MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. A…

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant
to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon,
by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios
of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their
respective sitios.

Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to
the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the
municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May
1959.^[1]

By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965,
issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres
was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 1515.^[2]
The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal
district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved
by the House of Representatives.”

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition
for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in
Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G,
the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices.^[3]
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General,^[4] the petitioning municipality
contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the
duties and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the
petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that since it
was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San
Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it
(petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the
creation of the new municipality;^[5] that
because the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its
corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the
petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was
not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to
the State acting through the Solicitor General.^[6]

On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to
dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.

On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a
motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading
thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for
Creation. – x x x.

“(d)  Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.”

The motion was opposed by petitioner
municipality, contending that the above provision of law was inapplicable to
the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.^[7]

In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court^[8]
finally dismissed the petition^[9] for
lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the
State, adding that “whatever defects (were) present in the creation of
municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and
executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as Local Government Code of 1991.” In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the
same court denied petitioner municipality’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition “for review on certiorari.”
Petitioners^[10]
argue that in issuing the orders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the
lower court has “acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or in excess of jurisdiction.” Petitioners assert that the existence of a
municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked
either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and
is inoperative such as though it has never been passed.^[11]

Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for
“review on certiorari” under Rules 42 and 45 of the
Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the
lower court for having been issued with “grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to
petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a
final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved.”^[12]
Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance
under Rule 65. We shall disregard the
procedural incongruence.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a
“prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show
by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.”^[13]
When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the
action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct
proceeding.^[14]
It must be brought “in the name of the Republic of the Philippines”^[15]
and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal “when directed by the
President of the Philippines x x x.”^[16] Such
officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action “at the
request and upon the relation of another person” with the permission of
the court.^[17]
The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but
this initiative can be done when he claims to be “entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.”^[18]
While the quo warranto proceedings filed
below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a
denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San
Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.

At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on
the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into
the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however,
contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior
to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right
to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply
Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners’ theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the
case been seasonably brought. Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and
later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the
powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a
public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a
position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed,^[19]
so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a
political subdivision be timely raised.^[20]
Public interest demands it.

Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for
being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other
than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a
status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining,
that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be
otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence
for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts
all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after
more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174
classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after
having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this
Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been
covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October
1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the
1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one
of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province
of Quezon. Equally significant is
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal
districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.” No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code is proferred. It is
doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions
is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective,^[21] and
aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,” are validly accepted
in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of
vested rights.^[22]

All considered, the de jure status of the
Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Present at the meeting when the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon
adopted Resolution No. 8 were Municipal Mayor Godofredo M. Tan, Vice-Mayor
Jesus R. Cortez, and Councilors Maximino F. Rivadulla, Eleuterio Aurellana,
Juanito Conjares, Dominador Nadres and Felix Aurellana. Councilor Eduardo L. Ausa was absent. The reasons for the adoption of Resolution
No. 8 are stated in the following clauses:

“WHEREAS, this body has been
informed that the chance for the approval of the bill creating the barrios of
San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala, into a regular
Municipality is very slim;

WHEREAS, the reason behind such
disapproval is the patent inability of the proposed Municipality to pay its
would-to-be (sic) employees at the rate required in the Minimum Wage Law;

WHEREAS, this body in particular,
and the great majority of the people of San Andres in general, notwithstanding
the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, agitate for the separation or
segregation of the abovementioned barrios so as to have a corporate personality
in the eyes of the Provincial Board, in the eyes of Congress and in the eyes of
the President;

WHEREAS, once said barrios acquire
a corporate personality in the eyes of the Provincial Board, of Congress and of
the President, the development of said barrios and practically the whole
southern tip of the Bondoc Peninsula will be hastened. (Rollo, p. 162.)

^[2]
This act has provided for a more
autonomous government for municipal districts, amending for the purpose Art.
VI, Chapter 64 of the Administrative Code. Sec. 2 thereof states that “any first class municipal
district the annual receipts of which shall average more than four thousand
pesos for four consecutive fiscal years shall ipso facto be
classified as a fifth class municipality and shall thereafter be governed by
the provisions of Articles one to five, Chapter 64 of the same Code.”

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 77-80.

^[4]
15 SCRA 569, holding that the authority to create municipalities is essentially
legislative in nature.

^[5]
Invoked was the Court’s ruling in Municipality
of Malabang v. Benito 27 SCRA 533.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 81-83.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 102.

^[8]
Presided by Judge Antonio V. Mendez,
Sr.

^[9]
Rollo, pp. 71-74.

^[10]
Named co-petitioners of the Municipality of San Narciso before this Court are
its municipal mayor and thirteen (13) councilors.

^[11]
Rollo, pp. 183-185.

^[12]
Ibid., pp. 2 & 21; Ibid., p. 50.

^[13]
Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, Vol. 3, 1970 ed., p. 208 citing Newman v.
U.S., 238 U.S. 537, 545, 56 L.Ed. 513.

^[14]
Only in few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of
government, an example of which is when the state law allows a private person
to question the regularity of the incorporation of an entity; see E. McQuillin,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, sec. 3.49, p. 592 (3rd ed. 1949).

^[15]
Sec. 1 (c), Rule 66, Rules of Court.

^[16]
Sec. 3, ibid.

^[17]
Sec. 4, ibid.

^[18]
Sec. 6, ibid.

^[19]
Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Tavora v. Ofiana, 83 Phil. 672; Unabia
v. City Mayor (99 Phil. 253). In Castro
v. Del Rosario (19 SCRA 196), the Court
stated that the one-year limitation for filing a quo warranto
proceedings is “an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an
office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps
to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one
year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment.”

^[20]
Noteworthy is Section 16, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court which sets a five-year
limitation for filing a quo warranto action if its purpose
is to bring about the “forfeiture of charter” of a corporation, that
period to be counted from the time “the act complained of was done or
committed.”

^[21]
Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, supra
at p. 534; SSK Parts Corporation v. Camas, 181 SCRA 675.

^[22]
Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, 174 SCRA 524, 532
citing Government of P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634.