G.R. No. 104209. November 16, 1993
PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEMA), DBP EMPLOYEES UNION (DBPEU), LBP EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (LBPEA), ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), AND KAPATIRAN NG …
VITUG J.:
Assailed in this petition
for certiorari is a provision of the Supplemental Rules Implementing
Republic Act No. 6971 (Productivity Incentives Act of 1990), jointly
promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Finance and the Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment, excluding from the coverage of said Act
the employees of the Philippine National Bank (“PNB”),
Development Bank of the Philippines
(“DBP”), Land Bank of
the Philippines (“LBP”), Social Security System (“SSS”) and
Government Service and Insurance System (“GSIS”).
Parenthetically, certain
rank and file employees of the Public Estates Authority filed a motion for
intervention to join the petitioners[1] which they later withdrew, nonetheless,
asserting that “any resolution in the instant petition would likewise
apply” to them.[2]
Republic Act No. 6971 was
signed into law on 22 November 1990 by then President Corazon C. Aquino. It took effect on 9 December 1990 (fifteen
days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation).
Section 3 of the law
states:
“SEC. 3. Coverage. – This Act shall apply to all
business enterprises with or without existing and duly recognized or certified
labor organizations, including government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions. It
shall cover all employees and workers including casual, regular, supervisory
and managerial employees.
The
same Act empowers the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of
Finance, “after due notice
and hearing,” to “jointly promulgate and issue within six (6) months
from the effectivity of (the) Act such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out (its) provisions” (Sec. 6, R.A. 6971).
On 03 June 1991, the then
Labor Secretary Ruben D. Torres and Finance Secretary Jesus P. Estanislao
promulgated the Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971. The Rules took effect on 18 June 1991
following the required publication thereof in a national newspaper of
general circulation.
Section 1, Rule II, of
the aforesaid Rules provides:
“Section 1. Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business
enterprises with or without existing duly recognized or certified labor
organizations, including government-owned
and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions.
(b) All employees and workers including casual,
regular, rank-and-file, supervisory and managerial employees.”
Forthwith, petitioner
organizations requested their respective employers to constitute and convene a
Labor-Management Committee (LMC) to discuss and adopt a Productivity Incentives Program (PIP). In the meantime, productivity bonuses were
distributed by the PNB, DBP,
LBP, SSS and GSIS.[3]
On 24 December 1991,
Secretary Estanislao sent the following memorandum to all heads of government
financial institutions (GFIs):
To : GFI Heads
From : Jesus P. Estanislao
On : Productivity Incentive Award
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
1. The
President has asked me to remind all the GFI heads about our agreement to
desist from making any further payments/moves regarding productivity incentives
until such time as DOLE/DOF can issue clarificatory guidelines.
2. In
view of the move of SSS, the President has authorized me to indicate that GFIs
may have a choice on granting productivity incentives under the new law or the
traditional PIA (productivity incentive award), provided the terms and
conditions of either choice are exactly the same.
3. She
has also instructed me to coordinate with DOLE and the immediate issuance of a
possible clarificatory guideline.
(Sgd.) JESUS P. ESTANISLAO”[4]
In
accordance with this memorandum, PNB Executive Vice-President Domingo A.
Santiago, Jr., sent a letter to petitioner
Philnabank Employees Association, through its president Jerry P. Tan, advising the
latter that in view of the Estanislao memorandum, PNB was “constrained to
wait for the issuance of the said clarificatory guidelines.”[5]
Allegedly without due
notice and hearing, Secretary Estanislao and Secretary Torres subsequently
issued the Supplemental Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971, clarifying or
amending the previously promulgated rules because “the coverage of GOCCs
(government owned and controlled
corporations) performing proprietary functions would require harmonization with
present definitions, concepts, strategies, policies and thrusts involving the
rationalization of the government corporate sector.” Paragraph (a), Section 1, Rule II, of the Rules was thereby
modified to read, as follows:
Coverage. These
Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business
enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations,
including government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions which are established solely for business or profit or gain and
accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the
Constitution or by law, and those whose officers
and employees are covered by the Civil Service.
