G. R. No. 10327. September 30, 1958

UNITED EMPLOYEES WELFARE ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. ISAAC PERAL BOWLING ALLEYS, RESPONDENT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 30, 1958 REYES, A., J.:
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REYES, A., J.:


This is an appeal by certiorari from an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations.

On October 10, 1952, thirty-six pinboys of the Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys, an
enterprise owned and operated by the Philippine Advertising Corporation,
declared a strike for the reasons stated in a petition filed in their behalf by
their Union (the United Employees Welfare Association) with the Department of
Labor. But through the mediation of the Court of Industrial Relations to which
the case was certified and where it was docketed as Case No. 751-V, the parties
entered into a temporary agreement on the basis of which that court issued an
order on October 22, 1952, providing that—

“* * * members of petitioning union, during pendency of case, are enjoined
not to declare any strike, and respondent on the other hand, is refrained from
accepting new pinboys other than those whose names appear in abovementioned
payrolls without express authority of Court, and shall permit under last terms
and conditions existing before the strike of October 10, 1952, continuation of
the 36 pinboys in the service.”

In view of this order, the striking pinboys immediately returned to work.

But on November 11, 1952, with the said case No. 751-V still pending trial,
the management of the bowling alleys dismissed four of the pinboys, named Ramon
Arevalo, Claro Bordones, Petronio Beriña and Carlos Menodiado “on grounds of
grave and wilful insubordination * * * and grave misconduct” and on the further
ground of “drunkenness” in the case of the last two.

Alleging that the dismissal was a violation of the above order, the Union
filed a motion to declare the manager and directors of the bowling alleys guilty
of contempt, later amending, the motion by also asking that the dismissed
pinboys be reinstated with backpay.

After hearing, the court handed down its order, dated December 9, 1955,
denying the motion for contempt but ordering the reinstatement of the four
pinboys—

“* * * with back wages from November 11, 1952 up to December 22, 1954, when
this case was submitted for decision. Provided, however, that such back wages
shall, be based on the average earnings of each and every one of said 4 pinboys
one month prior to their dismissal, or on November 11, 1952.”

Not satisfied with the above order, both parties sought relief from this
Court, one through a petition for certiorari and the other through appeal by
certiorari. The petition for certiorari, which is that filed by the bowling
Alleys, assails the order in so far as it directs the reinstatement of the
pinboys and awards them backpay. On the other hand, the appeal by the other
party, the Union, rests on the contention that the order was erroneous (1) in so
far as it allows back wages only up to the date the case was submitted for
decision and (2) in so far as it directs that the back wages shall be based on
the dismissed pinboys average earnings “one month prior to their dismissal.

The petition for certiorari filed by the Bowling Alleys having been already
dismissed for lack of merit (See resolution dated March 21, 1956 in G. R. No.
L-10331), the order complained of is now before us only for the purposes of the
appeal interposed by the Union.

With reference to the first ground of appeal, it is the contention of the
appellant Union that the dismissed pinboys were entitled to back wages until
actually reinstated and not only up to the day the case was submitted for
decision. This contention fails to reckon with the fact that the right to
backpay is not absolute but subject to the discretion of the Industrial Court
(Antamok Goldfields Mining Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 70
Phil. 340; Union of Philippine Education Employees vs. Philippine Education
Company, 91 Phil., 93). Being empowered—by section 5(c) of Republic Act 875—to
order the reinstatement of an employee Vith or without backpay”, that court must
be deemed to have also the lesser power of mitigating the backpay where backpay
is allowed. And we note that in the present case there are circumstances calling
for mitigation. For it appears that there was a long delay in the disposal of
the case—decision did not come down until one year after the case was
submitted—and as we had occasion to note in our decision in the main case (102
Phil., 219) the Industrial Court was aware that the financial condition of the
bowling alleys was “not very sound due to losses reported during the years
1952-1953.” In view of those circumstances, we are not for disturbing the order
appealed from in so far as it allows backpay only up to the day the case was
submitted for decision.

We are, however, with the appellant in the view that in determining the
earnings of the dismissed pinboys for the month preceding their dismissal,
account must be taken of the fact that the pinboys were on strike for 12 days
of that month. The order below must, therefore, be clarified in the sense that
the month referred to means a full working month, i.e., excluding the period of
the strike, so that the backpay awarded to the dismissed pinboys is to be based
on their earnings for such month.

With this only clarification, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.