DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
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Department of Agriculture versus National Labor Relations Commission
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari brought by the Department of Agriculture against the National Labor Relations Commission and the private respondent security guards. The Department asks the Supreme Court to nullify the Commission's resolution of 27 November 1991, which refused to permanently enjoin the execution of a labor arbiter's money judgment against the Department and instead merely suspended execution for about two months. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's cleanest statement on the non-suability of the State: consent to be sued is not consent to be executed against, and money claims against the government must first pass through the Commission on Audit.
Procedural History
Several security guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages and related money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May 1991, finding the Department jointly and severally liable with the agency for the guards' money claims, aggregating 266,483.91 pesos. Neither the Department nor the agency appealed, so the decision became final and executory. A writ of execution issued on 18 July 1991, and the next day the City Sheriff levied on three motor vehicles of the Department.
The Department then filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with the National Labor Relations Commission, Cagayan de Oro, arguing that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over it and that seizing its property would hamper its governmental functions. The Commission, in its resolution of 27 November 1991, dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of basis, lifted the preliminary injunction, and instead issued a temporary stay of execution for about two months, conditioned on the Department sourcing funds and posting a surety or supersedeas bond. The Department came to the Supreme Court on certiorari, charging grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
The Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract on 1 April 1989 for security services, and a second contract dated 1 May 1990 applied the same terms with an increased monthly rate for the guards. Guards were deployed in the various premises of the Department.
On 13 September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of thirteenth month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, overtime pay, and damages. The Labor Arbiter held the Department jointly and severally liable with the agency, and the decision became final when no appeal was taken.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, and on 19 July 1991 the City Sheriff levied on the Department's motor vehicles — a Toyota Hi-Ace, a Toyota Mini Cruiser, and a Toyota Crown — placed under the custody of the Department's property custodian pending public auction or settlement. The Commission declined to stop the execution outright, prompting this petition.
Issues
- Whether or not the Department of Agriculture may invoke the non-suability of the State to resist the money judgment and the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.
- Whether or not the Department's entry into a security services contract amounted to an implied waiver of its immunity from suit.
- Whether or not the money claims of the security guards fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, to the exclusion of the labor arbiter.
- Whether or not execution may issue against the property and funds of the Department once its consent to be sued has been established.
Applicable Provisions
The Constitution, Article Sixteen, Section Three, provides:
The State may not be sued without its consent.
This is the constitutional anchor of the doctrine the Court applies throughout.
Act Number 3083, the general law waiving state immunity, provides that the Philippine government:
consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
This is the statutory consent relied upon by the private respondents, and the Court uses it to locate the State's liability.
Commonwealth Act Number 327, as amended by Presidential Decree Number 1445, governs the prosecution of money claims against the government, and the Court quotes its effect through its earlier ruling in Carabao, Incorporated versus Agricultural Productivity Commission:
Claimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the Philippines, and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
This provision is decisive: it channels money claims to the Commission on Audit and bars execution against government funds.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the Department may invoke non-suability. The doctrine reflects the sovereign character of the State and insulates it from the jurisdiction of courts, based on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The Court acknowledged the doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty, but defended it: the loss of governmental efficiency would far outweigh the inconvenience to private parties.
On the second issue, the Court held that the Department did not impliedly waive immunity. While implied consent is conceded when the State enters into a contract, not all contracts operate as a waiver; a distinction must be drawn between contracts in the exercise of sovereign functions and those in a proprietary capacity. The Department never pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its governmental entity, nor that it could have performed any proprietary act. The Court quoted its ruling in United States of America versus Ruiz:
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
On the third issue, the Court held that the claims, though money claims arising from contract, must first be brought to the Commission on Audit under Commonwealth Act Number 327. The Labor Code, in relation to Act Number 3083, provides the legal basis for State liability, but the prosecution, enforcement, and satisfaction of that liability must follow the procedure in Commonwealth Act Number 327.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that consent to be sued is not consent to unrestrained execution. Quoting Republic versus Villasor:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation, and public services cannot be paralyzed by diverting funds from their legitimate objects.
Doctrine
A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the State may not be sued without its consent, which may be express, through a general or special law, or implied, as when the State commences litigation or enters into a contract. Second, implied consent from a contract arises only when the State descends to the level of a private party through a proprietary or business contract; contracts in the exercise of sovereign functions do not waive immunity. Third, even with consent, money claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit under Commonwealth Act Number 327, as amended. Fourth, consent to be sued does not carry consent to execution; no writ of execution or garnishment may seize government funds or property, and the Court's power ends when judgment is rendered.
Disposition
The petition was granted; the Commission's resolution of 27 November 1991 was reversed and set aside, the writ of execution against the Department's property was nullified, and the public respondents were permanently enjoined from issuing or implementing any writ of execution pursuant to the Labor Arbiter's decision against the Department.
Remember This
Memorize the line: consent to be sued is not consent to be executed against. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between sovereign and proprietary contracts, and the rule that money claims against the government must pass through the Commission on Audit before any judgment may be satisfied.