Government-owned and controlled corporations meeting the criteria
provided in the immediately preceding paragraph shall be certified to by the
Government Corporate Monitoring and
Coordinating Committee established by E.O. No. 236 of July 22, 1987.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
On 7 January 1992, under the letterhead, “Kapatiran
Ng Manggagawa Sa GFI” (KAMAGFI), PEMA President Jerry P. Tan sent
Secretary Torres and Secretary Estanislao a letter contesting the amendatory
rule and giving them forty-eight (48) hours within which “to recall and
revoke” the same. He also informed
the heads of the two departments that the supplemental rules were creating
“serious demoralization(s)” among the officers and employees of the
GFIs and that failure to revoke and recall the Supplemental Rules “would
mean drastic legal actions and
massive concerted activities” on the part of GFI employees.[6] KAMAGFI also addressed an open letter, dated
09 January 1992, of similar tenor, to the President of the Philippines,
Secretary Estanislao, Secretary Torres, Senate President Neptali Gonzales,
Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr., Senator Teofisto Guingona, and Congressmen Felicito
Payumo and Alberto Veloso.[7] On January 10, 1992, the matter was referred
by the Office of the President to Secretary Torres.[8]
On 09 March 1992, the
instant petition for certiorari was filed.
The petitioners contend
that by promulgating the Supplemental Rules, the respondents have
“overstepped the bounds of their rule-making authority by amending
the coverage of the Act as provided in Section 3 thereof.” Arguing that
Republic Act No. 6971 has been intended by the lawmakers to cover all
government-owned and controlled corporations which are performing proprietary
functions, without qualifications, the petitioners assert that the respondents
have “arrogated upon themselves the power not only to make law, but also
to unmake it by adopting rules inconsistent with and contrary to the clear
intention and the end sought to be attained by the Act.”[9] The petitioners conclude that the
respondents have thus gravely abused their discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The respondents, through
the Solicitor General, contest the herein petition as being both an improper
remedy, considering that the respondents “did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the
GFI employees,” and precipitate, since the petitioners’ recourse should have first been administratively
pursued with the Civil Service Commission.”[10]
The instant petition for certiorari cannot be granted.
Firstly, the respondent department secretaries, in promulgating
the questioned rule did so in accordance with the mandate of Republic Act No.
6971. Concededly, in the process,
neither did said respondents act in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity nor did they arrogate unto themselves any, such performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that may be
invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of court is explicit on this matter; viz:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.
– When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.
Secondly, although not inflexible, we have repeatedly declined on
grounds of prematurity, as well as in the interest of good order, a hasty
recourse to the courts when administrative avenues are still open.[11]
Thirdly, while this case is
styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no denying the fact that, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by the court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule,
thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which
this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.
Fourthly, even in cases,
where this Court is conferred with primary jurisdiction, starting with the case
of Santiago vs. Vasquez et al.,[12] we
have stressed, thus –
“x x x We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity
on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a
number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of
this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of
facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.”
Finally, the principal issue raised by the petitioners, i.e.,
whether or not the government financial institutions herein involved (but which
have not even been impleaded) are embraced by the phrase “government-owned
and controlled corporation performing proprietary functions” in the
context of Republic Act 6971, is itself not necessarily a mere question of law
that, for certain, can totally discard a factual assessment of the respective
operations of said institutions and the degree that such operations
interrelate, as the case may be, to their governmental or proprietary
functions. This Court has said, more
than once, that it is not an initial evaluator of facts.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 123.
[2]
Ibid., p. 159.
[3]
Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 6.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 37 & 65.
[5]
Ibid., p. 38.
[6]
Ibid., p. 41.
[7]
Ibid., p. 42.
[8]
Ibid., p. 43.
[9]
Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
[10]
Comment, p. 13; Rollo, p. 103.
[11]
Cruz vs. del Rosario, 9 SCRA
755; Llarena vs. Hon. Lacson, 108 Phil, 510; Chua Huat, et al. vs. Hon. Bagatsing, et al., 199 SCRA 1.
[12]
217 SCRA 633.