CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RESPONDENTS.

This is a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing Resolution No. 92-201 of the respondent Civil Service Commission,
which upheld the petitioner’s separation from the Philippine National
Bank. (PNB) as a result of the abolition
of the Fund Transfer Department pursuant to a reorganization under Executive
Order No. 80, dated 3 December
1986.

Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the
Philippine National Bank on 20 September 1972 as special assistant with the
rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB
President. After several promotions,
she was appointed in 1983 Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department.

Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed
several applications for leave of absence (due to medical reasons) which were
duly approved. While she was on leave,
Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized the restructure/reorganization
and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the
reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was abolished and its
functions trans­ferred to the International Department.

Consequently, petitioner was
notified of her separation from the
service in a letter dated 30 January 1987, thus:

“Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986 Revised
Charter of the Bank, please be informed that Management has approved your separation from the service effective February 16, 1986. You shall be entitled to the regular
benefits allowed under existing law. (underscoring supplied)

“Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the Bank’s
1986 Revised Charter, any officer or employee who feels
aggrieved by any matter treated above may submit his case to the Civil Service
Commission.”^[1]

This letter was received by petitioner’s secretary at the PNB
head office on 16 February 1987.

Petitioner’s first recorded appeal to the Civil Service
Commission questioning her separation is a letter dated 4 August 1989. Then CSC Chairman Samilo Barlongay upheld the validity of her separation from
the service in a letter/opinion dated 30 August 1989 (this was allegedly
received by petitioner only on 26 February 1990) stating thus:

“x x x                            x
x x

It may be mentioned in this connection, that inasmuch as you did
not avail of the ERIP/Supple­mentary Retirement Plans adopted by the PNB in
1986, you have therefore lost your right thereto. Moreover, since you lack the required number of years of service
to entitle you to retirement benefits under existing laws, you may be entitled
to the return of your GSIS personal contributions. Considering further that you have exhausted all your accumulated
leave credits as you went on leave of absence for the period from April 1, 1986
to February 20, 1987, there is no legal or valid basis to entitle you to
payment of terminal leave.

Finally, pursuant to Section 16, Article XVIII of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, you may be entitled to payment
of separation pay subject to auditing rules and regulations.”^[2]

In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service
Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning Chairman Barlongay’s ruling,
petitioner claimed:

1. The opinion/ruling was
not fully supported by the evidence on record;

2.  Errors of law prejudicial
to the interest of the movant have been committed. She argued:

“x x x that her separation from the service was illegal and
was done in bad faith considering that her termination on February 16, 1986
was made effective prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December
3, 1986, which law authorized the reorganization of the PNB, and even
before February 25, 1986, when President Corazon C. Aquino came into
power. She further claims that although
the notice of termination was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon
her on February 16, 1987 when the new Constitution which guarantees security of
tenure to public employees was already in effect.” ^[3]

x x x

“… the bad faith in her separation from the service in 1987 was
evident from the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department as a
separate and distinct unit from the International Department…”^[4]

Denying the motion for reconsideration, the Civil Service
Commission in its aforecited Resolution No. 92-201, dated 30 January 1992,
ruled:

“Section 33 of EO 80 (1986 Revised Charter of the PNB)
provides:

‘Section 33. Authority to
Reorganize. – In view of reduced
operations contemplated under this charter in pursuance of the national policy
expressed in the ‘Whereas’ clause hereof, a reorganization of the Bank and a reduction in force are hereby
authorized to achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations, including
the adoption of a new staffing
pattern to suit the reduced operations envisioned. The program of reorganization shall begin immediately after the
approval of this Order, and shall be completed within six (6) months and shall
be fully implemented within eighteen (18) months thereafter.’

Clearly, as aforequoted, PNB was authorized
to undergo reorganization and to effect a reduction in force to “achieve
greater efficiency and economy in operations”. It cannot be disputed that reduction in force necessitates, among
others, the abolition of positions/offices. The records show that prior to its reorganization, PNB originally had 7,537
positions which were reduced to 5,405 after the reorganization. Indeed, 2,132 positions were abolished, that
is, the original positions in PNB were reduced by 28%. This reduction in force likewise included
the senior officer positions, in PNB, which were reduced, thus:

The position of movant Yap (SVP) was one among the original twelve
(12) SVP positions. It was one among
the five (5) SVP positions which were abolished. In fact, the FTD of which she was then the incumbent SVP, was
merged with the International Department to which its functions were closedly
related.

