PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE AND HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 33 AT PILI, CAMARINES SUR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE CO…

In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled “Ernesto N. San Joaquin,
et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.,” this Court is asked to decide
whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is
subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
implementator of the agrarian reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm
for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.

The “WHEREAS” clause of the Resolution states:

“WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a
five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory
centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster
of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center, and other
progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary
scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur
and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;

“WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be
acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program
component;

“WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic)
present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;

“WHEREFORE x x
x.”

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed
as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The
San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to
answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The
trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January 18, 1990.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property
and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b)
that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated
December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to
admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial
court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of
injunction.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the
Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
right of eminent domain. However, the
Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to
non-agricultural land.

Hence this petition.

It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked for: (i) the dismissal of the
complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the
compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the
questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered
the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall
have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to
non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of “public purpose” or “public use” for
which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be
used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before
the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of “public
use”. Under the new concept,
“public use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which
tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of
Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461 [1987]).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit
and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make
available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would
be enhanced. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SCRA 461, “Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and
in sum the general welfare.”

It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its
exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section
65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a
non-agricultural land.

The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the
provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes,
125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism
Authority can expropriate lands covered by the “Operation Land
Transfer” for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be
expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was
affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued
by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was “no need under the facts of
this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to
another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest,” it
upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome
the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort
complex. A fair and reasonable reading
of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the
Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units
exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct.
360). It is also true that in delegating
the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose
certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin
Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be
clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.

Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:

“A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.”

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land
Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non­agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The closest
provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the
intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is
Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:

“SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. – After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application
of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties,
and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion
of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.”

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that
it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it
speaks of “the lapse of five (5) years from its award.”

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4
(k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129 – A, Series of 1987, cannot be the
source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would
be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands
for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to
the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.

Statutes confering the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v.
People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying
for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated
shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real
or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel
Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v.
Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no
matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government
Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign
powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general terms.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the
basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in
expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by
the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez,
183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid
down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to
submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their
property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the
trial court’s order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents’ property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to
obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents’ property from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it
sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss
of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.