PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLANDO A. ALAPIDE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Rolando A. Alapide was charged with murder on
April 12, 1991 in Criminal Case No. 1794 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 42; and, on a plea of not guilty,^[1] was
tried therefor upon an information alleging that he treacherously stabbed to
death Jose Abejo y Subion with a sharp bladed weapon.^[2]

As is to be expected, especially in cases of this nature, the
contending parties invariably submit conflicting versions which are necessarily
addressed to judicial evaluation. After
a careful and thorough review of the records, we agree with the findings and
conclusions in the decision of the trial court.^[3]

We start with the case for the People. It is the presentation of the prosecution that at around 9:30 P.M. on January 28, 1991 in Mayngaway, San Andres,
Catanduanes, there were some people playing mahjong inside the cottage of Ceferino
Mendoza. The players were (1) Napoleon
Arcilla, who occupied a bench attached to the cottage on the western side;
across him on the eastern side was (2) Expedito Arcilla, likewise sitting on a
bench attached to the cottage; on the northern side was (3) Jose Abejo, who was
seated on a chair; and on the southern side was (4) Norma Mendoza, who was
sitting on a stool with her back facing the door of the cottage. Appellant Rolando Alapide, the lone
spectator of the mahjong game
and who had arrived much later, was seated on the left side of Expedito
Arcilla, near the door of the cottage.^[4]

After a while, Oscar Monjardin, a fisherman and a business
partner of Abejo came to the cottage. The former stood at the door and informed Abejo that he brought some
fish for the latter to sell. These two
had a prior arrangement that it will be Abejo who would sell the fish that may
be caught by Monjardin. Abejo asked
Monjardin to wait for a while until Ceferino Mendoza shall have taken over his
place in the mahjong game.

Accordingly, when Mendoza arrived, Abejo stood up to leave but,
to do so, he had to pass behind Expedito Arcilla and in front of
appellant. While Abejo was passing in
front of appellant, the latter suddenly thrust a bolo, locally known as “palas,”
on the chest of Abejo, hitting him near the left nipple, and as appellant tried
to pull out the “palas” from the victim’s chest, his effort
caused him to stumble to the ground. Abejo said in the vernacular, “May tamo aco” (I was
hit) and ran towards the national road leading to his house, but he died on the
way.

Meanwhile, appellant stood up and pointed his “palas”
at Monjardin who parried it with a bamboo split, at the same time asking
appellant, “Ano baga an Dolan?” (What is this about,
Dolan?). Appellant’s reply was: “Putang ina binonotan aco caan caso
bago” (He drew something against me a while ago), adding in the
dialect, “He was hit, Oscar, he will be dead.” Thereafter, appellant
ran towards the gate leading to the house of Constancio Popa, the husband of
his aunt.

The incident was immediately reported to the barangay
captain. Later, police officers came to
the house of Popa, arrested appellant and brought him to their station. Only then did appellant know that Abejo
died. Popa turned over the “palas”
used in the killing to the authorities.^[5]

While admitting the killing of Abejo, appellant nonetheless
invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense.^[6] The
version of appellant is that on January 22, 1991, from around 6:00 to 8:30
P.M., he was in the seashore of Mayngaway, San Andres, Catanduanes, cleaning
fish with the use of a “palas.”
Thereafter, he stored the fish at the back of the house of his uncle,
Constancio Popa. Since it was still
early, he thought of waiting for another boat to dock, so he decided to spend
the time at the cottage of Ceferino Mendoza where a mahjong game was going
on. There, he found the four people
earlier mentioned playing mahjong. He
sat beside Expedito Arcilla near the door of the cottage.

A few minutes after his arrival, Oscar Monjardin came and
signalled something to Abejo. Later,
Mendoza came to replace Abejo in the game, so the latter stood up to leave the
cottage. Appellant shifted himself into
a slanted position to give way to Abejo as the latter had to pass in front of
him. After Abejo had passed by,
appellant resumed his seat.^[7]

Appellant insisted that after Abejo had passed by him and while
he was looking at the table where the players were shuffling the mahjong tiles, he was hit on his
temple. He stood up and saw Abejo who
simultaneously held him by his neck and dragged him outside the cottage towards
the back thereof. Abejo hit him on the
stomach, causing him to stoop down. Using his fist, Abejo then pounded appellant repeatedly on his back just
below the nape. When he was about to
fall, he reached out for his “palas”
at the right back pocket of his short pants and swung the same towards
Abejo. Appellant then fell with his
forehead hitting the ground, causing him to roll over, and when he stood up he
did not see Abejo anymore.

