RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND TERESITA P. CANSINO, RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari, for having been
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, is the 30 September 1991 Decision of public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)^[1] in
NLRC Case No. NCR-00-01-00160-89. The
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision of 27 April 1989 which in turn
dismissed the private respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner solely on the ground of laches.^[2]

The dispositive portion of the public respondent’s challenged
decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated 27 April
1989 is hereby REVERSED; the judgment rendered therein dismissing the
above-entitled complaint is hereby SET ASIDE; and, judgment is hereby rendered
DECLARING illegal and without valid cause the dismissal of complainant Teresita
P. Cansino from RCPI employment and ORDERING Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. to reinstate her without loss of seniority and to pay her the
aforestated total amount of FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY FIVE AND
17/100 PESOS (P57,195.17) representing her backwages for three (3) years,
without qualification or deduction.

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

The material operative facts disclosed by the pleadings of the
parties and the appealed decision are not disputed.

Private respondent Teresita P. Cansino was the petitioner’s
employee from May of 1975 until 23 November 1985, when she was terminated from
her employment. At the time of her
termination, Teresita was a Teletype counter-clerk at the petitioner’s
sub-counter at Farmer’s Plaza, Cubao, Quezon City.

It appears that on 5 November 1985, the petitioner issued a
memorandum to the private respondent placing the latter under preventive
suspension for (a) alleged cash shortages in the amount of P174.00 representing
the collections for 4 and 8 October 1985, (b) withholding thirteen (13)
telegrams and (c) altering dates of receipts and the filing dates of
telegrams. Teresita was also ordered to
explain within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum why her
services should not be terminated for misappropriating company funds and
withholding messages for transmission.^[4]

On 7 November 1985, private respondent submitted her explanation.^[5]

Thereupon, the petitioner’s Vice-President for Resources, Nilo G.
Palabrica, sent the private respondent on 23 November 1985 a second memorandum
this time dismissing her from the service.^[6]
Pursuant, however, to the provisions of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, the matter was first submitted to a grievance machinery composed of
a representative of the petitioner and the bargaining representative of the
employee. The union sought the private
respondent’s reinstatement for humanitarian considerations.^[7]
Consequently, since no favorable action resulted from the last meeting held on
14 December 1988, the private respondent filed on 10 January 1989 a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the petitioner with the National Capital Region
Branch of the NLRC.^[8]
The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-00-01-00160-89.

Appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, with the parties
submitting their evidence via position papers, were held before Labor Arbiter
Cornelio L. Linsangan. On 27 April
1989, the latter rendered a decision which, as earlier stated, dismissed the
complaint on the ground of laches. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:

“While we are not inclined to sustain the validity of
complainant’s dismissal for we find her infractions as not too serious enough
to merit a supreme penalty, yet we deeply regret that we can not rule in her
favor.

We agree with respondents that complainant is guilty of laches, if
at all her cause of action has not prescribed as yet. Complainant slept on her right too long. As cited in respondent’s rejoinder, the
Supreme Court has ruled that an employee who filed his claim for reinstatement
only after the lapse of seventeen (17) months after his dismissal, is guilty of
laches (national Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-21675, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 134).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
above-entitled complaint.”^[9]

Only the private respondent appealed the said decision to the
public respondent NLRC.

On 30 September 1991, the
NLRC promulgated its decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. In declaring illegal the dismissal of the
private respondent and ordering her reinstatement with backwages for three (3)
years, the NLRC held, firstly, that the private respondent was not guilty of
laches because her case was submitted to the grievance machinery which had its
last deliberation on 14 December 1988, and the complaint for illegal dismissal
was filed on 10 January 1989, or after the lapse of only thirty-eight (38) days
from such deliberation. Secondly, it
found:

“x x x only minimal support for the alleged shortages of x x x P131.00 and P43.00, x x x and manipulation through
non-observance of consecutive issuance of cash telegram receipts and altering filing dates of telegrams and/or cash receipts; absent a
showing from the record, viz:

(a)   copy of report of the auditor making the
findings on P131.00 and P43.00 shortages;

(b)   copy of even only one of the aforestated cash
telegram receipt, relative to its manipulation;

(c)   copy of even only one of the telegrams so
filed and/or of the cash receipts relative to their alteration;”^[10]

