ISIDORA S. VDA. DE JESUS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. LUCIANO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

It appears that in a forcible entry case filed in the Justice of the
Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, by Isidora S. Vda. de Jesus,
et al. against Marcosa Villaronte; and 11 others, judgment was rendered
by said court on October 5, 1954 ordering the defendants to vacate the
parcel of land involved in the case and restore possession thereof to
the plaintiffs and also pay the latter five cavans of palay per hectare
for the use of the land for each agricultural year beginning 1954-1955.

In due time the defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance
and the case was there docketed as Civil Case No. 1637 of that court.
Thereafter, defendants filed their answer with a counterclaim and
plaintiffs on their part filed an answer to the counterclaim.

With the appealed case still pending trial, the plaintiffs asked for
immediate execution because of the alleged failure of the defendants to
file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the value of the use of the land
as fixed in the judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, but on
April 29, 1955 the court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to
have the defendants vacate the land and restore possession thereof to
the plaintiffs. On May 19, 1955, the writ of execution was served on
the defendants and all adverse occupants of the land but they all
refused to vacate the premises. However, on June 9, 1955, plaintiffs
were able to obtain an alias writ of execution and this time the
sheriff, with the aid of the Philippine Constabulary, was able to eject
the defendants and the other adverse occupants from the premises and to
place the plaintiffs in possession thereof.

Alleging that after the sheriff and the Constabulary had left the
premises, the defendants and the other adverse occupants re-entered the
land, threatened the plaintiffs with physical harm and continued to
occupy and exercise acts of possession and ownership over the land to
the exclusion of said plaintiffs, the latter, on July 11, 1955,
petitioned the court to declare the defendants and the said other
occupants guilty of contempt of court. Acting upon the petition, the
court in its order dated October 3, 1955, cited “over 20 persons”
(actually 25, see briefs of the parties) including six of the twelve
defendants to appear and show cause why they should not be dealt with
in contempt. Not content with the contempt proceeding they had
instituted, plaintiffs, on November 11 of that same year, filed a
motion alleging that the defendants and other adverse occupants, after
re-entering the land, cultivated and planted the same in bad faith and
consequently lost or forfeited, what was planted by them without right
of indemnity in accordance with Article 449 of the new Civil Code. For
prayer, plaintiffs asked that the court order the Philippine
Constabulary to supervise the harvest and threshing of the palay on the
land, and that the palay harvest be deposited either with the
Constabulary or in any bonded warehouse. Acting upon the motion, the
court on November 29, 1955, denied the prayer that the harvest be
deposited in a bonded warehouse on the ground that the questions of the
alleged re-entry and bad faith were to be decided in the contempt
proceeding, but granted the prayer for the detail of Constabulary
soldiers in the premises to maintain peace and order during the harvest
and threshing of palay.

On December 17, 1955, with the main case, and the petition for
contempt still pending hearing, the plaintiffs filed in the same Court
of First Instance another civil action, which is now the subject of the
present appeal. The new action is directed against 65 defendants, three
of whom were already defendants in the former case. The complaint
alleges that in the months of July, August and September, 1955, in
disobedience to the orders of the court, and against the vigorous
objection of the plaintiffs, defendants unlawfully and in bad faith
occupied and cultivated the land in question and made plantings on the
same, thereby depriving the plaintiffs—who were themselves ready to
cultivate and plant the said property—of its use and, enjoyment; that
the defendants, despite the fact that they were sowers in bad faith and
therefore not entitled to what they had planted, were harvesting the
products of the land and appropriating them for their own use in
violation of plaintiffs’ rights. The complaint prayed (1) that a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued immediately enjoining all the
defendants and any other adverse occupant from taking and appropriating
for their own use and consumption the palay being harvested from the
land in question for the agricultural year 1955-56, after fixing the
amount of the bond to be executed in favor of the defendants; (2) that
the palay harvested be ordered deposited in any bonded warehouse or any
place deemed convenient; (3) that after trial, a judgment be entered
ordering that the palay harvested from the land in question be
forfeited by defendants in favor of plaintiffs without any right of
indemnity; and (4) that defendants be restrained from further
re-entering and cultivating the land in question.

Answering the complaint, the defendant set up defenses which, as
later supplemented, are to the effect that three of them, namely,
Ruperto Tayao, Gavino Magno and Gregorio Mangulabnan, together with
their co-defendants in the former case, have been in possession either
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, of the land in
question as homesteaders since 1914; that the said land being public
land, they engaged the services of Atty. Teofilo de Jesus, plaintiffs’
predecessor in interest, for the said attorney to secure a free patent
for them on condition that his services would be paid with a portion of
the products of the land, but that the said attorney, instead of
complying with his trust, declared the land in his name for taxation
purposes, had it also surveyed in his name, and instead of claiming the
land for his clients in the Cadastral Case, he filed a claim in his own
name, all this without the knowledge of the defendants, who discovered
the same only recently; that defendants were planters in good faith;
that they had not been legally dispossessed of the land by virtue of an
alias writ of execution obtained by plaintiff; that they have been in
continuous possession of the land in the belief that they have the
right to do so as homesteaders and, also to harvest the same as such;
that there was already a pending case (referring to Civil Case No.
1637) between the same plaintiffs and the three abovenamed defendants,
the rest of their co-defendants, aside from their co-defendants in that
former case,” “being only paid workers and/or harvesters (manggagapas)
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 1637 so that this case is but a
duplication of said Civil Case No. 1637, and therefore, should be
dismissed.” In a supplemental pleading later filed, defendants also set
up the defense that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction
over the case.

