PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE ESTHER NOBLES BANS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 72, OLONGAPO CITY, VICENTE MAGSAYSAY AND GIL MAGSAYSAY, RESPONDENTS.

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul
the order of respondent Judge Esther Bans of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 72, dated September 18, 1991, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence filed by private respondents and acquitting them of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and the order of the same court dated November
29, 1991, denying reconsideration thereof.

Acting upon an information that private respondent Vicente
Magsaysay was keeping assorted unlicensed firearms and ammunitions including
radio equipment in his residence at Barangay Magsaysay, Castillejos, Zambales,
as well as the reported presence in the same residence of some rebel officers
namely Lt. Cols. Rodolfo Tor and Neon Ebuen, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), through Capt. Jose Feliciano Loy of the Judge Advocate General’s Staff
(JAGS), applied for a search warrant with Hon. Judge Nicias Mendoza of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74.

Finding the existence of probable cause, Judge Mendoza issued a
search warrant and on the same day, combined elements of the AFP and the
Metropolitan District Command (Metrodiscom) conducted a search of the Magsaysay
residence in the presence of private respondent Gil Magsaysay, Barangay Captain
Godofredo Villanueva and other barangay officials. The search yielded the following unlicensed firearms: Pistol Ithaca Cal. 45 SN 922837; Pistol
Czechoslovakia Cal. 9 mm. SN 16539; Rifle Cal. 22 SN SM­-16550; Rifle SN Cal.
22 SN 817146 and Rifle Model 88 SN 8331.

On September 28, 1990, an information against herein private
respondents, brothers Vicente and Gil Magsaysay, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) was filed.

Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, private respondents filed
a Demurrer to Evidence alleging failure on the part of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground that since the search warrant
and the order to break open six vaults were illegally issued, the firearm and
ammunitions seized in compliance therewith are inadmissible in evidence. Despite opposition on the part of the
prosecution, respondent judge granted the Demurrer to Evidence in an order
dated September 18, 1991, the dispositive portion of which states:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Demurrer to Evidence is
granted and both accused are ACQUITTED of the offense charged in the
information, with costs de oficio.

“Maj. Victorio Tabanquil and Capt. Jose Feliciano Loy are
ordered to deliver to the court all the articles seized by them at the
Magsaysay compound covered by receipts (Exhibits ‘C’ to ‘C-9’ and ‘E’ to
`E-9′), which are not yet in the custody of the court, for its disposition in
accordance with law. The licensed
firearm, to be immediately returned to the licensee/es; those covered by the
amnesty to be validated or licensed/applied for permits to carry; and the rest,
particularly the ammunitions, to be confiscated in favor of the government.

“SO ORDERED” (Rollo, pp. 23-24).

The prosecution filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by respondent judge on the
ground that any reconsideration of the aforesaid order will place private
respondents in double jeopardy; the order granting the demurrer having resulted
in the acquittal of private respondents.

It appears, however, that before private respondents demurred to
the evidence, they moved to quash the search warrant before the issuing court,
RTC Branch 74. In an order dated
October 22, 1990, said court upheld the validity of the search warrant, the
last paragraph of which is quoted hereunder:

“It appearing therefore to the Court, that it was never misled
by the deponent-witness, and that the issuance of the questioned search warrant
was made after the Court minutely and substantially complied with the legal and
constitutional requirements for the issuance of the search warrant, and it
appearing further, that the search warrant had already been implemented at the
time when the motion to quash was filed, and finding that the implementation of
the search warrant by the police officers was done in accordance with law, the
Court is constrained to DENY as it hereby DENIES the motion of the respondent
to quash the search warrant.

“SO ORDERED” (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. In this petition, petitioner assails the decision of respondent judge on
the following grounds:

“Respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in:

“a) Invalidating the search warrant and related
Order of Judge Nicias Mendoza of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, a co-equal and coordinate trial court;

“b) Denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of September 18, 1991 on
the patently erroneous ground of double jeopardy; and

“c) Hastily acquitting private respondents,
despite petitioner’s evidence which ably established not only a prima facie case against the former
but their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” (Rollo, p. 7)

On March 19, 1992, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
as prayed for and ordered respondent judge to cease and desist from acting on
the “Motion to Order Release of Confiscated Items” filed by private
respondents with respondent court.

Certiorari will not lie.

Generally, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction may not
be modified or altered by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Given the facts of this case, however, this
rule cannot be applied.

There could have been no problem had the court which issued the
search warrant was likewise the same court before which the criminal case is
pending as a result of its issuance. But if the criminal case which was subsequently filed by virtue of the
search warrant is raffled off to a different branch, all incidents relating to
the validity of the warrant issued should be consolidated with that branch
trying the criminal case (See Nolasco v. Paño, 139 SCRA 152 [1985]). The rationale is to avoid confusion as
regards the issue of jurisdiction over the case and to promote an orderly
administration of justice. As observed
by this Court in Nolasco:

“Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of
the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two
different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a
search warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal
prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the search warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated
with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right
to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.”