It should be noted that as ruled by the Supreme Court in Dario vs. Mison (G.R. NO. 81954):

‘Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would
not be a Chinese Wall. x x x.

x x x Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.’

In the instant case, therefore, this Commis­sion is inclined to
believe that the reorganization of PNB was done in good faith. For indeed, the reorganization was pursued
to achieve economy. It undertook
reduction in force as a means to streamline the number of the workforce. It was incidental that movant Yap’s position
was one among those abolished. Movant
Yap failed to substantiate her claim by clear and convincing evidence that the
abolition of her position was a result
of her close identification with the previous regime, being a sister of former
First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos. This being so, and
pursuant to the presump­tion of regularity in the performance of official
functions, the abolition of movant Yap’s position should be upheld. PNB, in the instant case, has clearly proved
by substantial evidence that its act in terminating the services of some of its
employees was done in good faith.'”^[5]

Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her separation was illegal because it took effect on 16
February 1986 or even before the promulgation of EO No. 80 on 3 December 1986,
the CSC noted that the year “1986” stated in the notice of her
separation from the service was a typographical error. PNB
submitted documents (p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting its stand that
the separation actually took effect on 16 February 1987.

On the issue of bad faith as related to the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, the subject CSC resolution adds:

“x x x                x x x                 x x x

It may be mentioned that the recent restoration of the Fund
Transfer Department, actually was a merger of the Fund Transfer Group,
the Foreign Remittance Development and Coordinating
Unit based on Board Resolution No. 60 of March 12, 1991, or after the
lapse of over four (4) years from
the date it was abolished in 1987. Moreover, the restoration of the Fund Transfer Department and other
offices in the PNB was primarily caused by the improved financial capability
and present needs of the Bank. This
improved financial condition of the
PNB is evident from the 1990 Annual Report it submitted. It may be further stated that the
re-established FTD is headed by a Vice President, a position much lower in rank
than the former department headed by a Senior Vice President.

Furthermore, it should be noted that granting arguendo that
movant Yap’s termination from the service was tainted with bad faith, she
however, is now barred from assailing the same as she did not seasonably assert
her right thereto. Records show that
she was separated from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 or
about 2 years thereafter when she brought this matter to this Commission. By her inaction in questioning her
termination within a period of one year, she is considered to have acquiesced
to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to the
position.”^[6]

In the present petition before the Court, the following issues
are raised:

1.  Existence of bad faith in
the reorganization of the Philippine National Bank resulting in the separation
from the service of petitioner.

2.  Erroneous application of
the Dario v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB’s reorganization.

3.  Erroneous application of
the one (1) year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings
in petitioner’s case.

Dario v. Mison^[7]
laid down the requirement of good faith in the reorganization of a government
bureau wherein offices are abolished. It says:

“x x x Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the
‘abolition,’ which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or other­wise not
in good faith, no valid ‘abolition’ takes place and whatever ‘abolition’ is
done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid ‘abolition’ as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of posi­tions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as
a consequence, imposing a ’cause’ for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is
still removal ‘not for cause,’ if by ’cause’ we refer to ‘grounds’ or
conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime,
is judged from the facts of each case.”

In Petitioner’s case, the following instances are cited by her as
indicia of bad faith:

“1. The abolished department was later restored
and the number of senior vice presidents was increased.

2. PNB did not follow the prescribed sequence of separation of employees
from the service contained in Rep. Act No. 6656 which is:

SEC. 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to
reorganization, the following order of removal shall be followed:

‘(a)   Casual employees with less than five (5)
years of government service;

(b)   Casual
employees with five (5) years or more of government service’

(c)   Employees
holding temporary appointments; and

(d)   Employees
holding permanent appointments: Provided,
That those in the same category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in
terms of perfor­mance and merit shall be laid off first, length of service
notwithstanding.”