Thirdly, it observed that:

“x x x the record fails to support misappropriation of
company funds (in the absence of the factual report of the auditing officer
respecting the P131.00 and P43.00 ‘shortages’), failure to strictly observe company policy on proper cash handling and standard accounting procedure (in the absence of the formulated company
policy thereon), alteration/ falsification of company
records (in the absence of specific cash receipt, telegram filed, or
other similar record.”^[11]

It then concluded that the private
respondent has been “nothing more than a ‘counter clerk’” for ten (10)
years and her alleged gross dishonesty, negligence or loss of trust and
confidence had been only shown “as being incidental to clerical clearing
of telegrams filed for transmission, which is her main
function/responsibility.” The petitioner failed to present proof of her
specific duties and responsibilities as a “counter clerk.”

Dissatisfied with the public respondent’s decision, petitioner
filed this special civil action for certiorari. In support of its grievance that the public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion, it alleges that the private respondent (a)
committed acts of dishonesty warranting her dismissal; she should not be
reinstated; and (b) applying National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs.
Court of Industrial Relations,^[12] is guilty of laches in that although
she was dismissed on 23 November 1985, she filed her complaint for illegal
dismissal only on 10 January 1989.

After both the public and private respondents filed their
separate comments to the petition as required in our Resolution of 13 January
1992, and the petitioner its reply to the comment of the public respondent, we,
in the Resolution of 8 June 1992, gave due course to the petition; required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda; and finally issued a temporary
restraining order after the petitioner put up a cash bond of P57,195.70.

Some novel issues set forth in the instant petition need to be
addressed. For one, the petitioner
squarely raises the issue of laches on the part of the private respondent. Furthermore, the public respondent submits
that since the petitioner did not appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision, it
is now estopped from questioning the latter’s findings that the validity of the
private respondent’s dismissal cannot be sustained for her infractions were not
too serious to merit the supreme penalty of dismissal.

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case render a bit
ludicrous the claim of laches. As
earlier pointed out, the private respondent was dismissed on 23 November
1985. The matter of her dismissal was
then referred to the grievance machinery which had a final meeting on 14
December 1988. The complaint for
illegal dismissal was subsequently filed on 10 January 1989. The aforesaid referral was initiated
pursuant to a provision in the existing collective bargaining agreement. Such a provision was incorporated in
compliance with then Article 262 of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442, as amended)
which provided:

“ART. 262. Grievance machinery. -? Whenever a grievance arises from the
interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement, including
disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer
and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance
procedure as provided herein does not apply, grievances shall be subject to
negotiation, conciliation or
arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code.”

This article has undergone substantial
amendments, the last of which was by Section 26 of R.A. No. 6715 which, aside
from renumbering the provision (as Article 260), describes with particularity
the details of a grievance machinery.

In a very real sense, the aforementioned referral could be
considered as a part of appellate procedure. Hence, it may be asserted that the pendency of the matter thus referred
may even affect the ripeness of a cause of action for illegal dismissal in that
when parties submit to the grievance procedure, the institution of a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, prior to the grievance
machinery’s having resolved the referred matter, would be premature. It therefore follows that the private
respondent’s waiting until after 14 December 1988 before seeking redress for
her dismissal was not thereby diminished or impaired by laches. Laches is the “failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.“^[13] The defense of laches “is not dependent
on the existence of a statutory period of limitation. It can be invoked without reckoning any specific or fixed period;
it is sufficient that there be an unreasonable and unexplained delay in
bringing the action that its maintenance would already constitute inequity or
injustice to the party claiming
it.”^[14] For laches to be present, four (4) important
elements must concur, viz.: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the
complaint is made and for which
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.^[15]
In the instant case, it cannot be said
that there was delay — undue or otherwise — on the part of the private
respondent in filing the complaint because she had merely awaited the final
outcome of the grievance machinery. She
could not have instituted the complaint for illegal dismissal prior to such
final determination because if she did, her suit would have been
premature. Her grievance remained very
much in active status and the petitioner was fully cognizant of such fact. She could not, therefore, be charged with
laches. Such a conclusion is further
supported by the fact that since the petitioner was itself a party in the
grievance proceedings, it was well aware that any disposition on the matter
that was unfavorable to the private respondent would, in all probability, be
met with the latter’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Elsewise stated, it cannot be gainsaid that
the petitioner was in no way led to believe that the private respondent would
not have taken any further action to protect her rights in the event that the
results of the grievance procedure would be adverse to her.