At defendants’ instance, a hearing was held on the affirmative
defenses. After said hearing, the court below sustained defendants and
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there is pending another
action involving the same subject matter and issue and that it lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because it is in effect one
for forcible entry within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice of
the Peace Court. From that order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to
this Court.

The appeal is without merit.

Plaintiffs’ complaint in the present case is predicated on the
allegations that defendants, after re-entering the land in question,
cultivated and planted the same in bad faith, thereby forfeiting in
plaintiff’s favor whatever they may have planted. These allegations, it
will be observed, are the same allegations plaintiffs have made in
their motion for contempt, which is still pending hearing, and in their
motion of November 11, 1955 both in the forcible entry case (Civil Case
No. 1637). The two cases involve the same parcel of land and,
apparently, the same, plantings, the acts complained of in the present
action being alleged to have been committed in July, August, and
September, 1955, or before plaintiffs filed their incidental motions in
the forcible entry case. To allow, therefore, the present complaint to
be prosecuted as a separate and independent action would only
encourage, instead of avoid, a multiplicity of suits. As ruled by the
court in the forcible entry case when it acted upon plaintiffs’ motion
of November 11, 1955, the questions of the alleged re-entry and bad
faith on the part of defendants are to be decided in the contempt
proceeding. Obviously, the decision therein will necessarily dispose of
the issues in the present complaint and conclude the controversy
between the parties.

Plaintiffs-appellants argue that they had never asked, as they could
not, for the forfeiture of the palay harvest in the forcible entry case
and that only 3 of the 65 defendants in the present action are
defendants in that case. The contempt proceeding, however, filed by
them in the former case is civil in nature, the object being the
enforcement of their civil rights and remedies. The punishment would,
accordingly, be remedial and for the benefit of the complainants.
(Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271.)
Considering that in said proceedings complete restitution to the
injured party may be decreed (see. 6, Rule 64), and that a judgment,
except in default cases, may grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is tendered is entitled—even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings, or even if the complaint
contains no prayer for relief (Rule 35, sec. 8)—there is no reason why
forfeiture of the palay harvest, if warranted, may not be obtained by
plaintiffs in their favor. At any rate, the contempt proceeding is
still pending. If necessary, pleadings may still be amended to include
the prayer for forfeiture.

As to the alleged non-identity of parties, while only 3 of the 12
defendants in the forcible entry case and 20 of the persons cited for
contempt therein are among the 65 defendants in the present case, it
should be noted that the acts now complained of are the same acts
alleged by plaintiffs in their incidental motions in the said forcible
entry case. It is, therefore, difficult to see, as observed by the
court below, how about 42 new occupants could have come in as to
justify the filing of a new action. On the other hand, we are inclined
to believe that, as alleged in the answer to the complaint, these
additional defendants are mere hired workers or “harvesters (reapers)
of the defendants in the former case and consequently cannot be held
answerable for the palay allegedly harvested. Their inclusion as
defendants in this case, apparently, is but an attempt to circumvent
the proceedings in the forcible entry case, the court having previously
denied plaintiffs’ incidental motion therein to place the harvest in a
bonded warehouse.

In any event, even assuming that the 45 additional defendants are
not mere workers but trespassers and strangers to other defendants, the
allegations in the complaint filed in this case (as held by the court
below), clearly make out an action for forcible entry. Paragraph 5 of
the said complaint alleges that the defendants “without the consent and
against the vigorous objection of the plaintiffs unlawfully and in bad
faith occupied and cultivated the land in question.” To exclude
plaintiffs against their vigorous objection necessarily implies the use
of a certain degree of force and/or intimidation. (Moran’s Rules of
Court, 1957 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 296-297.) And the date of unlawful entry
having been made, according to the complaint, in July, August and
September, 1955, or within one year prior to the filing of the
complaint, the same should therefore be filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court which has exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The fact
that bad faith in planting is alleged and forfeiture of the harvest is
prayed for would not take the complaint outside the jurisdiction of the
Justice of Peace Court.

“* * * where the occupant has built on the land,
especially where said building is substantial and valuable, the courts
even in ejectment cases are bound to take cognizance of said fact and
when they find that the construction or planting had been effected in
good faith, instead of dismissing the complaint and suggesting to the
parties to observe and follow the provisions of Art. 361 or Art. 448 of
the old and the new Civil Code of the Philippines, respectively; and if
they cannot agree, to file a n aw action, not only to enforce or defend
the respective rights of the parties but to assess the value of the
land of the improvement as well, the courts in order to avoid
Multiplicity of actions and to administer practical and speedy justice
may, as was done in this case, apply the provisions of the Civil Code
relative to builders specially since there is no question as to the
ownership of the land as shown by the certificate of title, and the
ownership of the buildings.” (Tayag et al. vs. Yuseco, et al., 97 Phil., 712.)

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.