3.  Petitioner
was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new staffing
pattern as mandated by Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 6656, her qualification and fitness
for new positions were never evaluated or considered in violation of Sec. 27 of
P.D. 807 which was incorporated as Sec. 29 Ch. 5 Sub­title A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

4.  Lack
of notice and hearing before separation from the service.

5.  Petitioner
was forced to take a leave of absence and prevented from reporting for work.

6.  There
is a discrepancy in the date of her separation from the service and the
effectivity thereof.

7.  PNB
employees in the Fund Transfer Department identified with her were reassigned
or frozen.

8.  She
is listed as having resigned instead of being separated or dismissed which was
what actually happened.

9.  The
dismissal was politically motivated, she being a sister of Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, wife of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to
reorganize. The order was issued by
then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the
powers vested in the President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to be
done was the implementation of the reorganization. There is no doubt as to the legal basis for PNB’s reorganization. The real question is: was it
done in good faith, tested by the Dario v. Mison doctrine?

To start with it is almost absurd for petitioner to insist that her
termination from the service was antedated to 16 February 1986. At that time, the reorganization of PNB had not even been
conceived. In most of PNB’s pleadings,
it has documented and supported its stand that the year of petitioner’s
separation is 1987 not 1986. The
antedating of the termination date, aside from being clearly a typographical
error, is a peripheral issue. The real
issue is existence of bad faith consisting of tangible bureaucratic/management
pressures exerted to ease her out of office. Bad faith has been defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self interest or ill will or for an
ulterior purpose.^[8] It is the performance of an act
with the knowledge that the actor is violating the fundamental law or right,
even without willful intent to injure or purposive malice to perpetrate a
damnifying harm.^[9]

PNB’s reorganization, to repeat, was by virtue of a valid
law. At the time of reorganization, due
to the critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and
functions were abolished or merged. The
abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This, to the Court’s mind, was a management
prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this point, a distinction can be made in
ruling on the validity of a reorganization
between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions (like
the Customs) and a government-owned
or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (like the PNB).

Constituent function are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; ministrant functions are those undertaken
by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally,
not a govern­mental but a private sector endeavor. It is an optional function
of government.

“x x x The principles determining whether or not a government
shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake
and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very nature it is
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands,
pp. 19-20)

“From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there
are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an
attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those
corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects
of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corpora­tion. These are what we call government-owned or
controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal
characteristics of a private corporation under the Corporation Law.”
(Bacani vs. Nacoco, No. L-9657, November 29, 1956, 100 Phil. 468)

But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing
constituent functions or in a government-owned or controlled corporation
performing ministrant functions must meet
a common test, the test of good faith. In this connection, the philosophy behind PNB’s reorganization is
spelled out in the whereas clauses of Executive Order No. 80:

“WHEREAS, within the context of the general policy there
nevertheless exists a clear role for direct government participation in the
banking system, particularly in servicing the requirements of agriculture,
small and medium scale industry, export development, and the government sector.

“WHEREAS, in pursuit of this national policy there is need to
restructure the government financial institutions, particularly the Philippine
National Bank, to achieve a more efficient and effective use of available
scarce resources, to improve its viability, and to avoid unfair competition
with the private sector, and

“WHEREAS, the reorganization and rehabili­tation of the
Philippine National Bank into a similar but stronger and more operationally
viable bank is an important component of the nationali­zation programs for both
the financial system and the government corporation sector; x x x.”

Whether there was a hidden
political agenda to persecute petitioner due to her consanguinial relation to
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the widow of former President Marcos, is not
clearly shown. On the other hand, it is
entirely possible that precisely because of such consanguinal rela­tion,
petitioner may have been the object of deferential, if not special treatment
under the Marcos regime. It is part of
the Filipino culture to extend such deferential, if not special treatment to close relatives of persons in power. Many times this is carried to unwholesome
extremes. But a discontinuance of such
deferential or special treatment in the wake of a change in government or
administration is not bad faith per se. It may be merely putting things in their proper places.