Exasperated that the incident happened inside his cottage, Mendoza
angrily asked: “Why you did that
here?” (sic). Appellant was very
ashamed of what had happened and he slowly went out of the place still holding
the weapon in his hand. He proceeded to
the house of Popa to whom he reported the incident, as well as his speculation
that Abejo might have been hit. Popa
told him to rest and not to leave the house anymore. Before going to bed, appellant gave the weapon to Popa. Around midnight, he was awakened by his aunt
as there were policemen inviting
him to their headquarters for questioning. There he found out that Abejo was already dead.

The only incident which appellant claimed might have caused
Abejo’s anger towards him was that, two days before the fatal incident,
appellant and Abejo played several games of chess with bets. Appellant won and spent all his winnings drinking with their mutual
friends who, while drinking, kept on teasing Abejo about his losses.^[8]

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 31,
1991 finding appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to
compensate the heirs of Abejo in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the burial
expenses for the victim in the amount of P3,000.00.^[9]

Appellant now seeks the reversal of the aforementioned judgment,
faulting the trial court with reversible error (1) for lending credence to the
biased and incredible testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses; and (2) for
finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder despite the presence of
reasonable doubt which served to preserve the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor.^[10]

Of unbroken consistency in this jurisdiction is the rule that
when the accused had admitted that he is the author of the death of the victim
and his defense is anchored on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove
this justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. This circumstance he has to establish by
clear and convincing evidence, the onus
probandi having shifted to him. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing.^[11]

Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact. We have consequently
taken pains to review the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses and to conscientiously evaluate the same with
great care. We find nothing in the
trial court’s exposition which is unsupported by the evidence or which may
raise disturbing thoughts on the culpability of appellant. Its findings of fact merit our full accord
and the acceptance of its conclusions can rest easy on the conscience of the
Court.

Evidently, the core issue in this case is decidedly factual and
essentially involves the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses. That issue of credibility is to be resolved
primarily by the court below because it is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. Accordingly, the unbending jurisprudence is that the trial court’s findings
on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that
it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.^[12]

Also, it is basic and elementary that for a plea of self-defense
to prosper and thus relieve the accused from criminal liability, he is obliged
to establish the presence of the following requisites as statutorily required
and jurisprudentially explained, that is, unlawful aggression, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.^[13]

The initial and crucial point of inquiry in this case is whether
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for absent this
essential element, no claim of self-defense can be successfully
interposed. If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and, the second and third
requisites of self-defense would have no basis.^[14]

On the evidential aspect, as against the positive testimonies of
the witnesses we only have appellant’s uncorroborated and self-exculpatory
contention that “no less than four successive acts of inflicting bodily
harm by the victim on the accused clearly falls within the concept of unlawful
aggression.”^[15]
Ergo, so he contends, he was justified in swinging his “palas” towards the victim resulting in the
fatal wound that caused the death of the latter. Appellant’s postulation and argument are far from being the
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence required by law that would
exclude any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking
it.

It is indeed an affront to credulity, if not an impossibility,
that in or from a small four-walled cottage with persons positioned at all
sides, all of them failed to see the
commotion that allegedly preceded and accompanied a mauling incident that took
place before their very eyes. The
assertions of appellant that he was hit on his temple by something unspecified,
then he was dragged outside the cottage in the presence of its occupants, which
was followed thereafter by his being given a blow on the stomach, and capped by
his being repeatedly pounded on the back, must have taken at least several
minutes and could not but have caught the attention of the people there
present. Yet, from his account, the
whole episode incredibly appears to have passed unnoticed.

Moreover, defense witness Expedito Arcilla himself declared that,
when Abejo was leaving the cottage after Mendoza came to replace him in the
game of mahjong, he stood up to give way. About ten seconds after Abejo passed at his
side and while he was still standing and shuffling the mahjong tiles, he turned his head
backwards because of a commotion and saw Abejo and the appellant grappling with
each other, and then appellant tumbled to the floor while Abejo walked
away. Expedito Arcilla failed to notice
anything that preceded that commotion. Fully corroborating this observation was Napoleon Arcilla, another
player who was then present and likewise a defense witness, who claimed that
all he saw was that appellant fell face down all of a sudden, but he likewise
did not notice anything out of the ordinary prior thereto.^[16]

On the other hand, the prosecution’s theory was clearly
established by the testimony of Oscar Monjardin, the person situated closest to
appellant and Abejo during the moment in question, who positively saw appellant
suddenly thrust the “palas”
into the chest of the victim hitting the latter below the left nipple
while the victim was passing in front of appellant. Nobody contradicted this fact, not even the witnesses presented
by the defense; contrarily, nobody affirmed nor corroborated appellant’s claim
or said anything regarding the supposed mauling incident, not even his
witnesses who were supposed to strengthen his testimony.

