MARITES DANGUILAN-VITUG, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON MABUTAS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XLII, MANILA, AND MARGARITA…

Petitioner, Marites Danguilan-Vitug, wrote an article entitled
“Why Cory is Soft on Her Relatives” which was published on October 2,
1988 in Focus: A
Chronicle Magazine, a Sunday supplement
of the Manila Chronicle. The pertinent
portion of the article reads as follows:

“x x x                           x x x                             x
x x

In a meeting with the President in Malacañang, a group of traders
from Zamboanga City complained about her sister-in-law, Tingting Cojuangco and
her dominant role in the barter trade. She was referred to, in that meeting, as the ‘barter trade queen.’ Cory
Aquino listened and asked for evidence.

A Malacañang aide
observes: “She’s faced with a dilemma. She has contradicted herself. ‘The decision to dismiss Maceda and
Mercado on the basis of soft evidence has been overturned by the strong push
for proof in the case of her sister-in-law and those of other officials, too.

In the instance of Tingting Cojuangco, claims the aide, the most
the President has done – with a lot of pain on her part – has been to keep a
distance from her sister-in-law, ‘almost ostracizing her.’ She has not shown up
in events important to Tingting, such as the latter’s graduation from the
National Defense College, among others. Yet, this has meant little to the public who seeks due process for the
accused.

x x x                x x x                            x
x x.”^[1]

Private complainant, Margarita Cojuangco filed a complaint for
libel before the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. After preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor on May 9, 1989,
recommended the filing of the information for libel before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Accordingly, an
information was filed against petitioner. On June 30, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. In a resolution
dated April 30, 1990, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the charge for
libel. However, upon motion of
Margarita Cojuangco, the said resolution was reversed and the filing of the
information was sustained.

On May 17,1990, petitioner filed before the sala of Judge Ramon
Mabutas, Jr. a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that there was no
libel since the subject article was absolutely privileged as it was a mere
expression of opinion and a fair comment on matters of public concern and
interest. There was also no proof that
it was written with actual malice. As a
second ground for the quashal of the information, petitioner averred that the
prosecutors had no authority to file the information because the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing his prior resolution.

Respondent trial judge denied the Motion to Quash averring that
the grounds cited by petitioner are matters of defense. The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was similarly denied and arraignment was scheduled on August 6,
1991.

Thereafter, Marites Danguilan-Vitug filed a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals. The petition was
dismissed in a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises, this
petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.”^[2]

Hence, this petition which is anchored on the following
arguments:

“I

The disputed article is a non-defamatory
expression of opinion on a matter of public interest

II

The opinion is based on
true facts

III

There is no genuine issue as to the
existence of actual malice

IV

The Department of Justice violated
petitioner’s right to non-discriminatory enforcement of penal laws”^[3]

Meanwhile, in a resolution dated March 17, 1993, the Supreme
Court granted the Motion for Leave to File Brief for Petitioner dated February
18, 1993, by intervenors Melinda Quintos de Jesus, Sheila Coronel, Malou
Mangahas, Ramon Isberto, and Rina Jimenez-David (De Jesus, et al.) praying that
they be heard as friends of the Court or as intervenors. On the same day, the court also noted the
Motion for Leave of Court to Appear as Amicus Curiae filed by
Atty. Perfecto V. Fernandez. De Jesus,
et al., in their brief for petitioner, cited the following as
grounds for granting the petition:

“I

The presumptions of malice and of falsity,
when applied to libel prosecutions arising from publication of matters of
public concern, abridge the freedom of expression and the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern;

II

The presumptions of malice and of falsity,
when applied against a person accused of a libel arising from publication of a
matter of public concern, violate the constitutional right of an accused to be
presumed innocent;

III

Vitug’s article is not defamatory.”^[4]

On the other hand, Atty. Perfecto V. Fernandez argued in his
motion that in cases of privileged publications, the information must expressly
allege specific or actual malice for the libel charge to be sufficient. Moreover, the allegation should be supported
by prima facie evidence, as absence thereof would make the information invalid
since it amounts to no crime being charged.