The wisdom of this doctrine presents itself in the instant case.

Under the aforestated facts, two branches of the same RTC took
cognizance over two (2) separate incidents of the case. On June 6, 1990, Judge Mendoza of Branch 74 issued
a search warrant which led to the filing of the criminal case. On the other hand, on September 28, 1991,
respondent Judge Bans of Branch 72 of the same RTC heard and eventually decided
the said criminal case filed before it.

Procedurally, Judge Mendoza should have referred the Motion to
Quash the search warrant to Branch 72 where the criminal case was pending, as
prescribed in Nolasco for
purposes of consolidating the issue on the validity of the search warrant with
the criminal case for violation of P.D. 1866. If the rule had been otherwise, i.e., if the issuing court had been
allowed to resolve the Motion to Quash the search warrant despite the pendency
of a criminal case arising therefrom before another court, it would give rise
to the absurd situation where the judge hearing the criminal case will be bound
by the declaration of the validity of the search warrant made by the issuing
judge, and the former will thereafter be restrained from reviewing such finding
in view of the doctrine of non-interference observed between courts of
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. Such a situation will thus make it difficult, if not impossible, for
respondent court to make an independent and objective appreciation of the
evidence and merits of the criminal case. For this reason, the court trying the criminal case should be allowed to
rule on the validity of the search warrant in order to arrive at a judicious
administration of justice.

The prosecution contends that the denial of the Motion to Quash
became final and executory when the accused did not interpose an appeal
therefrom and hence, respondent judge could no longer disturb the same. It is elementary that a final order is one
which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. On the other hand, an order
is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely but leaves
something more to be adjudicated upon, as in this case, private respondents’
guilt (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657 [1982]). Applying the foregoing rule, an order denying a motion to quash
is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari (Cruz, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 145
[1991]).

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the
propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it
will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place
the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the
right to a speedy trial (People vs. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 [1989]; People vs.
Hon. Rodolfo M. Bellaflor, G.R. No. 103275, June 15, 1994). In the case before us, the resolution of the
Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after
a finding that the search warrant was illegally issued. Hence, it clearly falls under one of the
admitted exceptions to the rule. Double
jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally
barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.

Furthermore, the present petition is a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 which calls only for a review of any error arising from the
exercise of jurisdiction or lack thereof and not a review of an error of
judgment. A review of the sufficiency
of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused lies
outside the function of certiorari as it intrudes into the prerogatives
of Rule 45, under ordinary appeals, where an alleged error of judgment may be
subjected to review. A review of the
judgment of acquittal of private respondents under this petition for certiorari
(Rule 65) would place the accused in double jeopardy which is not allowed.

The case of Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals (171 SCRA 49
[1989]) clearly and lengthily expounded on the functions of the writ of certiorari,
viz:

“x x x Whether this conclusion was based merely on
speculations and conjecture, or on a misapprehension of facts and contrary to
the documents and exhibits of the case, is not for us to determine in a
petition for certiorari wherein only issues of jurisdiction may be
raised. Neither can we determine
whether the constructions given by the appellate court to a document is right
or wrong as errors in the appreciation of evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari
because they do not involve any jurisdictional question.

“The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. It
is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in the judge’s findings or conclusions. The mere fact that the court decides the question wrong is
utterly immaterial to the question of its jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo, that the court
had committed a mistake, the error does not vitiate the decision considering
that it had jurisdiction over the case. The writ of certiorari issues for the certiorari of errors
of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari
cannot be legally used for any other purpose. If the court has jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the person,
the orders and rulings upon all questions pertaining to the cause
are orders and rulings within its jurisdiction
and cannot be corrected by certiorari.

“Ordinarily, errors of judgment may
be corrected in an timely appeal
from the judgment on the merits. Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar,
the decision involved being one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by
the People would run counter to the accused’s constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy.

“We discern in this petition
for certiorari a subtle attempt to
have us review the judgment of the
appellate court on the merits. While the petition at
bar is denominated a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court and the issues
raised therein ostensibly dealt with the
jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioner’s
attack on the appellate court’s jurisdiction
is premised on the conclusions that (a)
the findings of facts of the appellate
court were based on conjectures and speculations,
or on misapprehension of facts
and contrary to the documents and exhibits;
(b) the exhibit relied upon by the
appellate court has not been offered nor
admitted in evidence during the trial;
and (c) the appellate court gave to
a document a meaning contrary to its
contents. But how valid
and tenable these premises are remains
a question. To determine
their validity would entail a review and
re­-evaluation of the evidence on record
as well as the procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions
arrived at by the appellate court; in
effect a review of the judgment of
acquittal, which we cannot do in a
petition for certiorari and without violating
private respondents’ constitutional right against
double jeopardy.

“Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that
‘the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy.’ The argument that the judgment is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because
whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error
of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It
did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer
be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may
be. The rule therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not reviewable by a higher
court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the accused
in second jeopardy for the same offense.” (underscoring supplied)

Having determined that respondent court had jurisdiction to issue
the assailed orders, this Court upholds the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued on
March 19, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.