A. BUCHANAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PILAR A., VIUDA DE ESTEBAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Buchanan versus Viuda de Esteban

The Case

This is an action for damages for malicious prosecution. Buchanan sues Pilar A., widow of Esteban, because she filed a criminal complaint for assault against him before the justice of the peace of Iloilo, a complaint of which he was ultimately acquitted. The case matters because it fixes the elements of malicious prosecution in this jurisdiction and, more importantly, because it teaches that a prosecutor who acts in good faith on facts that reasonably excite belief in the guilt of the accused is not liable, even if the charge turns out to be false. It is the classic illustration of the balance between protecting the citizen from vexatious suits and encouraging the citizen to bring offenders to justice.

Procedural History

The widow filed a complaint for assault before the justice of the peace of Iloilo against Buchanan. The justice of the peace convicted Buchanan and sentenced him. Buchanan appealed to the Court of First Instance, which acquitted him. In the judgment of acquittal, the Court of First Instance stated that Buchanan was authorized, if he saw fit, to bring suit against the complainant for damages for malicious prosecution. Relying on that declaration, Buchanan brought this civil action for damages in the Court of First Instance, which rendered judgment in his favor for 1,000 pesos. The widow appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint on the merits.

Facts

On the 16th of September, 1913, the defendant laid a complaint against the plaintiff before the justice of the peace of Iloilo, charging him with assault in that he, on that day, struck the thirteen-year-old son of the complaining witness with a thrown stone.

The accused was convicted in the justice's court. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, he was acquitted. In the judgment of acquittal, the court stated that the defendant was authorized, if he saw fit, to bring suit against the plaintiff for damages for malicious prosecution.

Acting under that declaration and alleged authorization, Buchanan brought this action for damages for malicious prosecution. The trial court rendered judgment in his favor for 1,000 pesos. The widow appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution must prove both want of probable cause and malice, in addition to the fact of the prosecution and its termination in acquittal.
• Whether or not the defendant acted without probable cause and with malice in filing the criminal complaint for assault.
• Whether or not the declaration of the Court of First Instance in the criminal case, that the charge was false and that the complainant should be prosecuted, is conclusive of the falsity of the charge in the civil action for malicious prosecution.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It applies the American common-law rule on malicious prosecution, which the Court states as follows:

To support an action for malicious prosecution under American law the plaintiff must prove, in the first place, the fact of the prosecution and the fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, or that he instigated its commencement, and that it finally terminated in his acquittal; that, in bringing it, the prosecutor had acted without probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motives.

This formulation supplies the elements the plaintiff must establish, and it bears on the case because the Court found that the element of want of probable cause was absent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the three elements must concur: the fact of the prosecution and that the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated its commencement, that it terminated in acquittal, that the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and that he was actuated by legal malice. The Court stressed that malice alone does not make one liable where probable cause is shown, and that malice and want of probable cause must both exist.

On the second issue, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to show that the prosecution was without probable cause and that it was malicious. The Court defined probable cause as follows:

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

The Court noted that the justice of the peace had convicted Buchanan, and that the complainant in good faith accepted the story of her son and, in the honest belief that he had been assaulted, laid the complaint. While the charge may have been false, it was not the falsity of the complainant; and while it may have been malicious, the Court could not, on the record, and especially after the judgment of the justice of the peace, find it to be so.

On the third issue, the Court held that the declaration of the Court of First Instance, or any other court, in a criminal action, that the charge is false and that the person making it should be prosecuted criminally or civilly, is not conclusive of the question of whether the charge is false in an action based on such declaration. The falsity of the charge is a question to be determined in the trial of that action and is open to the proof of both parties.

Doctrine

An action for damages for malicious prosecution requires the concurrence of the following: first, the fact of the prosecution and that the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated its commencement; second, that the prosecution terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; third, that the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and fourth, that the prosecutor was actuated by legal malice, meaning improper or sinister motives. Malice alone does not make one liable where probable cause is shown, even if the suit was brought for the mere purpose of vexing, harassing, and injuring the adversary. Malice and want of probable cause must both exist.

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. A judgment of a court in favor of the plaintiff is conclusive proof of probable cause, notwithstanding the case was subsequently reversed by the appellate court. It is a good defense that the defendant acted in good faith upon legal advice, as this negatives want of reasonable and probable cause.

The declaration of a court in a criminal action that the charge is false and that the complainant should be prosecuted is not conclusive of the falsity of the charge in a civil action for malicious prosecution. The falsity of the charge is a question to be determined in the trial of that action and is open to the proof of both parties.

Disposition

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is dismissed on the merits, with no special finding as to costs. The widow won.

Remember This

Memorize the twin requirements: malice and want of probable cause must both exist, and probable cause is measured by the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor acting as a reasonable mind. Examiners use this case to test the elements of malicious prosecution and the rule that a court's declaration in a criminal case does not conclusively establish falsity in the civil action.