On February 24, 1993, Margarita Cojuangco filed a petition
(motion) for contempt against Rina Jimenez-David for writing in her column, AT
LARGE, an article entitled “Challenging the Libel Law“^[5]
published in the February 23, 1993 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Respondent-movant alleges that the publication
was designed to influence or to interfere with the disposition of the court in
the case at bar and that the publication cast doubt on her character and
reputation. Rina Jimenez-David refutes
the charge by saying that what she wrote only expressed a general proposition
that a libel action is usually regarded as a threat and restriction to
newspapers that has a chilling effect on the journalistic community; that her
article was not meant to influence the Court; that the statements merely
pointed out that Margarita Cojuangco filed libel suits against other persons;
that the article simply made a comment that libel suits are used by the
powerful to intimidate a free and responsible media; that the article was
covered by the rights to a free press and free expression and that to be
subject to punishment, it should present a clear and present danger or a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.

At the core of this petition is the propriety of the denial of
the motion to quash.

Was the allegedly privileged nature of the communication a ground
for quashing the information?

We answer in the negative. The Court of Appeals correctly stated, thus:

“A reading of the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner
before the respondent courts shows that indeed, as correctly found by the
respondent court, the grounds cited in support thereof are matters of defense
which have to be proven during the trial. The respondent judge certainly committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Motion to Quash. In fine,
the claims of the petitioner in support of this petition that the disputed
article is a non-defamatory expression of opinion on a matter of public
interest; that said opinion is based on true facts; that there is no malice on
the part of the author (sic) are matters which need adequate proof and proper
appreciation by the trial court and are issues that cannot be passed upon
through mere arguments. x x x.”^[6]

We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117^[7] of
the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for quashing an
information. Specifically, paragraph
(g) of said provision states that the accused may move to quash the complaint
or information where it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification. Hence,
for the alleged privilege to be a ground for quashing the information, the same
should have been averred in the information itself and secondly, the privilege
should be absolute, not only qualified.^[8]
Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged in the information, quashal
is not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses.^[9]
With more reason is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged
communications because such cases remain actionable since the defamatory
communication is simply presumed to be not malicious, thereby relieving the
defendant of the burden of proving good intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on the prosecution to prove
malice.^[10] Thus, even if the qualifiedly
privileged nature of the communication is alleged in the information, it cannot
be quashed especially where prosecution opposes the same so as not to deprive
the latter of its day in court, but prosecution
can only prove its case after trial on the merits.^[11] In People v.
Gomez^[12] we held, inter alia:

“The claim of the accused x x x that the letter is privileged
communication is not a ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter of defense which must be proved after trial of the
case on the merits.”

In view of the above considerations, we rule that this petition
is not the appropriate vehicle for the arguments raised by De Jesus, et al. and
Atty. Perfecto V. Fernandez. They are
properly to be considered in the trial on the merits of this case.

Regarding the alleged lack of authority of the officers who filed
the information, suffice it to say that the assailed resolution of the
Secretary of Justice reversing the dismissal of the charge for libel reveals no
such abuse of discretion as would deprive him of authority to sustain the
filing of the information against petitioner.

With respect to the motion for contempt filed by Margarita
Cojuangco against Rina Jimenez-David, we believe that the article written by
the latter is not such as to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice. The allegedly contemptuous
article merely restates the history of the case and reiterates the arguments
which Rina Jimenez-David, together with some other journalists have raised
before this Court in their Brief for Petitioner Vitug. We do not find in this case the contemptuous
conduct exhibited by the respondent in In re Torres^[13]
where the respondent, being a newspaper editor, published an article which
anticipated the outcome of a case in the Supreme Court, named the author of the
decision, and pointed out the probable vote of the members of the Court
although in fact, no such action had been taken by the court; and in In re
Kelly^[14]
where respondent, having been convicted of contempt of court, published a
letter during the pendency of his motion for a re-hearing of the contempt
charge. In said letter, he severely
criticized the court and its action in the proceeding for contempt against
him. In contrast to the aforementioned
publications, Rina Jimenez-David’s article cannot be said to have cast doubt on
the integrity of the court or of the administration of justice. If at all, it was a mere criticism of the
existing libel law in the country. In
view of the above considerations, we are constrained to deny the motion for
contempt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Likewise, the
motion for contempt filed by respondent against Rina Jimenez-David is DENIED on the same ground.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, (Chairman), J., see
dissenting opinion.