Due to the restructuring – and this is empirically verifiable –
PNB became once more a viable banking institu­tion. The restoration of the FTD four years after it was abolished and
its functions transferred to the International Department, can be attributed to
the bank’s growth after reorganizations, thereby negating malice or bad faith
in that reorganization. The essence of
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right.^[10]
It consists of an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another, its absence should be established by
convincing evidence.^[11]

The records also clearly indicate that starting April 1986 to
February 1987, petitioner went on leave of absence for medical reasons. While she was not reporting to the office,
the bank’s reorganization got underway. She continued, however, receiving her salaries, allowances, emoluments,
honoraria and fees up to March 1987. Employees who were affected by the reorganization had the option to
avail of the bank’s Separation Benefits Plan/Early Retirement Plan (SBP/ERIP). Petitioner opted not to avail of such plan
and instead submitted to the result of the bank’s ongoing reorganization and
management’s discretion. If petitioner
had the desire for continued employment with the bank, she could have asserted
it for management’s consideration. There is no proof on record that she affirmatively expressed willingness
to be employed. Since she cannot rebut
the CSC finding that her earliest appeal was made on 4 August 1989, there is no reason for this Court to hold that
she did not sleep on her rights. On the
contrary, her present argument that bad faith existed at the time of the abolition of the FTD because it was
restored four years later is a little too late. Who could have predicted in 1986 or 1987 that PNB would be able
to rise from its finan­cial crisis and become a viable commercial bank
again? The decision to abolish the FTD
at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was a business judgment made in good
faith.

PNB for its part submits that its reorganization was effected in
good faith because –

(a)  There was not only a perceptible but
substantial restructuring of the PNB hierarchy showing reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices and abolition of positions.

(b)  Two thousand one hundred thirty two (2,132)
positions were abolished during the period from February 16, 1986 to January
14, 1987 leaving a lean workforce of five thousand four hundred five (5,405) as
of latter date per B.R. No. 34 hereto attached as Annex “R”.

(c)  The number of senior officers, including
Senior Vice Presidents, was accordingly reduced.

Another issue raised by petitioner is PNB’s alleged non­-compliance
with the mandate of Sections 2 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656. These Sections provide:

“SEC. 2. No officer or
employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a
position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the
service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circum­stances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party.

(a)  Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;

(b)  Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created;

(c)  Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;

(d)  Where there is a reclassification of offices
in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;

(e)  Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof.”

x x x

“SEC. 4. Officers and
employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new position in the approved staffing pattern comparable to
their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to
positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and
employees have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who
possess the necessary qualification require­ments, among which is the
appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions
in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be
filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature.”

In the first place, Rep. Act No. 6656 cannot be invoked by
petitioner because it took effect on 15 June 1987, or after PNB’s
reorganization had already been implemented. But assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it is
applicable here and petitioner must be accorded preferential right to
appointment in the bank, PNB in its rejoinder impressively asserts:

“Needless to say, there were various committees that were
created in the implementation of the organizational restructuring of the Bank
based on the foregoing policy guidelines. Each personnel to be retained was evaluated in terms of relative fitness
and merit along with the other personnel of the Bank. Thus, when then SVP Federico Pascual was chosen to head the
International Department from among other officers of the Bank, including Ms.
Yap, his qualifications far exceeded those of the other candidates for the
position.

We attach hereto as Annexes ‘G-1’ and ‘G-2’ the service records of
Mr. Federico Pascual and Petitioner Ms. Yap, respectively, which clearly show
that the qualifications of Mr. Pascual far exceed those of Petitioner Yap. Aside from being a lawyer having been a law
graduate from the Univer­sity of the Philippines, he is also a Bachelor of Arts
degree holder from Ateneo de Manila and a Master of Laws graduate of Columbia
Law School. He had studied Masteral
Arts in Public Administration at the London School of Economics and had
undergone extensive seminars since 1974 at the International Department and had
been assigned in several foreign branches of the Bank. Before he resigned from the Bank, he held
the second highest position of Execu­tive Vice President and served as Acting
President of the Bank before the incumbent president, President Gabriel Singson
assumed his position.

On the other hand, the service record of Petitioner Yap will show
that she only holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption
Convent and has undergone only one seminar on Management and Leadership
Training Program. She entered the Bank
service in 1972. (Rollo at pp. 312 to
313)

x x
x.”