As correctly noted by the trial court, “(i)f Jose Abejo was
stabbed by the accused according to the latter’s testimony, not only Oscar
Monjardin but also those then inside the cottage playing mahjong could have seen it because
it happened after the accused was hit on his left temple, held on his neck,
pulled outside the cottage, hit on his stomach and pounded on his back by Jose
Abejo, and these could have aroused their attention”.^[17]

The fact that Monjardin was a business partner of the deceased
does not make him a biased witness nor an incredible one. There is absolutely nothing in our law to disqualify
a person from testifying in a criminal case wherein the said person’s relative
is involved, much less if he is only a business partner as in the case at bar,
if the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the
execution of the criminal act.^[18]
Here, Monjardin was able to narrate the incident in a natural, straightforward
and categorical manner with convincing details consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things. Those
circumstances were obviously not lost on the trial court which accordingly gave
him full credence.

We hold that the killing was attended by treachery and,
consequently, the lower court did not err in handing down a conviction for
murder. We find no reason whatsoever to
even assume, much less believe, that the assault was just a spontaneous
physical translation of a criminal intent conceived on the spur of the moment.

It is significant that appellant admitted that he brought the
“palas” with him to Mendoza’s cottage that particular night
when he could have conveniently and safely put that weapon, together with the
fish he had earlier brought and left, at the back of the house of Popa. This is surprising since that house is much
nearer to the seashore where he claimed he intended to go back to the moment
another boat came to dock. Despite the
fact that the “palas” was sharp and pointed and had no
scabbard, appellant nonetheless stuck it into the back of the pocket of his
pants, at the risk of cutting himself with the exposed blade so dangerously located. Peculiarly, appellant even admitted that it
was never his habit to carry around with him a bladed weapon.^[19]
That he did so in such an unusual manner is highly indicative of a purpose for
which he deliberately armed himself, with the blade of the weapon unsheathed
for instant use.

The prosecution’s evidence proved beyond cavil that appellant
suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim on his left chest at the precise
time that the victim was unsuspectingly passing in front of him. There was no prior act or conduct on the
part of appellant which could have put the victim on notice that something
untoward would befall him. The victim
was unarmed and, without any warning, was deliberately and suddenly set upon by
appellant. The deceased was totally unaware
of the impending attack and was in no position to defend himself against it or
escape therefrom.

It is, therefore,
extremely difficult to assume that appellant did not deliberately and
consciously adopt the method or form of attack, which he was proven to have
launched, in order to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without
risk to himself arising from any defense which the victim might offer. The strategic position he took by seating
himself near the door of the cottage, the careful preparation of carrying the
“palas” with its uncovered blade concealed in the back pocket
of his pants, and the direction and stealthy speed of the thrust with that
blade towards a vital part of the victim’s anatomy — all these were
unequivocal indicia of a deliberate plan consciously adopted, and appellant’s
concomitant intent, to thereby inflict a fatal injury on and with complete
absence of resistance from the victim. Thus, undeniably, all the elements of treachery are present.^[20]

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the
court a quo in its judgment of conviction rendered against
accused-appellant Rolando A. Alapide, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Certificate of Arraignment; Original Record, 54.

^[2]
Information; ibid., 50-51.

^[3]
Original Record, 97-104.

^[4]
Exhibits D and 3; Original Record, 71,
85; TSN, July 16, 1991, 26.

^[5]
TSN, July 16, 1991, 16-21, 24.

^[6]
Appellant’s Brief, 13; Rollo, 57.

^[7]
TSN, September 3, 1991, 4-7.

^[8]
TSN, September 3, 1991, 8-15, 19.

^[9]
Original Record, 104.

^[10]
Appellant’s Brief, 1-2; Rollo, 46-47.

^[11]
People vs. Mindac, et al., G.R. No. 83030, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA
558, and cases cited therein.

^[12]
People vs. Florida, G.R.
No. 90254, September 24, 1992, 214
SCRA 227, and cases cited therein.

^[13]
Paragraph 1, Article 11, Revised Penal Code.

^[14]
People vs. Morato, G.R. Nos. 95335-59, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 361.

^[15]
Appellant’s Brief, 16; Rollo, 60.

^[16]
TSN, September 3, 1991, 25, 28.

^[17]
Decision, October 31, 1991, 8-9;
per Judge Silvestre S. Felix.

^[18]
People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 68319,
March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA
632.

^[19]
TSN, September 3, 1991, 17-18.

^[20]
People vs. Ybeas, G.R. No. 98062, September 11, 1991, 213 SCRA 793;
Paragraph 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code.