G.R. No. 10405. December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF RIZAL, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS A…
CONCEPCION, J.:
First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the
writ of preliminary injunction therein issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the
ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for
Public Works”, approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof,
an item (43 [h]) of P85,000.00, “for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement” of “Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas—Gen.
Araneta—Gen. Lucban—Gen. Capinpin—Gen. Segundo—Gen. Delgado—Gen. Malvar— Gen.
Lim)”; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the
aforementioned feeder roads were “nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed, * * * within the Antonio Subdivision * * * situated
at * * * Pasig, Rizal” (according- to the tracings attached to the petition as
Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between
the latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads “do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway”; that the
aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder
roads were to be constructed) were private properties of respondent Jose C.
Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member
of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 195S, respondent Zulueta,
addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate
said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June
13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition “that
the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of
two of them”; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig
was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another
letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No.
920, and the sum of P85.000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed
said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to
the present “has not made any endorsement thereon”; that inasmuch as the
projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the
passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85.000.00
therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of said projected feeder roads, was “illegal and, therefore, void
ab initio“; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress
because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in
question were “public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision”‘ ;
that, “in order to give a semblance of legality, where there is absolutely none,
to the aforementioned appropriation”, respondent Zulueta executed, on December
12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged
deed of donation—copy of which is annexed to the petition—of the four (4)
parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of
donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that
being-subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a
contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental
law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would
greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of
respondent Zulueta, “aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing
his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense”; that the construction of
said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public
Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would
continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
illegal provision of law, “to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice
not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation.”
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920
be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads
in question be “declared unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal”; that a writ
of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works, the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Public Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the
continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act
No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and
Communications, the Bureau of Public Works and the Bureau of Public Highways
from making any further payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act
No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making
and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act
No. 920 and from making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated
funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had
“no legal capacity to sue”, and that the petition did “not state a cause of
action”. In support to this motion, respondent Zulueta alleged that the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the
Province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code;
that said respondent is “not aware of any law which makes illegal the
appropriation of public funds for the improvement of * * * private property”;
and that,, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to
the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a
contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could not
assail the appropriation in question because “there is no actual bona
fide case * * * in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is
necessarily involved” and petitioner “has not shown that he has a personal and
substantial interest” in said Act “and that its enforcement has caused or will
cause him a direct injury”.
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the
aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public
interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the
provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, “have the requisite
personalities” to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of
Republic Act No. 920; that “the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenues for anything but a public purpose”, that the construction and
improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads were private
property, would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the following
condition:
“The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land
liereby donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes
whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of the
Kepuhlic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the
title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto
revert to the Donor, Jose C. Zulueta.” (Italics supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation
or contract is “absolutely forbidden by the Constitution” and consequently
“illegal”, for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares
inexistent and void from the very beginning contracts “whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals * * * or public policy”; that the legality of
said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein because his
“interests are not directly affected” thereby and that, accordingly, the
appropriation in question “should be upheld” and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision
granting the aforementioned motions to dismiss, which as such, are deemed to
have admitted hypothetically the allegations of fact made in the petition of
appellant herein. According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of
several parcels of residential land, situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the
Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been reserved for the
projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private property
of said respondent when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85.000.00 for the
“construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement” of said roads,
was passed by Congress, as well as when it was approved by the President on June
20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the construction of said feeder
roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00,
would have the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of
constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expenses,[1] and would “greatly enhance or increase the
value of the subdivision” of said respondent. The lower court held that under
these circumstances, the appropriation in question was “clearly for a private,
not a public purpose.”
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is
self-evident.[2] However, respondent
Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
“A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal
because Congress is the source of all laws * * *. Aside from the fact that the
movant is not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriatoin of public
funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may assume as private
property * * *.” (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being
inconsistent with the nature of the Government established under the
Constitution of the Philippines and the system of checks and balances underlying
our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court
invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or
organic laws.[3]
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private
purpose, the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
“It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is
the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of
public money.” (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
“In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.” (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics
supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
“Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax,
and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes
and prohibiting: the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion
thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for
other than a public purpose. * * ** * * * * * *
“The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * .”
(81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views
which, apart from being patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our
democratic system of government, which, as such,, exists primarily for the
promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the
established jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional
system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part
and parcel of our own constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the
appropriation in question, upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the
legality of the donation above referred to because the same does not affect him
directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises,
namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of
the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be annulled
without a previous declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation; and
(3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and
admits of no exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of
its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,
subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the
organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation
for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon
whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later
on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was
approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or
on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.[4] The donation
to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of
giving a “semblance of legality”, or legalizing, the appropriation in question,
did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments,
is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal
contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said Code,
exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are
inherent in his person, including, therefore, his right to the annulment of said
contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision
Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statuia may be contested
only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds,[5] upon the theory that “the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds,” which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.[6] Although there are some decisions to the
contrary,[7] the prevailing view in the
United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
“In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute the general rule
is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question llw constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.” (11 Am. Jur. 761; italics
supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in
Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws
are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S.
to its Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal
corporation to its government. Indeed, under the composite system of
government existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of
the Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations
imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same was made by
representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people of the
U.S., except insofar as the former represented the people of the respective
States, and the people of each State has, independently of that of the others,
ratified said Constitution. In other words, the Federal Constitution and the
Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the U.S. in consequence
of an act of, and, in this sense, through the respective states of the
Union of which they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between
said people and the Federal Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election
of its President, who is chosen directly, not by the people of the
U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal
Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the
one hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to
that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal
Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between
the people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that
the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people of the
Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union,
insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national
government is not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the
Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the
Federal Government in the interest of the states of the Union. For this reason,
the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds—which has been upheld by
the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) — has
greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of
Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257),
involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2)
taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the
price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exhorbitant. It is true that in
Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer
and employee of the Government was not permitted to question the
constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress.
