G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ANTIQUE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, RESPONDENTS.
NOCON, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office
of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of
the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the
Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
November 22, 1991 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney’s
Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service[1]
dated February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989,” when in
truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five
(5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for
decision. Respondent Abiera further
alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the
months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the
months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17)
months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over said case despite this Court’s ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan,[2] since the offense charged arose
from the judge’s performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty of supervision over
all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner’s basic
argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a
judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner
that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on
the powers granted to it by the Constitution,[3] for
such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts
and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of
his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such
a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its
records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.[4]
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this
case. Administratively, the question
before Us is this: should a judge,
having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before
him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised
with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the
present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a judge or other
court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss
the complaint filed by public
respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
[1]
New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1986.
[2]
L-50508-11, 139 SCRA 252 (1985).
[3]
The Order of September 18, 1991, in denying petitioner’s ex-parte motion
to refer the case to the Supreme Court, cited Article XI, section 13 (1) and
(2), which provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on
compliant be any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at it
own instance, any public official or employee of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
[4]
Rollo, p. 19.