THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, AND GRANDY N. TRIESTE, PETITIONERS, VS. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY AND THE MUNICIPALITY …

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District v. Hon.
Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990,^[1]
the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles
for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the
public streets.  It was there also
observed that even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations
was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to
be imposed by the Commission.  No motion
for reconsideration of that decision was submitted.  The judgment became final and executory on
August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on
July 13, 1990.

Subsequently, the following developments transpired:

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira
complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic
violation, his driver’s license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de
los Reyes in Quezon City.

On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators
Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision
in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation
of their driver’s licenses, and where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991,
from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver’s
license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in
Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991,
from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver’s license
by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was
received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N.
Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license
plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations
Center and the confiscation of his driver’s license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of
the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan
D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong,
authorizing the confiscation of driver’s licenses and the removal of license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.

For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste’s
driver’s license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the
District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National
Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National
Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never
authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and
that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision
in a memorandum, copy of which he attached entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle
License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong
decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation
of driver’s licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself “to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.”

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter
alia that:

Section 2.  Authority to
Detach Plate/Tow and Impound.  The
Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operations Center, is
authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.

The provision appears to be in conflict
with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA
432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be
detached except only under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43.  Additionally, the
Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police
authorities of driver’s licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction
is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under
PD 1605.

To clarify these matters for the proper
guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court Resolved to
require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit,
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in
light of the said decision.

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila
Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392.  It particularly cited Section 2 thereof
vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:

1.  Formulation of policies on the delivery of
basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and

2.  Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances
of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services
requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers.  (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the
decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not
supplant the latter.  It stressed that
the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in
the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was
enacted.  The Authority also pointed out
that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its
validity.

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power.  The flaw in
the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does
not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.  He made no mention, however, of
the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a
formal challenge to its validity.

On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to
remove once and for all the uncertainty of their validity.  A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in
question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy
before the Court.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the
doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct
action and not collaterally.  That is
indeed the settled principle.  However,
that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional
circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have
created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on
the questioned sanctions.  More
importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of
law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped.  We also note the disturbing report that one
policeman who confiscated a driver’s license dismissed the Gonong decision as
“wrong” and said the police would not stop their “habit” unless they received
orders “from the top.” Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a
formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are
lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the
problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than
dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus,
through its inaction, allow them to fester.

The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial
precedent.  Unquestionably, the Court has
the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as
expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
“pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.”^[2]
In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest
of substantial justice, which otherwise may
be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such
rules.

The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably
Araneta v. Dinglasan,^[3]
where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that “the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.”

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.  Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. 
(Aznar III v. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time
and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require.  In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the
case.  (Piczon v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 31.)

Three of the cases were
consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other
dates.  Inasmuch as all of them present
the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be
disposed of jointly.  For the same reason
we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of
the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question
whether prohibition lies in cases G.R.
Nos. L-2044 and L-2756.  No practical
benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the
petitioners’ cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not
in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others.  Above all, the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.  (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)

Accordingly, the Court will consider the
motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan
Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.  Stephen A. Monsanto,
Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered
co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of
Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents.  This petition is docketed as G.R. No.
102782.  The comments already submitted
are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution
of the substantive issues raised.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage
procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice. 
If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the
failure of the proper parties to file
the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of
resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues
raised.

Now to the merits.

The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11-Series of
1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in the Local Government Code.^[4]
It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and
convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative
power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such
delegation are present.  These requisites
are:  1) the completeness of the statute
making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.^[5]

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the
legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate
will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it.  What only can be delegated is not the
discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine
how the law shall be enforced.  This has
been done in the case at bar.

As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in
accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the delegation from
running riot.” This requirement has also been met.  It is settled that the “convenience and
welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case
at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s
authority.^[6]

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation
of legislative power.  The question we
must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments
acting only as agents of the national legislature.  Necessarily, the acts of these agents must
reflect and conform to the will of their principal.  To test the validity of such acts in the
specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:  1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 7) must be general and consistent with public policy.^[7]

A careful study of the Gonong decision
will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. 
The pertinent law is PD 1605.  PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. 
There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority)
to impose such sanctions:

Section 1.  The Metropolitan
Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline
drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan
Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed.  For this purpose, the powers of the Land
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws
over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.  When the
proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver’s license
or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or
its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate.  The suspended or revoked driver’s license or
the report of suspension of revocation of the certificate of public convenience
shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of
Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.

x          x          x

Section 3.  Violations of
traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a
twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows:  P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the
second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of
driver’s license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the
driver’s license for the fifth offense: 
Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher
penalties as it may deem
proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of
certain public roads, streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.

x          x          x

Section 5.  In case of
traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated but the
erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission
which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation
and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where
the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine
Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of
the citation ticket.

If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement
agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate
proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic
court, city or municipal court.

If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records
show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver’s license shall not be renewed
until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.

x          x          x

Section 8.  Insofar as the Metropolitan
Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.  (Emphasis
supplied).

In fact, the above
provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.  The Commission was allowed to “impose fines and otherwise discipline”
traffic violators only “in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein
prescribed,” that is, by the decree itself. 
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree
or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.  Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides
that “in case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be
confiscated.” These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan
Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The
requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself.  Local political subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself).^[8]
They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation.  As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal.  In
the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.

The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance is worth noting.  Curiously, it
is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority,
that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned
sanction.

In Villacorta v. Bernardo,^[9]
the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City
for being violative of the Land Registration Act.  The decision held in part:

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo
declared:

“From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that
would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance.  Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts
with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision
plans to be submitted to the City
Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the
General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act.  Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot
subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question
also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not
mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the
Register of Deeds allows registration
of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a
penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose.  In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of
Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.

x             x          x

“The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in
bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the
government.  But as already intimated
above, the powers of the board in
enacting such a laudable
ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights
granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local
ordinance.”

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing
them.  Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to
prevent bigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall
fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom
of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. 
The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of
PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
actually prohibits.  In so doing, the
ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD 1605
applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. 
It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 4136
on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic
rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed, including
those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with
the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective
reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators.  At the same time, it must also reiterate the
public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such
sanctions, including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision.  At any rate, the fact is that
there is no statutory authority for – and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against – the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
Manila area.  Hence, regardless of their
merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of
the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own
discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a
statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. 
Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit
the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver’s licenses as well for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and
VOID; and

(2) enjoining all
law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating
driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., no part.

^[1]
En Banc.  187 SCRA 432.

^[2]
Constitution, Article VIII, Section
5(5).

^[3]
84 Phil. 368.

^[4]
R.A. 7160, Title One, Chapter 2,
Section 16.

^[5]
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15
SCRA 569.

^[6]
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil.
726.

^[7]
U.S. v. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165.

^[8]
Article X, Section 5.

^[9]
143 SCRA 480.