The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner’s immediate
reinstatement to her former position as senior vice president and head of the
Fund Transfer Department, or reappointment to a position of comparable or
equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights and pay, etc… under the bank’s
new staffing pattern.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action for quo
warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another.^[12]

An action for quo warranto should be brought within
one (1) year after ouster from office;^[13]
the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes
more than a sufficient basis for
its dismissal^[14]
since it is not proper that the title to a
public office be subjected to continued uncertainty…^[15]
An exception to this prescriptive
period lies only if the failure to file the action can be attributed to the
acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed employee.^[16]

Measured by the above jurisprudence, petitioner’s action may be
said to be one for quo warranto, seeking reinstatement to her
former position which at present is occupied by another. She cannot
invoke De Tavera v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., et. al.^[17] and contend that there is no claim
of usurpation of office, and that quo warranto may be availed of
to assert one’s right to an office in the situa­tion obtaining in the case at
bar.

Santos v. CA, et. al.^[18] and Magno
v. PNNC Corp.^[19] are
invoked by petitioner to illustrate that this action is one for separation
without just cause, hence, the prescrip­tive period is allegedly four (4) years
in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code.^[20]
We do not agree. Petitioner’s
separation from the service was due to the abolition of her office in
implementation of a valid reorganization. This is not the unjustifiable cause which
results in injury to the rights of a person contemplated by Article 1146. The abolition of the office was not a whimsical, thoughtless move. It was a thoroughly evaluated action for
streamlining functions based on a rehabilitation plan.^[21] At the time of the abolition of the
Fund Transfer Department in 1986, foreign exchange losses of the bank amounted
to P81.1 Million.^[22] The head of office was a Senior
Vice President. At the time of
restoration of the department in 1991, it was headed by a vice president
(lower in rank) and showed
earnings of P2,620.0 Million.^[23] Other departments abolished in 1986
were also subsequently restored.

Restoring petitioner to her previous position with backwages
would be unjust enrichment to her, considering that she had abandoned or showed
lack of interest in reclaiming the same position when the bank was not yet
fully rehabilitated and she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or
two (2) years after her alleged unjustified separation.

To those who feel that their unjustified separation from the
service is for a cause beyond their control, the aforecited Magno case
teaches:

“ x x x while We fully recognize the special protection which the
Constitution, labor laws, and social legislation accord the workingman, We
cannot, however, alter or amend the law on prescrip­tion to relieve him of the
consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping). His explanation that he could not have filed the complaint earlier
because ‘he was prevented to do so beyond his control for the simple reason
that private respondent have (sic) tried to circumvent the law by merely
floating’ him is very flimsy and does not even evoke sympathetic consideration,
if at all it is proper and
necessary. We note that petitioner
herein is not an unlettered man; he seems to be educated and assertive of his
rights and appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed a motion for extension of time to
file the petition and the petition itself without the assistance of
counsel. We cannot believe that if
indeed he had a valid grievance against PNCC he would not have taken immediate
positive steps for its redress.”

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the questioned resolution. No pro­nouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Rollo, p. 12

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 43-44

^[3]
Resolution No. 92-201, CSC, Rollo,
p. 31

^[4]
Ibid., p. 32

^[5]
Ibid., pp. 33-34

^[6]
Rollo at p. 36

^[7]
G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 92-93

^[8]
Air France v. Carrascoso L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 166

^[9]
De Castro v. Carranza, 50460-R, July 3, 1974, see Moreno, F.B.,
Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition

^[10]
Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 205

^[11]
Hilario vs. Galvez, 45494-R, August 19, 1971

^[12]
Carillo vs. CA, G.R. No. L-24554, May
31, 1967, 77 SCRA 170

^[13]
Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 663

^[14]
Alejo vs. Marquez, G.R. No. L-29053, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 762

^[15]
Villegas vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-23752, December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA
720

^[16]
Cristobal vs. Melchor, G.R. No. L-43203, July 29, 1977, 75 SCRA 175

^[17]
G.R. No. L-48928, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 243

^[18]
G.R. No. L-47750, February 29,
1980, 96 SCRA 448

^[19]
G.R. No. 87320, June 6, 1991, 198 SCRA
230

^[20]
Article 1146, Civil Code, provides:

“Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted
within four years:

1.  Upon
an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

2.  Upon a quasi-delict.”

^[21]
Annex F-2, Rollo at 336

^[22]
PNB’s Rejoinder, p. 29, Rollo at 293

^[23]
Ibid, p. 294