Vitug, J., see separate
opinion.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 34.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 31.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 15-16.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 216.

^[5]
Said article runs as follows:

“TINGTING Cojuangco, who is now
governor of Tarlac but was a private citizen at the time, sued for libel on
Nov. 4 that year. Though Ms. Cojuangco
failed to prove that Vitug’s article was false and written with malice, the
prosecutor ruled that the article was malicious.

On April 10, 1990, the Department
of Justice reversed the prosecutor and directed him to withdraw the
Information, finding that ‘There is no evidence to prove that the questioned
publication was prompted by ill-will or spite…’

But a year or so later, on March
19, 1991, the DOJ, on the same evidence, reversed itself and directed the prosecutor to file an
Information for libel against Vitug, holding that Vitug and her co-respondents
should prove their innocence at the trial.

Vitug’s motion to quash the
information was denied by judge Mabutas, which decision was later upheld by the
Court of Appeals. Vitug has appealed
the CA’s ruling to the Supreme Court.

In our (De Jesus et al) brief, we expressed our belief that ‘to require Vitug and her
co-accused ‘to prove their innocence’ at the trial, as ruled by DOJ, abridges
the freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. It also violates the
constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent.’

***

THE Vitug case, which is now ready
for resolution before the Supreme Court, will, it is hoped, challenge the
‘presumption of malice’ contained in current libel law.

In the brief, we said that, as
practicing journalists, we have an interest in the case because if Vitug is
forced to go to trial, it would have a ‘chilling effect’ on the journalistic
community.

Ms. Cojuangco’s suit against Vitug,
for your information, is not the only one she has filed against a journalist
who has offended her. After she became
the target of media scrutiny owing to her prominent role in Mindanao politics
and the barter trade, Ms. Cojuangco slapped multi-million peso libel suits
against everyone writing disparagingly about her (including the INQUIRER). The tactic apparently worked because she
soon faded from the media spotlight.

Sylvia Mayuga, who was sued for two
columns she wrote in the Globe and
in the INQUIRER, and who is now facing trial, points out that ever since the
suits were filed, she has been ‘prevented from writing another line about her
or her activities while the case awaits decision.’

But another columnist, Jarius
Bondoc of the Manila Times, revealed
that Ms. Cojuangco agreed to drop her suit against him upon the intercession of
a high government official who happens to be related (by marriage) to Bondoc.

This just shows that though libel
is deemed the ordinary citizen’s defense against the all-powerful media, it is
much too often used as a tool by the even more powerful to intimidate, silence
and co-opt an otherwise free and responsible media.”

^[6]
Rollo, p. 30.

^[7]
Sec. 2. Motion to Quash
– Grounds. – The defendant may move to
quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds.

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction of the
offense charged or of the person of the defendant;

c) That the officer who has filed the information has no
authority to do so;

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form;

e) That more than one offense is charged except in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.

f) That the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification;

h) That the defendant has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense.

^[8]
REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 321.

^[9]
Ibid.

^[10]
People v. Montori, No. L-16772, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 801.

^[11]
Duque v. Santiago, No. L-16916, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 661.

^[12]
No. L-32815, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 181.

^[13]
55 Phil. 799.

^[14]
35 Phil. 944 (1916).

200

6 pt
6 pt
0
3