SPOUSES AGOSTO MUNOZ AND ROSARIO MUNOZ, SPS. JESSIE (JESUS) CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND APOLONIA FABIAN, ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR. HONORIO Y…

This case has its origin from a complaint^[1] for
unlawful detainer filed by Nicolas P. Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15,
1988 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol,
Pampanga. The complainant alleged that
he is a co-owner of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 2790 of
Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of
Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same municipality; that he and his co-owners
acquired the lot by succession from their deceased father, Pedro B. Garcia who
died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot is tenanted by Loreto Garcia; that the
defendants (herein petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of the
lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners; that he sent letters of
demand on June 6, 1988 asking the defendants to remove their houses from the
lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the
demands made by him, the defendants refused to vacate their houses (pp. 21-22,
CA Records).

In their answer, (pp. 44-47, CA Records), the defendants denied
the allegations of Nicolas Garcia and alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is
already deemed the owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27. The answering defendants also invoked the
following alternative defenses, among others: (1) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the
case being an accion publiciana which is
exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court; (2) no prior conciliation before the Lupong Tagapayapa; (3) misjoinder
of parties since defendants occupy lots distinct from each other; (4) that the
different lots they are occupying form part of the shore of a navigable river
and partly the shoulder of a public road, hence, of public ownership; (5) that they
are farmworkers of the lot, and are entitled to security of tenure on the land
pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657 and that they had erected their houses and had
continuously resided on the premises in issue since 1976 or for a period of twelve years before the filing of
the complaint.

After the issues had been joined, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court heard the case under the Rules on Summary Procedure and decided the case
on the basis of the position papers of the parties.

On December 7, 1988, the municipal court rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiff Nicolas Garcia, the
dispositive portion of which states:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering:

1) The defendants
and all persons claiming rights under them to remove their houses from Lot 2790
of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D, Macabebe Cadastre, situated at
Saplad David, Caduang Tete, Macabebe, Pampanga; and to surrender the possession
of the same to the plaintiff;

2) Every defendant
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) attorney’s
fees; and

3) Every defendants
to pay One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) reasonable monthly rental of the land
occupied by said defendants from the filing of the complaint on August 15, 1988
up to the time the possession of the land occupied by said defendants is
vacated plus the costs.” (pp. 72-73, CA Records).

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court found that the plaintiff is one
of the co-owners of Lot 2790 of Subdivision Plan Cad. 378-D of Macabebe
Cadastre, consisting of five (5) hectares. As such, he had every right to exercise his rights as owner and
possessor of the property and to demand the removal of defendants’ houses. The Municipal Court added that while the
defendants assert that the premises is of public ownership considering that their
houses occupy a part of a shore of a navigable river and part of the shoulder
of the public road, this
assertion runs counter to the very
claim of defendants that they are farmhands in the landholding for more than 12
years. Finally, the Municipal Court
also held that since the issue involved in the case is mere possession and the
defendants did not claim ownership, therefore, unlawful detainer is the proper
action for plaintiff’s recovery of possession.

The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court which
reversed the decision of the municipal court and dismissed the complaint. The Regional Trial Court held that:

“From all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds that
plaintiff-appellee fails to establish his proof of prior physical possession
over the land subject matter of this case where the respective houses of the
defendants-appellants were erected, considering that the case at bar only deals
with possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court also believes that the subject matter of this Court is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Macabebe, Masantol-Macabebe, Pampanga is hereby
reversed. The said case is dismissed with
costs against the plaintiff.” (p. 82, CA Records)

On June 27, 1989, Nicolas Garcia filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court’s decision. The reconsideration sought was denied by
order of the same court dated October 11, 1989.

Nicolas Garcia filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals which rendered a decision on August 6, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19154
reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
reinstating the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The reconsideration sought by the defendants
before the appellate court was denied on November 11, 1991.

Hence, this petition.

The principal question for resolution in this petition is whether
or not the complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer or an accion publiciana. In the latter case, the Regional Trial Court
and not the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
try the complaint.

The petitioner is of the view that with the following allegations
in the complaint, to wit:

“2. That the plaintiff is a co-owner of an
agricultural land located at Saplad, David, Macabebe, Pampanga identifed as lot
no. 2790, of the Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378­-D, Macabebe, Cadastre, x x x;

“x x x.