Finally, no injustice or inequity would have been caused to the
petitioner by the maintenance of the action which was filed within a reasonable
time after the final action of the grievance machinery. It should be noted that given the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the delay, for the purpose of determining
the existence of laches, must be reckoned from the final act of the grievance
machinery. A contrary view would only
serve to defeat the very purpose of the grievance procedure.

The petitioner’s reliance on National Shipyards and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) vs. Court of
Industrial Relations^[16] is
misplaced. In that case, this Court
categorically ruled that the NASSCO is a corporation owned and controlled by
the government and that the private respondent therein, Domingo de Jesus — ­employed
by NASSCO as a welder — belonged to the unclassified service and was covered
by the Civil Service Law. Being a
government employee, de Jesus should have instituted his court action for
reinstatement within one (1) year from his removal or separation.^[17] Since he filed his action only after the lapse of
seventeen (17) months from the date of such separation, we declared the same to
be barred by laches.

On the other hand, we do not agree with the public respondent’s
theory that since the petitioner did not appeal from the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, it is bound by the said Arbiter’s conclusion that the infractions
committed by the private respondent were not too serious to merit the penalty
of dismissal. The Labor Arbiter did not
evaluate the evidence for the parties or make findings of fact. His three (3) page decision merely refers to
the suspension letter of 5 November 1985 and its contents, the private
respondent’s subsequent letter of explanation, the petitioner’s 23 November
1985 letter of dismissal and the respective conclusions of the parties with
respect to the legality or illegality of the dismissal.

With respect, however, to the public respondent’s findings of
fact and conclusion that the private respondent’s dismissal was illegal, we
find the same to be correct. No
sufficient evidence was presented to
support the grounds relied upon for the private respondent’s dismissal. The petitioner’s evidence simply shows minor
infractions committed without malice, dishonest motive or bad faith. On the other hand, the private respondent’s
explanation, submitted immediately within the 24-hour period unilaterally given
by the petitioner in its 5 November 1985 order of preventive suspension,
is convincing enough to absolve her of any ascribed malice, dishonest motive or
bad faith and show that no material damage was inflicted upon the
petitioner. As quoted in the assailed
decision, her explanation reads:

“x x x 1) Regarding the cash shortage amounting to P131.00 I have
an error in writing
the amount in my cash transfer. I just
noticed it when I’m (sic) preparing my October 6, statistical report, so I
included it on (sic) my Saturday and Sunday cash collection and deposited in
the following day I have already deposited the money
before the auditor conducted an audit last October 7/85. But before the auditor cash
count (sic) the money I totalled my collection first because I have an (sic)
extra coins on (sic) my collections so (sic) happened that I did not notice
that the morning shift counter clerk already tear (sic) the yellow receipts
which I have not included in my total. After the audit, the auditor told me that I have a shortage of P43.00 I
told him that I will just cover the shortage. So before the auditor leaves (sic) the
office I have (sic) already covered said shortage.

2. Those 13
telegrams was (sic) filed October 24 and dated October 25, because that was
received after the last pick-up of the
pick-up courier, but we have an agreement with the
customers that their telegram will be
pick (sic) up tomorrow
(Oct. 25) lunch time and may be delivered next day
because I intend to send the telegram when I arrived the following day because the
reliever might be confused of (sic) the telegram
that I will leave knowing that she’s only new.

3. Regarding
the eleven telegrams left, I have totalled my
collection earlier as 6:30 p.m., so that when the pick-up courier arrives at
7:00 p.m., I will just give him the telegrams including my score, because I
have many works (sic) to do, being the acting incharge (sic) of that
sub-counter, the relievers assigned in our sub-counter do not file their
telegrams, starting the first date of the month. I also arranged some other files like duplicate (sic) of DRMH,
statistical reports, service and the bank slip deposit. With regards (sic) to the cash collections
of those telegrams, I just kept it intact, because I cannot just leave
it on the drawer because the steel
cabinet was transferred to the main office
for repair and besides the Farmers sub-counter is very easy to
open. x x x”^[18]

In view of the private respondent’s continuous service of ten
(10) years with the petitioner, the penalty of dismissal for the minor
infractions would be unduly harsh and grossly disproportionate. While the authority of employers to
discipline their employees is recognized and protected by law, it by no means
follows that there exist no restrictions to guide its exercise, for both the
Constitution^[19]
and the law^[20]
guarantee employees security of tenure. Thus, employees may be dismissed only in the manner provided by law;
moreover, such a penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission
imputed to the employee and imposed in connection with the employer’s
disciplinary authority.

