BLO UMPAR ADIONG, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347
pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

“SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. –
The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals,
stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials
not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14)
inches in length Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof.”

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

“SEC. 21(f) Prohibited forms of election
propaganda.?

It is unlawful:

xxx                          xxx                               xxx

(f) To draw, paint,
inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or
at the candidate’s own residential house or one of his residential houses, if
he has more than one: Provided,
that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three
(3) feet in size.” (Emphasis supplied)

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful election propaganda which
provides:

“Lawful election propaganda.
— Lawful election propaganda shall include:

(a)  
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written
or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width
and fourteen inches in length;

(b)  
Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or
against any particular candidate;

(c)  
Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted,
with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and
on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of
said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in
size, shall be allowed: Provided,
That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the
meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said
meeting or rally; or

(d)  
All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this
Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties
and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to
be heard: Provided, That the
Commission’s authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general
circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the
authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)

and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
6646 which provides:

Prohibited Forms
of Election Propaganda.-
In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit
any election propaganda in any place, whether
private, or public, except
in the common
poster areas and/or bilboards provided in
the immediately preceding section, at the candidate’s own residence, or at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall
in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided Further, That at the
site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more
than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be
displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be
removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; x x x” (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May
11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers in
“mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of
Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the
petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer
grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the
date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election
Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed
“Comelec Poster Areas.”

The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
kind of restriction involved in this case.

There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech
clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights
provision on this basic freedom.

All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are
important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred
freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US
516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228
[1970])

This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises
from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other freedom. (Palko v.
Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is
difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the
right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to
convince or persuade is denied and taken away.

We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement,
caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. (New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many
restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate,
the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free,
clean, and honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls
all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The determination of the limits of the Government’s power to
regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote
fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and
delicate task. The so-called balancing
of interests – individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests
on the other – is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because
the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections
to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC
during the election period is granted regulatory powers vis-a-vis the conduct
and manner of elections, to wit:

“SEC. 4. The Commission may, during the election period
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forms
among candidates in connection with the object of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.” (Article IX(c) section 4)

The variety of opinions
expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press
Club v. Commission on Elections (G.
R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion cases underscores how difficult
it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of election
campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free
and honest elections. In the National Press Club case,
the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of
expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through
political advertisements. The gray area
is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.

There is another problem
involved. Considering that the period
of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some,
too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove
unfair to affected parties and the electorate.

For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down
requirements which they deem inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove
to be a hollow remedy. The judicial
process, by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and
reflection. We cannot act instantly on
knee-jerk impulse. By the time we
revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the
essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have
been lost.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by
a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are
invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of
the citizen and the State’s power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if
in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are
unduly curtailed.

There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National
Press Club v. Commission
on Elections (supra)
case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its
limits. We examine the limits of
regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feliciano, shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the
test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and
scope in its application, if it restricts one’s expression of belief in a
candidate or one’s opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the
flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and
reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.

Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political
advertisements, with some rather strong dissents, in National Press
Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different
category. The promotion of a
substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.

“A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673.”
(City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct
2118 [1984])

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government
interest. There is no clear public
interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen’s right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not
only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one’s
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:

“The case confronts us again with the duty our system places
on the Court to say where the individual’s freedom ends and the State’s power
begins. Choice on that border, now as
always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting
legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great,
the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment x x x That priority gives these
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is
the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what
standard governs the choice x x x.

For these reasons any attempt to
restrict those liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in
other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds,
will not suffice. These rights rest on
firmer foundation. Accordingly,
whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the greatest abuses,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945].”
(Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree
with him. A sticker may be furnished by
a candidate but once the car owner agrees
to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily
his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press
Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not
covertly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the
prohibition against a sincere manifestation
of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and
as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when “it
offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”
(Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).

“In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.

In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the
Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at
any time or place in Griffin, Georgia, without a license, pointing out that so
broad an interference was unnecessary to accomplish legitimate municipal
aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US
147, 84 L ed 155, 60 S Ct 146, the Court dealt with ordinances of four
different municipalities which either banned or imposed prior restraints upon
the distribution of handbills. In
holding the ordinances invalid, the court noted that where legislative
abridgment of ‘fundamental personal rights and liberties’ is asserted, ‘the
courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation. Mere legislative
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of pubic convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to
justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions.’ 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct 900, 128
ALR 1352, the Court said that ‘[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society,’ but pointing out that in each case ‘the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to
infringe the protected freedom.” (310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364
US 479 [1960]

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not
more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches
in length in any place, including
mobile places whether public or private except in areas
designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle. In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section
1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law:

“Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it
includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the
Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right
to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The
Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L.
ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s
acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127.” (Buchanan v.
Warley 245 US 60 [1917])

As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the
posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would
not only deprive the owner who
consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but
more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to
free speech and information:

“Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever
he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free
society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time
and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The danger of distribution can so easily be
controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to each householder the full
right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent
prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.” (Martin v. City of
Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943])

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the
burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden
is not met in this case.

Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that
it prohibits the posting or display of election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster
areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means
that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on
his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no
limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of
the statute or regulation, may do.

The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that
they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living
room or bedroom. This is delegation
running riot. As stated by Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935]), “The delegated power
is unconfined and vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of power is susceptible
of transfer.”

Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate
and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II Section 26 and Article XIII section 1
in relation to Article IX (c) section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by
posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the
State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations
behind the regulation are of marginal significance.

Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, “The State
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, x x x while under section 1, Article XIII thereof “The
Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be
reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate. Whether the candidate is
rich and, therefore, can afford to dole-out more decals and stickers or poor
and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is
not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and
exercise his right of free speech. The
owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal
property. To strike down this right and
enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by
the Constitution:

“x x x The concept of the
Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the
lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of
law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy. The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have
no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must
ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency
in the execution of the laws cannot
ignore or disregard what it ordains. In
its task of applying the law to
the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of
judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate
branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.” (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)

The unusual circumstances of this year’s national and local
elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and
the right to know. It is not alone the
widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which
concern us. Nor are we limiting
ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about
political change. (Cf. New York Times
v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of candidates and elective positions
involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot
name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are
aspiring to be elected to public office.

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications,
platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a
candidate’s name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is
espousing ideas. Our review of the
validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today’s
particular circumstances. We are
constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion
of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections
providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof”
is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin,
Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., see concurrence.

Feliciano and
Bellosillo, JJ., on leave.