“4. That the aforesaid agricultural land is
presently tenanted by one farmer in the name of Loreto Garcia with an area of
more than five (5) hectares;

“5. That the defendants have constructed their
houses on a portion of the said lot no. 2790 without the knowledge and consent
of his co-owners;

“6. That the plaintiff has sent the defendants demand letters dated June 6, 1988
asking said defendants to remove their houses from the said lot within a period
of fifteen (15) days from their receipt of said letters, x x x.” (pp.
21-22, Records)

the complaint which the private
respondent filed before the municipal court was an accion publiciana
and not one for unlawful detainer as he had captioned it. An accion publiciana is
exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not by the Municipal
Court.

For his part, the
private respondent alleged that the action which he filed before the municipal
court was an action for unlawful detainer. The demand to vacate dated June 6, 1988 which was served upon the
petitioners was well within the one (1) year period required by the rules for
the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer the jurisdiction of
which belongs to the municipal trial court.

The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may
be distinguished from each other, as follows:

“4. x x x

“a. In forcible entry, the possession of the
land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession
thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful
detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes
illegal by reason of the termination of
his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the
plaintiff (Dikit v. Icasiano, 89 Phil. 44).

“b. In forcible entry, the law does not require
a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in
nature (Sec. 2; Medel v. Militante, 41 Phil. 44).

“c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove
that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived
thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have
been in prior physical possession (Maddamu
v. Judge, 74 Phil. 230; Aguilar v. Cabrera, 74 Phil. 666; Banayos v. Susana
Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30, 1976: Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, et al. L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980).

“d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the
date of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of
last demand (Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., L-22984, Mar. 27, 1968) or
last letter of demand (DBP v. Canonoy, L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; Calibayan v.
Pascual, L-22645, Sept. 18, 1967; Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc., L-20330, Dec.
22, 1966). (Regalado, Florenz D.,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, 5th Revised Edition, pp. 503-504)

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as
“unlawful detainer.” However, the private respondent alleged therein
that from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was
stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned
premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his
co-owners. This allegation clearly
characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and not for unlawful
detainer.

The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry
are: First, who had actual possession
over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the
filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the restoration of his possession? (Dizon v. Concina, et al., G.R. No. L-23756,
December 27, 1969).

There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper
of the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of
the property. There was an allegation
that the property “is presently tenanted” but it did not state when
the tenant started to possess the
property. While it is true that
possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the
complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of
the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained
possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this
entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the
private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the start of the counting of the one
year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started,
the action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria
in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) (Sarona et al.,
v. Villegas, et al., supra).

The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is
one for unlawful detainer. It failed to
consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in
unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such
possession or until the possessor does or
fails to do an act which
makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the
private respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot
change the nature of the latter’s possession of the property and convert the
former’s action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent appellate court likewise
erred in applying in this case the doctrine that – “a person who occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them” – because,
as We have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception
as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas,
G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1257:

“But will this rule as to tolerance hold true in a case where
there was forcible entry at the start, but the lawful possessor did not attempt
to oust the intruder for over one year, and only thereafter filed forcible
entry suit following demand to vacate?

“x x x.

“A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
‘tolerance’ confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer – not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for
two reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior
court – provided for in the rules. If
one year from the forcible entry is allowed
to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior
court. Second, if a forcible entry
action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a
plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in – and summarily throw him
out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in
mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are summary in nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action.

“It is well to remember that after the lapse of the one year
period, suit must be started in the Court of First Instance in an accion
publiciana.

It is also the contention of petitioners that private
respondents’ claim of ownership had no basis. He should have at least, introduced muniments of title to show the
extent and character of his possession. Moreover, mere allegations of ownership does not ipso facto entitle a
person to possession of the property claimed.

The main issue in an action for forcible entry and detainer is
one of priority of possession. If the
plaintiff can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession
even from the owner. This rule however
has no application in this case. It is
true that the private respondent in this case claimed that he is one of the
co-owners of the lot in question. However, he has not presented any evidence in support of such claim of
ownership by virtue of which he
is entitled to its possession. Moreover, he had not shown nor claimed in his complaint that he was in
prior possession of the property. On
the contrary, it is the petitioners who claimed possession of the property for
more than twelve years.

If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof was
deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his claim
before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion
reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be
wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve
(12) years through a summary action for ejectment.

“Although admittedly
petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title
it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria. (German Management and Services Inc. v. CA, 76216-17, September 14, 1988, 177 SCRA 495,
499)

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo,
JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 80 (20).