Finally, the requirements of due process in dismissal cases were
not faithfully observed by the petitioner. While it is true that it served upon the private respondent the written charge against her via the 5
November 1985 order of preventive suspension, no hearing was conducted after
she had submitted her explanation. She
was peremptorily dismissed effective 21 November 1985 pursuant to the
petitioner’s 23 November 1985 letter of dismissal. The relevant portions of Article 278^[21]
of the Labor Code, as amended by Sections 13 and 14 of B.P. Blg. 130, read:

“ART. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions.

x x x

(b) Subject to the constitu­tional right of
workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just or authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement
of notice under Article 284 of this Code, the clearance to terminate employment
shall no longer be necessary.

However, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes
for termination and shall afford the latter himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to
the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The burden
of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest
on the employer. The Ministry may
suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the case in the
event of a prima facie finding
by the Ministry that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in
implementation of a mass lay-off.”

From the above provision and Rule XIV, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, it may be observed that it is not enough that the
employee be served with two (2) written notices, viz.: (a) the notice stating the particular acts
or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal and (b) the notice of
the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reasons therefor.^[22]
The employee must also be afforded the opportunity to be heard and defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. Section 5 of the aforesaid Rule XIV reads:

“SEC. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt
of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.”

In the instant case, aside from the fact that no hearing was
conducted, the private respondent was deprived of a reasonable time within
which to answer the charge for, as earlier adverted to, she was given only
twenty-four (24) hours to submit her explanation. In the light of the nature of the preferred charges — which
would have certainly required repeated reference to documents probably already
in the petitioner’s possession — and the fact that the assistance of a lawyer
appeared indispensable for the full protection of the private respondent’s
right in view of the possible loss of her only source of livelihood, it is
difficult to believe that the petitioner itself did not perceive the 24-hour
deadline to be unjust, unreasonable and oppressive. It would seem that its swift action was a clear manifestation of
its unequivocal decision to dismiss her and the explanation it required of her
a mere cover-up to clothe the entire episode with a semblance of due
process. This is highly condemnable for
it mocks the statutory requirements and administrative guidelines to ensure due
process.

We have held in a number of cases that the aforesaid requirements
of due process are mandatory^[23] and
constitute conditions sine qua non for
the valid dismissal of employees.^[24]

It is thus clear that the public respondent committed no grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Second Division. Annex “A” of Petition;
Rollo, 16-34.

^[2]
Id., 27.

^[3]
Rollo, 34.

^[4]
Id., 5, 45.

^[5]
Rollo, 46-47.

^[6]
Id., 48.

^[7]
Id., 87.

^[8]
Id., 26.

^[9]
Rollo, 79.

^[10]
Rollo, 31.

^[11]
Id., 31-32.

^[12]
20 SCRA 134 [1967].

^[13]
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35 [1968].

^[14]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Cruz, 31 SCRA 819, 823 [1970].

^[15]
Go Chi Gun vs. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 [1955]; Mejia de Lucas vs.
Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956]; Vergara vs. Vergara, 5 SCRA 53 [1962];
Maneclang vs. Baun, 208 SCRA 179 [1992].

^[16]
Supra, footnote no. 12.

^[17]
Citing Alipio vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-17336, 26 December 1963; Morales
vs. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-21280, 30 April 1965.

^[18]
Rollo, 23-24.

^[19]
Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution; Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

^[20]
Title I, Book VI, Labor Code, as amended.

^[21]
This is now Article 277, with amendments introduced by R.A. No. 6715.

^[22]
Sections 2 and 6, Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations.

^[23]
National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 [1988]; Tingson vs.
NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; Marina Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 193 SCRA
420 [1991]; De Vera vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 439 [1991]; Salaw vs.
NLRC, 202 SCRA 7 [1991].

^[24]
Ruffy vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 365 [1990].