However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo
vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain
appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason
that impelled this Court to take such position in said two (2) cases—the
importance of the issues therein raised—is present in the case at bar. Again,
like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is
not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as
its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision,[7] and, the taxpayers therein bear a
substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this
case sufficiently justify petitioner’s action in contesting the appropriation
and donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the
lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It
is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, records remanded to lower court for further
proceedings.
[1] For, pursuant to section 19 (h.)
of the existing rules and regulations of the Urban Planning Commission, the
owner of a subdivision is under obligation “to improve, repair and maintain all
streets, highways and other ways in his subdivision until their dedication to
public use is accepted by the government.”
[2] Ex parte Bagwell, 79 P. 2d. 395;
Road District No. 4 Shelby County vs. Allred. 68 S-W 2d 164; State ex rel
Thomson vs. Giessel, 53-N.W. 2d. 726, Attorney General vs. City of Eau Claire,
37 Wis. 400; State ex rel. Smith vs. Annuity Pension Board, 241 Wis. G2C, 6 N.W.
2d. 676; State vs. Smith, 293 N.W. 161; State t’fl. Dammann 280 N.W. 698;
Sjostrum vs. State Highway Commission 228 P. 2d. 238; Hutton vs. Webb, 126 N.C.
897, 36 S.E. 341; Michigan Sugar Co. vs. Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674, 83 N.W.
625 Omard Beet Sugar Co. vs. State, 105 N.W. 716.
[3] Casanovas vs. Hord. 8 Phil., 12o;
McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil., 063; Compafiia General de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883;
Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 6;
McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil., 248; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440; Agcaoili
vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Government of P.I. vs. Springer 50 Phil., 259;
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transp. Co., 57 Phil., 600; People vs. Linsangan,
62 Phil., 464; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Jose O.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil., 535; 44 Off. Gaz. 428; In re
Cunanan, 94 Phil., 534; 50 Off. Gaz., 1602; City of Baguio vs. Nawasa 106 Phil.,
144; City of Cebu vs. Nawasa, 107 Phil., 11l2; Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68;
49 Off. Gaz., [5] 1807.
[4] In the language of the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, “An unconstitutional statute is a legal still birth, which
neither moves, nor breathes, nor holds out any sign of life. It is a form
without one vital spark. It is wholly dead from the trmment of conception, and,
no right, either legal or equitable, arises from such inanimate thing.” (Oxnartd
Beat Sugar Co. vs. State, 102 N.W. 80.)
[5] See, among others, Livermore, vs.
Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 25 L.K.A. 312, 36 P. 424; Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla.
41, 59 So. 063; Lucas vs. American-Hawaiian Engineering & Constr. Co., 16
Haw. 80; Castle vs. Capena, 5 Haw. 27; Littler vs. Jayne, 124 III. 123, 16 N.E.
374; Burlce vs. Snively, 208 111. 328, 70 N.B. 327; Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind.
336, 99 N.E. 1; Christmas vs. Warfield, 105 Md. 536; Sears vs. Steel, 55 Or.
544, 107 Pac. 3; State ex rel. Taylor vs. Pennoyer, 26 Or. 205, 37 Pac. 906;
Carman vs. Woodruf, 10 Or. 123; MacKinney vs. Watson, 145 Pac. 266; Scars vs.
James, 47 Or. 50, 82 Pac. 14; Mott vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 Pa. 9, 72 Am.
Dec. 664; Bradley vs. Power County, 37 Am. Dec. 563; Frost vs. Thomas, 26 Colo.
227, 77 Am- St. Rep. 259, 56 Pac. 899; Martin vs. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641, 17 Pac.
162; Martin vs. Lacy, 39 Kan. 703, 18 Pac 951; Smith vs. Mageurieh. 44 Ga. 163;
Giddings vs. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 18 L.R.A. 402, 52 N.W. 944; Eippe vs. Becker,
56 Minn. 100, 57 N.W. 331; Auditor vs. Treasurer, i S.C. 311; McCulloug-h vs.
Urown, 31 S.C. 220, 19 S.E. 458; State ex rel. Lamb vs. CumminR-ham, 83 Wis. 90,
53 N.W. 35; State ex rel. Eosenhian vs. Frear, 138 Wis. 173. 119 N.W. 894.
[6] Rubs vs. Tompson, 56 N.E. 2d. 761;
Reid vs. Smith, 375 111. 347, 30 N.E. 2d. 908; Fergus vs. Russel, 270 111. 304,
110 N.E-130; Burke vs. Snively, 208 111. 328; Jones vs. Connell, 266 111. 443,
107 N.E. 731; Dudick vs. Baumann, 349 111. 46, 181 N.E. 690.
[7] Thompson vs. Canal Fund Comps., 2
Abb. Pr. 248; Shieffelin vs. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675; Hutchison vs.
Skinnier, 21 Misc. 729, 49 N.Y. Supp. 360; Long- vs. Johnson, 70 Misc. 308; 127
N.Y. Supp. 756; Whiteback vs. Hooker, 73 Misc. 573, 133 X.Y. Supp. 534; State ex
rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson, 9 S.D. 149, 88 N.W. 202; Davenport vs. Elrod, 20 S.D.
567, 107 N-W. 833; Jones vs. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067; Birmingham vs.
Cheetham, 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac. 37; Tacoma vs. Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 65 Pac.
186; Hilg-er us. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19.
[7] It has 1,463,530 inhabitants.