engaged in business or industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under
Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of
their assigned tasks. But, it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show,
to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as
employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.^[45]
The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers
to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees in order to protect the public.^[46]

With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against
the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and his
co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case is undoubtedly based on a
quasi-delict under Article 2180.^[47]
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer
is negligent,^[48]
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family. For failure to rebut such legal
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the
employer is likewise responsible for damages,^[49]
the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or
on the employer’s own negligence.^[50]

As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez,^[51]
and thereafter, we have consistently held that where the injury is due to the
concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the drivers and
owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable
for damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and
the other on culpa contractual, as the solidarity of the obligation is
justified by the very nature thereof.^[52]

It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers
to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not
to be considered as an empty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to
be the fashion of the times, since the non-observance thereof actually becomes
the basis of their vicarious liability under Article 2180.

On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs. Camarote,
supra, lays down this admonition:

“x x x . In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as having
exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver’s license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service. These steps appellant failed to observe; he has therefore, failed
to exercise all due diligence required of a good father of a family in the
choice or selection of driver.”

Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand,
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection
of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or
its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of
acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.^[53]
To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not
enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies
on hiring and supervision. As the
negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all
employers, that “(t)he mere formulation of various company policies on
safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that
in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.”^[54]
Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of
compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.

These obligations, imposed by the law and public policy in the
interests and for the safety of the commuting public, herein petitioner failed
to perform. Respondent court was
definitely correct in ruling that “x x x due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employee (is) not proved by mere testimonies to the effect
that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements before one is
admitted as an employee but without proof thereof.”^[55]
It is further a distressing commentary on petitioner that it is a
government-owned public utility, maintained by public funds, and organized for
the public welfare.

The Court feels it is necessary to once again stress the
following rationale behind these all-important statutory and jurisprudential
mandates, for it has been observed that despite its pronouncement in Kapalaran
Bus Line vs. Coronado, et al., supra, there has been little
improvement in the transport situation in the country:

“In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from
common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the
standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners
of the cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not the only persons that
the law seeks to benefit. For if common
carriers carefully observe the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in
respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally
entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways. The law seeks to stop and prevent the
slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction
of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size
and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. x x x.”

Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise
of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court’s award, without requiring
the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in
the determination thereof, especially since private respondent did not
specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts, interest
as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not
as a matter of right. We do not
perceive that there have been intentional dilatory maneuvers or any special
circumstances which would justify that additional award and, consequently, we
find no reason to disturb said ruling.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and
Nocon, J., concur.

Padilla, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Rollo, 24-25.

^[2]
Civil Case No. C-8176, entitled “Nenita R. Custodio, assisted by her parents,
Rodolfo A. Custodio and Gloria R. Custodio vs. Agudo R. Calebag,
Victorino Lamayo, Godofredo C. Leonardo, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation,”
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 35, Caloocan City; Original Record,
1-4.

^[3]
Ibid., 17-22.

^[4]
Ibid., 36-41.

^[5]
Ibid., 54.

^[6]
Ibid., 57.

^[7]
TSN, September 2, 1982, 4-16.

^[8]
Ibid., June 10, 1988, 3-12.

^[9]
Ibid., April 29, 1988, 2-8.

^[10]
Civil Case No. 8176, Regional Trial Court, Branch 125, Caloocan City; Judge
Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding.

^[11]
Original Record, 177.

^[12]
Ibid., 178-181.

^[13]
Ibid., 195.

^[14]
CA-G.R. CV No. 24680; per Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, with Justices Jose
A.R. Melo and Emilio C. Cui, concurring; Rollo, 24-30.

^[15]
Rollo, 33-34.

^[16]
Ibid., 2.

^[17]
Ibid., CA-G.R. CV No. 24680, 63-72.

^[18]
Rollo, 2.

^[19]
Ibid., 7.

^[20]
143 SCRA 643 (1986).

^[21]
American General Insurance Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
150 SCRA 133 (1987).

^[22]
100 Phil. 459 (1956).

^[23]
Memorandum for Petitioner, 11-15; Rollo, 16-21.

^[24]
Comment of Private Respondent, 3-4; Rollo, 47-48.

^[25]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 185 SCRA 722
(1990).

^[26]
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., et al., 191 SCRA 218 (1990).

^[27]
Cathay Insurance Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 151 SCRA 710 (1987);
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 160 SCRA 821 (1988); Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 183 SCRA 133 (1990); BA
Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 201 SCRA 157 (1991).

^[28]
Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 236 (1987); Medina vs.
Asistio, Jr., supra; Calalang vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 194 SCRA 514 (1991).

^[29]
Valenzuela, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 191 SCRA 1 (1991).

^[30]
Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 191 SCRA 411 (1990).

^[31]
Cea vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil. 538 (1911); Barcelo, etc. vs. The
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 29 Phil. 351 (1915); De la Riva vs.
Molina, 32 Phil. 277 (1915); Agdoro vs. Philippine Mining Industrial
Co., 45 Phil. 816 (1924).

^[32]
Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 41-42.

^[33]
Annex B, Ibid.; id., 28-29.

^[34]
Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court.

^[35]
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 173
SCRA 619 (1989).

^[36]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 182 SCRA 290 (1990), citing Tai
Tong Chuache & Co. vs. The Insurance Commission, et al., 158 SCRA
366 (1988); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 204 SCRA 160 (1991).

^[37]
U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910).

^[38]
See Pleno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 161 SCRA 160 (1991).

^[39]
See Garcia, et al. vs. Gonzales, et al., 183 SCRA 72 (1990).

^[40]
54 O.G., No. 31, 7415 (1958).

^[41]
Petition, 6-7; Rollo, 14-15.

^[42]
Supra, Fn. 34.

^[43]
Andamo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA 195
(1990).

^[44]
Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. V, 1959 ed., 519

^[45]
Martin vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 205 SCRA 591 (1992).

^[46]
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942).

^[47]
Lanuzo vs. Ping, et al., 100 SCRA 205 (1980).

^[48]
Bahia vs. Litonjua, et al., 30 Phil. 624 (1915); Campo vs.
Camarote, supra; Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., 148 SCRA 353 (1987); McKee, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 211 SCRA 517 (1992).

^[49]
Lanuzo vs. Ping, et al., supra, and cases cited therein.

^[50]
Bahia vs. Litonjua, et al., supra; Yamada vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 33 Phil. 8 (1915); McKee, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., supra.

^[51]
56 Phil. 177 (1931); Cf. Barredo vs. Garcia, supra; Viluan
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 742 (1966); Anuran vs.
Buño, 17 SCRA 224 (1966); Malipol vs. Tan, 55 SCRA 202 (1974); Poblete vs.
Fabron, 93 SCRA 200 (1979); Pleno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra;
Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 (1989).

^[52]
Art. 1207, Civil Code.

^[53]
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
212 SCRA 637 (1992).

^[54]
Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 (1989). See also Franco, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 178 SCRA 331 (1989).

^[55]
Rollo, 28.